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CHAPTER 4 
ILLUSTRATING THE NEWS 
Ha~ilton and the Period of Stability 
The period between Hamilton's appointment in August 1949 and 
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1961, the point at which this thesis ends, saw a marked decrease in 
direct political attempts to influence news policy and the end of 
dissension within the department. Journalists rallied arotmd Hamilton 
as the focus of Departmental and professional loyalties. The period of 
divided loyalties between Cotton and Dixon was over, and the new 
Editor-in-Chief became the sole interpreter and arbiter on Commission 
news policy. With the decline of Dixon and the defeat of Labor at the 
polls in 1949, the old ties between Departmer.tal staff and influential 
Labor politicians were broken. At last the Commission could look 
forward to a period when it could rely on its policies being carried 
out by the News Department without argument and without coaflict of 
interest. 
Hamil ton in his first seven years, say eye to eye with Boyer and 
his Commissioners on matters concerning news. He irrq:>ressed the 
Commission with his dedication, his ideas and the enthusiasm he 
generated among his staff. Soon so much confidence was placed in him, 
that all but the most routine ne~<s decisions disappeared from Commission 
agenda. He was left very much to his own devices, as Dixon had been 
many years be fore. The difference however was that Hami 1 ton was 
committed to putting Commission policy into practice, whereas Dixon hac\ 
been largely left to formulate his mm approach to news-gathering. 
Up to 1956, while working within Conunission guidelines, he had 
imposed a new professional code, partly based on his long years with 
newspapers. It was marked by a distinct dislike far over-reliance on 
tho Government and a more rigid concept of' impartiality'. These met with 
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Commission approval. In fact, his standing could not have been higher. 
It came as a great shock therefore to Boyer and the Commission when, 
after television began in Australia in 1956, Hamilton became a tough 
and uncompromising opponent of their policy on TV news. Led by Boyer, 
the Commission decreed that there should be minimal illustration of the 
news on television, in order to preserve what they saw as essential 
news values. Hamilton and his TV news staff on the other hand saw this 
as an unwarranted slur on their professionalism and an impediment to 
their use of the facilities of the new medium to their best advantage. 
The conflict lasted into the early 1 sixties and proved a 
substantial barrier to the acquisition of new techniques of news 
reporting and production. Eventually the Commission had to tacitly 
admit that it had gone too far and that implementation of the programme 
based on its policy of minimal illustration was impossible. In this 
chapter, there will be an examination of the reasons for the eventual 
failure of this, the third major news policy initiative of the Commission 
since 1942 - the others being the newspaper agreements of 1943 and 1946 
and the news policy Directive of 1946 - and also an evaluation of the 
influence of Hamil ton. 
The i\tti tude of the Liberal-Countr)' Party Coalition 
---
Although the Cmmnissi.on had satisfied itself that Hamilton was the 
outstanding candidate for the position of Editor-in-Chief and had further 
convincvd itself of his suitability by discreet enquiries, there was 
still son1c nervoUS'1CSS about his capacity for meeting the challenge of 
h . . . 1 1s new pos>tlon. As controversy had clung to the previous heads of 
·------------
J. Oakley says "a 'J oak 1 from the top was that my appointment 
[as Assistant Editor-in-Chief] was made as a 'steadying' influence 
in case too much change was att..::mptcd too soon". Letter from 
Oakley to the writer, 20 July 19:1.6. 
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news. like a shroud, its nervousness was perhaps understandable. 
Although news seemed to be far less a matter of contention with the 
Government than it had been, a new nervousness had developed with the 
ever-increasing possibility of a Labor defeat in the December 
election and the return of the Liberal-Cotmtry Party coalition under 
Menzies. 
The Commission was uneasy about this prospect because it was 
unsure about the effect of its independent service on the Opposition 
parties. Since 1945 Boyer had embarked upon a policy designed to rid 
the news service of the suspicion that it was merely a mouthpiece of the 
Government, and therefore to avoid the possibility of a backlash from 
the conservative parties when they returned to power. He had fought 
a tough but successful campaign to wrest control of his News Department 
away from the Dixon-Hanlon-Amour group and enforce survivalist 
principles of 'impartiality' . He had survived the close scrutiny of 
the Labor Government while doing this which became finally convinced of 
his basic attachment to the principles of 'straight' independent news-
gathering. But the attitude of the Opposition parties remained something 
of a mystery. 
They had criticised the establishment of the independent service 
in 1946 for either the unwarranted cost or the fact that it would 
continue to be a tool of the Labor Party, Rumblings continued to be 
heard but rather infrequently from Opposition benches. In 1949 
uncertainty continued about their attitude. On 10 February, Menzies's 
comment on the release of the Fit zgcral d Ct•nmi. ttee report was negative 
but not hostile. He said: "1 have yet tc lo~ convinced that the 
independent news service is anything hut a duplication of existing nC\;s 
services". 2 On 13 October, however, the Liberal member H01;ard Beale 
-------- -·--------··--··---------- ------------
2. A quotation from a news conference by Menzies 10 February 1949 
contained in a telegram Commins to Moses of the same da.te. SP613, 
Box 3, 1/8/1. 
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made a savage attack alleging that the ABC news was not sufficiently 
'objective, 'detached' and 'impartial'. Ministers' names occurred 
too frequently, he claimed, and "we have all noticed from time to time, 
this subtle influence in the broadcasts of news and other items, which give 
(sic) quite a Government slant" .3 Beale said he did not blame the ABC, but 
the Labor Party "who are trying to destroy the impartiality of that 
organisation". 4 This did not herald any Opposition campaign to 
disband the independent service and neither the ABC nor its news were 
issues during the election campaign. Instead, what little was said 
about broadcasting on hustings which were overwhelmingly dominated by 
the issue of communism, was related to the new Control Board. The 
Liberal-Country Parties would curb its powers. 
If the Commission was uncertain about the future of its news 
service under Menzies, some of its news staff were very worried. Harris 
noted this. He reported: "In a number of cases, efficient journalists 
have expressed doubt to me as to the security of their positions, 
particularly if political changes took place". 5 He consequently urged 
that state News Editors should be able to join the permanent staff so 
that they would be spared the worry of possible sacking. The Commission 
however was consistent in its refusal to do this and they, like all 
working journalists in the ABC, remained members of the temporary staff. 
3. CPD, 13 October 1949, p.l407. 
4. Ibid. 
5. Harris Report, p.3, para.l7. 
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According to Dixon, the defeat of Labor "was a blow to all members 
of the news staff, who felt the new government might abolish the 
independent service". 6 But the real threat to news had in reality arisen 
many months before the Liberal-Cour.try .Parties were voted into power, and 
it came not from politicians but from P.W. Nette,one of the two senior 
civil servants who were now sitting on the Commission as a result of the 
Broadcasting Act of 1948. 7 Both Nette and Vanthoff attended their first 
Commission meeting in March 1949, a month after the Fitzgerald Committee 
Report had been tabled in the House. Boyer was concerned about the 
emphasis being given in the press to the adverse comments made about the 
news service, and the relative lack of space given to the Committee's 
favourable findings. The press had concentrated on the criticism when 
details of the report were leaked in March and April 1948. 8 Now they did 
so once again. The Age commented in an editorial: 
In Britain, the BBC does not find it necessary to employ 
large staffs of news gatherers, but makes use of established 
agencies. If the ABC were to work on similar lines, it could 
make large savings even if a sufficient number of competent 
people were retained to ensure that news lending itself to 
over-emphasis and distortion, from the political standpoint 
was fairly presented. The original mistake was the attempt 
to establish an organisation all over Australia, involving 
costs often grossly dispro~ortionate to the value of the 
service to the Commission. 
Boyer sought to put the record straight by prevailing on Cameron 
to release the ABC's comments on the Fitzgerald Report sent to him in 
~larch 1948. Cameron decided not to do so but the soothing remarks he 
made in explanation are a good indication of the lack of any real 
concern on the Government's part about the news service. He wrote: 
6. Dixon, ABC, p.203. 
7. See Chapter 3, p, 292. 
8. See Sydney Morning Herald, 18 March 1948; Courier-Mai 1, 9 April 
1948. --
9. The Age, 11 February 1949. 
it seems to me that to re-open the matter at the present 
time would be inopportune, since remarks of a contentious 
nature might be invited and complaints levelled against the 
Commission, which although not justified as a general rule, 
would involve a good deal of time and effort in rebutting.lO 
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Nette, the representative of the Treasury, was not so willing to 
put aside the findings of the Committee. Armed with a copy of its 
criticisms of the regional news in particular, he raised the question of 
costs of the service at his first Commission meeting. He wanted a 
complete week's bulletins to study to see if the service was worth the 
money being spent on it. It was the beginning of a concentrated 
campaign he ,;as to ,;age over the next t,;elve months. Nette added a ne,; 
divisive element to the Commission at a time when it ,;as struggling to 
implement the reorganisation proposals of the Harris Report. According 
to Boyer, he was never able to reconcile his duties towards the 
Commission with his Treasury responsibilities. The Commission which 
had no>< become so attached to the idea of regional ne><s, and had 
carefully ensured that it ><as not investigated by Harris, no>< found the 
,;hole question reopened. 
Because of Nette' s insistence that regional news should be 
justified, a draft questionnaire ,;as drawn up for sending to country 
listeners asking them what value they attached to the service. Nette 
also asked for a breakdo,;n of the costs of the regional service and for 
details of the number of country-originated news items being used. On 
the production of these statistics, which sho,;ed the heavy use being 
made of country material, and also letters from a number of organisations 
and people in appreciation of regional news, Netto agreed to have the new 
Editor-in-Chief, Hamilton examine the question critically and suggest 
improvements. He ,;as to visit all regional stations concerned and make 
his report as a matter of urgency. The idea of a listener survey was 
dropped. 
-
10. Cameron to Boyer, ll March 1949,-SP6l3, !lox 3, 1/8/1. 
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This ~<as the first major task to be undertaken by Hamilton and a 
great deal depended on it. To Boyer, regional ne~<s ~<as perhaps the most 
valuable product of the ABC and epitomised his ideal of community 
service. To provide a country ne~<s service from sources other than 
those of the ABC t<ould be to break down the principle of the Commission 
accepting responsibility for all the ne~<s it broadcast. To go to 
country net<spapers once again for regional ne~<s ~<ould introduce the 
possibility of political dissatisfaction t<ith reliance on press sources, 
as happened prior to 1946. failure to put up a convincing case might 
find the Treasury demanding some kind of political action to curtail 
ne~<s activities. Nette's intervention raised all of these disquieting 
possibilities. Hamilton had to find the anst<ers to prove himself 
t<orthy of the Commission's trust. 
Hamil ton ~<as still compiling his report when the Chifley 
Government fell. This increased the pressure on him, because Nette ~<as 
convinced that the Menzies Government was greatly concerned about ABC 
news. He had told Dixon: "If by any mischance there is a change of 
government, there ~<ill be a very close enquiry into the ne~<s service. 
I think ~<e are heading for political trouble":! 
Hamilton was a romantic. But behind the florid language of the 
many substantial reports he wrote during his career was a mind that 
could assemble facts and arguments precisely and convincingly. Oakley 
says: "J t<ould say Hamil ton's general mastery of detai 1, his ability to 
. . d h c . . " 12 organ1se, 1mpresse t e ommlSSlOn . The Commission had never seen 
reports like those of Hamilton. They were rhetorical, emotive, often 
moving into the world of fancy and over-exaggeration. They ~<ere 
frequently pompous. Yet their argument was almost invariably totally 
persuasive. His report on regional news was just what the Commission 
needed. 
ll. Dixon, A_B_~, p .194. 
12. Letter to the wd ter from Oakley, 20 July i976. 
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He had visited regional stations in New South Wales, Victoria 
and Tasmania, where he had spoken to farmers, local officials, business-
men and newspapermen. He reported: 
We are inclined to regard the regional news we give them as 
little news. In the larger scheme of things, as we see it, 
thatTs natural. But to them it is just ne1;s. The adjective 
has no place ... Little news. No! It is not little to 
them. I knew that, I hope, in theory. But I am grateful for 
being so completely reminded of the elementary truths of my 
business ... So, if we give our listeners to so-called little 
news of councils and crops, deaths and dance~, we must 
recognise that is the news they want. That is their news. 
Disasters and plagues are generally remote from their daily 
lives. They live with their animals, their crops, their small 
shops, their roads and their schools.l3 
llami l ton argued that only the ABC was providing them with this service 
of news. The metropolitan press ignored country news by and large. 
The quality of country newspapers was variable and they frequently did 
not endeavour to a coverage beyond the town in which they were printed. 
Only the bigger towns could support a daily paper. Those who did 
subscribe to country papers outside the town frequently had to wait 
days for them to arrive because of infrequent mail services. 
The ABC's regional news, on the other hand, helped defeat the 
isolation of country life, gave country people a vital place in the 
larger scheme of things outside their immediate boundaries. It 
broadened their interests, helped them dra~< comparisons with developments 
in surrou11ding country areas, gave them vital information on floods or 
fires. It had brought goodwill to the ABC because it had demonstrated 
its concern for country listeners. Hamilton believed that a truly 
national bulletin must include as much ne1;s from the country as possible. 
The only way such a flm; could be generated was through the system of 
regional ne1;s which gave constant work to country correspondents. 
l3. Hamilton to Finlay, 25 January 1950, P.32/2. 
llami 1 ton's . 
Emphases are 
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We would not have as we do have, the best country cover of any 
news organisation in Australia [if there were no regional 
bulletins] ... Without the regional bulletins it would 
quickly disintegrate. We would soon be in the same 
position as the metropolitan papers, many of whose 
correspondents see so little for their labor (sic} that 
they are simply not bothering.l4 
Hamilton, in conclusion urged that the time for regional news be 
extended by one minute and that permission be given to appoint 
additional correspondents. Attached were pages of summaries of 
favourable remarks on the service given to him during his tour. 
The Commission the following month considered thj s report together 
with a recommendation that two additional regional journalists be 
appointed and two journalists for Perth. Moses strongly supported Hamilton 
and Finlay. It is clear that something of a crisis occurred at this 
meeting, triggered by the request for more news staff. The Commission 
approved this, over the strong objections of Nette, whose dissent is 
officially recorded in the minutes. This was a rare occurrence since 
Commission resolutions we!"e invariably unanimous during !layer's period 
as Chairman .15 The Commission then recorded a remarkable second 
resolution in 1~hich it appeared to be bowing to pressure to reconsider 
the whole future of its independent news. It read: 
14. 
15. 
16. 
That with regard to the general question of the independent 
news service, as at present required by Statutory obligation, 
the Commission is of the opinion that its essential 
independence in news must be retained at all costs, but that 
if this question is raised by the Government, the Commission 
is prepared to indicate that it considers its present Statutory 
obligations to be too rigid and that it would recommend the 
restoration of the original section of the Act which pernii ttcd 
the Commission to secure its Austra1i8n news as it thought fit, 
without the obl i ~ation to obtain such news in all cases through 
its own staff .16 
Ibid. 
Boyer noted in a letter to his son that Commission meetings usually 
resulted in 'a consensus' being reached. He said: "We very seldom 
take a vote on the Commission, and a record of dissent is even more 
rare". Quoted in Bolton, ~oyer, p.l40. 
Minutes of Commission meeting, 16-17 Feb,·uary 1950. 
387 
We have seen how convinced Boyer had become since 1946, that 
complete separation from newspaper interests was the only way to 
avoid constant political interference and help re-establish public 
confidence in ABC news. He had grown more and more disenchanted with 
newspaper standards which he felt were debasing public tastes. He 
had championed independent gathering of regional news, originally 
against the wishes of his 01-m News Department. We have noted how 
important independent news had become in carrying out what Boyer felt 
to be the essential function of the ABC - the fostering of national 
unity by providing the basic material for independent judgment. News 
had helped build up popular regard for the ABC. What then brought 
about this extraordinary change of attitude, which appeared to open 
the door once again to the possibility of taking news from the press? 
The answer must be that it is not clear. The resolution was not 
the result of any official communication from the Government. Nor was 
it subsequently relayed to the Government officially. If the 
Commission had been at all desirous of ridding itself of some of its 
news responsibilities this surely would have been done. It appears 
obvious that it was the result of some threat of Government action 
initiated by Nette. We have seen that Nette believed the new Government 
would act against the news service. It is possible that he thought 
he would get Treasury, and subsequently ministerial backing, for 
action to c.hange the nature of ABC news. 
Another strange aspect of the resolution is that no follow-up 
action is specified, as a result of which the Commission could examine 
much more closely the implications of such a vi tally important decision. 
Normally, this would have been done. As soon as the meeting was over, 
however, Finlay and Hamilton were inst,·ucted by ~loses to preparG most 
urgently a report which \\'Ould irTefutably ~rgue the case for an 
independent service and against newspaper sources. 
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The task fell largely on Hamilton's shoulders. The report was 
written in t~<o parts. The first dealt with the Commission's regional 
and overseas ne~<s arrangements and possible alternatives, and the 
second ~<ith State and national ne~<s and the possibilities of agreements 
with the press. Despite Hamilton's recent press origins, it is 
apparent that by this time he had absorbed the strong anti-newspaper 
ethos which had long been a driving force behind the News Department 
and which had become official Commission news philosophy. 17 They are 
couched very much in the terms used by Dixon, Hanlon and the AJA before 
the PSCB hearings. Because the ABC news had now become a serious 
rival of the press: 
some sections of the press would very much like to see our 
service curtailed to the extent where we would become a 
mouthpiece of one or other of the press organisations or, at 
best, be powerless to compete with up-to-the minute important 
news .18 
In some respects the reports dangerously oversimplified newspaper 
attitudes as they had been expressed before the Parliamentary 
Committees and would, in this respect, have hardly stood up to outside 
scrutiny. Dumas was quoted at length, for example, from his evidence 
of 1942, in which he denied the ABC right to supplement. This ignored 
the fact that the press had agreed to unlimited ABC rights to supplement 
in 1946. Doubts were raised as to whether the press would provide a 
service, in view of the fact that they provided their own commercial 
stations with basic news, which competed directly with the ABC. This 
also ignored the fact that newspapers had raised no objections to the 
ABC selecting what they wanted from their offices in 1946, when 
commercial news services were already well established. One of the most 
17. This had been accentuated by the ABC/press clashes of 1947-48 
which arc described in Chapter 5. 
18. Finlay tc Moses, 6 April 1950, R32/2. 
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effective arguments against press agreements, however, was a new one. 
ANPA had split into ti<O competing organisations. It now consisted of 
the Sydney ~lorning Herald, The Sun, The Argus, IJle Age, the Brisbane 
Telegraph, and Western Australian papers. The breakaway group had 
reformed the ANC and comprised the Dai.ly Telegraph, and the Keith 
Murdoch papers in Melbourne, Adelaide, and Brisbane. It was 
convincingly argued therefore by Finlay that 
We could obviously not enter into any agreements with one 
of these organisations and not the other, if we desire 
to keep any vestige of impartiality and accuracy and so 
we would have to deal with two groups of ne~<spapers, each 
demanding its o~<n payment.l9 
All this was conjecture. No-one approached the newspapers to 
see what their attitude would be, or what kind of service they might 
propose. So Finlay and Hamilton were able to rule out the possibility 
of any reductions in staff because they based their arguments on the 
formula worked out by Boyer in 1945 under which the ABC ~<Ould place 
news selectors in newspaper offices. This proposal had always been 
unworkable. 1~ere were, as we have pointed out earlier, other ways in 
which news might have been made available. 20 
But the very nature of the news service was at stake. The 
advantages of the independent service were that its legislative 
'protection' from the press and its new 'objective' standards allayed 
suspicions that undue influence was being exerted from outside. With 
the imposition of properly 'impartial' standards by the Commission 
itself, the news service was no longer the political football that it had 
once been. Its image ~<as now a beneficial one for the C01runission. 
Hamilton and Finlay put it strongly that 'impartiality', 'objectivity', 
and 'independence' would be lost if a basic nc~<s service ~<as taken from 
19. Ibid. 
20. See Chapter 2, pp.l72-73. 
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the press. The ABC could no longer vouch for the accuracy of its news. 
It would not be as up-to-date, because newspaper output was geared to 
edition times. 
Finally they could point to the g7nerally favourable reaction now 
to the service from consensual interests and from the public. 
Criticisms and complaints in regard to our news bulletins, 
particularly over the last few months, are not practically 
non-existent. On the other hand, we have received an 
increasing amount of praise from all sections of the community, 
including members of the Government and the Opposition and 
important public authorities and organisations representing a 
wide variety of interests. Moreover recent surveys disclose 
that the listening audienco to our news bulletins has been 
maintained and in many instances greatly increased. 2l 
Finlay concluded: 
I consider that no good purpose could be served by purchasing 
a basic service from any of the Press organisations. We 
would lose in control, and consequently in efficiency, and 
I cannot anticipate any appreciable saving if the standard of 
the service is to be maintained. 22 
The Commission meeting of April considered once again the still 
anonymous suggestion that expenditure on news might be reduced by 
buying news from the press. Moses once again backed the views of 
Finlay and Hamilton. This time Boyer was simply asked to prepare a 
statement, to be approved by the Commission, for submission to the 
new Postmaster-General, Anthony. This letter of 10 May reveals that 
Anthony had requested this information, apparently not be letter but by 
word of mouth. Presumably the Treasury had requested some form of 
action, at Nette 1 s behest, and between the February and April Commission 
meetings this had been referred to Anthony as the responsible minister. 
It is significant that Boyer did not mention or even hint at the 
Commission resolution of February. He was totally opposed to any 
arrangements with the press. He repeated what he had come to strongly 
believe - that the Commission 1 s security was inextricably bound up 
·-------------
21. Finlay to Moses, 29 March 1950, RJ2/2. 
22. Finhy to Mose5, 1:: A.pril jSJO, R32/2. 
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with the avoidance of any dependence on the press. He told Anthony: 
"[the Commission has been] insistent that ne~<s of an objective, 
reliable, non-sensat~onal character, befitting the National 
Service, was a necessary and unavoidable aim. Further it 
believes that the confidence of the public in the complete 
reliability and non-partisanship .of the ABC n<ews, demands not 
only an adequate and qualified staff to check and re-check for 
truth, but also camp lete access to all the news of the day. 23 
Minor savings ~<hich might result from press agreements, Boyer said, would 
be so minute that they would be outweighed by these more important 
considerations. 
This letter is so categorical in its confirmation of Boyer's 
position on news that it makes the February Com1<1ission resolution even 
more inexplicable. What kind of pressure Nette brought to bear is not 
known. If there was any Government anxiety about the news service it 
is not borne out by ABC records. Although there is no reply by .A.nthony 
on file, he obviously did not disagree with Boyer's arguments, for 
there was no further discussion of the issue in the Commission. From 
this point on, Notte was far less adamant about the news service. He 
had obviously found that he did not have sufficient support in Canberra. 
So satisfied did the new Government become that on 5 December 
Anthony wrote to Boyer suggesting that all the ABC's regional stations 
should broadcast their own local bulletins of news of special interest. 
Following this, the Commission agreed to set up a regional ne11s service 
in Darwin, and to find out at which other centres regional journalists 
could be based. At the February 1951 Commission meeting it was agreed 
that regional journalists should be apointed to Port Pirie, in South 
Australia, and at Longreach, Maryborough and Cairns in Queensland. The 
regional news had obviously come to stay. 
23. Boyer to Anthony, 10 ~lay 1950, R32/2. 
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The assembly of vi tal information and argument by Hamil ton had 
been extremely valuable to the Commission in its confrontation with 
Nette. Towards the end of 1950 Finlay told Moses: "I cannot speak too 
highly of Mr Hamil ton's ·,;ork. He has s.hown initiative, loyalty, and 
over-all ability which makes him one of our most valuable officers". 24 
There was, however, one more occasion on which ::he cost of the 
news service was questioned. In July 1952, Vanthoff wrote to Boyer 
on Anthony's behalf to ask him to make a particular effort to review 
expenditure for the current year closely and critically. In particular, 
Boyer :-·as asked to provide details and justification for the amounts 
being spent on news and on engaging overseas artists, It is obvious 
that there were still some voices in Cabinet who were sceptical about 
the value of the news service. Hamil ton again drew up an analysis of 
the cost and organisation of the department. A study of this document 
shows that the threat posed to news at this time was not considered to 
be a serious one. Compared to the voluminous reports of 1950 it is 
limited to a basic recital of staff figures, locations and duties. 
Expenditure on the news service was estimated to cost £305,921 for 
1952-53, an increase of £25,800 over the previous year. Staff had heen 
kept to the basic minimum recommended by Barris, except for the 
engagement of additional men for the expansion of regional coverage and 
for Radio Australia. 25 Total staff was now 130 journalists and 15 
cadets. Agency payments to Reuters, BUP, and the Exchange Telegraph 
amotmted to £16,310, only just over £2,000 more than had been paid in 
1947-48. Boyer concluded the report by pointing out: 
24. Finlay to Moses, 10 November 1950. ABC Staff files, "W.S. 
Hamilton". 
25. Radio A us trali a had been retun1ed to the ABC's control by the 
~!enzies Goven1ment in 1950. 
that the service has steadily increased in public esteem 
and our present method of collecting and preparing 
material for our news bulletins has made it possible to 
maintain the impartiality and objectivity laid down in the 
Commission's directive. No other system would give the 
ABC the control so essential to maintain this standard ... 
I am very doubtful whether any appreciable saving could be 
made if we we:re to purchase a basic service in Australia 
from agency sources and most certainly we could not 
provide a comparable service.26 
The covering letter was terse and brief and the matter was not the 
subject of any resolution by the Commission. 
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The positive and self-confident way in which r-oyer and Hamilton 
disposed of this last challenge to justify independent news collecting 
speaks volumes for the new authority possessed by the news service. It 
had arrived at a formula for presentation and organisation which had 
progressively disarmed political criticism, and which had enabled it 
to be removed from the political arena~ 7 Bolton remarks that there was 
less pressure generally on the ABC during Menzies's period as Prime 
Minister, probably because the ABC had "at last managed to establish 
its credentials as an impartial organisation". 28 As far as news was 
concerned that process, as we have seen, became virtually complete 
before Menzies came into power. The Departmental re-organisation, the 
appointment of Hamil ton as the one man in total control of the 
Department, the decline of Dixon and Amour, and the death of Hanlon, 
all occurring in the latter half of 1949, had at last presented the 
Commission with the opportunity of reaching total rapport with its 
.epartment over the policy of 1946 which it wanted pursued, with 
'factuality', and total 'objectivity' made more rigid and obligatory 
because of the Commission's experiences during the industrial disputes 
26. Boyer to Anthony, 6 August 1952, SP724, Box 39, 15/l/17. 
27. Moses says he never received any complaint from Menzies as Prime 
Minister about ABC news. 
28. Bolton, Bore:r:_, p. 190. 
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of 1948-49. The nature of the service had not only become politically 
unobjectionable, there was now a big audience for ABC news with a 
corresponding dwindling in the number of complaints. There was less 
inclination to regard the ABC as the mouthpiece of the Government. By 
1952, news had become "one of the most potent attractions for the 
general public to the national stations". 29 Moses considers that by 
this time the news service was the only one which was believable and was 
recognised by the public as such because of its uncoloured, 'objective' 
nature. He adds: "it had a high reputation among the listeners 
There was no question about it Twenty-five to thirty per cent of 
people tuned into the ABC for their news". 30 And he confirms that 
internal confidence in its unassailability was manifest before the advent 
of Menzies as Prime Minister. He recalls: 
I never thought towards the end of the Labor Government, that 
there was any likelihood [of the independent service being 
taken away]. No, I think it had built its reputation. I 
think there would have been such a reaction amongst the 
people of Australia, taking away this one completely independent 
news service, that no Yovernment would have stood up against 
the public reaction". 3 
Because the news service was no longer politically contentious, and 
had growing public support, it was much better able to withstand Nette' s 
attacks which were based purely on cost. The cost of the service was 
only a dangerous argument when it was used as a weapon or lever by those 
who considered that ABC news was weighted politically - those on the 
conservative side who initially saw it as a propaganda weapon in Labor's 
hands and those such as Amour on the Labor benches who believed Boyer 
had no real intention of keeping it out of press hands. In Smith's 
terminology, the ABC had arrived at a view of the audience for news and 
29. ABC, 20~1 Annual Report, p.S. 
30. Interview 11ith Sir Charles Moses, 8 February 1976. 
31. Ibid. 
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its needs which coincided with those of its journalists. Up until 
this time, there had been conflict between the Commission and its 
news staff over this concept of audience. That divergence occurred 
because the News Department of the early nineteen-forties related 
itself very closely to the wartime Labor Government's attitudes and 
expectations. The Commission, sensing the dangers to its existence 
because of the 'official' nature of its news, tried to reassert control 
and failed because of political protection of the service. The press 
agreements, though they broke new ground in including 'observer' 
broadcasting and then unlimited supplementation, still provided for a 
basic service from the newspapers. In Labor's eyes therefore ABC news 
would still include some press news which would be slanted against the 
Party. Also Labor did not like the concept of back grounding news 
because this smacked of 1 colouring' the facts according to personal 
opinion. Labor's view of the news was always one in which its 
statements could reach the public unaltered. TI1e audience was always 
essentially one which had a right to hear the facts of Government 
performance unfiltered by the press. 
The 1946 legislation, designed both to end forever the possibility 
of ABC news audiences being fed press news, and to enshrine the principle 
of unrestricted radio access to the national by the Government, provided 
the means by which the Commission could still develop and assert an 
audience view of its 01m. The answer was to move its journalists m;ay 
from their Government-centred approach to an establishment-oriented 
policy, which served all politicians equally. With Hs demonstrated 
heavy emphasis on fact, unadorned and uncoloured, and on nccuracy and 
sobriety, of language, Labor suspicions of residual press influence 
gradually disappeared. The difficulties caused by hard-core attachment 
by some journalists and politicians to the old idea that only 
Gove111ments were nc~<sworthy were gra<lually overcome. As Government and 
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Opposition both realised that they could sti 11 reach their public, 
though on equal terms, and therefore began to leave ABC more to its 
own devices in news, the Commission found it had more freedom to widen 
its coverage. More news from overseas, interstate, and the country 
meant a more diversified, comprehensive ne~<s cover which Boyer 
believed was serving the audience in a much more responsible way than 
previously. The swing a~<ay from official Canberra news ~<as recognised 
and opposed by Dixon, Hanlon and Amour but could not be prevented, 
only hindered. Boyer also came to recognise that news was the best 
vehicle for 'strengthening' democratic institutions by means of giving 
the audience the facts relating to divisive issues, such as communism, 
and allowing them to make up their own minds. The limited, rigidly 
controlled confines of the news bulletin was the ideal national forwn 
for presenting controversy without arousing the dangerous political 
passions that might result from longer presentations. 
By 1949 the dedicated adherence by the ABC and its news to 
recognised social and community values and institutions had been 
recognised, particularly as a result of its handling of the 1948-49 
strikes. It had, to paraphrase Cotton, become dull but responsible. 
Boyer's idea of news as the essential medium for strengthening national 
unity could not be quarrelled with by either party. Nor could the 
writing or presentation, being the faithful reproduction of events as 
they occurred, be criticised. The Commission guaranteed the accuracy 
and prudently refrained from adding supplementary information. The 
audience needed facts, the ABC said, and nothing more. With the end of 
divided journalistic loyalties between Canberra and the Commission, 
news staff could appreciate the commonsense reasoning beyind Boyer's 
nnws aims and the way in which they guaranteed the survival of the 
service, if successfully maintained, by winning both political and 
audience support. It was clearly recognised by both staff and 
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management that problems in news provided the opportunity for the 
more overt political intervention and control being exercised over the 
ABC. A safe News Departm~nt was the best guarantee of a secure ABC. 
Journalists recognised that the Commission 1 s security was intertwined 
with the survival of the independent ne>~s service. The news service 
thus became the product of an institutional obstacle course, through 
which the Commission had picked its way over the years. It 
represented, through its bulletins, the beliefs and attachments which 
the Commission knew were linked with its chances of continued existence. 
In Smith 1 s words, it had found a way of reaching a bargain of style and 
content with the civil power, which guaranteed survival. Yet, as Smith 
also indicates, the struggle between audience concepts within broad-
casting institutions is a continuing one. 
The struggle between these two forces - the view of the 
audience as it appears to the broadcaster and that view of 
the audience and the society in the name of which the 
organisation has been constructed - goes on inside the minds 
of the broadcasters.~2 
Although views of audience identity and needs and institutional 
requirements were shared by both Commission and Department, there was 
no guarantee that this mutuality of interests >~ould be permanent. As 
we shall see, it began to break down when the Department 1 s strength 
and standing reached their peak and when it felt it had to challenge 
the Commission viewpoint in order to reach, and build its reputation 
with, its TV audience. 
In February 1953 Hamilton felt that he had steered news 
successfully into safer and calmer waters and therefore could be 
allowed a degree of complacency. He wrote to Finlay: 
32. Smith, §_h_adow, p. 6 7. 
I think I can say truly that [my] reputation has been 
enhanced and has perhaps spread strongly to places where I 
was little known before ... I do knm< that I have given a 
lot of myself to the work I have been doing. I feel it has 
been a worthwhile service to the people of Australia and one 
that has given me a genuine personal satisfaction. On ·the 
professional level, it has been equally satisfying to me 
personally, to see the service working efficiently and to see 
its prestige and influence increase and to hear from people 
qualified to make some sort of judgment the tributes to its 
high standing in the Australian scene.33 
The Commission felt this to be true and decided that he should be 
appointed to the permanent staff. Approval had to be sought from 
Anthony under Section 17(9) of the Broadcasting Act which makes it 
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obligatory to obtain Government permission for permanent appointments 
of the top-ranking group of senior officers. In his letter to Anthony, 
Boyer could hardly have been more effusive. 
Mr Hamil ton has now been with us for some years, and after 
close observation of his work, the Commission is convinced that 
he has proved to be an excellent choice. The standard of his 
work is high, he has shown very sound judgment, and he has been 
most effective in guiding and directing the news staff, with a 
view to maintaining the standards the Commission has set for 
this section of its activities.34 
Hamil ton became a permanent staff member from 8 May and the Commission 
had no hesitation about leaving news largely in his hands. 
Hamilton's Influence on News Policy 
We have remarked that from 1951 to 1956, news virtually dropped 
from Commission agendas. So confide'!t w;;.s the Commission about Hamil ton 
and so closely did bulletins mirror Commission policy and attitudes that 
he was left very much to himself. Within the broad guidelines of the 
Commission's directives Hamilton was free to introduce ideas of his own. 
As he took up duties however, Boyer had occasion to stress more firmly 
than ever before what had now become a cardinal rule - that news i terns 
would be confined to bare recitation of events. He had been stung into 
33. Hamilton to Finlay, 5 February J952. Staff files -Hamilton. 
34. Boye:r •.o Anthony, 25 ~larch 1953. Staff files - Hamilton. 
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making this positive statement publicly, by some remarks contained 
in Bernard Minogue's Candid Commentary column in Smith's Weekly. 
Minogue was critical of the nGws service for failing to convey meaning 
in its reports. He talked of its 'bald statements masquerading as 
'factual'" and "the abstract and brief chronicle of flatulent events" 
carried in ABC bulletins. 35 Boyer, in his reply, provided evidence 
that he did not understand how the news could be presented in any other 
way, without undermining its credibility. He assumed that Minogue was 
suggesting that the ABC should offer its own opinions on the news as it 
was presented. He rejected this, claiming that all the public needed was 
simple fact in order to make independent and informed judgments. He 
argued: 
we do a far greater servic-e by attempting to give a balanced 
and factual review of events as the raw material of honest36 
opinion-forming than by injecting any judgment of our own. 
Clearly, there were only the alternatives of fact and opinion as far as 
he was concerned. It had to be one or the otl<er, and opinion meant 
passing judgment. This ignored the possibility, envisaged by Minogue, 
of news providing something more than simple fact, but stopping far 
short of edi torialising, in order that listeners could arrive at a more 
intelligent appraisal of situations, and become, as Nordenstreng says, 
intellectually activated. The provision of background, additional facts 
relevant to a news situation, so that 'raw news' can be related to 11ider 
context was recognised by the BBC and American networks as one. of the 
roles of the voice reporter, but Boyer steadfastly resisted this 
technique in news, as possibly damaging to the essential values he was 
trying to preserve. Ne shall examine this attitude and its effects at 
greater length in the next chapter. The ABC did broadcast news 
35. Sl_l1.ith's Weekly, 15 October 1949. 
36. Smith • s__~l'cckly, 29 October 1949. 
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conunentaries twice a day. H01vever they continued to be controlled by 
the Talks Department and although topical, Here not necessarily 
related to the news of the day and only rarely to the news contained in 
the news bulletins they preceded. They lvere also almost entirely 
restricted to international affairs, Their value therefore in aiding 
the llllderstanding of news i terns was lirni ted. They were contributed by 
a panel of outside speakers, not by staff and their presentation and 
supervision was rigidly separated from that of news. As far as Boyer 
was concerned there could be no overlap of the two, believing as he 
did that conunent meant the injection of personal opinion. Nordenstreng 
however, in arguing for the linking of comment and news, as a means of 
aiding understanding, does not agree that conunentary need have this 
characteristic at all. He says: 
the commentary will explain the general concepts occurring 
in the raw news ... so that their content becomes familiar 
and wi 11 provide general backgrolllld. Conunentary does not 
mean conunitment to a particular point of view or side in 
ar. issue. Such conunitment implies support for particular 37 
norms, which is not the function of background nc\.'iS corrunentary. 
Although Cotton had sought more interpretive material, it is 
apparent that this went beyond Boyer's intentions and his remarks were 
a salutary remainder to Hamil ton of the course that he wanted followed. 
One method of examining Hamil ton's influence is to compare the lengthy 
directives to journalists which were issued under his name, with the 
original policy statement by the Commission of 1946. Stress is placed 
in a number of new areas. Hami 1 ton veered away even further from the 
old doctrine of Dixon and Denning that only news was wanted and not views. 
He also disagreed with its corollary that Governments were newsworthy 
and Oppositions much less so. In this he continued the new trend begllll 
by Cotton and extended it. The difference in emphasis is obvious in 
37. Nordenst:rcng, "Policy for News", in McQuail (ed.), Mass 
Communications, p. 399. 
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the following instruction with its insistence on the active quest for 
critical statements from the Opposition - quite the opposite of the 
case argued by Dixon and Denning in 1946. 
It is well to bear in mind that, by the very nature of things, 
the hard news of politics will flow mainly from the government 
of the day. Because of this, you should look for opportunities 
to present news from the opposition of the day. In particular, 
remember that the essential function of an opposition is a 
critical function. Therefore criticism of government policy is 
legitimate news.38 
On another occasion he wrote, "We must give a lot of official 
news, but don 1 t let our bulletins sound like a Government gazette". 39 
And under the heading 'balance': "On a controversial subject we want 
both sides to give their views. We don't want a story slanted for the 
union or the employer, the Government or the Opposition. We seek and 
get opposing views on every controversy". 40 He thus more strongly 
defined 'impartiality' than ever before. He continued Cotton's 
practice of attacking over-dependence on handouts. "Too often these 
days", he advised, "a reporter takes the handout, the prepared 
statement, puts it in his pocket and walks off, his job completed. 
That's the tragic error. His job has merely started, not ended. For 
it should be recognised that handouts and prepared statements are not 
necessarily designed to give information. Frequently they are not so 
intended, but have been written deliberately so as to obscure the truth 
rather than reveal it". 41 This also was a stronger line on a problem 
which had bedevilled ABC news since it began. 
38. W.S. Hamilton, ABC News Directive, undated, p.l4. Emphasis is 
Hamil ton's. 
39. W. S. Hami 1 ton, ABC News Service Style Notes, No.9, p. 3, undated. 
Emphasis is Hami !ton's. 
40. W.S. Hamilton, ABC News Service Style Notes, No.6, p.6, undated. 
Emphasis is Hamilton's. 
41. IbJ:.d._, p.4. 
IVe know, from R.H. Morrison's recollections, that even in the 
early years of news, anything 'sordid' was not broadcast. 42 In the 
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1946 Directive, the Commission warned against. giving priority to news 
items which were 'startling' and 'sensational' but had no other inherent 
news value. In Chapter 2, we have pointed out that the terms 
'inherent news value' and 'news of intrinsic importance' seemed to mean 
news which provided the raw factual material for individual judgment. 
Individual judgment was necessary for 'good citizenship'. News which 
could best do this was that which was selected according to the criterion 
of news of 'beneficence' being superior to 'disturbing' news which was 
'sensationalist'. 'Disturbing' news could destroy moral values built 
around family life and influence, which lay at the core of our society. 
Also we know that Boyer's 'consensual ism' included the strong belief that 
conflict or 'agitation' threatened by emerging social issues could be 
avoided by public debate on parliamentary liues in which the ABC, 
through its microphones, would play a crucial role. 'Disturbing' ne1;s 
therefore also included reference to 'violent' tactics outside this 
behavioural norm. His own beliefs and outside consensual pressures 
could not allow this news to be given the same 'impartiality' of treatment 
as that given contending forces within the democratic framework. The 
Directive also urged that a dignity of expression be observed. As an 
example, it said: "it is not necessary to quote verbatim statements in 
Parliament or elsewhere which in themselves, a.re in bad taste". 43 
42. R.H. Morrison, ABC Archives reco1·ding, 30 September 1968. 
43. Directives, News and Spoken Transmissions, 1946. 
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Hamil ton attempted to further codify these beliefs. He wanted to 
avoid giving the least offence to any listener. He reasoned: 
the ABC news is heard in the home and all the news must be 
expressed in such a way that it can be heard in the home 
without giving offence4 or causing embarrassment to a right-thinking person. 4 
He did not attempt to define the latter phrase, but he defined 'taste' 
on another occasion as: 
good manners in news. It excludes horror film, unpleasant 
and gory detail in accident stories, it shuns ridicule or 
extravagance. It avoids the exploitation in word or film 
of mental or physical handicaps. It doesn't giggle about 
things, it doesn't smirk. It doesn't invade privacy 
unnecessarily.45 
This also meant an avoidance of crime, divorce and scandal stories. 
Only a small percentage of murder cases were to be reported, the 
criterion being their 'social value'. Divorce cases were banned, but 
could be mentioned if the judge said something of general social 
interest. Crime was to be reported only if there were "wholesome 
public interest". 46 Only a minimum of detail could be given even then. 
One therefore would never have gathered any impression of the incidence 
of crime from ABC bulletins. The more important factor, to Hamil ton's 
mind, was to avoid any distress by the mention of the seamier side of 
life. This was a more marked reaction against newspaper standards than 
previously and it also helped to reinforce the heavy leaning of the news 
service towards the side of such social values as 'law and order'. To 
give crime only the most cursory treat !lEnt is to suggest that the 
disruptive elements in society are far less a factor than they are in 
reality. It suggests that the forces of law and order are more in 
control of a situation than is really the case. 'National unity', to 
44. W.S. Hamilton, ABC News Service News Policy, January 1960, p.l. 
Emphasis is Hamil ton's. 
45. Hamilton, Directive, p.20. 
46. Hamilton, News .£_olicy, p.2. 
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use Boyer's phrase, is well served by such guidelines. In fact, 
Hamilton's ideas of 'good taste' matched Boyer's philosophy of community 
service. Boyer had asked journalists in 1946, as their first principle, 
to determine news values by asking the.question "Is it a service to 
inform the community of this event?"47 Hamilton told his staff far more 
precisely the circumstances in which the answer would be in the negative. 
He reduced journalistic uncertainties by spelling it out. Hamilton 
superimposed his own moral values on those of Boyer to produce a vision 
of an audience that was highly sensitive, easily shocked, and which had 
to he protected from the harsher aspects of real life. He could 
therefore write: "(The ABC] accepts the responsibility to decide what 
is best for the community, soberly and thoughtfully". 48 It was this 
paternalistic idea of audience which the Department accepted as the one 
expected of it, and which governed its selection of news. 49 This results 
in the unconscious bias in the form of "'self censorship' of the 
journalist as he systematically attempts to fit events into a particular 
world view whose basic premises he sees as embodying a faithful 
portrayal of society". 50 
47. Directives, News and Spoken Transmissions, 1946. 
48. Hamilton, News Policy, p.2. 
49. The Commission was not so squeamish about reporting crime before 
the influence of Boyer and Hamilton began to assert itself. Note 
the different emphasis in a letter from Moses to a complaining 
listener in 1940. "You may be assured that the Commission fully 
sympathises with your abhorrence of 'horrors' in the news 
Special care is taken to eliminate the grisly details and 
descriptions of accidents and crimes so often indulged in by the 
Press. Obviously, however, the Commission cannot prevent such 
happenings, and when they do occur, they are generally accepted as 
legitimate 'news'. I am afraid that the National broadcasts would 
lose much of their authenticity if the Commission were to omit 
genuine news i terns simply because some listeners, or even the 
Commission itself, found them unpalatable." Moses to Symington, 
1 March 1940, SP286, Box 2, Sll, "News Comments and Enquiries". 
SO. Cohen and Yow1g, "The Process of Selection", in Cohen and Young 
(eds.), News ~lanufacture, p.l9. 
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Definitions of 'bad taste' by llami 1 ton and what should be 
excluded under this heading, neatly dovetailed into a broader concept 
of concentration on the 'positive' ne~;s of society which was always one 
of Boyer's favourite news themes and one about which he became more 
enthusiastic in the final decade of his Chairmanship. It ~;as taken up 
and enthusiastically endorsed by Hamil ton, once again revealing the 
similarity of the thinking of the t~;o men. Boyer, after the less 
palatable truths about newspapers had been revealed to him in 1945-46 
had become increasingly unhappy about press standards. In an address to 
the Australian Institute of Political Science Summer School in 1955 he 
alleged that the freedom possessed by the press was being misused. They 
were catering only for the baser public tastes as a means of making money 
instead of developing higher instincts by providing more uplifting 
news items. We have noted earlier how convinced Boyer was of the power 
of the media to influence and shape minds, and this conviction was at the 
heart of his attack. In his view, man was weak and could be easily 
misled. 
However noble our ambitions, it is astonishing how ready 
we are to wallow in sensation, in the character-assassination 
of our fellows and in the detail of the seamy side of life. 
The beast in us is the most easily captured market for all the 
means of mass communication.51 
Boyer believed that by feeding the public this kind of news, the press 
was not reflecting public taste but actually creating it. Conversely, 
the public would benefit if a different type of news was put before it. 
He therefore suggested "that the community generally would be grateful 
if its better instincts and higher aspirations, rather than its lower 
tastes, were made the chief target". 52 Boyer therefore sa~; the task of 
ABS news in this light because "The positive dynamic creation of 
51. Boyer, "Freedom", in Wilkes (ed.), Libe!ty, p.93. 
52. Boyer, "Freedom", in Wilkes (cd.)., Libe~ty, p.95. 
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community's tastes and standards through its mass media is daily 
becoming more obvious and more unavoidable". 53 
This viewpoint was taken up and embellished by Hamil ton and became 
one of the most significant influences ~m ABC news. Hamilton wrote 
subsequently: 
It is our duty to take proper notice of the positively social 
side of our community life, inasmuch as concentration on its 
anti-social aspects can present an entirely false picture. 54 
ABC news was to "seek the rrogressi ve news of society, rather than the 
ephemeral, sensational news of the day". 55 The policy owed much to 
strong influence of Reith on Boyer. Reith spoke constantly of using 
radio to influence the public for good. He told the Crawford Committee 
"The preservation of a high moral tone is obviously of paramount 
importance. Everything definitely vulgar or hurtful must of course be 
avoided". 56 If the level of programmes 1·:as pitched higher than 
warranted by public taste, then it could be expected that appreciation 
would rise accordingly. The BBC had to lead and not follow. 
So the responsibility as at the outset conceived ... was to 
carry into the greatest number of homes everything that was 
best in every department of human knowledge, endeavour and 
achievement; and to avoid whatever was, or might be, hurtful. 
ln earliest years accused of setting out to give the public 
not what it wanted but what the BBC thought it should have, 
the answer was that few knew what they wanted, fewer what they 
needed. 57 
53. Ibid. 
54. Hamilton, News Policy, p.7. 
55. Hamilton, Directive, p.3. F.mphasis is Hamilton's. Some of 
Hamilton's most ornate prose was on this subject. For example, 
"The News that will stay with you is the ne\\rs that shines with 
its own light, the presentation of an emotion or a deed which 
shows just once in a while that man isn't completely a material 
creature - that he will go out of his way to make a sacrifice for 
the well-being of another". Qirective, p.9. 
56. Quoted in Garry Allighan, 
1938)' p.202. 
Sir John Reith (Stanley Paul, London, 
57. J. C. W. Reith, Into the Wind (Hodder and Stough ton, London, 1949), 
p .101. 
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Reith was quite open in hi~ attachment to the values of the establishment, 
and 'the Boyer-Hamilton variations were expressive of their support for 
similar values in Australian society. As Hood points out the 
institutional fostering of these consensual values means that impartiality 
is a policy applied only to activities that remain within the consensus. 
Hamilton embraced and helped develop the institutional ethos of support 
for the status quo. He defined more rigidly the news criteria based on 
it. 
Hamilton did however attempt to widen the scope of news beyond the 
rigid principles of Boyer, but with only mixed success. His only 
difference of opinion with the Commission up until 1956 was over the 
question of colourful language and attempts to enliven bulletins by the 
injection of stories relating to people rather than to events. Hamilton 
brought from The Sun a strong belief in the wisdom of relating anonymous 
news to people. He wrote: 
keep in mind the people for whom your produce is designed ... 
Failure to remember about people ... people who walk and rlll, 
sleep and eat, laugh and cry - this is one of the great 
dangers of our profession. When it happens, the people, in 
their turn, forget you.58 
His early attempts at introducing these 'human interest' stories 
however, led to trouble. M. II'. 0' Donnell, the Treasury official who had 
replaced Notte on the Commission in 1952, complained about the over-
dramatic language being used in some news items at the Commission meeting 
of April 1954. The phrase objected to was "the wild sea" in a story 
about an accident in which troops on exercise were involved. This led to 
a discussion of Hami 1 ton's 'human interest' stories about which Boyer 
expressecl his coilcern because they "appear sometimes to be used mainly 
because of t~lCir emotional appeal". 59 He felt that "the news service has 
built up a reputation for the calm and objective preser;ta'!:ion of factual 
58. Hamilton, D:i:r~_ctive, p.l4. 
59. Minutes of Cornrrrission meeting of l-2 April 1954. 
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~aterial [and therefore] particular care should be taken in the use of 
human interest stories and in the wording of nm<s items about individuals 
that have an emotional appeal". 60 
Although the Co=ission did not r.ule out 'human interest' stories 
entirely, it resolved that Boyer should issue a directive on the 
subject for Hamilton's guidance. Subsequently, it was thought better 
for Boyer to discuss the matter with Hamil ton personally. This was the 
second time the brake had been applied by the Commission to attempts to 
lift some news items beyond the routine dedication to unembossed 
factuality by interspersing material in which reporters had used 
imagination and colourful writing. TI1e first in 1948, had related to 
the coverage of the Queensland railway strike and any injection of the 
reporter's personality in those circumstances, alarmed the Commission. 
By 1954, however, it is clear that there was a blanket ban on prose 
which was likely to excite the senses in any way. 61 The story in 
question had no political connotations whatever. 
In these circumstances the role of the reporter can be an 
extremely frustrating one, as he is deprived of the opportunity of 
expressing himself fully. Hamilton was aware of the limitations placed 
on his reporting staff by the severe confines of ABC news ·policy and he 
attempted to ensure that some trace of their personality and style 
remained after sub-editors had assessed, altered and abbreviated 
stories. He ruled that 
broadly speaking, the sel"'· :ce believes in a reporter writing 
the story as he sees ~c. Interference by sub-editors and 
Chiefs-of-Sto:::; ... owever well intentiol!~ should be kept 
to ~ ~- :, : .. u:n • .)...., 
~ -------
uu. Ibid. 
61. P•w cxnwn'e. Finl~v enj:Jined the news staff as follows at the News 
Editors' Conference of 1~52: I! l t we are to m<1.~ntain and improve 
our service, a firm rein will have to be kept on sub-editors and 
reporters". News Editors' Conference, S-6 May 1952, p.l. ABC 
File E/l/16, Pt.II, "Nei<S Editors' Conferences" 
62. Hamilton, Directive, p.l7. Hamilton's emphasis. 
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Beyond this, Hamil ton gave reporters a slight degree of extra freedom in 
the extent to which they could add interpretative statements of their 
own. We have noted earlier Commission concern about unattributed 
material and Boyer's belief that anything but fact amounted to 
unacceptable interpolation of opinion. Hamil ton, with great 
circumspection, made this policy more flexible. The extent to 1vhich 
reporters were permitted to co~~ent was severely restricted, but the 
fact that it was allowed at all marks a small but significant advance 
towards adding meaning and perspective to the ABC news bulletins. TI1e 
examples given in Hamilton's instructions on this matter are 
illustrative of the simple form they took: 
It is probably true ... that the annual show of a country 
town 'was a success'. But the ABC cannot say it. If there 
is nobody we can quote, but our con·espondent is quite posi ti vc 
the show was a success, 1'e allow him to say it. 'The ABC 
correspondent says the show was a success.' The same with 
stories by staff reporters. There are things which a reporter, 
having closely investigated, kn01vs to be correct. He may be 
allowed to give his opinion. 'The ABC's political reporter 
says the Government is unlikely tc bring the bill d01m this 
session. '63 
Hamilton also in this context allowed unattrihutable statements from 
union leaders, as well as politicians, to be used, although permitting 
this freedom to very experienced reporters only, who ~Vould be expected 
to use care and discretion. As union leaders in the news are usually 
involved in some form of controversy, this appears to be a definite 
casing of the policy enunciated by the Commission in 194 7, which has 
been described in the previous chapter. 64 The Commission does not appear 
to have taken issue with either of these initiatives by Hamilton, which 
is a measure of the degree of trust they had in him, and also perhaps, 
of the fact that the Commission fcl t it less necessary to scrutinise 
bulletin content as they had in the past. 
63. Hamil ton, _Directive, p .13. 
64. See Chapter 3, pp.373-77. 
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}he Complaints of Dr EY-~t-~ 
While neither Government nor Opposition saw any threat posed 
to them from the ABC's news service after 1949, resulting in fewer 
incidents of overt political pressure, Evatt, Labor's leader from 1951, 
never forgot that the ABC's news service was fostered and given 
independence in order to retain an uncoloured channel through which the 
Party's statements could reach the voters. He always retained the old 
wartime image of the ABC's news as one which faithfully reproduced 
statements which were issued by the Party. When, under Hamilton, the 
service became more selective about the use of Canberra originated 
material, Evatt felt personally aggrieved ~;hen any statement from his 
office was not reported in the bulletins, and had several clashes over 
the years with the ABC over the use of his material. 
Through Burton, he had been one of the most constant critics of 
ABC ne~;s in the years 1946-49 while Labor was still in po~<er. He did not, 
as ~;e have noted, appreciate the new 'impartial' approach adopted, nor 
Cotton's efforts to move away from reliance on handouts, and to avoid 
the approaches by Evatt's External Affairs Department to 'advise' 
journalists. The Commission was as firm as it was prudent to be, 
on these occasions. It admitted some errors, denied others, hut 
treated him respectfully and warily. 
When Evatt kept up his pressure on the News Department in 
Opposition, the Commission took a much firmer line. It asked him to 
refrain from approaching the staff direct, and instead direct any 
complaints to the Chairman or the General Manager. Evatt, however, 
felt he ~;as more likely to achieve results if he telephoned the newsroom 
direct, and he continued to do so. Rut these tactics did not appear 
to be successful because the complaint was often simply referred to the 
Conunission, or in some cases strongly res is ted at Departmental level. 
In fact, Evatt's telephon<:; calls seemed to have aroused a strong level 
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of resentment within the Department, which at that time, was very 
conscious of the need for 'impartiality'. Denning was at the ABC end 
of the telephone when Evatt protested about omissions of his statements 
on two occasions in 1951 and 1952. The Labor Party had had no reason 
to complain about the treatment given to it over the years by Denning, 
who had been responsible for reporting its statements far more faithfully 
than the 110wspapers. Yet he felt that Evatt's manner was threatening to 
him personally and asked the Corr~ission to take action to protect him 
from similar calls. 
He seems to have produced a similar response with other who spoke 
to him. Fraser recalls: 
Evatt was the sort of man who would monitor a news bulletin - and 
this has happened to me when I've been working out there [at 
Gord Hill] - and ring up and tell you you were sacked, in no 
uncertain 6@rms. He kept up a sustained pressure on ABC news 
bulletins. ~ 
Moses remembers him as 
one who was continually demanding equal time or more time. 
You could never have gl von Evatt enough time. He would feel 
that if he had three-quarters of the bulletin, and perhaps 
Menzies shouldn't have had a quarter.66 
In 1952, Hamilton was telephoned at his home by Evatt and asked who 
was responsible for the omission of a statement he had made on the 
Gover11ment's airline policy. Hamilton refused to say and told him he had 
no right to ask. Nhen the matter was investigated, Hamilton upheld 
the decision of his sub-editors. His report gives some idea of the extent 
of the move away from rep0rting all handouts produced in Canberra: 
It has been o~r policy that measures before the House should 
be debated in the House, not in the ABC news bulletins by 
statements made outside the House, except insofar as any statement 
may contain impoTtant hard news which it is our duty to report. 6 7 
--------------------------
65. Interview ,,•ith Keith Fraser, 28 November 1975. 
66. Interview with Sir Charles Moses, 8 February 1976. 
67. Hamilton to ~.cting General Manager, 27 October 1952, SP613, Box 44, 
15/17/13. 
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When Evatt spoke in the House on the Airlines Bill his views would be 
fully reported. His arguments against the bill had been well publicised 
already and his statement contained nothing new. "In this case, the 
statement was omitted entirely on its merits, in line with decisions 
made from time to time about Ministeria-l statements as well. "68 
Hamilton further raised the question of the backlash that can occur 
IYhen there is such persistent suggestions of mistreatment. He referred 
to Evatt's manner as 'intimidatory' and his whole approach as being 
'bullying pressure'. He then pointed out that 
such personal intervention by a political leader inevitably 
creates an emotional atmosphere which makes objective 
decisions difficult ... if errors of judgment are made 
against him - I ho~e they will not - Dr Evatt will have only 
himself to blame.6 
Hamil ton throughout his career saiV greater dangers arising from 
resentment against pressure, than he did from the pressure itself. In 
1970 he told an audience that pressure from politicians from both 
sides could be resisted. Ho~Vever, 
More insidious and less known or talked about is the 
inverse risk - of reacting too violently against pressure 
and making a wrong judgment simply as a personal reaction 
to the pressure. I still remember vividly making a wrong 
decision because of that. 70 
He did not specify the instance. 
It is possible to suggest that Evatt's complaints had two results. 
They would, as he surely hoped, have caused journalists to be extremely 
careful in the handling of his statements and speeches, knowing that he 
would create trouble if they were dropped. But Departmental resentment 
might well have meant that he received less sympathetic treatment at 
times than he deserved. Statements can be rw1, but at varying lengths, 
68. Ibid. 
69. Ibid. 
70. W. S. Hamil ton, Resr_onsibili ty in the Public Sector of Broadcasting, 
Lecture given at Macquarie Univel'sity, September 1970, p.15. 
'Y-
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and with varying emphasis, depending on the 1 judgment 1 of the sub-
editors. This would seem to cancel out some of the apparent advantages 
of applying pressure constantly. 
The Commission considered four co.mplaints by Evatt in the period 
1950-61. 71 In all cases, he made representations on his own behalf and 
not on behalf of the Party. In the same period, there were no other 
complaints considered at Commission level by any other member of the 
Party. There i5 thus no evidence of Party dissatisfaction. Nor does 
Evatt appear to have believed that the ABC news service was necessarily 
b . d . h. 72 1ase aga1nst 1m. He rang Moses on the eve of one election to thank 
71· They 
(1) 
were as follows: 
Commission meeting 6-7 February 1951. Evatt was dissatisfied 
with coverage given to a statement he had made. 
(2) Commission meeting 7-8 April 1952. Evatt protested against 
the exclusion of a statement on the reported sale by the 
Government of Commonwealth ships. 
(3) Commission meeting 14-15 July 1955. Evatt complained about 
the absence of any story on statements he had made on the 
recent privilege case in Parliament. Hamilton conceded 
that one statement should have been used. 
(4) Commission meeting 22 July 1958. Evatt said a statement he 
had made on the forthcoming Federal election should have 
been included. 
72. Evatt did make a statement critical of news in Parliament in 1958. 
He told the House "the commission, on a whole, does very important 
and useful work. But I think it is open to criticism in relation 
to both television and broadcasting, because of its selection of 
news and its commentaries, for instance, on international affairs". 
CPO, 23 April 1958, p.ll77. The whole of this speech, however, 
consisted of an attack on the Commission for the selection of its 
news commentators, in ~;hich he made specific reference to the 
decision by the Commission to refuse to allo~< the broadcast by 
Rohan Rivett on the Suez invasion in 1956. He did not cite any 
shortcomings in ABC ne~;s, nor did he mention ne~<s in any context 
again in this debate. 
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him for the fair treatment he had been given. It appears very likely 
that he kept up his campaign of harrassment in tho belief that unless 
he did so, the Government wvuld, in the normal course of events, get 
vastly predominant treatment. It had been so during the war years. 
The Department, in its turn, objected to the inference that it was not 
doing its best to be 'impartial'. 
It would be easy to dismiss the Commission's firm handling of 
Evatt in news matters as a logical flow-on from the fact that he was 
only Opposition Leader, and lacked the capacity or authority, while 
in that position, to threaten its position. However, this would be 
simplistic reasoning. Tiw Commission had throughout its history, as 
we have noted before, been very conscious that it had to find formulae 
l<hich would enabJ e it to survive transitions of power from one party to 
another. It was possible that Evatt could be voted into power at any 
election. The Commission realised therefore that it was dealing with a 
man who could cause real trouble in the future. In these circumstances, 
the way in which it dealt with Evatt showed an increasing sel £-
confidence and firm backing for the judgment of its news staff. These 
developments shm<ed how far the Commission had moved in creating a 
News Department in which it could rely to preserve institutional values 
related to its survival. It believed its own news service to be 
'impartial' and able to withstand any scrutiny on that score. Evatt's 
representations were recognised for what they were - attempts to 
influence news selection rather than indicators of a basic dissatisfaction. 
Boyer's Policy for TV Ne«s 
Boyer had investigated overseas television developments during a 
trip to Britain and the United States in 1950. He came back convinced 
th"t the new medium would have even greater influence on the public mjnd 
thm1 radio. Its social implications on the risjng generation were much 
greater and so was its capacity to be used for good or evil. Because 
people tended to believe what they saw it would create a climate of 
values which people would accept. In a report he prepared in 1951, he 
outlined his beliefs in the necessity for the 'strictest supervision' 
of the material used in TV broadcasts. This is because: 
One of the conclusions which can be drawn not only from the 
experience of television but from the history of radio to date, 
is the inevitable tendency of a community to come to accept 
after a time the material of mass media which at first it 
deplored and reprobated ... The entry of television is a 
critical turning point in the life of any community adopting 
it. Its potency for influencing the moral, cultural and 
intellectual climate of a people, and particularly of 
its children, is greater than that of other contemporary 
media.73 
These beliefs governed his approach to news on television. In 
Britain, he had seen the BBC make no effort to televise the news. 
Instead the radio news was simply read from the television studio over 
a slide of the Houses of Parliament. BBC executives had opposed 
American ideas of trying to illustrate the day's events. Ivan Chapman 
says of this period: 
[The BBC] were nudged by the fact that the Americans got into 
television news instantly after the war and there was a 
definite holding out against it. There were people who were 
actually saying that news cannot be televised. In radio news 
at the BBC at that time, in some of the high positions, there 
was a definite and very perceptible rigidity of thinking. 
These men were getting on towards sixty and they couldn't 
accept it in their minds that this new-fangled thing was 
eventually going to hit the nation.74 
In the United States Boyer had seen quite the opposite approach. 
The news was presented by an announcer, who moved about the studio 
frequently to maps and graphics in an attempt to explain the news. He 
introduced film clips and spoke at some length on the more important 
stories. He had noted also the method of reading news items from a 
73. R.J. i'. Boyer, !he Implicat_ions of Television itS a Public Medium, 
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26 November 1951, p.34. Stencilled copy in Rl?/4, Box 2 (no title). 
74. Interview with Ivan Chapman, 9 October 1976. 
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scroll rolling alongside the TV cameras - a type of prompting machine. 
These American methods appalled Boyer, who believed that they distorted 
news values. The BBC approach was by far the one he preferred. He felt 
that in televising the news, the tempta~ion would all;ays be to give first 
choice to those items which could be illustrated and to place out of 
perspective, those which could not. Film and illustration could best be 
reserved for quite. a separate programme, such as the BBC did in their 
Newsreel. This was a fifteen minute programme, based on the cinema 
newsreels, which was not made by news staff but by film producers, and 
which dealt with the more timeless story. It was, according to Chapman, 
made at a very leisurely pace, and usually packaged a week before going 
to air. Boyer saw that film would have to be an adjunct of news, but 
could not, in his opinion, form part of the bulletin. He 1.rote: 
It is not too much to say that if news bulletins are televised, 
the public service in the dissemination of balanced, reliable 
and objective news will have disappeared altogether ... There 
can be no doubt of the importance of this issue, and I am 
impressed with the degree to which the BBC ... is courageous 
enough to present its viewers with an indeterminate 'still'. 
It is precisely this sort of restraint which distinguishes a 
responsible service from an irresponsible one. 75 
By 1953, Boyer felt confident that the reputation of the ABC had 
reached such a high point, based on its 'impartiality' and responsibility 
in news and talks presentation, that it would be given control of the 
national television service under the same conditions as applied to its 
radio service. The Commission's Annual Report for 1953 noted that: 
7,. ~. 
76. 
There seems to have developed a general appreciation of t.he fact 
that the difficult balance bet~<een opposing points of view in 
delicate areas of social, rcli gious and political opinion has 
been maintained. This has been evidenced in comments regarding 
discussions on current affairs and the manner and presentation 
of ne~<s .76 
Boyer, Implications, p.l3. 
ABC, 21st Annual Repor~, year ending 3(1 June 1953 (Commonwealth 
Government Printer, Canberra, 1953), p.6. 
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The Commission had to argue its case ho~<ever before the Royal Commission 
on Television set up in February of the same year to investigate the 
standards and conditions ~<hich should apply to television and the best 
f . d . . . A 1· ?7 means or lntro UClng 1t 1nto ustra 1a. Boyer claimed that the 
Commission had, throughout its history, been involved in differences of 
opinion with the various Governments of the day over its control of 
political and controversial broadcasts. It had constantly met, and 
resisted, attitudes of mind in Canberra which objected to criticism of 
the Government being carried on national stations. 
The Com:nission for its part felt that its function Mas to 
act for the community as a whole. It regarded the opinions 
of His Majesty's Opposition as being of equal importance to 
those of His Majesty's Governments, and the Conunission resisted 
the attitude which each succeeding Government was inclined to 
adopt that because it operated under Common,;eal i.h Statute and 
was financed by fu:1ds authorised by the Commonwealth, it was in 
effect an instrument of the Commom<eal th Government. 78 
He detailed the history of broadcasting legislation to show how the 
inherent conflict between the Minister's powers to direct the Commission 
to broadcast or refrain from broadcasting material and the po«ers given 
to the Commission over political and controversial broadcasts, had finally 
in his opinion, been resolved in the 1948 Broadcasting Act. Boyer pointed 
out that with the increased impact of television, it «as even more 
desirable to vest such coatrols in the ABC rather than run the risk of 
political misuse of the medium. 
The swing of a camera may have political implications quite as 
potent as, for example, the choice of a news i tern or the subject 
of a commentary. If our experience in Australia to date·can be 
taken as any guide, it is obvious that similar political and 
controversial safeguards should be attached to a national 79 television service as has been developed under a radio service. 
77. The Royal Commission was set up trnder the terms of the Television 
Act, 1953. Clause 5 of that Act made it an open question whether 
national television was to be run by the ABC or a specially 
authorised authority. Commercial stations were also to be 
established. See CPD, 17 February 1953, p.33. 
78. R.J.F. Boyer, Evidence submitted t() the Royal Commission on 
Televisicn, 8 June 1953, p.S, Rl7/,1, Box 2. 
79. !bid.' p.6. 
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Boyer also argued that he already had a proven, reliable staff, 
well versed in handling matters with taste and balance, who could run the 
television service in the same way. The differences between the two 
were not great. 
The spectacular techniques of sound and sight 'mixing' are apt 
to overshadow the fact that the work is still 'broadcasting' 
which needs to build and dra1; from the proven and hard won 
structure of radio ... The main reason why TV has become the 
child of existing radio organisations abroad, is that it needed 
the varied resources and experience of sound broadcasting in 
every aspect of its work ... The social consequences of TV are 
such that it is much more important to build on the right 
foundations than to seek spectacular results for their own 
sake. 80 
As far as news was concerned he envisaged a 'simulcast' approach, in 
which the radio news would simply be read over a still of a clock face. 
Discernible here is Boyer's developing fear that TV news, unless 
rigidly controlled, would pass into the hands of technicians, producers 
or cameramen, who would seek to entertain beyond all else. These would 
be men who had no understanding of the institutional attitudes governing 
the approach to news selection and priorities and would destroy the 
delicate structure based on 'impartiality' and 'objectivity' which was 
now receiving public recognition for its qualities of truth and sobriety. 
The standards and control of radio news must apply to television as well. 
The Royal Commission found that "The provision of the programmes 
on the national television service should be the responsibility of the 
ABC". 81 In the Bill to give effect to its recommendations, 82 the 
Government not only endorsed Boyer's reasoning that the ABC's organisation 
was competent to handle television as well as radio, but it also, as he 
had wanted, said that its existing statutory rights and obligations would 
80. Ibid., pp.l7-18. 
--
81. Report of the Royal Commission on Television (Commonwealth 
Government Printer; -canberra;-f:c)s4j-;-p:-2o2-:-
82. The Broadcasting and Television Bill, 1956. 
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apply to both media. The Postmaster-General, Charles Davidson, 
specifically underlined that the Government had approved the Commission 
being given control over the transmission of political and controversial 
matter in the same way as had been done with radio, in 1948. Additionally, the 
end was announced of the practice of appointing Treasury and Postmaster-
General's Department representatives to the Commission, 83 and the ABC 
was given control of its TV technical facilities. The system of 
financing, however, remained unchanged. Thus the Commission won a 
substantial vote of confidence from the Government. The blameless 
'objectivity' of ABC news and its attachment to core consensual values 
no doubt played its part in influencing this decision. Certainly 
financial and radio technical control remained and the freedom won was 
only relative, but in the circumstances it was all that Boyer could have 
hoped for. As Belton says: 
The 1956 Act seemed to justify Boyer's patience and tenacity 
and to answer criticisms that he and the Commission had been 
too passive in thS face of successj ve government encroachment 
on their powers. 8 
Davidson had warned in introducing the Bill that television 
would be introduced only gradually, and future development and expansion 
1<ould depend on the way in which broadcasting organisations responded 
to the challenge. He said: 
There will be problems to face, arising mainly from the social 
impact of television, but these all revolve around, and depend 
for their solution on, the overriding question of the establish-
ment and maintenance of satisfactory programme standards ... it 
can confer very great bencfi ts on the people of the Commonwealth 
if we take prudent steps to avoid the misuse of this powerful 
medium of communication. 85 
83. The previous year, Boyer had had to argue strongly with Anthony (who 
was replaced as Postr.wster-General by Davidson in December 1955) 
over the pr.incip le of the Commission being made up of 1 aymen and not 
specialists. Anthony thought that the addi tiona! technical and 
artistic demands of tdcvis.ion might require more qualified people 
as members. The Government did not pTess the idea. See Bolton, 
Boyer, pp.208-210. Also ABC, ~~nd~~~ualJ~ryor~ (Commonwealth 
Government Printer, Canberr.<, 1954) ,p.4. 
84. Bolton, Boy_er, p.2l2. 
85. CP[)_, 19 April 1956, pp.l533-34. 
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As the date for the beginning of television neared, Boyer felt more and 
more the weight of the responsibility that had been put on the 
Commission's shoulders. On its decisions about the standard of 
material transmitted, depended the moral well-being of hundreds of 
thousands of Australians who had placed their trust in the ABC. Could 
the ABC maintain its standard of 'impartial' news coverage on TV? If it 
failed, it ran a higher risk than ever before of political intervention, 
given the enhanced power of television to effect the public's opinion. 
Could TV news, given the attraction of visual illustration, provide the 
coverage of the positive news of society, and thus enhance democratic 
values, or was it more likely to cover the unpleasant, anti-social 
activities which could prove disruptive to national unity'! Boyer was 
determined that his rigid code of news conduct should prevail. It had 
ensured and enhanced the Commission's chances of political survival. 
Boyer was convinced that the progress in winning back Government 
confidence between the years of 1946 and 1956 were indissolubly 
linked to the growing reputation of the news service for truth and 
accuracy. 'Impartiality' must govern the conduct of TV news or the 
Commission could lose control of national television. The Commission 
warned against interference when it said: 
Television, without doubt, will prove even more powerful in 
influencing community attitudes and beliefs than the sound 
medium and it is of first importance that a service which 
is operated for and financed by the >~hole community s.~ould 
represent both majority and minority opinions of the community 
and not be subject to sectional pressures. 86 
86. ABC, 24th Annual Report, year ending 30 June 1956, p.5. 
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Overseas, developments in Britain had disappointed Boyer. There, 
the Television Act of 1954, which set up the Independent Television 
Authority: "introduced competition for the BBC, which had always 
attached great importance to its monopoly". 87 Independent Television 
News Limited [ITNJ was established in 1955 to supply a news service to 
the independent progrrunme companies. Faced with the prospect of the 
commercial stations having a TV bulletin, the BBC had to bow to the 
inevitable and contemplate one for themselves. Tahu Hole, their New 
~ealand born news editor, was sent to the United States to evaluate the 
;;ec;niques being used there. Hole is remembered by many BBC newsmen as 
the man who imposed such a rigid control over the BBC newsroom that 
"the search for truth was destroyed by the demand for accuracy. Under 
him ... an obsession for political 'balance' made a mockery of proper 
. 1. " 88 )ourna 1sm . Hole appeared to regard the idea of news on television 
with contempt, and when he returned he instituted a system in which the 
p.ewsreader was forbidden to appear on camera. "His thinking was that 
!'Ven the slightest raising of an eyebrow would be suggestive and perhaps 
undermine the credibility of BBC news. " 89 TV news bulletins began on the 
BBC in 1954, using this technique, but after a year, it was changed to 
enable the announcer to appear. New production ideas were introduced 
which enabled more film to be used and more reports from correspondents. 
1hese changes came about because of strong criticism of Hole's news style. 
Chapman says: 
There was almost a revolt in the news service itself against the 
editor because ·11e realised ,;i th great alarm that we weren't 
putting on a proper news service say for the first year of it at 
all ... The newspapers took up this cry and there ,;ere loud 
accusing headlines in the national ne,;spapers that the BBC ~<as 
running a lantern slide service and this wasn't proper news. 90 
87. Report of the Committee on Broadcasting, Cmd.l753, 1960 (the 
Pilkington Committee Report) (HMSO, 1962), p .10. 
88. Dimbleby, Dimbleby, p.270. 
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The certainty that ITN would present a lively bulletin using all 
available techniques was another factor which elicited the altered stance. 
By 1956, the BBC had six reporters working exclusively for television, 
presenting their reports from the studi_o live, with film 'overlay' or 
illustration. Many of them were radio news personalities whose names 
were well known to the British audience. 
Hamilton had been sent overseas in May 1956 to report on TV news 
and newsreel activities. At the time of his departure, no decisions 
had been mad8 abaut the way straight news would be handled, but a 
newsreel was certainly planned. On his return, he explained that 
changes had taken place in the BBC 's approach. He argued strongly 
that ABC should attempt a TV news bulletin from the outs.ot, and that no 
credence could be placed any more in the argument that news had no 
place on television. He reported: 
Television is using the methods which belong to television. 
In doing so, it can and does com;nunicate news ... a film, 
the camera's record of an event, has as much right to the 
term 'news, as a reporter's version printed on paper. Often, 
of course, the communication of an event, television--wise, 
must have far greater impact than a version in words only.91 
These were bold words, knowing Boyer's views en the illustration of 
news. In more recent years, Hamilton confirmed that Boyer had opposed 
a TV news bulletin as such right up to 1956. He recollected that: 
in 1956, when the ABC .vas preparing for television, I had quite 
a tussle with Sir Richard Boyer, ... who said to me in amazement: 
1 But surely you IVGren' t thinking of putting the ABC news on 
television?92 
But Hamilton l<ent even further. Ee urged the full usc of all available 
expertise, raising the point that ~<orricd Boyer most - the loss of 
control to technicians. Jlamil ton said: 
91. Hamilton to Finlay·, 20 .June 1956, ABC File 11/l/l, "TVNei<S". 
9~. \'I.S. Hamilton, "The People and the ~lcdia", in 1111itelock (ed.), 
Aus~E.a~i_~Jl_!'Je\~'-?_J~1cdia_, p. 51. 
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we cannot afford not to gi vc news on television ... What is 
our responsibi.li ty, as ah;ays, j s to see that our standards 
in selection and presentation are maintained at a high level. 
It is just as much our responsibility also, to see that our 
technical standards and professional attainments match our 
standards of responsibility. The advantages offered by 
twentieth century engineering skills are just as much for us as 
for the purveyors of trash. Just· let us use them better. 93 
Hamilton went on to point out that Newsreel, because of its total 
reliance on film, could not cover the essential events of the day, but 
would have to rely on film available. It would be more of a 'magazine'. 
Instead he wanted the ABC to follow overseas practice and present 'live 
news' which uses annoWlcer, film of the day, and film rE:lated to the 
day's events. There could be 'live' inserts from outside locations, maps, 
still photographs, reporters on camera and interviewing people in the 
news, and 'back projections' behind the annotmcer. He had seen all of 
these techniques in Britain and on American networks and he felt they 
could be developed with practice in the ABC. He recommended a five 
minute news bulletin to begin with, a ten minute Newsreel three times 
a week, and a longer 30 minute weekend magazine, once a week. Hamilton's 
report had concentrated heavily on the exciting and challenging news 
presentation methods in use overseas, which had impressed him 
considerably. He had little to say about the dangers of attempting to 
illustrate the news, which were so evident to Boyer. He had however 
thought it politic to add: 
no matter how skilled we become in handling the medium, we 
should aim definitely to avoid the temptation of becoming too 
good in technique, being wrapped up in the trappings of the 
medium rather than in watching always for the maximum effect on 
the viewer. For this is a point at which dnzling technique, as 
in newspaper or radio news, can tend to defeat the primary object -
giving the ncws.94 
93. Hamilton to Finlay, 20 June 1956, ll/1/1. 
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TI1is ~<as not enough to reassure Boyer. He ~<as ~<orried about the 
implications of Hamilton's enthusiasm for the trappings of overseas 
television news. He expressed his concern about the report to Moses: 
It ... does in general confirm my worst fears on the position 
~<hich may face us in respect of our ne~<s service to the 
Australian community ... our ne~<s service has not only been 
a piece of acceptable radio programme but a most vital 
contribution not only to honest reportage, but to the health 
of our democracy. Indeed, it may ~<ell be, in future history, 
that our news service 1vill bulk large in the formative 
influence of our nation ... I ~<ould regard it as a tragedy of 
the first order if the change in the medium ~<ere in any ~<ay 
to alter the type and quality of service ~<e are already 
offering in this field.95 
Boyer continued in similar despondent vein. He felt that the danger 
1 ay in TV ne~<s technique having an adverse effect on the moral and 
mental climate of the people. The effect of the commercial stations 
would be bad, as it had been in Britain, ~<here: 
the BBC has felt itself compelled to conform to the ITA 
pressure for televised ne~<s to a9gegree that its o~<n convictions ~<ould have rejected. 
If the ABC ne~<s allo~<ed itself to surrender to the public appetite for 
visual illustration instead of 'straight' and 'balanced' ne~<s, it ~<Ould 
be a major defeat. 
Mr Hamilton's instincts are all on the side of the angels, but 
he, like all of us, is caught up in this ne~< dilemma ... 
uttering the proven principles ~<hich have been our guide so far, 
but turning the technical and intimate achievement of them over 
to the production boys in the TV studios ~<hose interest must of 
necessity be that of visual sho~<manship. 9 7 
Visual illustration, said Boyer, must take second place to balance and 
essential news priori ties. He was, quite rightly, as it turned out, 
becoming aware of the distinct possibility of a dispute arising over 
different conceptions of audience. The audience which had to be protected 
from the bad effects of the medium but instead be morally uplifted by the 
repetition of radio news, with minimum illustration, was hardly likely to 
95. Boyer to Moses, 22 July 1956. ABC Archives, "Boyer's Correspondence". 
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appeal to journalists who saw that visuals could enhance the meaning 
of news items. 
Hamilton hastened to place his mind at rest. The News D.epartment, 
he told Boyer, would not be betrayed by the bright lights of television. 
'Objectivity• and 'responsibility' ~<auld continue to be the guiding 
stars. He had noticed the tendency overseas for cameramen and 
producers to be given semi-editorial responsibility but he would not 
allow it in Australia. He would make sure that his journalists knew 
enough about television that they would not have to rely in this way 
on the technical staff. 
The Commission had a long discussion with Hami 1 ton about his 
plans at its meeting in September 1956. He affirmed his intention to 
stick rigorously to the standards of radio news in television, but argued 
that it ~;as necessary to illustrate the news to allow viewers to gain 
greater understanding of the sig.1ificance of the items used. The 
Commission agreed that TV news would begin and that it would be five 
minutes initially, but lvith ~;eather forecast and a ne~<sreel, would take 
up a total segment of fifteen minutes. It urged that the bulletin be 
extended to fifteen minutes as soon as possible, so that the bulletin 
would match the radio news in content and length. It then ruled: 
that the selection of news for inclusion in television news 
bulletins should be based on the standards now applied in 
s01md broadcasting and should not be influenced by the 
avail2.bility of illustrations. The Commission considers that in 
television the obj ec:ti ve of t 11e news staff should be to present 
all the important news, whether it can be illustrated or not. 98 
Here was the origin of a conflict between the Commission and its Editor-
in-Chief and TV ne~;s staff which continued until the death of Boyer in 
1961. The Commission had survived and prospered with news written to an 
essentially safe but credible formula. The selection and emphasis given 
98. Minute of Commission meeting of 27-28 September 1956. 
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to items were in accordance with the Cor.1mission 's sense of community 
values and the necessity to win confidence within the political 
environment. New criteria for selection coDld threaten the 
relationship the Conunission had established with the institutions which 
represented power and influence. It is note1-1orthy that in Hamil ton's 
perioJ, unspecified elites are usually cited as expressing approval for 
the news service in Annual Reports. In 1951, increasing appreciation 
had come not only from individual listeners but from "responsible 
public bodies". 99 In 1953, there was evidence of support from 
"important public and commercial organisations, welfare bodies and 
cultural movements". 100 The importance of such gestures of approval and 
acceptance to the Commission is obvious. Television could not be 
allowed to interfere with the Commission's standing within the 
establishment. 
The Conflict over Illustration 
ABC television went on air in Sydney for the first time on 
5 November 1956. There were news bulletins six nights a week, Sunday 
being excluded and newsreels on four nights. Hamilton reported that 
in the first few nights of operation, the ABC had badly beaten TCN 101 
on two occ~sions in getting news agency film to air. The TV news 
staff had accumulated a pool of film for its newsreel which ranged from 
the assimilation of Aborigines to experimcn ts with fruit fly. According 
to Chapman, who had been re-engaged by the ABC to help start the 
television service, "There was a tremendous excitement about it all and 
99. ABC, 19th Annual Report, year ending 30 June 1951 (Commonwealth 
Government Printer, Canberra) , p. 15. 
100. ABC, 21st Annual Report, p.l7. 
101. One of the two commercial stations which began transmission in 
Sydney in l956. The ether ,;as ATN. 
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they worked terribly hard and there was magnificent team spirit". 102 
Unli'ke th0 BBC, there were no traumas about putting an announcer in 
front of camera to read the news. The ABC did this from the beginning. 
But given the Commission directive about relating the content to radio 
news, there were no attempts to copy the BBC approach of employing 
full·time television reporters who appeared on camera to give their 
reports. There was no thought given to putting reporters' pieces or 
interviews on air live, as the BBC were doing. 
The ABC felt that every phase of the operation had to be 
disciplined and be in our control, and by doing it ... 
on film it becomes a packa<::e, y~H- time it and you kno~< 
exactly what's going tc happen. .; 
The ne~<sreel being dubbed and prepared from film which was in 
hand the previous day, did not contain any coverage of the day's 
events on which it was programmed. A compulsion was therefore felt, 
by journalists who had been newly trained in film direction and writing 
techniques, to obtain coverage of the day's news and use it in the 
bulletin. Once it was decided to film some event, the edited end-
product frequently ran to one or two minutes longer than the time 
alloted to the tightly edited radio bulletin version of the same story. 
Sometimes, a report was included in TV news, of an event which was not 
considered newsworthy by radio news. From these obvious differences in 
approach emerged a noticeable hardening in the Commission's attitude. 
On 26 April 1957, Hamilton was summoned before the Commission. 
At this meeting, Boyer seriously considered adopting the old BBC format 
of news without any visuals at all. The Commission and Hamilton argued 
over the relative merits of having the announcer in vision reading the 
Yad1o 1:e"s without alteration, having the announcer's voice behind some 
indeterm:i.nate still picture, or having some pictures included. Boyer 
had retumed to the concept of TV ne"s he had admired on the BBC in 1950. 
102. Interview "i th Ivan Chapman, 9 October 1976. 
103. Ibid. 
~ ~! 
427a 
Finally the Commission decided in favour of illustration but with such 
strict rules attached that chances of including any meaningful film were 
minimised. The i terns used on TV were to be word for word the same as 
on radio. The lead story had to be the same, but some variation in 
order was allowed, a concession that was not related to the 
availability of film, but was to cater for the metropolitan audience 
for television, as distinct from the national audience for radio. 
The time allocated for each story had to be the same in both media and 
there was to be a reduction in the number of stills being used, which 
were now restricted to personalities who had not previously been 
featured in the news. Photos of well-known personalities were not to be 
used. This meant that if there was some illustrative film of a story 
which radio ne1;s had judged 1;orthy of inclusion in its bulletins, it 
could be used, as long as it did not exceed the time given to it on 
radio. The fact that a story had been filmed gave it absolutely no 
priority over stories which had not received this treatment. Finally, 
the Commission urged that fifteen minute bulletins be started as soon 
as possible so that all radio news items could be repeated on 
television. 
The impact of this directive on the TV news staff was immediate 
and obvious. It was decided to resist it at every opportunity. Keith 
Fre.ser, who had been appointed Assistant to the Editor-in-Chief 
(Television) and put in charge of the operation at Gore Hill, had been 
sent overseas for eighteen months to study TV news presentation in 
Britain, the United States, Canada and France. He returned in 1956, 
shortly before the ABC transmissionsbegan only to find his newly 
acquired professional kn01dedge was not to be used to the full, and 
that, although he was one of the more senior and experienced newsmen, 
his judgments were being constantly questioned and he was under the 
closest supervision. He expresses his_ feelings about this situation 
by saying: 
r 
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I'd worked like a slave and I knew what I was about and I was 
one of the founding working journalists of the ABC news service, 
impregnated up to my bloody ears in the need for an honest 
factual news service, and I find myself being supervised down 
to the greatest detail on the basis that I was going to sell the 104 damn place down the river and turn it into a Mutt and Jeff cartoon. 
He decided to oppose the Commission's viewpoint in two ways. He would 
argue as strongly as he could in writing or in person, while at the same 
time he would bend and break the rules. Hamilton and Moses supported 
him. In his words: 
I pointed out that I couldn't carry out that instruction, that I 
had to integrate film and graphics, all sorts of weird, and 
interesting and novel and beautiful elements into this 
television news bulletin because it wasn't a radio bulletin 
and I could not mtcke it radio with pictures, that I would 
write a story diffe1·ently and treat it differently and some 
stories I wouldn '£ 1;ant at all from radio, because I could do 
better with film. OS 
Those writing scripts for film found themselves inhibited and not able 
to venture from the factual emotionless style that was set down for 
radio. According to Chapman: 
[the Commission] didn't like any imaginative film ,;riting 
because of the fear that this could twist the meaning, over-
emphasise a point ... In other words, it never quite got 
through to them that a picture is a visual thing and could bi 
enhanced with the proper restrained well-written commentary. 06 
The Commission, for its part, could once again point to BBC 
example. In the first few months of BBC television news in 1954, radio 
news decided the order of items, on the instruction of Hole. Chapman 
however recalls that they were less dogmatic about it and the rule was 
relaxed very soon. A. G. Lowndes, who strongly backed Boyer's news 
policy as a Commissioner, and who took a keen interest in news matters, 
defends these early directives on the grounds that some film found 
104. Interview 1-1ith Keith Fraser,25 September 1975. Fraser had been 
News Editor in Queensland from 1949 to 1955. 
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its way into news bulletins v1hich had no news value, and ,;as included 
simply because it was available. He remembers: 
a famous example, which we joked about for years. A hen laid 
the biggest egg that had been seen for a long time and we had 
a camera team and God knows ;;hat go out to some remote 
suburb of Sydney to take photographs of the lady whose hen had 
produced this egg, and the egg ... and we reckoned there'd 
been several things in the news that day IB't could have been 
very well covered ... significant things. 
Many times Fraser was called upon to explain 1;hy the new directive 
was not being rigidly followed. Hamilton had to analyse bulletins and 
report to the Commission. Fraser himself was frequently interviewed by 
Boyer or the Commission. At its meeting in July the Commission decided 
that Hamilton and Fraser should be informed officially of the concern of 
members that the dil·ective was not being observed. Boyer reported that 
stills were being used wmecessaril.y. The picture of the Chairman of the 
Milk Board had been held in vision for the entire length of an item. 
Also, a film showing Beale, the Minister for Supply inspecting a 
muo1i tions factory had been shown. This, in Boyer's opinion, should 
never have qualified for inclusion in the news. There had been some 
film dealing with the auctioning of a car seized by Customs, which had 
lasted for two minutes, whereas the same item on radio lasted only a 
few seconds. This according to Boyer meant that it was given more 
prominence than was justified. This and a film dealing with the finish 
of the Ampol car trial had taken up nearly half of the time of the 
complete bulletin. The Commission had no objection to such films 
going into Newsreel, but TV news 1;as definitely not the place. 
Hamilton now became very angry. lie resented personal criticism 
of any kind, and in Moses's view was hypersensi ti.ve. Because of the 
Commission's high regard for him and his judgment up to this point, he 
107. Interview with A.G. Lm;nJes, 20 January 1976. 
43o 
had been largely left alonP- to run the Ne1,·s llepartment. He wrote to 
Moses: 
In my eight years as Edito:.·-in-Chief the Commission has never 
felt it necessary to give me a di<·ective in sound news. I 
appreciate their trust and it would be a poor commentary on 
my intelligence and my ethical standards to suggest that I 
would now deliberately betray that trust.lOS 
He defended his staff claiming that the Commission rebuke had 
seriously affected morale. 1'/hen they heard, "They were like whipped 
children, hurt and bewildered. It is my job now to built up again 
their morale and enthusiasm". 109 Fraser, he claimed, had been 
stricter in his enforcement of standards than any censor. Hamilton 
then once more pointed out what had been explained before - that film 
coverage, particularly with sound on film, takes longer than a 
straight radio story read by an announcer. He instanced the 
difficulties involved in trying to match the television and radio cover 
in such a story as the present at ion of a model of the Opera House, by 
the designer Joern Utzon, to the ;,,S.W. Premier. Worth only a fm> 
1 ines on radio, the film story ran for a minute to allow the model to 
be properly examined. What about a recent spccc:h by the American 
Ambassador, he asked, in which he spoke very slowly and which was filmed 
with sound? To cut this film back to the length of the radio coverage 
would have made it useless. It had been run for three minutes to allow 
the Hlan to say anything at all. In asking for "guidance 1' in such 
instances, Hamilton 1•as in fact, ridiculing the whole Commission approach. 
Something of the nature of the paucity of any film coverage in the 
bulletins of the time can be gauged from the fact th;:,t on several 
evenings there had been no illustration at all. .Just fifteen minutes 
of the announcer reading. Finally, Hamilton called into qu8stion the 
108. Hamilton to Moses, 7 August 19S7, ll/l/l. 
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restrictions on the use of stills. He asked how was one to know 
whether a person had never been in the news before, and if this was the 
case, he doubted whether anyone would have stills available. 
Fraser and Hamil ton were becoming_ very frustrated at their 
inability to explain their point of view as professional newsmen, to the 
laymen on the Commission. Fraser feels that the Commissioners should 
never have let themselves become so involved in the matters concerning 
I 
professional skills, which they did not understand. Lmmdes however 
is of the opinion that frequent discussion of points of programme 
detail helped the Commission identify areas 1-1hich needed large-scale 
decision making. If the same point cropped up several times, then it 
was worth examining to see whether some broad policy directive was 
called for. Out of minor points frequently arose major decisions. 
Hamilton was now instructed to institute the strictest control 
of TV news to ensure the Commission's wishes ••ere followed. Chapman 
remembers. the 
famous pho<~e call about five o'clock every afternoon from 
[Hamilton) to our operation at Gore Hill and if radio news 
decided that you'd lead on a certain story, well my goodness 
me, no matter Khat pictures you had or hm; dramatic they 1-1ere, 
you led with the dull thing chosen by radio, 1-1hich was a very 
bad, shackling thing we all felt ... we were being fettered 
by the older minds of radio who didn't want to see this thing 
spread its wings and fly.llO 
The number of journalists 1-1orking with Fraser at Gore Hill had 
grown to seven by mid-1957, with three film editors and one script 
assistant. Three cine-cameramen were working full-time for news. The 
following year, in September 1958, the Commission approved the 
appointment of three additional journalists in order to increase the 
number of newsreels a 1;eek from four to five and to introduce a 
bulletin on Sunday evenings. The decision •.;as also to allow for the 
110. Interview with Ivan Chapman, 9 October 1976. 
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expansion of existing technical facilities, so that more film 
reporting and filmed intervic~;s could be done. Similar expansion ,;as 
~:pproved for Melbourne and permission in principle ~;as obtained for 
extra positions when the second bulletin.at 10 p.m. was begun. 
Thus the capacity for filming was increased, particularly with the 
ordering of more sound cameras, while the restrictions on the use of 
same·-day, up-to-the-minute material were maintained. At the same 
meeting of the Commission, approval was refused for the separation of 
the newsreel from the main TV bulletin at 6.45 p.m. and the programming 
of it at 10 p.m. Boyer realised that if the newsreel followed 
immediately upon the bulletin, it alleviated somewhat the stark nature 
of the news. A repeat of newsreel l<as permitted at 10 p.m. 
TI1e late 10 p.m. bulletin was introduced in early 1959 but still 
the Commission remained adamant that both editions of TV ne,;s should be 
restricted to the reading of the main radio news items of the day with 
minimum of illustration. It found it necessary to confirm this policy 
in December 1958 and again in February 1959. In between Commission 
resolutions, Boyer, Lowndes, Moses, Hamilton and Fraser were engaged in 
frequent meetings, often acrimonious, about the role of film and stills 
in news bulletins. Fraser says: 
I appeared before that Commission more often than the minutes 
secretary, I think ... but in all these vicissitudes, oddly 
enough, the Chief Executive of the ABC ["loses] was one hundred 
per cent behind me. He took the attitude, and I heard him say 
this on a number of occasions, well we've got the man there. 
Why the devil don't we let him go and judge his bulletins on 
what we think a television bulletin should be. But no ... lll 
lll. Interview with Keith Fraser, 25 September 1975. 
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lne Coml!lission had shown such a sensi ti vi ty about TV news that 
they had felt it necessary to j ntcrvene on many other relatively minor 
matters, in addition to the a_uestion of illustration. This increased 
the frustration of the TV news staff. .They twice questioned the 
suitability of the set being used and caused changes to be made. In 
March 1959, the Commission discussed the use of music in bulletins and 
in newsreel and came to the conclusion that the practice must cease. It 
was only prepared to allow it in special circumstances where there might 
be a particularly long film sequence in newsreel with no spoken 
commentary. It felt that: 
Apart from diverting attention, the use of background music 
can introduce an emotional clement. This is, of course, 
particularly undesirable in the case of news bulletins. We 
require our news readers not to show any emotional reaction to 
the content of the bulletins and we must be careful to maintain 
this attitude in other aspects of TV presentation .112 
Nothing illustrates better the dilemma confronting Boyer than this 
directive, which tried to carry on the policy tradition, em&nating 
from the coverage of the Queensland railway strike, that all emotion 
should be squeezed from news. In the writing of news for radio, 
particularly if voice reports and actualities are excluded, such a 
policy can achieve its aim. In television, where any film is likely to 
carry emotional overtones, the extent of which depends on the story 
being covered, it is impossible to make a product ~<hich docs not 
affect the viewer in one way or another. Boyer always failed to 
appreciate the argument that i 1 lustration could assist in understanding. 
Illustration, to him, meant influencing the viewer in some way in the 
judgments they made on the essential news items of the day. This brings 
us to the basic fallacy in lloycr's perennial justification for the 
importance that he att1d12d to news. If ne><s was "to inform listeners 
on the matters o2ssent ial to an understand.i. ng and appreciation of the 
112. Moses to 1\ctinp, Eclitor-in-Chi<'f, 16 Harch 1959, 11/1/l. 
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problems of a modern democratic way of life" 113 in order that the 
public's attachment to democratic ways and institutions be strengthened, 
much would seem to depend on the degree of understanding by the 
audience of the issues reported. Boyer felt that news could.serve 
democracy by giving the public the bare essentials on which they could 
make decisions on matters of controversy, but he was never prepared to 
go beyond this and actively promote understanding by allowing the 
addition of supplementary information. It is extremely doubtful that 
the spartan, heavily-subbed product of news at this time aided public 
understanding at all. It is a further instance of symbolic reassurance. 
lloyer frequently proclaimed the virtues of the news service - its truth, 
its credibility - and the fact that it was promoting democracy and 
national 1mi ty, by providing the means for greater comprehension of 
social issues, when it fact it failed to tal~e the necessary steps to do 
so. We have quoted Edelman before on this phenomenon. His thesis is 
that the public respond to such gestures or ritualistic assertions 
that goals have been reached, are reassured and therefore acquiescent. 
Although failing to assist in audience understanding, Boyer's precepts 
were however successful in preserving public confidence in the 
institutions around which the country's life was ordered. Nordenstreng 
point out that popularity and belief in the reliability of a news 
service frequently conceal the basic failure to communicate information. 
Little is remembered of the content. Instead it becomes a daily ritual. 
In such a situation news programs do not fulfil t:1eir 
function, which is the transmission of information; they begin 
to serve a completely different purpose, ,;hereby the following 
of ne><s broadcasts becomes r, ritual, a custom serving to 
maintain a feeling of security .114 
Such a feeling serves to maintain confidence in those in positions of 
power. 
------------------
113. ABC, 24th Annual Report, p.21. 
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Music in news bulletins has alvmys been regarded as doubtful news 
practice, by journalists VJOrking in the medium, and Fraser did not 
contest this point. But he was not so sanguine about its absence from 
newsreel and he was particularly vehement in arguing for its retention 
before Boyer and Lowndes. Ne"sreel was produced in a studio, with music 
and sound effects being mixed with the announcer's voice in much the same 
way as the cinema ne11sreels. To remove the music, in the opinion of the 
TV news staff, would have taken away much of its appeal. Fraser's plan 
of campaign, to show up the Commission's lack of appreciation of the 
finer points of film work, cons is ted of running nm;sree 1 for several 
nights with only the announcer's voice being heard. Although the 
Commission did not specify that sound effects be also removed, Fraser 
did so. There were long interludes of silence between the sections of 
narration. The effect was so bad that Fraser had no doubts about the 
outcome. He says 
I was never told to put the music back, but I put it back 
and no-one objected ... and that was the way I operated there. 
I used to get these directives not to do a thing, I'd scream 
blue murder, eventually obey the directive and then sneak 
disobedience in, ei thcr piecemeal, or the best way I could .115 
Faced with this hostile climate of resistance to its policies, 
the Commission decided in March 1960, that it could no longer leave any 
discretion about the inclusion of film to either Hamilton or Fraser. It 
ordered that for a trial period of one month, no more than two minutes 
of film could be included in a fifteen minute bulletin. Local film was 
to be moved almost entirely into newsreel, which could be extended for 
that purpose. Hamil ton was irate. 
I cannot pretcnt [he said], that I am at all happy about the 
Commission's direction ... I will of course carry out the 
Commission's direction as instructed but I am bound to say, 
since I was not consulted, that the decision taken and to be 
pursued is contrary to my best professional advice. The idea of 
a rigid mathematical formula rep being cdi to rial responsibility 
and judgement is foreign to all my thinking.ll6 
115. Interview with Keith Fraser, 28 November 1975. 
116. Hamilton to Hoo,cs, 30 March 1960, ll/1/1. 
436 
Hamil ton pointed out the procedural problems which this would involve. 
Technical and staffing difficulties made it impossible to include 
any same day film in the newsreel which was 'pre-packaged' before 
local material became available. Additional local film would have to 
be added to the newsreel, when the bulletin was actually being produced 
but the effect would be clumsy, because it would not be 'dubbed', with 
sound mixed, as the newsreel was. The arbitrary separation of the 
news of the day from the film of the same events, was also seen as 
introducing obvious repetition. The Commission was unmoved by these 
arguments. The policy was confirmed and made permanent at its 
meeting in May. The two minutes could however be averaged over a 
week, with a maximum of two and a half in any one night. 
The issue this time almost cost Hamilton his job. According to 
Moses, Hamilton strongly resented the implications by the Commission 
that the TV news was not being presented with sufficient attention to 
its instructions. He had lost his temper at one meeting at which this 
was discussed, and two months later, when it was going to be brought up 
again, Moses felt his behaviour, if repeated, might put his position at 
. k 117 some r1s . In his words: 
I knew he was going to be asked a few questions and I sent 
Betty Cook [Moses's Executive Assistant] out to have a talk 
with him first and tell him for goodness sake, not to allow 
himself to lose his temper or anything and I wanted him to be 
very calm ... and he was calm at that one interview ... he was 
inclined to fly off the handle. That's why I had to protect 
him. He, I think, would !lave sacked himself that time in 
Perth if he'd just let himself go.ll8 
Lowndes remembers this and other confrontations with Hamilton: 
117. The two meetings of the Commission involved were those in 
Adelaide, 11-14 March 1960 and in Perth on 5-7 ~lay 1960. 
118. Interview with Sir Charles Moses, 8 February 1976. 
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There were r.1any times when we had Wally Hamil ton in and when 
I can remoElber the atmosp:1ere cmd my meatal picture of him, 
where his face would g_o reel, when:~ his voice h'as raised, where 
he'd get terribly dignified and almost pompous, almost speaking 
like an Archbishop ... laying dmm the J.aw to the Commission 
and saying that this ~ms a matter of principle _119 
Hamilton could only advise his Tv· journalists to make the best of 
a bad situation. There was nothing to prevent more illustration in 
bulletins by the use of other methods such 2.s graphics. Film could be 
bctt<:r planned and better shot so that the two minutes is made as 
effective as possible. Fraser had to time each film used and report to 
Hamilton with details and his reasons for using it. Frequently he 
exceeded the tirae allowed and this was reported to Iloyer. Fraser would 
then be called to Boyer's office. After about six months of this 
"impossible situation", as Fraser calls it, he suddenly perceived that 
the arrival and more widespread use of sound cameras could help undermine 
the Commission's position. In his words 
I got hold of a brilliant idea, as I thought. By that time, we 
were getting sound cameras, so ,;e were doing interviews, and one 
day ... I said to myself, now if I put a roan up there interviewing 
him, or getting him to make a statement, that's not film, that's 
words. So I did this. And then I reported back, seven minutes 
of film ... but only two and a half minutes of Teal fi lm.120 
For three or four days Boyer, Lmmdes, Moses and Hamil ton argued a.bout 
the definition of film as a result of Fraser's challenge. Eventually he 
was told that his definition was accepted. A sound on film interview or 
speech was not to be included in the two minutes allowed. It was a 
development that marked the end of the restrictions on the use of film 
in news. Tile floodgates were opened. Fraser say that after the sound 
on film ruling "we cheated like hell every single day, because I would 
say that that ban's severity lasted no longer tha.n six months ... we 
started to just jam tile stuff through on our mm assessment" . 121 
-----------
119. Interview with A.G. Lowndes, 20 January 1976. 
120. Interview with Keith Fraser, 25 Septemb21· 1975. 
121. Ibid. 
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Another factor in the lessened interest in the subject of film 
in news was undoubtedly the long illness and death of Boyer on 5 June 
1961. ll'e have dwelt at length on his obsession with the importance of 
'pure' and factual ne.vs values being essential to the Commission's 
survival and standing in Australian society and with news being the 
vanguard of the Commission's efforts to carve for itself a unique and 
safer place in the hierarchy of values by promoting solid support for 
the Australian democratic way of life. Chairmen after Boyer were less 
concerned with the supposed dangers of a more flexible approach to the 
selection of news on television, than they were about the arrival on the 
scene of current affairs television l<hich appeared to contradict and 
challenge every principle previously applied to the presentation of 
controversy on the ABC. 'Four Corners', the first of these programmes 
went to air fol" the first time on 19 August 1961. Lowndes records 
that Commission meetings chaired by Boyer's successor, Dr Ralph 
Darling, had quite a different emphasis. In his view, the Commission's 
preoccupation with news in Boyer's time "reflected the character of the 
Chairman, the Chairman's interests and the Chairman's personality". 122 
After a period of five years during which the Commission's directive 
on the allowable amount of news film was largely ignored, it decided to 
regularise the situation by rescinding the relevant minutes and instead 
officially recording that it was more desirable to allow flexibility in 
the choice of film material. 123 Instead of the old idea of extending 
Newsreel to reduce the film usage in news, the bulletin could now be 
extended at the expense of the time devoted to newsreel. The place of 
film in bulletin was at last sanctioned. Nevertheless, film could only be 
used if it was ne1;sworthy and up to standard and not simply because of its 
122. Intervie1; tvith A.G. Lowndes, 20 January 1976. 
123. Minute of Commission meeting of Fcllruary 1966. 
' 
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availability. TI1e links with radio news 11ere also subsequently 
weakened but retained. Currently the rule still stands that the six 
main radio stories must be found a place in the TV bulletin. 
Lowndes does not no~< feel that the successful challenge to 
Boyer's policy by the TV news section amounted to a defeat for the 
C01runission. His assessment is that the senior staff of the Commission, 
such as Fraser and Hamilton, had to understand that they could not 
simply indulge their professional whims without taking into account 
their responsibility to the audience, and he regarded himself as 
representative of the audience. Lm;ndes feels that the mere fact that 
the Commission can demand explanations and justifications is in itself 
useful because it forces the staff to take Commission viewpoints into 
account in their work. Even if there is no follow-up action, as in the 
case of the restriction of news film to two minutes, the Commission 
is assured that the officer concerned will exercise responsibility, 
within the degree of freedom cllcwed him, because he knows that what he 
does is under close scrutiny. He sums up the episode by saying: 
[I) thought it was worth having the argument. I think it had 
some impact. It might have appeared to have been completely 
discarded but it would have still been in the mind - there's 
someone looking over our shoulders ... I think that with the 
material that was available to us at that time, it wasn't bad 
that we took a stand. We didn't have the same sort of 
facilities to go out and get good film. To fill in, because 
it was television, they would put in rubbish. I think it's as 
simple as that. But I don't think there was any reluctance to 
relax the thing later on.l24 
In Lowndes's view the Commission had successfully fulfilled it"s role 
of insisting on accountability. It had successfully impressed its 
own institutional standpoint on the ABC's responsibility to its audience 
on its TV news staff to the extent that they had to take this into 
account in daily decision making. ;fuile conceding these points, it is 
124. Interview with A.G. Lowndec, 20 January 1976. 
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impossible to ignore the fact that the Conunission was unable, over a 
period of six years, to impose the degree of control over TV news content 
that it desired and finally abandoned Boyer's standards. To this consider-
able extent, Commission policy was not implemented. 
Summary 
The Commission policy to curtail visual illustration in TV News 
was fol101;ed by reso lotions, directives, and follow-up discussions in 
an attempt to enforce it. It was thus a goal which was followed by 
action geared to achievement, and can therefore be studied as an example 
of attempted implementation of a programme. As with the first two cases 
we have dealt with, participants in the programme at the various decision 
points were few, thus removing one of the major obstacles to implementa-
tion. The more participants, the greater the number of diverse 
perspectives that are encountered, and tt:e greater the possibility 
therefore of varying delays to the programme. Fewer problems are met 
with fewer people involved and the greater are the chances of avoiding 
delays and maintaining high positive intensity. The 1956 TV News 
policy also had several other factors which would appear to have 
contributed further to its chances of fulfilment. Unlike our two 
previous examples, the Government was not an active participant, not did 
the two key participants in news, Hamilton and Fraser, have a history 
of opposition and antagonism towards the Commission such as Dixon 
possessed. On the contrary, the Commission felt supreme confidence 
in Hamilton, and his capacity to swing his staff behind its policies. 
Pressman and Wi ldavsky say: "To assume reasonable prospects of 
programme implementation it is necessary to have a high probability of 
0 f . . ., 125 
co-operation rom every pa.rt1c1pant· . The Commission may reasonably 
12S. Pressman and l'iilda.vsky, }J1lplell1_~tatio~, p.l32. 
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have expected this, but it still persisted with its policy even when 
disagreements were obvious. Pressman and 1\'ildavsky point out that when 
there is a conflict of goals, coercion, wwhich might produce a 
superficial acquiescence, conceals real problems which can adversely 
affect implementation. Hamilton and Fraser agreed to follow Commission 
policy under duress, but still opposed it in reality and worked 
against it. Coercion therefore does not resolve the problems, but 
merely conceals them. If implementation is to be successful it must 
be as a result of the co-operation of the participants. Once Hamilton 
and Fraser tacitly opposed Commission policy, with, in Fraser's case, 
staff resources and following which backed him, the chances of 
implementation diminished rapidly. As both men were negative 
participants, blocking the programme in the hope of eventually winning 
concessions, delays occurred with a consequent reduction in intensity. 
Implementation was not possible because too little attention was paid by 
the Commission to ascertaining responses to its prograw.me at the time the 
Boyer policy was initiated. While attempts were made to break dmvn the 
resistance, they ~eerc not on the basis of reaching an acconunodation or 
striking a bargain . There was no modification made to the original 
progra1mne to win over the t<vo negative partidpants. Ultimate agreement 
cannot be achieved in these circumstances, The original programme was 
rigidly adhered to, and even toughened to try to secure acceptance. So 
the progranune eventually foundered bzcause no attemp·c was made to find 
out the probability of carrying out of the 'routine' steps for its 
execution. This is the essential problem in implementation. There can 
be no certitude that once the programme has been set in motion, the 
steps necessary are routine and will look after themselves. The problems 
.of implementation must be considered at the same time as the policy 
itself. 
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As the paternalistic policies of Boyer were being advocated in 
their purest form, the very similar policies which were the hallmark of 
Reith were crumbling at the BBC under the assault of the new foTces 
released by television. The struggle within the BBC News Department 
against the conservative old guard, which we have already referred to, 
was one of the earliest challenges. Soon after came the advent of 
Panorama, chaired by Richard Dimbleby, a Talks Department production, which 
took the first tentative steps into the mud of the real 
'"orld from whicl) [the Corporation] had flinched for more than 
~hirty years. 126 
Topics were aired which had been taboo before. Its reporters were given 
a much greater degree of freedom than had ever been the case in the BBC 
before. "It was a new type of reporting, in which the interviewer assumed 
h . 1 d h d . . . . d . "127 t e rlglt, an t e uty, to 1nqu1re, 1nvest1gate an cross-exam1ne. 
Some of the reports on Panorama began to question aspects of Government 
policy, unthinkable under Reith. During the Suez crisis in 1956, the 
Governors decided to ask Labor to reply to the Government statement on 
the situation, much against the wishes of the Prime Minister Eden and his 
cabinet, who replied with di:,:e threats ag:1inst the CoYporation. Reith 
railed against such indicators of the changed climate of thinking at the 
BBC but was no longer in a position to influence events. In 1963, the 
Director-General William Haley had told him that television had prevented 
a return by the BRC to Reithian values. 128 By 1964, he was totally in 
opposition to everything Director-General Hugh Carleton-Greene was doing. 
He. wrote: 
I lead; he follows the crowd in all its disgusting 
manifestations of the age ... Without any reservation he 129 gives the crmvd public what it wants; I would not, did not. 
126. Dimbleby, Dimbleby, p.272. The programme had existed from 1953, 
but did not-brcaknew ground until Dimbleby was engaged as 'chairman' 
or 1 8nchorman 1 • 
127. Dimbleby, lhmbleby, p. 278. 
128. See Charles Stuart (ed.), Reith Diaries, p.481. 
129. Charles Stuart (ed.), Reith Dlai·ics, p.SlO. 
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Burns has concluded that Reithism as an influence diminished 
because of the advent of television and because of the end of the 
BBC's monopoly of broadcasting which brought to a close its role of 
b~ing the sole judge and arbiter on taste and morals for its audience. 
He notes that with television came a new type of employee, who did not 
share the old ethos and purpose, and in news and allied programmes, was 
concerned with audience building, and presentation techniques geared to 
new interviewing and reporting styles. 
Burne and McQuail question whether Reithism could have existed in 
the changed social climate in Britain in the nineteen-fifties. McQuai 1 
goes on to define tendencies which he sees as replacing the paternalistic 
concept of audience. One of these is professionalism. It is based on 
a special skill but subject to ethical and institutional codes of 
behaviour. It is marked by a sense of calling, a growth of autonomy and 
a feeling that practitioners ought to be able to make their 
own decisions without external pressures from clients or 
others outside their professional groups.l30 
Another tendency is that of ritualism, in which well-tried formulas 
are maintained, particularly those with audience appeal, thus enabling 
anxieties about audiences to be allayed, at the expense of freedom and 
creativity. He notes that there is great difficulty in accurately 
perceiving the audience, there being little feedback. Audience research 
figures are not themselves a guide to the nature of the audience. 
Many of these observations arc equally applicable to the conflict 
in the ABC over TV news in the late nineteen-fifties. !Ieith might not 
have been in a position to resist the erosion of his principles due to 
the impact of television but Boyer was. Television could be a threat to 
the well-being of the Australian audience - to their moral standards and 
to cherished democratic values. Boyerism had brought the ABC's standing 
130. Denis ~lcQuai 1, "Uncertainty about the Audience and Organisation of 
Mass Communieations", in Halmos (ed":'"), Cor:lmtmicators, p. 80. 
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to its highest point within the community by 1956. It had been 
accepted by the News Department and provided a paternalistic and 
protective view of the audience which reduced the necessity for any 
further evaluation. As Brown says: "affirmation of ideology replaces 
. . f" " 131 sc1ent1 1c measurement . Boyer saw television as posing a threat 
to 'factuality' and 'objectivity' in reporting. We have noted how 
narrowly he interpreted these qualities. They had been under attack as 
early as 1947 in the United States, for the purely passive role they 
gave the reporter. The US Commission on the Freedom of the Press in 
that year called upon the media to advance beyond 'objective' reporting 
which I< as, it said, not an aid but a menace to understanding. The 
supreme test of the media, it noted, was how well it provided for the 
integration of experience. In this connection, Carey remarks that 
'objective' reporting was designed to report a world in which there 
were broad consensual values, purposes and loyalties. Today no such 
system of interpretation exists. With political values and purposes 
the subject of considerable contention, 'objectivity' merely adds to 
confusion by conveying isolated fragments of information, devoid of any 
contextual aids to understanding. 
As the BBC experience shows, the idea of presenting only facts to 
a news audience, came under increasing pressure in the nineteen-fifties. 
It was due 'both to a rapidly changing social climate, and to g1·owing 
realisation that television could play an important part in the 
exploration of social issues. Reuven Frank, an NBC news executive 
comments: "The highest pmver of television journalism is not in the 
. . f . f . b . h . . f . " 132 transmlSSlOn o 1n ormat1on, ut. 1n t e transm1ss1on o_ exper1ence 
The implication is that the picutre adds more than mere information. The 
131. Roger L. Brown, "Some Aspects of ~lass ~ledla Ideologies", in Halmos 
(eJ.), Communicator~, p.l62. 
132. Reuven Frank, !!Memorandum from a Te-levision Newsman", Appendix II in 
A. William Blucm, Documentary in American Television (Hastings !louse, 
New York, 1965), r-:-268:-llte-ildcls: -·;'fie have found a -dimension of 
:inform::1tion which is not co11tained in words alone". 
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realisation of this within the BllC caused the wholesale questioning 
and the rapid erosion of Rei thia:-~ prj r!ciples. No longer could the 
BBC continue to protect its audiences from unwholesome and unpalatable 
realities. The TV cameras explored the problems of the s lwns and the 
factory floor. No such rapid transformation was possible in the ABC, 
with Boyer still very much in the saddle. But there were the beginnings 
of a similar professionalism, in TV news, which .vas linked both to the 
realisation that television could help Audience comprehension, and also 
to a rather vague, but emerging idea that television >~as a medium for 
the masses, and it should therefore adopt a more down to earth approach 
to its coverage. 
Burns has recently dra\Vll attention to the professional ethos, 
or mystique, associated .vith the activities of professionals in broad-
casting, with which "goes the disqualification of outsiders not only from 
the job, but effectively, from competence to evaluate performance". 133 
Fraser's fight against !layer's directives sho.vs the relevance of this 
to TV News, and the extent to which this kind of professionalism .vas 
emerging in the late nineteen-fifties. The langua.ge in >~hich he still 
expresses the Departmental resentme!lt of the time, is replete >~ith 
references to the special knowledge of equipment and techniques possessed 
by his journalists, and the lack of such knowledge on the part of the 
Conuni ssion. TV newsmen did not accept Boyerism in the way in which their 
radio news colleagues did. To Fraser, the much greater amounts of money 
spent on television news, were in themselves a justification for producing 
a product that was popular. He says: 
I sa.v no point, and 1 still sec no point in putting it away on a 
top shelf and dr&gging it out for a small elitist minority 
within the community. I feel strongly that news is gathered in 
the hedgerow or the market place. It belongs down there in the 
dust of the roads. That's where it stcr11s from and ... it should 
be thrown right back to the widest cross-section of the community 
that generates it.l34 
133. Tom Bums, "Conunitmcnt and Career in the BBC", in McQuail (ed.), 
.~ass C~-~\YP~ni_catj_'?~?._~_, p. 298. -
134. Interview .vHh Keith rraser, 25 ;ieptembcr 1975. 
~. 
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He thus thought ratings for TV ne\;s were extremely important. Otherwise 
the expense could not be justified. This 'populist' theory did not 
accord ·,d th Boyer's ideas of the ABC's function in society. He had 
written: 
If ... too great attention is given to the wooing of a 
maximum audience, there is the inevitable danger of neglecting 
the more specific tasks [of] national broadcasting which the 
community has a right to expect. 135 
Divergence in attitudes to audience had been the genesis of the 
first disputes the Commission had had with its news department. 
Specifically, in the TV news dispute, the question had been whether 
the news should be illustrated, and so provide the audience with wider 
perspectives than bare facts on which to make their own judgment. The 
latter prospect, to Boyer, meant taking a far more active role in 
opinion forming that the Commission could allow. It was therefore a 
struggle between ABC standards of 'objectivity' and the transmission of 
experience, and between paternal ism and professionalism. Boyer's 
dedication to the principles of Reith were doomed in the nineteen-
fifties as television widened newsmen's horizons everywhere. 'Four 
Corners' was to begin ~<ithin six months of his death. But Boyerism, 
like Reithism, did not die completely. It lived on in radio news for 
many years and the success of Hamilton and Fraser in questioning its 
o·:er-rigid application to TV News did not mean that issues began to be 
reported in some depth in that Department's bulletins, or that reporters 
were allowed to present and explore issues as they were in the BBC. A 
great many of the Boyerist institutional precepts ~<ere still 
adhered to. Chapman recalls the distinct aversion of ABC news, for 
example, to the idea of interviewing people live on air, a well-
135. ABC, 23rd Annual Re_E_o_r! (year ending 30 JLmc 1955 (Commonwealth 
Government Printer, 1955), p.S. 
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established BBC practice at this time, In his view, the ABC was much 
more fearful of the possibility of something being said which was 
offensive, or out of keeping with 'good taste'. He remembers also: 
"we were terribly pure. We were much purer than the BBC. Everything 
was very clean and good and godly and straight". 136 The roots of 
conservatism in ABC news run deep. 
In retrospect, it seems doubtful whether Hamilton, despite his 
fight over pictorialisation, ever had much comprehension or under-
standing of the degree to which TV news could aid understanding by the 
additional dimensions of perception which it uses. It is more likely 
that he chose to fight for two main reasons - the undermining of his 
editorial responsibility by Commission interference, and the fact that 
the credibility of TV news might have been severely affected if it 
had limited pictures to the extent proposed by the Commission. Although, 
as we have seen, he shared some of Boyer's consensual attitudes, 
particularly those of protecting society and social values from the 
unpleasant, the disturbing, the morally seductive in ABC programmes and 
news bulletins, as with Boyer there was a limit to the extent to which 
he was prepared to go to ensure that these principles were enforced. 
In 1948-49, Boyer had balked at the prospect of losing some degree of 
believability by too obviously excluding the Communist Party. Something 
of the same concern alerted Hamilton to the prospect that ABC TV news 
might come in for criticism and ridicule if it was too conservative in 
its approach - the fate that had befallen the BBC in its early TV news 
days. 
136. Intervie;v with Ivan Chapman, 9 October 1976. 
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In fact, an analysis of Hamil ton's \Hi ting and correspondence 
at the time of the dispute and a decade later, reveal that he came to 
share some of Boyer's misgivings about TV news. In his mind, its 
problems and disadvantages became far mqre absorbing than its potential. 
In 1956, he told the Commission that "illustrations would assist 
the viewers in understanding the significance of the news items 
concerned" . 137 He believed that "often, of course, the communication of 
an event, television-wise, must have far greater impact than a version 
in words only". 138 After the Commission crackdown, he did not attempt 
to define further TV's advantages, but simply argued in terms of 
leaving editorial judgment in his Department's hands. His writing in 
his later years reveal that his earlier beliefs had not been firmly 
held. In 1968, newspapers had come to seem to him to be the most 
admirable form of disseminating news. 
Only with a newspaper can you stop the unfolding of a story, 
hold it and read it again for better comprehension ... What 
they can offer in this age of instant, fragmented news is the 
chance to stop and read again, with background and interpretation, 
with which radio too seldom bothers at prime time, and which 
television too often confuses by merely dazzling and exciting.l39 
Television news was 'uncertain' , 'experimenting' , 'astray with emphasis' , 
and put 'technique before content'. 
If he still chose occasionally to refer to its 'impact' and 'aid 
to understanding', he would immediately return at far greater length 
ot its capacity for increasing misunderstanding, for distorting 'truth'. 
Two matters worried him most. The first was the apparent shift in news 
values in television, with pictures playing a major part in deciding 
the worth of the story .. · This was not 'truth', but subservience to 
137. Minutes of Commission meetir>g 27··28 September 1956. 
138. Hamilton to Finlay, 20 June 1956, 11/1/l. 
139 l'I.S. Hamilton, Information Jungle, pp.8-9. 
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entertainment values. 'Truth' to Hamilton was the 'straight' 
presentation of news. It is extremely clear that 'straight' news was 
basically a one-way communication process between 'authority' and the 
people. 'Straight news', told 'soberly' a.'ld 'thoughtfully' would 
maintain trust between the people and their leaders. Thus, he wrote, 
the mass n1edia must share [the blame] for the growing gap between 
the people and authority in whatever form it be. We call it the 
credibility gap, the area of suspicion, dis be lief, scorn and 
unconcern, the gap between the leaders and the masses . . . the 
communicators cannot be guiltless. It is their failure to 
inform successfully, that has aggravated the gap. 40 
Hanulton saw that TV news had plenty of opportunity for sapping 
public confidence in 'authority'. This was because it could show 
scenes of 'violence', of resistance to authority with much greater 
impact. Time after time he returned to the theme of 'lack of balance 1 
shown in TV news in their depiction of riots, and clashes of 
demonstrators with police. The pictures were too 'selective' or 'out 
of balance' in concentrating to this degree on violence, because the 
vast majority of people were not protesting. Hamilton, as Boyer did, 
eventually saw TV news as a danger to the core consensual value of 
non-violent resolution of disputes. This was not serving 'truth'. 
He was particularly critical of many TV reporters, who got in the way of 
'truth', by serving their own ego, instead of having "a dedication to 
serve society with the highest purpose" . 141 
Hamilton and Boyer believed TV news posed a threat to established 
social values because the pictures made it more 'believable'. As 
Tuchman says: 
140. 
141. 
television news presentations lend thcmsel ves to acceptance of 
this everyday dictum, becaQse a television presentation entails 
more dimensions of perception than either newspapers relegated to 
the written word, radio programs bound to spoken presentations, 
or magazine formats wedded to the written word ,;nd the still 
photograph. On television, the viewer can 'judge' most or all of 
these dimensions at the same time,with the added benefit of moving 
film.l42 
Hamilton, Inf£.rmation .Jungle, pp.lS-19. 
Hamilton, Resp~~~bi_l_ity, p.ll. 
142. Gaye Tuchman, "The Technology of Obj ecti vi ty", Urban Li fc and Culture, 
Vol.2. No. I (Apr.i.l 1973), pp.22-23. ---
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To Boyer and Hamilton, it was more 'believable' but it was not 
'truth'. 
'Truth' to Boyer and Hamilton lay in the news selection 
criteria employed by the radio newsmen.· Words in brief copy form 
were far more manageable than film. ~ewsmen and editors worked to 
elementary 'objective' formulas, with the overvie1; of 'community 
value' always uppermost, together with the other news policy restraints. 
Boyer and Hamil ton came to realise that the decision to cover an event 
on television, even in the simple non-interpretive fashion of the 
ea1·Jy years, itself guaranteed a certain form, treatment, and duration 
which was independent of radio news values. Stories took longer on 
television, 'minor' stories took precedence over 'major' radio 
stories. Because of the different work pattern in television, with 
control of the workload vital, and consequent demands on cameramen 
and reporters to present stories in standard forms so that editors and 
other technical staff can handle them in time, all coverages assume a 
basic presentation pattern. Tuchman says: "the technological and 
organisational dictates of television news processing trru1sform events 
by placing them in standard presentation forms". 143 Events are trruts-
formed, reality reconstructed by the TV newsman's need to control his 
work. Thus the radio newsman's assessments are not necessarily those of 
the television newsman whose work patterns and view of reality have 
been affected by the standard forms which he must use. 
When Boyer criticised TV news because it lacked 'balrutce' and 
'objectivity' again he had ;-adio news standards in mind. The simple pro 
and con 'objective formula', with the checking of ascertainable facts 
was much more eas~.ly policed and controlled in radio. He and 
143. Gaye Tuchman, "TV news: The Control of Work and Construction 
of Reality", Politics, Vol.lO, No.,.2 (1\ovember 1975), p.l49. 
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Hamilton were frightened at the opportunities for 'selectivity' that 
film editing offered. In this area too Tuchman has pointed out 
television cameramen perceive vision and space according to social 
definitions. 'Objective' camerawork is 'straight' because it keeps 
to conventional time-space rhythms, 'head-on' camera placement, and 
'fixed-plane' perspective, in which the eye of the camera is not 
itself in motion. Through the adoption of these techniques, 
'objectivity' is demonstrated, which adds to their 'believability', 
because the visual perceptions are those of everyday reality. 
What Boyer and Hamil ton failed to see is that there is more 
than one kind of 'objectivity'. They did not understand that the work 
patterns of radio news also reconstructed reality to fit rigid 
strategic rituals. That the control of work in the radio newsroom 
also involved 'routinization' which reconstituted the events of the 
everyday world, so that the 'unexpected' could be handled rapidly 
and 'objectively'. The neE>d for work to be controlled transforms 
the perception of events and their importance. As work differs in 
radio and television, it can be seen that each can perceive an event 
in a different way, while still maintaining 'objectivity'. Radio 
'objectivity' will be examined further in the next chapter. 
~ . 
• 
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CHAPTER 5 
Brevity, Speed and Accuracy: 
The Rejection of Interpretive Reporting 
In previous chapters, emphasis has been given to the heavily 
edited, brief nature of ABC news reports, their confinement to the 
essential 'facts' and the exclusion of any elements of colour or 
drama. Recordings by reporters themsei ves, and the inclusion of any 
kind of actuality, were rare. Some of the factors responsible for 
this sober, highly formalised approach to ne~<s have already been 
ell.amined. They included the competitive relationship ~;ith the 
newspapers, in which ABC round;men began to eover the same 'beats' 
as newspaper reporters, in order to gain access to news bet~;een ne~<spaper 
edition times. Unlike broadcasting organisations abroad, the ABC did 
not have access to round-the-clock agency l<ire services, one factor which 
enabled reporters of the BBC for example, to selectively cover major 
events by the use of voice descriptions. Unlike the BBC, ABC 
reporters were not 'voice' men, but reporters who worked very mueh like 
their newspaper equivalents. When the Commission's officers, real ising 
developments in news broadcasting overseas, began to urge changes in news 
presentation in 1942-43, they were frustrated because the News Department 
associated the move with a 'sellout' to newspaper interests, and the 
PSCB itself rejected the idea of Parliamentary reporting which l<ent 
beyond 'facts'. Later, Boyer strongly endorsed this simple factual 
approach to news, adding his own d gid interpretation that anything 
which ~<ent beyond 'facts' \'laS 'conunent'. His insistence on the 
abandonment of 'colour' was similarly linked with his belief that only 
a safe, neutral service could ensure Commission survival in a dangerously 
uncertain po li tical environment. 
~ 
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These are some of the explanations but they do not provide the 
complete answer. They do not sufficiently explain why the ABC, unlike 
major broadcasting organisations in America and Europe, continued to 
broadcast news according to the traditional formula well into the 
nineteen-sixties. When news bulletins abroad were replete with tapes 
of actuality, intervie>l and voice-report, ABC news still consisted of 
pages of 'copy' read by an announcer. Such a contrast in styles 
which continued for such a long period implies deliberate rejection of 
overseas techniques not only by the Commission itself, but by the radio 
news staff al,;o. By 1961, there had been no emergence in radio news 
of that sense 0f f:rustr2tcd professionalism which had marked the 
relationship of the TV news staff with the Commission. Radio newsmen's 
horizons were still bormded by the notebook and pencil, despite the 
exciting developments in the use of tape machines which the Talks 
Department were demonstrating every day. News was not to be seduced 
by the siren calls of the broadcaster. 
In this chapter, attention is drawn to some of the purely 
organisational factors which we1·e responsible for the conservatism in 
news. The consequences of the anti-newspaper ethic of <:he news service 
are looked at more closely. The question is posed whether the news 
service itself became aware of the limitations of its approach to news-
gathering? If it was, why did it decide that such a style was desirable? 
ABC Ne1;s - The Alternative Newspaper 
(i) The Beginnings of Press Hostility 
Fran!: Dixon had joined the ABC in 1936 ~;ith a strong dislike of 
newspaper monopolies and the influence thE')' were l<ielding in Australian 
society. But he had respect for the professionalism of the staff they 
employed. He had no soon2r taken up his position ~;hen he had a 
protracted argument with the Controller ,,f Pl·ogrammcs, Keith Barry over 
I 
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the suitability of using material from the press which was 'disturbing 
and unpleasant". Barry had complained that on Christmas Day, 1936, the 
news had consisted of news of war preparations in Europe and Asia, details 
of accidents, and crime reports. He asked: 
I was wondering whether we might not deliberately make up 
our minds to evade as much as possible the unpleasant things 
in the press and make a special ~oint of looking, within 
reason, for the pleasant things. 
Dixon arbued that such a policy would mean that listeners would question 
the credibility of the service. He added: 
I am convinced that we will serve our listeners well if we 
follow the standard of journalism set by the Sydney Morning 
Herald in New South Wales, The Times, the Manchester Guardian 
and the Daily Telegraph in London.2 
As this correspondence continued, Dixon made his views plainer. "I don't 
think the press is as bad as it is painted": he told Barry on one 
occasion. And later he said, "I have precedent in the shape of well, 
conducted newspapers like the Sydney Morning Herald, Melbourne Argus 
etc. to guide me". 4 
Even when Denning was appointed to Canberra in 1939, Dixon took some 
time to become convinced that his reports should always be preferred to 
those of the press. Within days of taking up his post, Denning 
complained to Dixon that a report from the Sydney Sun had been preferred 
to material which he had sent. He wrote: 
the point I do m:>ke is that the neHspapers' political news is 
notoriously um·eliable ... My own disposition would be to suggest 
that nothing should be used as coming from Canberra unless I have 
sent it, or unless it has been referred to me for confirmation. 5 
1. Barry to Dixon, 29 December 1936, SP286, Box 3, S2. 
2. Dixon to Barry, 5 January 1937, SP286, Box 3, S2. 
3. Dixon to Barry, ll June 1937, SP286, Box 3, S2. 
4. Dixon to Barry, 15 June 1937, SP286, Box 3, S2. 
5. Denning to Dixon, 7 June 1939. Quoted in Dixon to Moses 
7 June 1939, SP286, Box 1, S2, "GM Correspondence". 
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Dixon and his staff at this time were wedded to the belief that they 
should use i terns from the press '::hich Denning might miss, and 
furthermore there was a feeling that the press might, on occasions be 
more reliable than ['enning, Dixon reported to Moses: 
I think it 1<0uld be bad policy to exclude an i tern simply 
because we did not receive it from our o~n representative, 
Naturally Mr Denning does not wish to prejudice his relations 
with Ministers, and it may be that oc"asionally he deems it 
expedient to suppress a particular item because he feels that 
a Minister, or the Government, would wish him to do so. 6 
This, of course, is in marked contrast to Dixon's attitudes both to the 
Government and the press during the war. We have earlier pointed out 
that it was Cleary, not Dixon, who up to this time had become 
convinced of the unsuitability of press news for the ABC because of 
colouration resulting from editorial policy. ~~en Dixon began to 
react against the press sources on which he relied, it was because he 
began gradually to realise that press reports contained too many 
'factua 1 1 errors, which, when repeated in ABC bulletins, brought adverse 
reaction. 7 In 1939, although Dixon joined with his Chairman and 
General Manager in railing against 'the bad faith' of the newspaper 
proprietors and connived with them in breaching the newspaper agreements 
whenever it was thought necessary, 8 there was still no evidence to 
suggest that he had anything but admiration for the columns of the 
'quality' press in Australia and the journalists who provided them. 
6. Dixon to Moses, 7 JWJe 1939, SP286, Box 1, S2, By 1943, it had 
become ABC practice to use only the ABC's own material from Canberra. 
7. See Chapter l, p.65. 
8. See Chapter l, pp,39-40. 
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The switch to an aggressively hostile attitude to the newspapers 
dates partly from 1939, but more positively from 1942. 1939 saw the 
newspapers' attack on Denning's appointment and the beginning of 
deliberate attempts to impede him in his work. It •1as the beginning of 
the newspaper campaign to prevent any further attempt to 'supplement' 
the news by the ABC. 1942 was the year in which the Labor Government 
and most Australian newspapers began t0 fall out over the rights of the 
latter to criticise aspects of Government policy in wartime. By 1944, 
there was continuous conflict between the two, and in these disputes, the 
ABC News Department 1 s sympathies lay, and were seen to lie, with the 
Govcrrtment. The bitterness this evoked was apparent not only at 
executive level but also at that of the working journalist. It 
continued well into the nineteen-forties and confirmed and reinforced 
the strongly competi ti.ve nature of the ABC's relationship with the 
press. This, in turn, influenced the style and content of ABC news. 
Until Denning began to gather Government statements from the 
same sources as other 'roundsmen' employed by the press, the handful 
of sub-editors 1<erking at the ABC had little workir.g contact with 
their press colleagues. Arguments over the agreements with the 
newspapers took place between senior executives in remote boardrooms. 
When Denning, the ABC's first reporter, was subjected to a very cold 
reception from newspaper reporters in Parliament House, the reaction 
among Dixon's news staff must have been one of surprise and then anger. 
In 1944, Denning gave details of the difficulties created for him by 
other newspapermGn in evidence before the PSCB. 9 Other journalists 
c.Jaimed he had no right to attend the Prime Minister's press 
conferences and to use information given in answer to their questions. 
As Keith Murdoch put it: 
------·--------------
9. See Denning, Evidence, PSCB, 14 J~nuary 1944, pp.l35-36. 
457 
There has always been a bit of difficulty about the Commission's 
Canberra rounds man. All the rounds men go in as a body to 
interview the Prime Minister or some other Minister, and every 
hare which we raise is at once caught by the Commission's 
roundsman, and we are left with no hare at a11.lO 
Canberra pressmen were successful for a period of six weeks in urging 
Menzies , in his first term as Prime Minister, to hold separate news 
conferences for them and for Denning - a device which Menzies found 
obliged to abandon because it took up too much of his time. Denning was 
eventually forced to compromise and agreed to withhold some stories 
at the request of newspapers which claimed they formed part of some 
'campaign' in ";hich they Nere currcn tly involved. Denning had been 
engaged in parliamentary reporting for ten years before he joined the 
ABC but the professional friendships he had formed in the capital were 
of no account when other reporters saw him as a threat to the 
pre-eminence they had always enjoyed. It was the speed with which ABC 
radio could relay Denning's reports Nhich ~;orried them. We have already 
dra~;n attention to the preoccupation of the press at this time ~;ith the 
necessity of al~;ays being first with the ne~;s. 11 
The obstinacy of the press on this point \Vas strongly resented 
by both Dixon and Moses. As Denning's problems became kno\Vll in 
Sydney, Dixon drew Moses's attention to a press report from Washington 
that radio reporters had, after a campaign lasting eight years, been 
given equal facilities IVi th ne~;spapermen for covering the affairs of 
Congress, been given access to \'/hi te House press conferences and had 
been given a radio gallery of their o~Vn". 12 By the end of 1939, Dixon 
was, for the first time, describing ne~<spapers as being 'tmsuitable' as 
sources of radio news, and there seems little question that Denning's 
unhappy experiences, and the subsequent newspaper adamancy that there 
10. ~lurdoch, Evidence, PSCB, 4 November 194 3, p. 22. 
11. Sec Chapter 1, pp.69-70. 
12. See The .Journalist (June 1939), 
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could be no further extension of ABC news- gathering, were vi tal factors 
in his change of attitude. 
There .vas a further deterioration in the relations between the 
ABC News Department and the press in the period of the Gibson Committee's 
hearings. The full extent of the bitterness and the disputation between 
press and Commission became revealed for the first time. Newspaper 
proprietors giving evidence claimed that the ABC could not collect its 
own ne1;s without them. Dixon and his staff became more self-confident 
as the list of their 'scoops' over the press from Canberra and from 
overseas grew. The advertising of ABC 'scoops' angered the press, which 
became mora aware that ABC news was bent on competing to the extent 
that it was able, given the restrictions of the newspaper agreements. 13 
As the Gibson Committee heard its evidence, there occurred the 
first indicators of the coming conflict. On 9 September 1941, Dixon 
reported to Bearup that the newspapers had refused to print a statement 
issued by the Minister for Munitions, Senator ~!cBride, because it had 
been broadcast in the ABC news before they could publish it. The 
statement, dealing with the manufacture of small arms ammtmition, had been 
released simul tancously to the press and the ABC. The S~ had told the 
minister's publicity secretary that they and other papers would treat 
all other statements first broadcast by the ABC in similar fashion. 
Dixon commented: 
In my opinion, this specific refusal of the papers to print a 
statement that had been previously been broadcast means th·ey 
are attempting to coerce Ministers into withholding statements 
from broadcasting until they have appeared in print . 14 
13. See Chapter 1, p.S9. 
14. Dixon to Bearu;:>, 9 September 1941, SP286, Bundle 6. 
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A week later, ABC news prominently featured a statement by the 
Minister for the Navy, W.M. Hughes, which denied a front page story 
in the Sunday Sun reporting the shelling of Nauru by a German raider. 15 
The ABC news staff had spent most of the day checking the story with 
Government departments before obtaining the denial. Four days later 
The Telegraph accused the ABC of failing to officially verify a report 
which it had carried, claiming that the United States and Japan had 
. h p . f" 16 come to an arrangement to guarantee peace 1n t e ac1 1c. The 
newspaper said it had not received ne1;s of this from its own extensive 
sources and when it had checked with Governme:1t ministers, they had 
known nothing about it. The Mirra;:, then the ren5gade in the 
newspaper world, the same afternoon mocked Th~Telegraph for its 
sensitivity on the issue. Dixon directly linked The Telegraph's 
article with the denial of the Nauru shelling. "Of course, The 
Telegraph's article was a 'hit back' for our use on Sunday night, of 
Mr Hughes's statement that publication of the report about the 
attack on Nauru was 'mischievous and misleading'. " 17 
So far, the arguments had been pitched at the predictable level 
of trying to cast doubts on each other's authenticity. When the 
Labor Government took office however, in October 1941, it took on a 
new tone entirely. Labor's strong views about the press monopolies 
were well known. In the early months of the new administration, the 
press began to chafe at what it considered were onerous and 
unnecessary censorship restrictions, and at political "in t.erfE:ren<:e" 
with the censorship authorities .. 
15. In the Sunday Sun, 12 September 1941. 
16. In the Daily Telegraph, 16 September 1941. 
17. Dixon to Bearup, 16 September 1941, SP286, Bundle 6. 
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At the conference called in Canberra on 10 February 1942 to 
discuss these issues, the conflict bubbled to the surface, Press represent-
atives criticised the differing poin~of view held by the censorship 
authorities in the various States, the 'blanket' censorship of 
references to certain subjects, such as industrial disputes, and the 
ban on the publication of enemy claims of success until officially 
confirmed. The Government wanted some news withheld because of the 
possible effect on public morale, while the newspapers claimed that the 
withholding of news would have a more damaging effect. Curtin had a 
sharp exchange with Warwick Fairfax of the ~dney ~J?zaing Herald over 
the canvassing for support from cverseas for the paper's editorial 
policies which were critical of the Government. 18 Curtin said: 
Whilst you have an entire right to influence the public of 
your own country, you have no right to use your organization 
for the purpose of trying to make it appear that what you say 
in this country is also the considered opinion of the great 
body of the public of another country .19 
Evatt revealed that the Government had considered prosecution, in one 
instance, under wartime regulations which made it an offence to 
interfere with the war effort. He added: "I do not think it fair that 
a newspaper which has strong opinions about the Government should 
canvass for supporting opinion in other parts of the world". 20 
18. Curtin was referring to cables sent by one press organisatior., 
apparently the Sydney Morning Herald, to other overseas press 
organisations, which, it ;;as alleged, sought critical comment 
similar to that contained in a Sydney Mo!'ning Hcr:lld editorial. 
The editorial commented on dissension -T:~-~l:straT].o[r,-Advisory 
War Council meetings. The cables \vere apr;Er.:Htly ch·awn to the 
Government's attention by the Chief Cen,;or. 
19. Newspaper and Broadcasting Conference, 1942, p.l2. 
20. Ibid. 
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Nevertheless, the conference appeared to end amicably with 
newspaper agreement to limit their reporting of the affairs of the 
Advisory War Council to official statements in return for Government 
agreement to limit the usc of 'blar.ket'. censorship bans. Brian Penton 
of the Daily Telegraph warned that '"hlanket; ;;cnsorship opens the way 
to political censorship", 21 a trend he already felt was apparent in 
the banning of news of strikes. Curtin assured delegates that: 
the Government ... does not desire to have any restriction 
upon the expression of opinion or criticism of policy which 
responsible people in Australia think is demanded. We do not 
want views to be the subject of Government control. 22 
The follm;ing month, however, the Prime Minister began to express 
his opinions in no uncertain terms about domestic criticism of 
the Government, carried in editorial columns. At an "off-the-record" 
ne~;s briefing in Canberra on 18 March 1942, he attacked the Sun News 
Pic!orial (~1elbourne) and the Dai !L..._Telegraph. According to the ABC's 
own confidential reports of these meetings, he described leader writers 
as "a bloody lot of nit-wits", 23 threatened to ban all advertising of 
luxury goods and said he would "put the clamps on Brian P·~nton, Editor 
of the Telegraph and warned the Daily Telegraph repreo;entative that 
he should instruct his paper to take care of this warning" 24 
As this tmdercurrent of hostility between the major newspapers and 
the Government gre.v stronger, it threw into relief the nature of the 
new ABC bulletins emanating from Canberra which largely contained 
Government statements. As we have noted earlier, they began on 
Government instructions in December 1941, and were increased in number 
the following month. From February, three of these bulletins were 
21. .D!_id._, p.l3. 
22. Ibid., p.l. 
23. Hamilton to Dixon, 18 March 1942, SP286, Bundle 6. 
-
24. Hamilton to Dixon, 19 Mctrch 1942, SP286, Bundle 6. 
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relayed daily by all commercial stations. 25 The press quickly became 
aware of the Government pressures being exerted on the ABC. A report 
of the discord at the Canberra conference of 7 January was carried in 
the Daily Telegraph of 8 February. 26 Earlier the Sydney Morning IJera~d 
called attention to what it called "objectionabl~ features" of the 
Canberra news. It concluded: 
In effect, the Australian Broadcasting Commission is being made 
a political weapon in the service of the Government and the 
Government party - a state of affairs more in keeping with 
Fascism than the Democracy which the party professes. 27 
Following the Ward-Spender- Fadden controversy, the press were even more 
convinced that ABC nev.·s was the plaything of politicians. Among the 
publications carrying editorials protesting against the "misuse" of 
ABC news were the Courier-Mail : 8the Brisbane Telegra~, 29 The Mercury 
(Hobart), 30 The Bulletin, 31 and The Age. 32 After questions were asked 
in the House about Government instructions relating to ABC news, 
the Sydney Morning Heral<!_ called attention to "new influences" at work 
in the bulletins. It said: 
the Prime ~1inister cannot allow an influential national 
instrumentality, reaching hourly into the homes of hundi·eds 
and thousands of people throughout the Common•·er.l th and 
spreading into both friendly and enemv co1mtries 1:0 drift 
any further. 33 
25. See Chapter 1, pp.83-94 for the background to these developments. 
26. See Chapter 1, pp.85-87. 
27. Sydney Morning Herald, 30 January 1942. 
28. 3 February 1942. 
29. 2 February 1942. 
30. 2 February 1942. 
31. 11 February 1942. 
32. 3 February 1942. 
33. 9 March 1942. 
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Dixon, as we have seen, had welcomed the new and important role 
given to the ne~<s service by the Government, and had seen the 
opportunities it had presented for expansion of the service if it 
met with Government approval. 34 From this time on the major newspapers 
and the ABC assumed their different roles in relation to the Canberra 
Government, one being the 'adversary' and the other 'good citizen' . 35 
Positions hardened in 1943. As the year began, Postmaster-General 
Ashley produced in the House >~hat he described as "Further evidence of 
the campaign that is being waged to disunite the Australian people and 
create a wrong impression in the British Empire and America". 36 It 
consisted of a press message sent oversGas by AA.P, which que-ted at 
length an editorial of the Adelaide Advertiser cri tcc<:al of the 
Government's ~1ili tia Bill. Then came the shock to the press of the 
Government's rejection of the ABC agreement with the ne1~spapers. 
Evidence given at the subsequent PSCB hearing showed the press clearly 
the division that had arisen between the Commission and the journalists 
it employed. The leaks to the Government by ABC news staff, and 
their feeding of information to the AJA, showed the press and their 
staff that they were confronting men with quite conflicting views on 
news coverage. The allegations by Pratt of the AJA of "distortion" 
and "suppression" by the newspaper monopolies, were followed by the 
corollary from James of the same union that: "the existence of an 
independent ABC service minimizes the degree of inaccuracy and 
distortion that appears in the newspapers; in other ~<ords it has a 
sort of policeman influence and exercises a check on the newspapers" 37 
34. See Chapter 1, p. 89. 
35. See Chapter 3, pp.227-28. 
36. ~PD, 17 February 1943, pp.778-79. 
37. J.C. James, Evidence, PSCB, 9 November 1943, pp.37-38. 
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The staff feels, he said, that the people want the truth, instead of 
speculation. It has been pointed out earlier that the views of Pratt 
and James at the hearing were, in fact, those of the ABC news staff. 
Ezra Norton supported James's view, maintaining the Cmmnission' s news 
service, "sets a certain standard and puts the newspapers, both the 
members of ANPA and ourselves, on our mettle". 38 This role-taking by 
ABC newsmen supported and justified the stance they had taken over the 
reporting of matters of government. They were to be more 'factual' 
and less prone to 'errors' than the newspapers. They were to be 
•trusted' more. As Pratt pointed out, ne~<spapers might be able to get 
away with 'errors', but they were more obvious in radio news. The 
news service had now taken on an idcnti ty of its cwn. 
The newspapers had been inclined to blam8 t:h.:; Govetnment in 
1942 for 'misusing' the ABC news. Now, it was apparent the Government 
had a willing team in ABC news who saw, as Dixon did, that it was their 
duty to 'balance' the press attacks on the Government. \'/hen, in 1944, 
the newspapers moved into a position of confrontation with the Government, 
the 'impartiality' of the news service in reporting these events, was 
seriously questioned. 
(ii) The ABC's Role in Government - Press Clashes, 1944 
On 18 February 1944, Sir Keith Murdoch \<rote an article in the 
Melbourne Herald which was highly critical of the Australian-New Zealand 
Agreement which had been signed in January, largely due to the efforts 
of Evatt. The two countries agreed to work together in matters of COJTh110n 
concern, particularly security and defence, civil 3Viation, post-war 
disposal of territories and bases and the welfare of all Pacific people. 39 
Murdoch felt that it was insulting and unwise to exclude the United 
38. Ezra Norton, Evidence, PSC~, 10 November 1943, p.44. 
39. See Evatt's TC)'Ort to the House, CPD, 10 February 1944, pp.72-73. 
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States from such deliberations, and he urged that consideration be 
given to handing over to that country the Pacific territories of New 
Caledonia and New Britain after the war. On 25 February, Evatt told 
the House that the Murdoch article cont.ained "misleading statements" 
and was "un-Australian in sympathy and outlook". Tht> same afternoon 
Denning was summoned by Information Minister Cal.well to explain why 
the midday news bulletins contained only part of Evatt's statement. 40 
Calwell insisted that the whole of the statement be carried. Cleary 
and Boyer were contacted immediately but decided that the statement 
merited no special treatment and was to be subject to the usual 
editorial discretion. Dixon chose to run it in full. Cleary had 
noted that no precis of Murdoch's remarks had been included when 
Evatt's edited statement was run and the Commission demanded an 
explanation from Dixon. The News Department maintained that they had 
carried the question from the Labor member Pollard which had elicited 
Evatt's reply, and Pollard's four line summary of Murdoch's proposal 
was all that was required. Pollard had phrased his question in the 
most subjective way using words like 'subversive' and 'unpatriotic'. 
It is very doubtful therefore 1'hether such a 'summar;r' sr.o.uld have been 
relied upon instead of making reference to the originr.l. Dixon, in 
his book, leaves no doubt where his sympathies lay: 
40. Calwell had become Information Minister on 21 September 1943. 
Professor Colin Keirnan who has Calwell's personal papers ·and has written 
his biography (as yet unpublished],says: "lle believed the press was the 
agency used by capitalism to mislead the people ... it was 
Arthur Cal well's intention to put an end to this alliance, to 
harness the media to l'lhat he believed to be a national policy". 
Colin Keirnan, "Arthur A. Calwell 's Clashes ~<ith the 
Australian Press, 1943-1945", Historical Journal, (University of 
Wollongong), Vol.2, No.1 (l>larcllT976), pp.76-77. 
Murdoch did not supply us with copies of his stuff and 
we did not feel disposed to summarise them from his paper. 
He was a purely private controversialist, whereas Evatt, 
as Minister for External Affairs, was outlining Australia's 
foreign policy.41 
There is no clearer evidence of Dixon's .strong inclination towards 
the favouring of those in authority. It was not only Murdoch's 
original statement that was not reported. His :reply to Evatt w,;s 
also ignored. 
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By April 1944 the newspapers were extremely concerned about what 
they regarded as an obvious political slant in the exercise of censor-
ship. Some form of showdown seemed inevitable. It occurred finally 
over reports carried in the American press of a statement by Army 
Minister Forde that ninety thousand men were to be released from the Aust-
ralia" Army. Agencies had sent the report from Australia. Members of the 
U.S. Foreign Affairs Committee criticised the decision, believing that U.S. 
forces would have to shoulder a greater burden in the Pacific theatre. 42 
Cal we 11 seized his opportunity to defend censorship, saying that 
Forde's statement had been taken out of context. Although, he said, 
the Government was alleged to have failed to keep the American public 
informed of the Australian war effort, it was the metropolitan 
newspapers which must take most of the responsibility for any failures 
in this respect, because of the: 
very mischievous messages to the United States [which] have been 
based on partisan and inaccurate editorials ... If it had not 
been for the commonsense restraint imposed by censorship, the 
volume of anti-Australian propaganda would have been many 
times as great ... The writers of some of these diatribes are 
little better than fifth colu~<ists.43 
41. Dixon, ABC, p.ll6. 
42. See Daily Telegraph, 11 and 12 April 1944. 
43. Daily Telegraph, 13 Apri 1 1944. 
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The following day Henderson replied on bcnalf of ANPA. 
Calwell's statement he said, 
is another example of Mr Calwell's method of diverting public 
attention from his own failures by making baseless char-ges 
against other people. Because of censorship most 
correspondents of American papers· have been withdrawn from 
Australia and for the same reason Australian correspondents 
have not been able to inform their papers of Australia's great 
effort. 44 
The same day Calwell accused Henderson of making inaccurate statements 
and the Australian press generally of distortion and suppression 
against the Labor Government and all preceding Governments. 
Henderson this time prepared a reply which contained details of 
recent acts of the censor, thus intending to prove his point that his 
powers were being abused in the name of national security. The censor 
had prevented publication of news that tram and bus emplcyees in 
Sydney had defied Curtin's order fo:r them to -return to >wrk. Phrases 
critical of the Government had been r~moved from some stories. The 
censor had stopped some Reuters messages for overseas which had 
contained Australian newspaper extracts. A paragraph had been deleted 
from a report of a speech which had been critical of Calwell. 
The latest statements by Calwell and Henderson were prepared 
for publication in the Dailv Telegraph of 15 April. However, State 
Publicity Censor Horace Mansell refused to allm; parts of Henderson's 
statement to be printed, including the examples given above, although 
he passed Calwell' s comments in full. The TelegrapJ:l thereupon decided 
to ignore the censorship agreement which did not permit references to censor-
ship and thus banned blank spaces to indicate the extent of censorship~5 
44. Daily Tc lc_graj~, 14 Apri 1 1944. 
45. The agreement has beth·ccn the press and thf, G;,vernm::··-1t 's Press 
Censorship Advisory Committe''. See Keirnan, "Cal well's Clashes", 
pp.85-86. 
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It published Henderson's statement with blank c,p1~es. ftender;oon 
prepared another strong attack on Calwell for the Sunday 'feLcgl'aph 
next day, claiming: "With this weapon of war-time regulations up his 
sleeve, Mr Calwell is free to make venomous personal attacks on 
individuals and then prevent them from giving the facts that would 
answer him". 46 The censor this time ordered the entire statement to 
be deleted as well as an editorial on the same subject. The Editor 
refused to fill up the blanks, and Ca!Hell ordered in Commonwealth 
1. . h h . b . d" "b d 47 po 1ce to se1ze t e papers to prevent t e1r e1ng 1str1 ute . The 
four Sydney metropolitan newspapers, the Adelaide News and the Melbourne 
Herald were all banned the folloHing day when they attempted to give 
details of Henderson's statement. The newspapers sought a High Court 
injunction restraining Mansell from preventing publication of the 
material and it was granted on 17 Apri1. 48 
From the outset, Cleary a•1d Moses thought the .\BC would be 
prudent to remain outside such an archetypal conflict as far as was 
possible. Moses personally ruled that Call;ell' s statement of 14 April 
was not to be used. Nothing was carried in bulletins relevant to the 
dispute until the seizure of the Sunday Telegraph. Cal well's statement 
of that day, 16 April, justifying his action, Has sent to the News 
Department with a covering letter from Mansell asking that it be 
46. Sydney Morning Herald, 17 April 1944. 
4 7. In his biography, Callvell claims that the information in 
Henderson's article would have endangered Australian prisoners-of-
war. The full text of Henderson's statement published in both the 
Sydney Morning Herald and the Daily Telegraph after the injunction 
does not support this contention. -see A.~Calwell, Be .Just and 
Fear Not (Lloyd 0' Neil, t-Iel bourne, 1972), pp. 90-91. Pages 88-95 
of thesame book give the background to Calwell' s intensely 
hitter fee 1 ings towards the neHspaper proprietors, partisularly 
Keith Murdoch. 
48. The newspapers won the court case which followco, znd th.o 
Government failed to have the decision reversed in the High Court. 
See Kei.rnan, "Calwell 's Clashes'~ pp.89-9l. 
broadcast in full. Although the statement was run at great length 
by the ABC, two sections - one alleging that censorship had been 
flagrantly defied and the other that the la~; had been defied - were 
deleted. No comment from Henderson was included. 
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The follo~;ing day, ABC news staff ran into trouble with Mansell 
and with his superior, the Chief Publicity Censor, E. G. Bonney, over 
the extent to ~;hich the newspapers should be allowed to present their 
case. Mansell ordered the deletion of part of the n0ws item in which 
the newspapers defended their action. He claimed that they could not make 
excuses for breaking the law. Later, however, he asked that the news 
item be submitted to Bonney. In the ABC report of the conversation 
which followed it is clear that very heavy pressure was put on the 
news staff to emphasise the Government's case and play down that of 
the press. Bonney told the ABC newsman that the ABC was supposed to be 
a Government organ, and he proceeded to virtually dictate the form the 
item should take. At Bonney's instructions were inserted sentences 
which said the newspapers had acted jn defiance of a censorship 
instruction. He ordered the deletion of part of the newspaper case. 
And he finally ordered the inclusion of part of Cal well's statement of 
the night before. The news staff agreed to these changes on the spot 
without any references to the management or the Comr.n:;sion. 
That evening Forde issued a statement in Canberra which the 
Commission instantly seized upon as indicating a way out of their 
dilemma. He said that, in his opinion, any comment on the censorship 
affair was sub judice and improper, as the issues had to go before the 
High Court. Menzies immediately attacked Forde's remarks alleging 
that they represented an ingenious attempt to muzzle public discussion. 
·This was not used in any bulletin in accordance 11ith ~1oses' s instructions. 
A similar statement by Fadden was rejected the following day, 19 April. 
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Calwell was in Adelaide at the time, and on the morning of 
19 April he picked up his copy of the Advertiser to see not only 
Menzies's statement of the previous day, but also photographs of 
Commonwealth Police with drawn pistols preventing the departure 
of newspaper deli very trucks. They were photographs 1~hich had appeared 
in the Sydney newspapers the previous day. Cal well was angered at their 
use which he felt created the 1nong impression in the mind of the 
public. It is possible also, though it is not clear, that at about 
the same time he had heard of the statement issued that morning by 
the Commissioner of N.S.W. Police, W.J. MacKay, which assured the public 
that the photographs were not of his ovm police force. 49 Cal well took 
strong exception to MacKay's action, which he regarded as being 
instigated by McKell, in order to win voter support at the forthcoming 
State election. 50 Summoning an ABC reporter to hi.s oifice, Cah1ell 
dictated a statement which was largely a personal attack on Menzies but 
which also praised the action of the Commonwealth Police. There were 
hurried consultations among Commissioners and Moses when this story 
reached Sydney, and it was finally decided to broadcast the comments on 
the police and leave out his reference to Menzies. 
It seems apparent that the Comwission was under some pressure at 
this time to justify its exclusion of newspaper and opposition comment 
on the controversy, the relatively skimpy cover given to the Government's 
views, and also its apparent lack of interest in an issue which had 
triggered widespread concern and interest. On 20 April Denning, apparently 
under Commission instl'Uctions, sought an intervie1; with the Acting Prime 
Minister Forde to explain that the Commission had accepted hi~ viewpoint 
49. For the full text, see Daily ~lirror, 19 April 1944. 
50. Calwell and McKell openly feuded over the affair, alarming Acting 
Prime ~linister Forde, because of the dissension it revealed in 
Labor ranks. He urged Cal well to .!efrain from ~ommenting further. 
See Keirnan, "CHl\~'ell's Clashes", p.92. 
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on comment on the issue, and to ask for his s J~)pvrt. i"l(!nning' s report 
of that meeting contains the following significant passage: 
Mr Forde replied that he entirely agreed with our view 
and promised to make it clear to Ministers, if the question 
arose, that I had saen him personally, discussed the problem 
with him and that he had endorsed· our attitude. 51 
Clearly the Commission was after Forde's backing because it was only 
too aware that some ministers, particularly Calwell, would probably 
insist on more extensive coverage, and therefore endanger the 'hands 
off' policy it had adopted. 
The Commission's fears were justified. On 25 April Cal well 
asked the Commission to allow him to make a broadcast to reply to 
comments by Henderson and Kennedy which had appeared tn newspapers 
. 52 that mornmg. The Commission would not agree to this. When Calwell 
then asked for his full statem~nt to be included in the news bulletins 
again he met with resistance. Moses told him on the telephone that 
any statement would be summarised for news purposes. Cal well then 
informed Moses that he would probably ask Ashley, as Postmaster-General, 
to instruct the Commission to run the statement in full under Section 23 
of the Act. 53 There is evidence once again at this point of lack of 
unanimity among the Labor Cabinet about the extent to which the Government 
51. Transcript of telephoned report from Denning. 20 April 1944, 
SP286, Box 1, Sl3, "Newspaper Censorship Controversy". 
52. Cal well had been successful with a similar request a few months 
before. On 16 December 1943 he was given time on ABC stations in 
Victoria to broadcast a reply to a statement by Eric Kennedy, then 
Acting President of ANPA. Calwell claimed his reply to Kennedy's 
attack on alleged use of censorship powers for political purposes 
had been suppressed by all Melbourne newspapers, although published 
in Sydney. It was for this reason that he asked Moses for 
facilities to put his views to the Victorian public. See Moses 
to Commission, 17 December 1943, Attachment to Commission minute 
of meeting of 12-14 January 1944. 
53. Moses to Commission. 25 April 1944, Atta~.hment to Commissjc'n minute 
of me8ting of S -·10 May 1944. 
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should interfere with the ABC's news service. This has already been 
referred to in Chapters 2 and 3. In his report to the Commission Moses 
recorded the difference of opinion between Postmaster-General. Ashley 
and Cal well: 
After speaking to Mr Calwell I got in touch with the Postmaster-
General and informed him of the situation. Senator Ashley said 
that he considered the Commission had given Mr Cal well very 
fair treatment and that we had his full support in refusing to 
broadcast Mr Cal well's state,nent. 54 . 
Moses decided that if Calwell 's st!'!t:ement was to be run, it would 
have to be broadcast side by side with the statements by Henderson 
and Kennedy to which it was replying. A considerable proportion of the 
news that night was devoted to the three statements, Henderson and 
Kennedy getting 17 lines and Calwell 21. It must have seemed rather 
unreal to many listeners, seeing that the ABC had hardly referred to the 
subject since the days on which the newspapers were seized. Predictably, 
it was not good enough for Cal\'lell. He telephoned Moses to complain 
that the announcer had read the remarks by Henderson and Kennedy clearly 
and effectively, but had read his comment without expression and with 
several mispronunciations. 
lfuile on this issue there is no evidence that the News Department 
staff deliberately chose to emphasise the Government's point of view, as 
they had done with the Murdoch-Evatt dispute earlier, the Co::>rnmission' s 
timidity, and strong pressure from Calwell and the censors had once 
again thro\Vll into question the 'objectivity' of the news service. 
Although the Commission had resisted the more excessive demands of 
Calwell, it had not found the strength to give equal coverage to the 
disputants, except in the bulletin of 25 April. It looked for an excuse 
to avoid the issue as far as possible and found one in adopting Forde's 
attitude. But the result of this 'freezing' of the news coverage, was 
54. Ibid. 
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to leave the Government side 1<1ell ahead in terms of lineage, because it 
had had an overwhelming share of bulletins prior to Forde's statement. 
Also, the immediate result of adopting Forde's policy was to deny the 
Opposition &,y coverage at all. The ne~spapers realised they had not 
been given equal time or prominence for their point of vie1<1 and the 
affair confirmed in their minds that the news service was very 
largely controlled by the Government and therefore hostile to their 
point of view. They were shortly to get confirmation of this. 
On 7 October 1944, printe!·s at The Sun in Sydney stopped work to 
demand a forty hour week and four weeks annual leave. The strike soon 
spread. The following day there were no papers. Other unions had joined 
in when the proprietors had attempted to print composite editions. On 
9 October, the newspapers managed to put out a composite paper of a 
few pages lUlder the names of the four Sydney dailies. The following day, 
the AJA combined with the Labor weekly The Standard to bring out a four 
page daily in competition. The dispute went befo:re the N. S. \'/. Industrial 
Commission, with the final settlement occurring on 20 October. 
From the earliest days of the dispute, the newspaper proprietors 
complained about the nature of the ABC news coverage. On 13 October, 
Henderson himself complained in the composite ne~;spaper of the "unbalanced 
and untrue version of the dispute which was contained in news broadcasts 
over national stations". At the end of the strike he 1<rote that he 
believed that the Government had cons pi red with the strikers to allow 
their "illegal" newspaper to be printed. Ministers, he said, had also 
connived jn the breaking of the law by allowing the strikers' paper to 
take some of its news from ABC broadcasts. The ABC coverage itself had 
showed disgraceful partiality in its reporting of the strike. 
These are very ominous systems. All law is weakened when Govern-
ments and their agend cs become partisans or abettors of industrial 
law-breakers, declared so by the Court. 55 
55. Com.E.osite new':'}1a[ler, 20 October 1944. 
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Dixon's news staff were upset at Henderson's allegations and 
demanded a retraction. Dixon himself drafted a letter of protest 
to Henderson which Moses would not send. A detailed analysis which the ~<ri ter 
has made of sixty-five bulletins containing news of the strike between 
7 ru1d 17 October shows that at least in terms of space - not accepted 
nowadays as the sole criterion by most researchers, ru1d not accepted 
at all by some - there is substru1ce to Henderson's complaints. There 
~;ere 283 lines devoted to statements by unions involved in the strike 
or sympathetic to the strikers. The newspaper proprietors received only 
152. The imbalance is accentuated considerably when the 52 lines given 
over to statements from Federal Government ministers in support of the 
strikers are taken into account. There was no comment used from 
politicians supporting the ne~<spapers. In the report asked for by the 
Commission, Dixon gives ru1other ex01mp!e cf the application of his 'news 
not views 1 philosophy: 
On the whole we probably gave more space to the men's case 
than to the proprietors, simply because the men were holding 
meetings and passing resolutions, whereas the proprietors, 
in the composite paper, were merely repeating the history of 
the dispute, which we gave at least three times on the first 
day of the trouble.56 
Correspondence and a study of bulletin content show that Dixon acceded 
to union requests to direct attention to the time and place of union 
meetings in connection with the stoppage. 
Despite the heavy emphasis given to the strikers' viewpoints, the 
Commission still rru1 into trouble with Cal~;ell over the space it gave 
Henderson. With the Commission becoming uneasy over the news coverage 
in its bulletins, Dixon was instructed by McCall to offer Henderson the 
chru1ce to reply to Calwell, ~<hen the Ministe!' iss·1~d a strong statement 
on 10 October. Henderson's statement was rececved just as the culletin 
56. Dixon to Bearup, 24 October 1944, SP314,Box 3, Sl, "Press Agreements". 
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was about to go to air and was run llllCUt. Calwell noted that Henderson 
had been given 21 lines to his 14, and was 1~hat he called "a personal, 
unwarranted attack". 57 The Colll!11lssion felt obliged to give Calwe1l 
another 18 lines in which to attack Henderson the following night. 
This time Henderson was given no opportllllity to reply. The Commission 
was at this time striking consideral:l}e trouble with C:d11ell in a number 
of areas, and was annoyed that the rwmint; of !1ende:cson' s statement 
at length had given the Minister the opportunity to interfere once more. 
It told Dixon it was dissatisfied with his handling of the Calwell/ 
Henderson statements. 
The dispute is additionally interesting because it marked the 
first time that the News Department had ever been thrown completely 
on its own resources for the gathering of Australian news. The 
Commission had ruled that Dixon was not to use material from the composite 
paper published by the proprietors, and he was given additional short-term 
staff to enable him to collect all his own news. He was also given 
additional bulletin time. He reported: "throughout the dispute many 
of our sessions gave a wider and better coverage of Australian news than 
we had ever been able to give by relying on the papers" 58 In the 
PSCB hearings of l946,Dixon was able to point to this episcde as 
evidence of the News Department's capability of 'going it alone'. 
(iii) ABC 'Objectivity' an? 'News Judgment' 
There is evidence during the wartime years of the inexperience of 
ABC reporters as compared with their newspaper colleagues. Some of the 
ABC's biggest 'scoops' resulted in fact from failure to keep to standard 
verification procedures. The story of the sinking of the Prince of Wales 
57. Record of telephone conversation bet~;een Moses and Calwel1, 
ll October 1944, Attachment to minute of Commission meeting of 
18-20 Octobe:c 1944. -
58. Dixon to Bearup, 24 October 1944, SP286, Blllld1e 6. 
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and the Repulse for example, was based on a highly dubious Japanese 
broadcast. 59 Although, to the News Department's relief it turned out 
to be true, it is obvious that other news organisations, such as the 
BBC, would not have given it such promi.nence until it had been 
confirmed. In August 1945, there was a similar case when the ABC 
obtained an exclusive story that Evatt had demanded that the Japanese 
Emperor Hirohito be brought to t:cial as a l<~.r criui.nal. Evatt's 
secretary, Allan Dalziel, has ~i;";ce recounted the story of this incident. 
Evatt had prepared a speech for delivery in Melbourne in which he had 
stressed the necessity for trying Hirohito. Just before the speech was 
given, he changed his mind about this section and deleted it. Copies of 
the speech given to reporters present after he finished were altered. 
The ABC reporter however had had to leave early, before Evatt had 
finished, and had received an unedited version from Dalziel. When it 
was soon realised that the unedited copy had left the hall, attempts 
were made to locate the reporter, whose organisation \vas not known, but 
failed. The ABC broadcast the expurgated section much to Evatt's 
dismay. The ABC reporter had failed to have the speech checked against 
delivery, a standard journalistic procedure. 60 The newspapers thought 
that Evatt had deliberately given the ABC an exc:lusive story. 
In her analysis of what newsmen mean by the term 'o':Jj ecti vi ty 1 
Gaye Tuchman draws attention to the nature of the journalist's task, 
which, with its immediacy, and necessity for speedy processing of the 
product, leaves little time for reflection on the 'validity' or 
59. See Chapter 1, p. 83. . The following day the J apancse announced 
the sinking of the battleship 'King George'. This was a fallacious 
claim, which Dixon this time fortunately rejected on 'a hunch' 
See Dixon, ABC, pp.59-60. 
60. See Allen Dalziel. Evatt the Enigma (Lansdowne Press, Melbourne, 
1967), pp.49-51. ----------
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•reliability' or 'truth' of the material h•; is handling. By working 
instead to a certain routine Nhich estatlishes the 'objectivity' of his 
material in the eyes of his bosses and the public, he lessens the risks 
of reaction from 'concerned' consumers. One of the 'strategies' 
employed to demonstrate 'objectivity' is to ensure that 'facts' are 
those which have been observed or which are verifiable. Clearly, in 
the two cases cited above, not even this first elementary step towards 
establishing 'objectivity' has been followed. Even when 'facts' have 
been verified, Tuchman points out that the appropriate structuring of 
those 'facts' to make a news story is an important way of denoting 
'objectivity'. This involves "news judgment' [which] is the ability 
to choose 'objectively' between and among competing 'facts' to decide 
which 'facts' are more 'important' or 'interesting'". 60 But, she 
stresses, the reporter's assessment of the importance of these facts 
may differ from his editor's and from that conta.ined in another 
newspaper. Yet all claim to be 'objective'. Obviously 'news judgment' 
also means making decisions about ~<hat facts are to be reported, as well 
as deciding the order of those ~<hich are eventually chosen. The 'news 
judgment' of ABC reporters frequently differed from that of their 
newspaper counterparts. 
The best example of this, which eventually further strained 
relations which the press was the news coverage of the dispute between 
Cal well and General Thomas Blamey in January 1945. Fadden had 
criticised Cah;ell' s Department of Information for its failure to 
keep the public informed about the actions involving Australian 
servicemen in the Pacific islands. On 16 January Cal well held a news 
conference at which he denied his department was responsible for the lack 
of news of the war. .1\n ABC reporte,· present saw that he could get the 
61. Gayc Tuchman, "Objectivity as Strategic Ritual", American Journal 
of S_ociology, Vol.77, No.4 (January 1972), p.670. 
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story into the midday news bu~ let ins if he filed quickly. His story 
began: "The Minister for Infc,rJoation, M-r Cah:e:.. >., said today that the 
Army Public Relations section was solely to blame for the black-out of 
news of Australian fighting forces during the past three months". 62 The 
item went on to indirectly criticise the Army for failing to accredit a 
correspondent from the Information Department, so that better 
information could be obtained from the front line. As soon as this 
broadcast was heard in Canberra it caused a stir in the Labor Government. 
Other ministers objected to Cal we 11' s attack, particularly the Acting 
Prime Minister, Frank Forde, and the Acting Army Minister, Senator Fraser. 
The same afternoon Calwell claimed the ABC had misreported him, and he 
issued an 'authorised' version of his press conference, in which his 
remarks were considerably toned down. There was no reference to blaming 
the Army, not to the Army's failure to accredit an Information Department 
correspondent. It mildly rebuked the Army 1Yi '~h the s t8.temer t: ·'The 
sole responsibility for not advising the pvblic of d0velopments over the 
last three months in New Britain, and the Solomons, and norther11 New 
Guinea rested with Army Public Relations". 63 Even this however aroused 
the anger of Calwell's colleagues and in the evening he issued 'an 
amplification' of this remark which added the words "which do'-lbtless had 
good reason for the action it took in withholding premature announcement 
of the fighting in these areas". 64 
62. The transcript is in the Sydney MoJ!ling Herald, 17 January 1945. 
63. Ibid. The Sun, 16 January 1945 carried the 'authorised 1 
¥eTsion only. 
64. Ibid. 
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Blarney, having heard of the ABC's broadcast version of Cal well's 
news conference, the following day rep lied on strong terms. He 
emphasised that all information about the Army's activities was 
controlled by General MacArthur. As the ·past weeks had seen great 
numbers of men move through dangerous areas of the Pacific, subject 
to submarine ru1d aircraft attack, it was necessary to maintain 
secrecy. He added: 
It i.s incredible that these facts and consiaerations are net 
known to the Minister for Information. I ,·e.gret the necessity 
for a public statement on the matter, especif.lly >;here prope1.· 
action had been taken to secure the safety of our gallant lads 
and their American comrades in their passage of perilous waters. 65 
The ABC, accepting that it had misreported Cal well the previous day, 
carried part of Blarney's statement but did not touch the section 
quoted above. It dropped also Blarney's further reference to the 
allegation that the attack "from high places" had been "a direct lie". 
The newspapers had a field day over the affair. They reported both 
the text of the ABC broadcast and the 'authorised' version of Cal well's 
remarks, and they carried Blarney's attack in full. Henderson, as 
President of ANPA, took the opportunity to praise the army and criticise 
the attitude of Cal well's Department as being "consistently obstructionist 
and hostile". 66 Noticing the ABC's reluctance to ar.noy Calwell any 
further by reporting Blarney's more contentious remarks, Wynne of AAP 
wrote to Moses to point out what hi3 News Department: had done, quoting 
the deleted lines. Dixon refers to the action of the reporter as 'a 
blunder'. He says: "We used what Blamey had to say except his personal 
65. Sydney Morning Herald, 19 January 1945. 
66. Sydney Morning Herald, 17 January 1945. 
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attack on Callvell, because Call,ell hadn't really attacked Army 
Public Relations, although we had said he did". 67 It is characteristic 
of Dixon that he immediately accepted Cal well's word, instead of that of 
his reporter. What seems far more like.ly, given the positive nature of 
the ABC news story, and its strong ring of authenticity, is that Calwell 
did say what the ABC man attributed to him, but did not intend his 
remarks to be reported in that form. The ABC's records of the incident 
are skimpy, but it seems likely that with Calwell's fiery nature and his 
unconventional vocabularly, there was some widely accepted principle 
that his remarks frequently required transposition by parl1amentary 
reporters into a form which was 'acceptable' and 'authorised'. No 
doubt a check could be made later by reporters if they were uncertain 
about what to report. Experienced reporters however would be aware of 
the convention and would avoid the pitfalls of having their story denied 
b h . . 68 y t e Munster. 
Tuchman's remarks on 'news sense' are very relevant to this 
incident. She points out that the judgment on which journalists rely 
for their 'objectivity' is related to their experience with inter-
organi. zation relationships. 
Institutions and organizations have procedures designed 
to protect both the institution and the people who come into 
contact with it. The significance of either a statement or a. 
'no comment' must be assessed according to the newsman's 
knowledge of institutional procedures.69 
67. Dixon, ABC, p.l28. 
68. When reporting for the ABC in South-east Asia, 1961-65, the writer 
was made aware of a similar convention in reporting the remarks of 
the Malayan Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman. The Tunku was 
renowned for his 'indiscreet' remarks about other politicians, the 
Chinese, and neighbouring countries, and journalists generally agreed 
that he had to be 'protected' from himself, by leaving such comments 
unreported. 
69. Tuchman, "Objectivity", p.672. 
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It seems probable that the ABC reporter was not aware of the normal 
procedure for reporting Cal•~ell' s off-the-cuff remarks, and 1·:as 
therefore lacking in 'news judgment'. Or perhaps the JNcessity for 
speed in reporting, to beat the press, was a factor which swayed his 
judgment. Radio cannot use one of the other devices for ensuring 
'objectivity' - that of using quotation marks. If printed, in that 
form, it would have been much harder for Calwell to deny. 
If we assume that the initial report of Calwell's remarks had 
been correct, Tuchman's views on 'objectivity' appear to be substantiated. 
The 'objective' report of Calwell's remarks expected by the ABC, and 
presumably by the newspapers as well, was not the actual record, but a 
structured version of them which had been subjected to the procedure of 
becoming 'authorised'. 'Objectivity' which is the product of this kind 
of 'news judgment' is not objectivity at all but only a device of self-
protection for the journalists involved. Having made the 'blunder' 
of running the Minister's unauthorised remarks, the ABC News Department 
then made the situation worse by liSi'lg only part of Blarney's reply in 
order that Calwell 1~ould not be further incensed. This was the degree 
of 'objectivity' thought desirable by the ABC so as not to draw attention 
to the 'blunder' of the first report which it had carried. The 
'objectivity' of the newspapers on this occasion was much more self-
evident. Because the ABC had broadcast the 'unauthorised' report, it 
was able to use that and the 'authorised' version, side by side, and 
allow the public to make up its mind. Having done this, it was able 
to 'balance' this with the full text of Blarney's statement. The overall 
effect of the newspaper 'objectivity' was therefore far stronger than 
the 'objectivity' of the ABC. The newspapers had been far more diligent 
in subjecting their 'facts' to the necessary procedures which ensure the 
appearance of 'objectivity'. The newspapers on this occasion and others 
were therefore able to point to the greater degc-ee of 'objectivity' 
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which they possessed when compared to the ABC. It seems clear that the 
ne~Vspapers would not in normal circumstances have published the 
'unauthorised' statements in the way the ABC did. To have doPe so would 
not have accorded with their professional judgment. But once the ABC 
broadcast had been made, the same 'news judgment' told them that in using 
both versions, they were being 'objective', while at the same time 
undermining the position of Cal~Vell, whom they disliked intensely, and 
their rival, the ABC Ne\Vs Department. In this sense, the ne~Vspaper 
staff probably possessed better 'ne~Vs judgment' than their more 
inexperienced opposite numbers in the ABC. The bitter feelings of ABC 
journalists towards the press, and their strong links IVith the Government 
\Vere too often made obvious in their ne\Vs reports. 'Objectivity' is the 
result of subjecting 'facts' to a certain pattern so that criticism is 
nullified. The ne~Vspapers were no more genuinely 'objective' than the 
ABC but at times were more successful in this period in giving the 
appearance of being so. Conversely, the ABC frequently failed to 
demonstrate its 'objectivity' part.icl'l~.rly in matters affecting the 
press, and this helped undermine confidence in the service, and increase 
the uneasiness of the Commission. 
The same kind of analysis can be applied to an affair which 
occurred almost simultaneously with the Calwell/Blamey controversy. 
On 17 January, the Sydney Morning Herald reported that it had been 
requested by the Milk Zone Dairymen's Council to appoint an independent 
accountant to investigate the price-fixing methods used by Professor 
Copland in an enquiry he had conducted into the industry. Copland's 
report had resulted in prices being fixed which had brought about a 
strike by dairymen in protest. Once the Sydney ~lorning Herald had 
agreed to the request, the dairymen agreed to go back to work. The 
same day, the Federal Government announced that it would pay a special 
subsidy on milk if the producers went back to work. The reaction of 
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Dixon and his newsmen to these developments was undoubtedly affected 
by the embarrassment and anger they felt at their treatment by the 
press over the Ca lwell/Blamey statements. Dixon comments: 
Our ne~<s staff regarded the Herald's move as a publicity sttmt and 
made no mention of it ... I told-Moses the Herald's enquiry ~<as 
unworthy of attention by the ABC. The Government had said it 
would take no notice of the inquiry.70 
On 20 January, the Sydney Morning Herald carried a long statement from 
F.J. Sedgwick, the Secretary of the 1·1ilk Zone Dairymen's Council 
protesting at the "distorted broadcasts of the ABC regarding the 
settlement of the recent milk dispute". Sedgwick claimed the only reason 
for the return to work was the Sydn-:;_y ~'O!!'_~!_!":Tald 1 s promise to hold 
the enquiry. This had forced the Government to agree to arbitration. 
Because of the ABC ne11s broadcasts: "The public were misled and a belief 
created that it ~<as ~<holly due to Government action that the milk service 
was restored". The ABC promised to hold an enquiry and on 10 February, 
the Sydney Morning Herald published a letter from Bearup to Sedgwick 
which denied political bias but raised the possibility that "an error of 
judgment" had occurred. In making no mention at all of the Sydney Morning 
Herald's moves, Dixon's staff had failed to take one of the elementary 
steps necessary to produce the impression of 'objectivity'. They failed 
to present both sides of the story, and instead gave all credit to the 
Government. Tuchman points out that even when these 'balanced' and 
verified 'facts' have been obtained, they are then subjected to 
structuring in appropriate sequence according to 'news s8n.se'. 'News 
sense' in this context 11ould be very subject to echto:.:ial influer.ce, as 
the Sydney Morning Herald had taken a public stance in support of the milk 
producers and against the Government. The stories that resulted 
emphasised the Sydney Mornirl_g_Jl":rald' s contribution to the ending of the 
dispute, and do~<nplayed that of the Goven1ment. Both sides were ho~<ever 
given. We are not talking about either side - ABC or the Sydnt>yMorning 
70. Dixon, ABC, pp.l27-28. 
i 
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Herald - achieving genuine 'objectivity', but the degree of success of 
each in laying claim to objectivity, or making use of 'objective' 
procedures which are discernible to the consumer. The Sydney Morning 
Herald once again managed this better than the ABC News Department. 
By mid 1945, as Boyer and the Commission were once again engaged 
in discussion with the newspaper proprietors over new agreements which 
would meet the objections of the Government, feelings against the 
newspapers were running very high in the ABC News Department. Deamer's 
article in the Daily Telegraph 71 had evoked a strong reaction. Dixon 
wrote to Bearup: 
Apparently Deamer works on the same principle as Henderson -
the bigger the lie the more Lkely it is to be believed ... 
Members of the news staff here feel that unless something is 
done to challenge HendeTson's statements, they will have to 
ask the AJA to move in the matter. Every journalists on 
our staff feels that the repetition of such serious mis-
statements had a damaging effect on his or her professional 
status. 72 
Dixon was referring to alleged statements by Henderson that the greater 
part of the national news was taken from the newspapers. 73 
To the newspapers, ABC news had now become a very pliant tool of 
the Government, running statements without question whenever required. 
Occasionally there were lapses which showed a strong element of Labor 
orientation and sympathy - lapses which again indicated that too few 
pains were taken to ensure 'objectivity'. The best known case was 
legendary among the newspapers, but unfortunately no record of the 
71. See Chapter 2, p.l87. 
72. Dixon to Bearup, 3 May 1945, SP286, Btncle 6. 
73. He did not specify the source of these statements. 
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particular news item, or any correspondence concerning it, exists. It 
was a quotation from an official in the Department of External Affairs, 
. . h' . . D E t 74 praiSing IS minister, r vat . 
Another example which does exist, 8.lthough not so "xtreme, 
shows naivety. On 27 July 1945 the following item was read: 
Mrs H.V. Evatt, who has just returned from America with 
Dr Evat1:, l·lill give her impressions of America to members of the 
Henry Lawson Labor College at 8 o'clock tonight. The public 
is invited to hear her description of educational facilities 
in the United States.75 
It seems very likely that the newspapers complained about the simple 
propagandist nature of this piece. McCall rang Dixon to ask him to 
stop all such 'advertisements' in the future. It was, he emphasised, 
a Commission instruction. Dixon wrote a memo to his staff giving 
the Commission vie•.;point, but clearly implying it was not his mvn. A 
member of his staff then leaked the memo to the Labor weekly, The 
Standard, which attacked the Commission under the heading "ABC's Vicious 
Sniping at Mrs Evatt". It can be assumed therefore that the viewpoint 
given in the article represented the views of some of Dixon's staff, 
and perhaps that of Dixon himself. The Departmen<: obviously felt 
suspicious of the Commission, felt beleagured, ar,d had the~efore 
fostered good contacts with the pro-Labor anti-monopoly newspapers. 
The Standard wrote "The 'guilty' men of Broadcast House have stepped up 
their war of nerves against News Department journalists who dared to 
oppose the treacherous sellout of ABC news services to the Murdoch-
Fairfax monopoly". 76 It called McCall's instruction 'insolent', and 
74. Opinions differ slightly about the exact wording of the story. 
Hmvever, in his Daily Telegraph article of 14 May 1945 Deamer 
recalled that it had gone something like this: "High officials 
of the Department of External Affairs stated today that the 
statement made in the House of Rcprcsentati ves by the Minister 
for External Affairs [Dr Evatt] was, in their opinion, one of 
the most statesmanlike expositions of Australia's vie~<point ever 
given in this country". 
75. The text is contained in }'he StandaE_cl_, 3 August 1945. 
76. Ibid. 
said the suggestion that the item was an advertisement could only 
exist "in the minds of morons, or brains filled with prejudice". 77 
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Thus the News Department defended the item and their 'news judgment' 
which must again be seen as very questiqnable and leaving the 
Department open to attack. 
We remarked earlier on DL:on 's obsessive pTeoccupation with the 
speed 1vith which radio could b:r8ak news. 78 He recognised very early 
that this was radio's basic advantage over the press, particularly in 
wartime, and as the element of competition between press and ABC 
increased, he placed more and more emphasis on the speed with which 
statements, usually from the Government, could be put on air. 79 
When many of the commercial stations decided to end the arrangement to 
relay the ABC's major bulletins in May 1945, and began taking their 
news from newspaper offices, the emphasis on speed became even more 
apparent. A radio competitor was harder to 'beat' than a newspaper. 
The months that followed the start of the commercial services were 
largely devoted to speed comparisons on important stories. At times 
the ABC was ahead, such as the announcement that Forde and Chifley 
were both to stand for the leadership of the Labor Party. 80 At other 
times, such as the election of Chifley to the leadership, the cor.unercial 
stations, in this case 2UE and 2SM, were ahead by some minutes in getting 
a 'flash' on air. The latter case was symptomatic of consistent troubles 
the News Department were to have in subsequent years in getting 'flashes' 
on air. The commercials had fewer programmes which were on national relay 
77. Ibid. 
78. See Chapter 2, p.l89. 
79. See also the examples in Chapter 2 at pp.lS0-51, and pp.209-10. 
80. See Chapter 2, p.209. 
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and difficult to break into, and fewer programmes of 'serious 1 music 
or drama which were thought difficult to interrupt. 
In the latter half of 1945, the press accused the ABC of taking 
material from the newspapers which was copyright and using it without 
acknowledgment. Under the terms of the "gentlemen's agreement" with the 
newspapers, i terns used in the news would be acknowledged to their source. 
In April 1943, the newspapers agreed that there need not be any 
acknowledgment of press i terns used in the national news. Nearly all the 
Australian items in this bulletin were provided by the ABC's Canberra 
staff anyway. Press news used in State bulletins was still to be 
attributed. In August 1945, Claude McKay, managing editor of Smith's 
Weekly complained to Boyer that an exclusive story from his paper had 
been !stolen' and used in the ABC news. Smith's~seklv was not a party 
to the ABC agreement with ANPA. The story revealed that Jimmy Carl1:on, 
the champion sprinter who had become a priest, was leaving the ministry 
to be married. The morning it appeared in Smith's Weekly, the ABC 
broadcast a similar story. McKay wrote: 
It took us seven weeks with one man continually on the job to 
verify this piece of news. That item so light-heartedly 
thieved cost over £100 to obtain. This is no new breach of 
a recognised code on the part of the ABC. We have in the past 
noticed the unauthorised rifling of our columns, and I am sure 
from knowledge of you that you would not be a party to such 
practices.81 
It transpired that a sub-editor in the ABC had known Carl ton had resigned 
but had been asked not to run the story. Seeing the details in Smith's 
Weekly, however, he believed he was no longer bound to remain silent. 82 
81. McKay to Boyer, 20 August 1945.. SP286, P.tmdle 6. 
82. Dixon is wrong in claiming that its arpea:.·ance' in Smith's Weekly 
on the same rnonli.ng as its broadcast in ABC nel·!S \;as a coincidence. 
See 'Dixon, ABC, p. 1'43. 
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In November, Henderson ~Oi'lp l.lim:d ·~Jnt :.< ~ton• on the enquiry into 
the actions of General Gordon Bennett and another on Einstein's views on 
the atomic bomb were taken from the Sydney Morning Herald without 
acknowledgment. He referred to these trvo cases the follmdng year in 
his evidence to the PSCB. 
We are constantly getting cases of that kind and from time 
to time I protest to the Commission. The Commission investigates 
but these incidents continue to happen ... That is something 
which a national organisation docs not do. But it is done ... 
I know that the Commission is not a party to such practice 
but I am suggesting that the staff of the Commission in their 
keenness overlook ownership in news and every no1v and again 
literally take things to which they are not entitled. 83 
Dixon claimed that in the Bennett story, the item had been correctly 
acknowledged in the State news and that the Einstein story had been 
received from the ABC's London office. 
We have earlier mentioned that the ABS >~as at times responsible 
for putting news on air without adequately verifying the essential 'facts' 
of the story. This was a charge which Dixon vras also fond of making of 
the newspapers. Much of his evidence given to the PSCB in 1946 was 
devoted to illustrating his point. He was disturbed mostly about 'facts' 
which had been carelessly misreported. Two instances of what he regarded 
as classic misreporting by the press are both about the arrangements for 
important meetings. In December 1945 he reported to Moses that a story 
taken from the Daily Telegraph had proved to be incorrect. The Daily 
Telegraph had reported the Iromvorkers Union application for reregistra-
tion would be heard before the Industrial Commission on Wednesday of 
the following week. ftn ACTU executive member had telephoned to say this 
was incorrect and the newsroom, on checking with the President of the 
Commission found that no date had been set. The :_relcgraph repeated the 
error on the following two days and Dixon remarked; "The blunder 
83. Henderson, Evidence, ~SCB, 1 July 191\6, p.371. 
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on the part of the Telegrap~ is one of the most serious and persistent 
in my recollection". 84 Before the PSCB he related a very similar 
instance in which the ABC news service had run a story from an unnamed 
Sydney newspaper that the Prime Minister would meet union officials 
about the coal crisis the same evening. The Prime Minister denied this. 
Dixon also made the charga bE fore the PSCf3 that the ABC news 
service could prompt an adverse reaction among listeners if it repeated 
some of the more sensational and baseless newspaper stories. He 
instanced the newspaper coverage of recent floods at Port Fairy 
in Victoria. An ABC reporter sent to the scene had found hostility 
among local residents because of 'exaggerated' newspaper reports. He 
estimated that a quarter of the newspaper stories filed: "were 
the product of unsubstantiated reports or unwarranted speculation". 85 
This again is evidence of a very different 'news sense' or 'news 
judgment' being applied. The newspapers involved would no doubt have 
claimed that their stories were 'objective' and the facts had been 
verified. The ABC reporter, having been sent from Melbourne to ascertain 
the real 'facts' because the ABC was dubious about the press stories, 
was undoubtedly under strong pressure to bring back a 'different' 
story, which was more 'objective'. Both wot:ld have presented supporting 
evidence. Both would have been a collection of 'facts' assessed and 
structured by the newsmen. As Tuchman says, one form of supporting 
evidence which demonstrates 'objectivity' is the quotation of other 
people's opinions. "Adding more names and quotations, the reporter may 
remove his opinions from the story by getting others to say what he him-
self thinks."86 From Dixon's accot .. :nt it is obvious that his reporter 
quoted sources which denied that there had been much damage. Newspaper 
reports carried quotations which said the opposite. 
84. Dixon to Moses, 17 December 1945, SP286, Bundle 6. 
85. Dixon, Evidence, PSCB, 25 June 19~6, p.354. 
86. Tuchman, "Objectivity", p.668. 
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B}· 1946, it is clear that the 'news judgment' of newspaper and 
ABC reporters were frequently at variance in their assembling of 
information in appropriate sequence. Their identification of material 
facts differed. What was 'news sense' .to one, was not to the other. 
In the PSCB hearing Henderson tried to show that it was unfair to 
accuse the newspapers of suppression and distort ion. It was more 
appropriate to examine the political 'colouring' of ABC news 
bulletins by ABC reporters. Henderson complained bitterly about 
the numerous occasions when charges have been made against 
a newspaper, either in Parliament or elsewhere and the reply 
of the newspaper has never ueen put over the air. 87 
He instanced the milk strike affair, mentioned earlier, and gave the 
latest example - the Yoizuki incident. On 6 Marc!1 1946, th" former 
Japanese destroyer Yoizuki took aboard 1,005 Formosan men, women and 
children for repatriation. The vessel was very overcrowded, and many 
of the Formosans had to be forcibly put on board in Sydney. Newspaper 
pictures taken at the wharf caused concern. The Opposition raised 
the subject in Parliament the same day, and the newspapers clamoured 
for action to be taken to recall the vessel to avoid unnecessary 
suffering. 
The debate in t:1e House over the issue saw the Government on the 
defensive in trying to explain why the vessel was not brought back to an 
A 1 . 88 ustra um port. The vessel was ordered to put into Rabaul where an 
investigation was held but newsmen were banned from visiting the port 
to see for themselves. On 13 March Henzies produced in the House a 
87. Henderson, Evidcmce, PSCB, 1 July 1946, p.375. 
88. See CPO, 6 'larch 1946, pp.Sl-55; 
CPD,"D t-!arch 1946, p.l72; CPD, 
CPrl, 14 Harch 1946, p.247. --
CPD, 8 ~larch 1946, pp.l53-67; 
13~Tarch 1946, pp.207-226; 
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statement by General Macarthur denying that he was responsible for the 
orders to load the vessel, a claim which Army Minister Forde had made 
to the House a week earlier. A Government-appointed c01mnittcc of 
enquiry eventually reported that the passengers had arrived 'in good 
condition'. Calwell claimed that "This has been a Sydney t·lorning Herald 
stunt from beginning to end". 89 
Henderson told the PSCB that Chifley had alleged the Sydney 
~lorning Herald_ had taken some material about the affair out of context 
in an article. The newspaper published a reply. The ABC news had 
carried Chifley' s complaint but not the Herald's rejoinder. Once 
again Dixon has provided evidence of the editorial policy pursued 
within his Ne~<s Department which was responsible for this one-sided 
reporting. In Inside the ABC he says "I thol'ght t:1e r.ev:spapers were 
hysterical and to some extent irresponsible in the way they demanded 
that the government recall the ship which was taking a large number of 
Formosans home". 90 This view was obviously reflected in the 
reporting of the incident. 
As pointed out, it is very difficult to establish an appearance 
of 'objectivity' if one of the basic steps - the reporting of both 
sides in a dispute - is not taken. The lack of 'objectivity' by the 
ABC News Department in the reporting of disputes between the press and 
the Government was not only apparent to the ne1<spapers. It was also 
apparent to the Commission. Henderson gave evidence that "Whenever I 
have gone to the Commission with a complaint ... I have inva.riably had 
satisfaction; it has been as concerned about t!1ese incidents as I 
have". 91 M1en Boyer drew up his News Directive in 1946, 92 his aim 
89. CPO, 13 March 1946, p.2"1. 
90. Dixon, ABC, p.l52. 
91. Henderson, Evidence, PSCB, 1 .July 1946, p.375. 
92. See Chapter 3, pp. 215-30. 
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therefore was not only to curb the heavily pro-Government nature of 
the reporting, but also to put an end to the obvious taking of sides 
against the major newspapers. He had realised that the 'news judgment' 
of newspapers >Jas not the standard required for the ABC news service 
because he believed it was based on circulation-building, through 
'sensationalism'. He recognised that many pec'ple, including the 
Labor Government believed newspaper news was supplied and edited 
according to its 'policy'. He knew too, although the ABC News 
Department escaped any censure at all on this point from the PSCB 
that ABC bulletins also lacked 'objectivity' because they were 
subject to Departmental policy over which the Commission had not yet 
established control. Hence Boyer in his directive called for a 
degree of 'objectivity' which surpassed that of the newspapers. 
'Speed' as a prerequisite for the national news service was endorsed 
by the PSCB in its report. The Commission's new independent ne1~s 
service was therefore required to be faster, mor 'objective' than 
the press and also to use different 'news judgment' in selecting news, 
which would not be based on 'sensationalism'. Boyer had therefore 
endorsed the competitive nature of his news service and also its 
search for different news values. He had not endor~ed its hostility 
to the press. The Commission's relationship with the press was at 
this time friendly. 
(iv) Press Attempts at Sabotage 
With the passing of the Broadcasting Act of 1946, and the 
ending of any chance of an agreement between the press and the ABC, 
the press began to take a much tougher stance towards ABC news. 
Even before the Act was passed, Dixon and his staff began to be 
a"·are of press attempts to deny them information through official 
channels. These were invariably at State level, as the ABC's channels 
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had been well secured at Federal level for many years. But when 
ABC reporters began to move for the first time on a regular basis on 
'beats' covered by newspaper roundsmen in State capitals, they quickly 
discovered that these men and their papers resented their presence 
and acted to preserve their interests. In March 1946 Dixon wrote in 
quick succession to C.N. Neale, the Commissioner for Road Transport, 
and T .J. Hartigan, the Conunissioner for Railways, complaining that 
stories had been withheld from the ABC reporte-..s. Harjorie Plunkett, 
the ABC's pioneer state Parliamentary roundsman reported to Dixon in 
July, that reporters from the Sydney Morning Herald, the Telegraph 
and AUP were refusing to cooperate with her. 
Secretaries of some State ministers had shown a bias towards 
the morning press. The Sydney Morning Herald's Qan had deliberately 
failed to give her a news release which he had been asked to deliver. 
She concluded her report with this remarkable statement: 
I have told the Ministers of these difficulties and 
Mr Baddeley [Deputy Premier and Chief Secretary] promised to 
talk to the Premier [W.J. ~1cKell] about it. However, he 
informed me yesterday that the Government had come to an 
agreement with the papers that the Government would receive 
a 'better deal' from the papers if it gave the papers the 93 
news first. He was sorry but he had no choice in the matter. 
The ABC does not appear to have taken any official action as a 
result of this allegation. Cotton, h<:tving confirni<od that the press 
was attempting to exclude ABC reporters from press talks with 
Ministers, told Dixon he would appoint another roundsman to help 
Plunkett. Dixon approved this step, telling Moses 
It is a serious matter indeed IVhen Ministers of the Crown 
join ~;ith a section of the press to deprive the national 
broadcasting service of an even break IVith the neiVS. That 
is all IVC have ever asked for; and I am determined that we 
shall get nothing less.94 
93. Plunkett to Dixon, 4 July 1946, SP286, Bundle 6. 
94. Dixon to Moses, 4 July 1946, SP286, Bundle 6. 
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Members of the ABC staff decided that at this stage they would 
make their own moves to help their Parliamentary reporters. They 
leaked the details of Plunkett's experiences to Truth, which was 
strongly pro-Labor and anti-ANPA. Th_e newspaper published them and 
added: 
This effort by the disgruntled daily newspapers to create 
a further monopoly in news is distinctly naive. It is 
difficult to imagine any but the most politically biased 
Minister falling for such a scheme. Certainly not Labor 
Ministers.95 
This revelation might well have had some effect. There is no further 
record in ABC files of any similar difficulties in securing news from 
the State Government. There is evidence that by 1948, the Labor 
Government in N.S.W. had discovered the value of adequate coverage on 
ABC radio. If Plunkett's allegativns are true, the Government had 
by then changed its mind. In that year the Prer..:i.er j"ames McGirr 
apologised to Moses because a news release had failed to be 
communicated to the ABC. A press officer had thought the news office 
would be closed after midnight. He wrote: 
The fact that the news was not released to the ABC on this 
occasion, as desired, is very much regretted. The ABC 
Representative, Miss Plunkett, is at all times keen and most 
anxious to secure the release of news on the same basis as 
other representatives, and action has been taken to ensure 
that this will obtain in the Future.96 
Many major newspapers throughout Australia saw the ABC news 
service as basically hostile to them, because of its record in covering 
disputes bet~;een the press and the Government. To them it was also 
pro-Government and devoted to practices and employing news standards 
which were damaging to journalism and to the press generally. The 
95. Truth, Sydney, 7 July 1946. 
96. McGirr to Moses, 16 August 1948, SP286, Bundle 6. 
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newspapers therefore reacted in kind. They exerted their influence 
wherever possible to deny the ABC news. !.a P.eyth fo-:: exarr:rle, the 
ABC appointed a shipping roundsman, only to fine! tnal: he could not 
join the newspaper reporters in boarding vessels as soon as they 
arrived, because the Commonwealth Health Officer had received 
mysterious instructions that no more inoculations ~<ere to be issued 
to reporters for this purpose. The West Australian and the Daily News 
were able to send their men aboard ~<hile the ABC man had to wait on the 
wharf. Dixon complained of this 'unfair discrimination' and asked his 
Canberra office to take the matter up with the Director-General of 
Health. After a delay of some weeks, the approval for the 
. . . 97 
vacc1nat1ons was g1ven. 
In Brisbane, there was a complaint that the staff of Government 
House had dehberately withheld ne1~s of the appointment of the new 
Governor, Sir John Laverack, from the ABC. The News Editor in 
Queensland asked the State Manager to protest against what he regarded 
as the decision by the Lieutenant-Governor and his secretary to give 
the Courier-Mail the scoop. 98 
It was in Queensland that the ABC news service struck its most 
serious snag with the press and one 1~hich, for a while, caused real 
difficulties in the supply of news from country centres. On 6 January 
1947 the Courier-Mail had begun its mm radio news service through 
stations 4BK, 4AK, 4BC, 4SB, 4BH and 4IP. 99 The newspaper was 
97. See Dixon to Commins, 26 May 1947, SP286, Box 3, 53. 
98. See Dixon to Cotton, 5 September 1946, SP286, Box 4, 52. 
99. For details see the Courier-Mail, 4 January 1947. 
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supplied with country news by the Queensland Country Press Limited, 
a company comprising about 26 of the State's country newspapers. When, 
as in other States, the ABC began to approach journalists working 
within country newspapers to act a~ thei:::- correspondents, Country 
Press and the Courier-Mail heard about it, and J)Ut pressure on their 
newspaper suppliers to refuse to allm~ their staff to accept these 
appointments. In April, Colin Bednall of the Courier-Mail wrote to 
Moses expressing his alarm, "at growing evidence that the ABC News 
Department is lifting matter from the country newspapers of 
Queensland and making improper approaches to employees of country 
ncwspapers". 100 Later the same month, the Acting Manager for 
Queensland reported that five country correspondents had ceased to 
act for the ABC under pressure from Country Press. The ABC's News 
Editor in Queensland, B. Wright, strongly denied there had been 
improper approaches to country journalists. He claimed that in every 
case the appointment was made with the approval of the paper's Editor. 
He reported that ne1~spapers in Cairns, Mackay and King a roy had ignored 
Country Press and continued to let their staff work br the ABC. In 
nine smaller country centres, the owners of n~wspape:rs t~et·e, acting as 
ABC correspondents. Dixon expressed his bewilderment at developments 
in Queensland. He told Moses 
In N.S.W .... country newspaper propTietors encourage 
members of their staff to act as correspondents for 
metropolitan papers ... the extra money thus earned by staff 
members helps to keep them contented and compensates for the 
lower scale of salaries in the country.lOl 
100. Bednall to ~loses, no date but received in early April 1947, 
SP286, Box 3, Sl, "Queensland News Service". 
101. Dixon to Moses, 11 April 1947, SP286, Box 3, Sl. 
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On 29 April H . .J. Manning, Chairman of Country Press wrote to 
) 
Boyer and told him: "The ABC is now regarded as a competitor for news 
and the provincial press considers it is distinctly unfair of them 
to life news items from our papers for broadcasting purposes". 102 No 
reporter on any of the company's member papers would be permitted to 
work fer the ABC. In his reply, Boyer said that only the individual 
papers o;1 which ABC correspondents were employed could terminate any 
arrangements reached with its employees. The ABC would not act to do 
so. Urging Manning to reconsider his attitude Boyer added, "I am at 
a complete loss to understand in what way the broadcasting of news 
either regional or metropolitan by the national service can conflict 
with the interests of newspapers". 103 
The extent of the proble1a caused by the refusal to co-operate 
by Country Press was evident to Denning who visited Queensland 
towards the end of 1947. He reported to Dixon: 
It is most unfortunate that the one State where we have met 
with nothing but difficulty and obstruction on [country 
coverage] is the largest and most inaccessible State in 
Eastern Australia ... We have a large chain of country 
correspondents who in the main are not professional 
journalists, and this is precisely where we fall down ... In a 
few places we have managed to keep going with local newspaper-
men who have refused to truckle to the Queensland Country Press; 
t!1e servic:e we receive from these tmms is the backbone of our 
country coverage ... There is a depressing and disheartening 
list of major provincial towns and cities where the ABC's 
news service scarcely exists.l04 
Denning recommended either an approact, to Country Press at the 
highest level to persuade them to change their attitude or the 
102. Manning to Boyer, 29 April 1947, SP286, Box 3, Sl. 
103. Boyer to Manning, 5 May 194 7, SP286, Box 3, Sl. 
104. Denning to Dixon, l October 1947, SP286, Box 3, Sl. 
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appointment of eight to ten additional staff journalists in country 
areas. Keith Fraser, then a sub-editor in the Brisbane newsroom 
visited regional centres later the same month. On his return he 
supported Denning's remarks. 
Cairns, Bundaberg, Maryborough and Gympie are towns of 
some news importance and before the Country Press took action, 
journalists on the daily papers there acted as ABC correspondents. 
Tt is my opinion that so long as the ABC covers these places 
wi·c:1 i'art-time correspondents, a full coverage of news will not 
b;o sent from them.lOS 
By the following year, 1949, the problem had become far less 
acute. First it became obvious that the Country Press ban would not 
be a totally concerted one. According to ABC's Chief of Staff 
appointed in that year, Don Speedy, the acute shortage of trained 
journalists in the years after the war made it difficult for Country 
Press to take action if its journalists defied the ban. He himself 
did so when working for a country newspaper before joining the ABC. 
He filed for both the ABC and his o~n newspaper. 
Bednall was astute enough to notice that once when a big 
spot news story broke up my way, the story on the ABC and 
in the Courier-Mail bore a remarkable resemblance (I put 
a carbon in my typei.1riter). Bednall wrote me a cryptic note 
inquiring if his assumption was correct. I never had time 
to reply to his letter, or to his several follow-ups. He 
took no action. He couldn't afford to. Once again - it was 
a journalist's world.l06 
The second factor was that the ABC's correspondents began to 
be better trained and more reliable. The regional journalists to 
whom they worked, were instructed to give them more guidance and 
maintain close contact with them. Instruction sheets were sent to 
them, and regional journalists paid them frequent visits. The need 
105. Fraser to Sholl, 20 October 1947, SP286, Box 3, Sl. 
106. Letter to the writer from Esmond (Don) Speedy, 16 June 1977. 
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for Country Press journalists, and those fron• other country newspapers, 
became far less pronounced. Speedy says, 
Over the years we had numerous correspondents on Queensland 
Country Press affiliates but they rarely lasted long. Almost 
invariably they proved to be the least productive correspondents, 
for a variety of reasons - too busy and oven<orked because of 
inadequate staff; and the ABC's scale of payments hardly 
induced dedication.l07 
By 1952, when the present Chief of Staff in Queensland, Vern Black 
transferred to that State, he "got a distinct impression that our 
network of correspondents was (and still is) far superior to the 
newspapers". 108 At that time ABC correspondents working for country 
newspapers numbered only four - in Ipswich, Emerald, Allora and Mt Isa. 
1952 was also the year in which the ABC opened its new regional 
offices in Cairns, Maryborough and Longreach. This in turn meant the 
appointment 0f ABC staff journalists to these centres, and more 
effective guidance for correspondents working in other towns in those 
areas. It was in Cairns, on the occasion of the opening of the ABC 
office that SpeEdy encountered the only case in his experience of 
planned newspaper obstruction of the ABC. It may well also have been 
the last in Queenslanl. Speedy had gone to the town with the ABC's 
Queensland Manager E.K. Sholl for the occasion. 
On arrival I learned that the Post editor had put on his 
staff notice board a directive forbidding any member of 
his staff to fraternise with - and most certainly not to 
co-operate with in news gathering - any ABC journalist. 
Also, he had ignored the ABC's invitation to the party after 
the opening ceremony. Against Sholl's better judgement, I 
called on the Editor; we visited a local pub; he and his 
wife attended the opening and the party; Sholl and I kept 
his glass filled; and later in the evening he eagerly sought 
me out to show me a message his office had hurried across to 
him - a ship had gone aground early that night on a reef off 
Cooktown. He ''as sure the ABC h'Ould be interested. We were. 
His directive was removed from his staff notice board _109 
107. lbHJ. 
108. Letter to the writer from Vern Black, 6 July 1977. 
109. Letter from Speedy, 16 June 1967. 
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(v) The DeteriorBtior. in Corrunission-Press Relations 
The Corrunission soon began to lose patience with the nel<spapers. 
It had been prepared to concede up to 1946, that ABC news had not 
demonstrated the necessary lack of bias needed for a national 
broadcasting service. But now that it was gradually but successfully 
exerting ne,; control and demonstrating a previously unknown brand of 
'objectivity', the Commission felt newspaper attacks on the service 
were quite unwarranted. 
Soon after the independent service began, the ne~<s staff began 
noticing ''.'h?.t they be] i.eved ·to be instances of newspapers pirating 
material from ABC news bulleTins and printing it as their own. They 
backed their contention by comparing cables from tile ABC's London 
office made up up from overseas agency services, with items in the 
press. Phrases used by ABC sub-editors, and not contained in overseas 
cables, were repeated in several press stories. Moses complained 
officially to G.T. Chippindall, Acting Director-General of Posts and 
Telegraphs about this in October 1947. 
From the moment the independent service began, the press were 
monitoring it closely for evidence of breaches of standard journalistic 
practice. Within the first few months they began to notice a certain 
carelessness about keeping rigidly to embargo times on overseas 
material. These times of release were sometimes crucial in the 
battle bet~<een the ABC and the press to be first with the ne~<s. A 
story <mbargoed 2300 or midnight G~IT, in order to be available for 
the ildtish mon.ing ne~<spapers,,;ould be available for release in Australia at 
9a.m. or lOa.m. ,allo~<ing for the ten hours difference. This ,;ould make it 
too late for the ABC moming bulletins but just in time to catch the early 
editions of the afternoon Sydney papers, ,;hich would be on the street 
before the AilC midday bulletins. T:1ere ~<as a temptation therefore, 
~;ithin the ABC News Department, to occasionally 'beat the guni by an 
hour or so, and include embargoed stories in morning bulletins. On 
18 June 1947 Frank Packer of the Daily Telegraph ~<rote to Moses to 
complain about one such occasion, when a story on Japanese trade, 
marked for release at 2300 G~IT. was broadcast in the 7.45 a.m. 
bulletin. Hoses, in a very terse peremptory reply admitted that a 
miscalculation had occurrect. 110 
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The tone of Moses's letter, which appeared to dismiss the incident 
as of no consequence, could well have caused the press to stiffen 
its resolve to demonstrate the inadequacies of the costly new service 
and the impossibility of it becoming in any real sense, a competitor 
with long-established and experienced newspapers. The press noted 
two other breaches of embargoes in October, both dealing with British 
Cabinet changes. Unknmvn to the ABC, information about these 
incidents was given by Australian press offices in London to the 
originator of the messages - the Prime Minister's office at 10-Dt>wning 
Street. 
Then on 31 December 1947, the Hews Department presented the 
press with their golden opportunity. A sub-editor on duty when part 
of the New Year's Honours List was cabled by the 
ABC's, London· office misinterpreted the midnight G~IT embargo, 
thinking it meant the beginning of the day instead of the end. There 
seems :vJ Teason to doubt his story, as such a glaring error was 
bound to be pi·~k,~d up anJ w<>uld not have been perpetrated deliberately. 
So the ABC broadcast the list of eight names, including that of McKell, 
then Governor-Genera 1, who had been nade a Privy Councillor, t~<enty-
four hours ahead of official release time. Frank Ashton, Editor of 
The Sun immediately rang Moses to complain. The ncwsps;_>Grs through 
AAP ~<ere quick to relay this latGst information to 10 Downing Street. 
Bearup, now London Reprcscn tat i vc of the ABC, was the astonished 
110. Sec Hoses to l'acker, 24 .June 19'!.?, SP613, Box 44, 15/17/13. 
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receiver of a phone call from a member of Atlee's staff giving 
specific details of the ABC's breach of the embargo. He then also 
recited chapter and verse of the two previous incidents. The 
ABC was asked to ensure that appropriate steps be taken to avoid 
breaking embargoes again. As the cable from Bearup relaying this 
information reached Moses, so did a telegram from Wynne of AAP 
asking for "an assurance that adequate steps are being taken to atone 
for the breach of faith and to prevent recurrences". 111 
Moses, with Dixon's strong support, decided the best defence 
was attack. In a telegram to Wynne112 and in an interview with a Sun 
113 
reporter he counter-charged that The Sun had on 19 December broken 
an erobargo set by Chifley on the release of a story about an aerial 
survey of Pacific Islands being undertaken for Australian defence 
forces by the American air force. 114 Eric Kennedy, Chief Executive 
of }he Sun protested vigorously to Moses when he heard this 
allegation, saying the Americans had released the information in 
Tokyo, which automatically released the story everywhere. 115 
Meanwhile the press had been busy else~<here, both in publishing 
the story of the pre-release of the New Year's Honours, and in 
stressing the seriousness of the ABC's action to State Governments 
and vice-regal staff in the various States. In Victoria they had 
111. Wynne to Moses 1 January 1948, SP286, Bundle 6. 
112. Telegram Moses to Wynne, 31 December 194 7. Only the draft is on 
file, though Di}cn believes it was sent. SP286, Bundle 6. 
113. Quoted by Kennedy in Kennedy to Moses, 1 January 1948, SP286, 
BW1dle 6. 
114. The article was in The Sun, 19 December 1947. 
115. Kennedy to Moses, l January 1948, SP286, Bundle 6. 
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singular success in persuading the Premier Hollway to issue a 
denunciation of the ABC news service. He urged the Federal 
Government to inquire into the premature announcement and sald that 
if it did not, his own Government might do so. He warned that, 
"if the ABC was not prepared to recognise fully the rules of propriety 
it should be excluded from all privileges accorded the Press". 116 
The Victorian Government was as good as its word. The State New 
Year Honours list was deliberately withheld from the ABC by Government 
House, the Governor's Official Secretary, Kinsman, confirming that the 
action was related to the breach of the London embargo. According to 
a report from the Victorian News Editor, the State Education Minister, 
Wilfred Kent Hughes, subjected his roundsman to "some humiliation" at 
an 5.nte:rvieF by questioning his right to be there. 117 Dixon urged ~loses 
to protest to Hollway, cl.aiming, "The Victorian Premier and his Minister 
have no doubt been inspired to discriminate against us by the local 
118 
newspapers". 
In Western Australia, the ABC's State Manager Ewart Chapple 
discovered that the Lieutenant-Governor had directed that their State 
Honours List was to be made available only to the West Australian. 
The Lieutenant-Governor's private secretary was, hm;ever, a little 
more friendly to the ABC and personally develivered a copy to Chapple 
119 himself. 
Moses had cabled London instructing Bearup to assure Attlee that 
the ABC deeply regretted the embarrassment it had caused and would make 
certain no similar errors «ould occur. Bearup replied that 10 Do~;ning 
116. Sydney Morning Herald, 1 January 1948. 
117. Telegram Taylor to Dixon, 2 January 1948, SP286, Bundle 6. 
118. Dixcn to Moses, 2 January 1948, SP286, Bundle 6. 
119. In Chapple to Dixon, 2 January 1948, SP286, Bundle 6. 
504 
Street had accepted the apology. In his cable to Bearup, Moses added 
that he would also apologise to State Premiers and Governors. As 
Dixon points out, Mcses w~.!:' clearly under the impression that State 
honours !la<i been i:avol ved in the embargo breach, whereas in fact 
McKell's was the only Australian name included in the ABC broadcast. 
According to Dixon, Moses was extremely angry when he heard of this, 
saying, "Here I have been crawling on my belly to all and sundry over 
h • II 120 not 1ng . On 6 January he wrote to Hollway, pointing out that no 
Victorian had been mentioned and also giving details of similar bad 
breaches which had been conuni tted by the Press. He instanced a 
Sydney Morning_ Herald story on 20 December 194 7 about Truman's American 
aid plan. 
Moses had sought and received an assurance from Cotton that no 
embargo breaking would occur again. However the incident was tailor-
made for another attack on Cotton by Dixon, who claimed it provided 
evidence of his lack of editorial experience. Although there were 
nany recriminations, neither Dixon nor Cotton came up with any 
positive plaa for reducing the possibility of further misinterpretations 
of embargo times. It was Moses himself who suggested that midnight 
embargos should never be given as such but instead expressed as one 
minute past midnight, thus making absolutely clear which day was referred 
to. This idea was adopted as standard practice for the ABC's London 
office. 
Neither Moses nor Dixon were prepared to let the ne~vspapers get 
away with such a massive attack on the integrity of the news service. 
In the weeks that follmved Dixon prepared evidence of newspaper 
breaches of embargoes with which ~loses could confront the newspapers. 
The Pacific Islands air survey still provided the most clearcut case, 
120. Quoted by Pixor., ~Rg, \).176. 
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in Dixon's opinion, and the ABC's Canberra office was asked to confirm 
that The Sun had broken the Prime Minister's embargo. As soon as 
this was received, 121 Moses wrote to Kennedy detailing the ABC charges.122 
The following day, 20 January, he wrote to Wynne giving not only this 
case, tc.t also alleging that the Argus had broken an embargo on the 
Air Force decorations list, scheduled for release on 1 January, and 
listing the 
123 Herald. 
release of the European aid story by the Sydney Morning 
Kennedy subsequently denied 
attached to their copy of the air survey 
that any embargo had been 
124 
story, and Wynne curtly 
told Moses that there was no evidence to support his allegations. 125 
The echoes of the affair of the New Year's Honours List 
reverberated for some time. When the Birthday Honours List was released 
on 10 June 1948, the ABC once again had trouble with Government House in 
Melbourne, the Governor's secretary, Major Maxwell, at first refusing 
to give the newsroom the list under embargo. The Victorian News 
Editor, Oakley, remonstrated with him, pointing out that the Melbourne 
Herald station 3DB had been given the list but had broken the embargo 
by some fourteen hours. Maxwell eventually agreed to co-operate. Oakley 
late! reportE·d "although there was much ado early in the year when the 
ABC broadcast prematurely some New Year Honours, there was absolute 
silence on the part of the press regarding the breach by 3DB". 126 l\1len 
121. Telex message Spurr to Cotton, 12 January 1948. The confirmation 
that The Sun had broken the embargo came from Strahan, Secretary 
of the Prime Minister's Department, SP286, Bundle 6. 
122. Moses to Kennedy, 19 January 1948, SP286, Bundle 6. 
123. Moses to Wynne, 20 January 1948, SP286, Bundle 6. 
124. Kennedy to Moses, 21 January 1948, SP286, Bundle 6. 
125. Wynne to Moses, 27 January 1948, SP286, Bundle 6. 
126. Oakley to Dixon, 18 June 1948, SP286, Bundle 6. 
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the New Year's Honours List was issued for release on 1 January 1950, 
Wynne of AAP protested to Hoses that the ABC had once again broken the 
embargo by broadcasting the names in the early morning news sessions. 
Moses this time was on firm ground, because the London embargo had 
been moved back ten hours to coincide 1~i th midnight Australian eastern 
time, thus allowing the Australian media to carry the lists from early 
morning 1 January. The AAP message had however still carried the 
midnight GMf embargo, apparently an error in their London office. 
Thts sharp and noticeable decline in relations between the 
Commissl on and the press ~rum 1946 onwards was reflected also in ABC 
touchiness about criticism in the pages of the net>spapers. In April 
1948 Granny's Column in the Sydney Morning Her.§l:_ld contained 
allegations that the ABC's independent news service was set up in 
order that the Government could secure for itself a vehicle for 
ministerial propaganda. 127 ABC news staff protested to the Sydney 
Morning Herald about the item and Boyer himself backed their 
representations with a letter to the Editor. Again in September the 
same year, when the Daily Telegraph alleged the news service was 
loaded with official handouts, Boyer replied: 
It is not only our duty, but also a point of honour for 
the Commission and all its st<Jff to serve all sections of the 
community, of whatever shade of poll tical opinion, with 
scrupulous fairness, and within the limits of human frailty 
this has been achieved.l28 
127. 'Granny's Colunm' was, at this time, written by Deamer. 
128. Daily Telegraph, 18 September 1948. 
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We h:.ve noted how, prior to 1946, the ABC News Department had 
given preponderant treatment in their bulletins to Government replies 
to newspaper criticism. In July and August 1949 there was an 
excellent illustration of the gro11ing self-confidence of the Department 
and the much sharper 'news sense' it possessed in relation to 
newspaper-Government disputes. On 22 July Calwell, now Minister for 
Immigration, issued a long statement in Canberra to refute allegations 
made in The Sun and the Daily Telegraph in Sydney that there had been 
considerable difficulties encountered aboard the migrant vessel "General 
Harry Taylor" on its way to Australia. The papers alleged there were 
fights between political factions on board, and th<:t the vessel was 
unclean. Calwell's statement was not used by the ABC. On 26 July he 
complained about this to the Postmastcr-Ge~eral Cameron and asked him 
to bve~:tigate. Cal well had been told that it was not the ABC's policy 
to carry deni~ls of stories which it had not broadcast. This was 
unquestionably a purely internal policy of the News 
Department at this time, because the Commission had not ruled on this 
question. It seems clear that it had evolved ~<ith the beginning of 
the independent service, because of the difficul tics that had occurred 
in this area in previous years. Calwell instanced two examples earlier 
in the year when ABC news had carried ministerial denials of newspaper 
stories which he had issued. His arguments for rwming such statements 
are interesting in that they coincide with the vie~<s Dixon held for so 
long. In broadcasting them, the ABC ~;auld be acting "in the national 
interest". It should select its news l<i th regard for ~;hat is "nationally 
desirable". The Commission should not allow itself to become a party 
to the undenr.ining of "a vigorous and successful immigration programme". 
1-inally he orgued that it was: 
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unthinkable that a body such as the Commission, which has the 
best interests of our country at heart, should endorse a 
policy which 1;ould have the effect of allowing newspapers to 
tell lies about nationally important macters with impunity .129 
Oakley pointed out to Boyer that in the first instance mentioned 
by Cah;ell the matter had been the subject of parliamentary debate and 
was reported as such. In the second, a mistake has been made by a 
sub-editor at a weekend. Oakley asked Boyer to give the policy his 
blessing. Boyer agreed, telling Cameron that the ABC could not be 
put in the position of setting a precedent for the broadcasting of 
corrections of press mis-statements or omissions. 
We have believed that we should forfeit ... confidence and 
this service were our bulletins to be used for rebuttals 
of stories and statements carried by other press services ... 
such" policy, as suggested by the t•linister, would involve 
us in commitments which would be not only embassassing but 
quite impossible to handle and yet retain a semblance of an 
acceptable news service.l30 
The Commission endorsed Boyer's letter, resolving that "the 
Commission does not handle charges which it may suspect as frivolous, 
tendentious or malicious, or replies thereto". 131 Nevertheless it 
thought it wise to instruct the News Department to regard each case 
on its merits, because a dispute involving the press and replies to 
its allegations could develop significant public interest. In such 
cases it could be dealt with by giving a fair report of both 
allegation and reply. "Any other course would forfeit all public 
confidence in the Commission's impartiality in its news service."
132 
Cameron did not feel obliged to press for any further explanation 
from Boyer and the matter was dropped. 
129. 
130. 
Calwell to Cameron, 26 July 1949. Copy attached 
Commissi~on ;neeting oc 14-16 September 1949. 
Boyer to Cameron, 12 August 1949. Attachment to 
Connni ssion meeting of 14-16 September 1949. 
to minute of 
minute of 
131. Minute of Corrunission meeting of 14-16 September 1949. 
132. Ibid. 
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The changes in approach by both the D.spartment and the Commission 
which had developed since 1946 are obvious. The Department now felt 
strong enough to drop a statement by Calwell and argue its case for 
doing so. The Commission, once anxious to avoid newspaper-Government 
controversies, now felt there were occasions when they were newsworthy 
and should be dealt with in the normal way- with strict 'impartiality'. 
We have given additional evidence in Chapter 3 of the extent to 
w:O.ich the ABC had gradually succeeded in winning widespread confidence 
in, and support for, its news service by 1949. There seem to be strong 
grounds for arguing that this confidence and the corresponding decline 
in the controversy surrounding the news service are directly linked to 
the success with which it achieved the appearance of 'obj ecti vi ty 1 in 
contrast to the period before 1946, when, as has been shown, it too 
frequently failed to take the essential first steps in this direction. 
The acceptance of Boyer's policy of 'impartiality', reinforced by 
Cotton's strong views on the subject, meant that the Department 
consciously began to follow procedures to demonstrate its adherence to 
this doctrine of fairness. Boyer knew that the politicians, the public 
and the press all had to be reassured that the news service was 
worthwhile and neutral. It is clear that what Tuchman describes as 
the "strategies of n!lwswork" began to figure large in the minds of ABC 
newsmen as they equated a demonstrated 'impartiality' with survival, in 
the very hostile environment in which they had to work in these years. 
The ABC reporter therefore verified facts, presented both sides of the 
story, and placed heavy emphasis on leaving the consumer to decide. 
With Commission and Department following the same policy guidelines, 
the structuring of a reporter's facts was more lik,1ly to be in accord 
with the vic~>s of his editors. The influx of experienced reporters 
hired from outside would have int:roduced a far great:cr clement of what: 
Tuchman calls newsmen's "common sense' ... , meaning "what most newsmen 
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hold to be true or take for granted". 133 Boyer's heavy emphasis on 
separating 'fact' from 'opinion' and his insistence on removing any 
element of 'colour' were additional attributes which could be said 
to lay claim to 'objectivity'. The s.emblance of 'objectivity' by 
the end of 1949, would have been largely responsible for the sudden 
decline of criticism, and the elevation of news to a position of 
supreme status in the Connuission' s programmes. It has been pointed 
out in Chapter three that Boyer's consensual leanings, and the 
nec<>ssity to compromi~e on basic issues in order to maintain political 
support, strongly influenced the content of news. This editorial 
policy affected the selection of 'facts'. As well, as Tuchman says, 
the persistent presentation of 'facts' presented from differing view-
points in order to allow the listeners to make up their minds, can 
and does lead to selective perception. Thus in the ABC's case, as 
with the newspapers, procedures demonstrating objectivity frequently 
mean "there is a distinct discrepancy between the ends sought and 
those achieved". 134 
Unquestionably this process of successfully introducing and 
using news procedures which protected the ABC from charges of bias and 
from continued political interference, received great stimulus from the 
onus placed on the news service to demonstrate its superiority over 
the pre~s in terms of 'impartiality' and 'objectivity'. The huge 
outlay on the service had to provide the public with something which 
was demonstrably different - an alternative news service, which was 
faster and more reliable. Before 1946, one could say that the ABC 
133. Tuchman, "Objectivity", p.674. 
134. Tuchman, "Objectivity", p.676. 
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newsmen at times lacked sufficient 'news sense' to follow standard 
'objective' procedures. After 1946, the trend was towards more 
rigorously observing 'objective' procedures than their newspaper 
competitors. The path towards greate_r 'objectivity' was the ruthless 
exclusion of extraneous material which 'coloured' newspaper reports. 
The newsmen who joined the ABC did so because this new type of 
'factual' journalism was appealing. Many of them were disillusioned 
with newspapers. Keith Fraser has confirmed that the driving force 
of the news service in those early years of the independent service 
was the feeling that it was a more 'honest' form of journalism, 
without editorial policy. "We were there to dig out the facts and 
present them unadorned without editorial comment, without slanting, or 
u.1dUE• emphasis ... that was about the dynamic of the whole service. "135 
Or, as Oakley puts it, the early journalists were "idealists who 
believed that facts l<ere stubborn things and if presented simply 
would speak for themselves and the listeners could do the assessments"~36 
Sigelman in questioning Breed's stressing of the significance of 
conflict betl<een reporter and newspaper, 137 argues that bias in 
reporting is the result of a far more complex organisational process. 
The recruitment, socialisation and working norms of reporters are 
intended to avoid conflict by preserving "the institutional mythology 
of objective reporting, while they also assure newspaper leaders of 
favourable attitudes and performances". 138 His research indicated 
that instead of newspaper executives selecting staff on the basis of their 
compliance with their policy vie>;point, journalists are hired on the basis c 
135. Interview "'ith Kei•.:1 Fraser, 25 September 1975. 
136. Letter 1:0 the :·;riter from Oakley, 20 July 1976. 
137. See Warren Breed, "Sodal Control in the Newsroom: A Functional 
Analysis", So_ci.al Fo1·ces, Vol.33, No.4, 1955, pp.326-35. 
138. Lee Sigclman, "Reporting the News: An Organisational Analysis", 
American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 79, No.1 (July 1973), p.l49. 
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professionhl qualifications alone. The end result is the same however 
because ~~urnalists are attracted to seek jobs with organisations 
with which they have sympathy. The process of self-selection preserves 
the myth of a "free and responsible press" ~<hile actually ensuring they 
share similar attitudes. Clearly this socialization process occurred 
within the ABC's news service, as the evidence of the early newsmen 
shows. Staff were attracted to ABC news because they believed that 
an alternative method of presenting news was nationally desirable. The 
'community service' aspect of the work of the ABC, so frequently 
emphasised by Boyer, and the quest for greater 'objectivity' than the 
press sould have been very much in accordance with their journalistic 
role definition. There was never any need therefore for 'selectivity' 
on the part of the ABC in recruiting staff. Fraser has recently 
confirmed this point, categorically denying that in the early years of 
ti1e independent service the news service had ever, in his experience 
deliberately soughr. people that might fit into the ABC way of doing 
h . 139 t 1ngs. 
Other socialisation procedures would also have been operating. 
Contacts with more experienced newsr.1en, who no doubt regaled the new 
recruits with tales of newspaper perfidy, would have aided this 
process. Sigelman also draws attention to the organisational control 
measures, at the editorial level, and the assigning level, which 
maintain policy and yet are accepted by journalists as not being in 
conflict with institutional mythology. These existed in the ABC. 
Fraser has recounted the problems encountered in getting former 
newspaper reporters to write copy according to ABC radio style. 
We had enough of the key men who really believed in what they 
I< ere doing. We had enough of those to be able to knock 
these other blokes into shape and it was done with subbing, 
1 t wa3 done ~Vi th chief of staffing ... you'd brief the brumby 
--- -·-·-----------
139. Jnt:ervicw wit.h Keith Fraser, 25 September 1975. 
L 
newspaper recruit as to the type of story the ABC wanted, 
the treatment he was to give it and you'd follO>I his copy 
through, particularly if you were doubtful of him and you'd 
knock him over the head with it if he didn't write it 
properly.l40 
Some of the early appointees to the news independent service 
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founc! '.:he reality di f"ferent from the expectation and left. The bulk 
stayed on, revelling in the fierce competition with the press and 
feeling more confident about the final product and the reaction of 
the public to it. People began to come to the ABC with stories which 
they felt the newspapers would not print - the 'positive' story in 
ABC judgment, instead of the 'sensational'. 
We started to get the support of ... the educationist with 
an axe to grind, the countryman who had some sort of story to 
tell who wasn't getting it into the local press, the local 
authorities ... and above all the country people ... We 
started to get an ABC news type of story, something that was 
almost exclusive to us. Some communal activity out in some 
country town where everybody got together to send little 
Tilly Brown to the conservatorium for music lessons ... The 
more abstract against the more sensational ... [The Press] 
chased after us like nobody's business.l41 
Dixon's record of the ABC news service - Inside the ABC - makes 
it appear that working journalists everywhere were in sympathy with 
the ai111s and efforts of ABC newsmen. It was the proprietors, in his 
opinion, who issued the instructions which caused trouble for the ABC 
in the field. From the examples already quoted however, it is clear 
that some press reporters were hostile to ABC reporters. It is 
appropriate to refer to Sigelman' s analysis in this respect also. In 
the two newspapers which he examined, there was a distinct conflict 
in editorial policy. Yet in each, organisational mechanisms -
140. Ibid. 
141. Ibid. Fraser recalls that although the Press were forced to 
follow up some ABC stories, they invariably looked down on ABC 
reporters, claiming they ><ere not 'true journalists'. This 
was another source of friction. 
514 
recrui tn;ent, socialisa':ion and working arrangements - had resulted 
in co-operation between staff and proprietors. This model .vould 
explain why some newspaper reporters happily went along with their 
bosses in attempting to frustrate early ABC attempts at news gathering. 
The fact that there was hostility at the ~<orking level seems to 
question Breed's theory of essential conflict between ne~<spaper policy 
and journalistic norms - reasoning which mirrors Dixon's views. 
Ne~<spaper antagonism towards the ABC news service ~<ould seem to run 
contrary to journalistic canons of behaviour. Therefore one might 
have expected over~<helming support from working journalists for the 
ABC. This ~<as not the case however, indicating a degree of harmonious 
accord between some of the ne~<spaper journalists and ne~<spaper policy. 
The soci ali. sat ion process ~<hich has been described helps to explain 
the degree to which the Ne.vs Department swung behind Boyer and the 
Commission in the years after 1946. The ne.vs staff shared the belief 
in the need for an alternative, more 'objective' news service and they 
were in agreement that the 'excesses 1 of the press were to be avoided. 
Press attempts to undermine and destroy confidence in the service .vould 
have merely stiffened the resolve. Finally, .vhen the Commission itself 
was so angered by the continuation of the press campaign against the 
news service that it spoke out in its defence, it gave its blessing to 
the continuation of the strong anti-newspaper ethic fostered in the 
news service in the years before 1946. While the service after 1946 
could no longer play the active role against the ne.vspapers that it had, 
because of the acquisition of a greater sense of 'news judgment 1 , the 
determination to prove radio's superiority over the press in the 
speed and ?.(;Curacy .vith which ne.vs could be comrnw1icated to the public, 
became: ~'"'~amoant in the Department's thinking. Also, because ABC 
newsmen were convinced that they kept their functional autonomy t<ithin 
the bounds of AllC policy, a harmonious relationship .vith management 
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was established, which would have had the effect of reinforcing the 
bias towards consensual ism inherent in Boyer's philosophy of 
broadca$ting. As Sige lman says, "The key to understanding bias lies 
not in conspiracies, not in conflict'· but in co-operation and shared 
. f . " 142 sat1s act1ons . 
Just how strong the socialisation process was in the ABC news 
service can be gauged by Hamilton's reaction on coming to the ABC. 
According to Con Simons, former Sun Sporting Editor, and a close 
personal friend of Hamil ton when he worked for that newspaper, 
Hamilton severed all links with his former newspaper colleagues soon 
after becoming ABC Editor-in-Chief. 143 In September 1962, Hamilton 
gave vent publicly to the disenchantment he now felt for the 
newspapers, and in particular for his old employer, The Sun, when he 
wrote a highly cynical article for The Australian Quarterly about 
press criticism of a film story in the TV News feature programme, 
Weekend Ma[:azine. 144 The film had dealt with the shooting of 
kangaroos on a N. S. W. property, and the ABC news service was 
criticised by both The Sun and The Mirror for allowing it to be shown.145 
Hamilton detailed the way in which the newspapers had built up the 
story, implying deliberate distortion of the facts and 'sensationalism'. 
He concluded: "Nobody had objected to, even referred to, a film we 
showed in the same programme the same night of abandoned and destitute 
African children living on street refuse". 146 
142. Sigelman, "Reporting the NeiVs", p.149. 
143. Personal communication, Con Simons, 25 May 1977. 
144. W. S. Hamil ton, "The Kangaroo Affair", Australian Quarterly, 
Vol. 34, No.3 (September 1962), pp. 4 7 -sz:--- Tfie programme \Vas 
shown on 20 ~lay 1962. 
145. The Sun, 21 May 1962; The ~lirror, 21 Hay 1962. 
146. Hamilton, "Kangaroo Affair", p.52. 
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The obsession with confronting the press and demonstrating the 
superiority of its news service in eyeball to eyeball competition had 
several important consequences. It validated and strengthened the 
method of news-gathering Nhich had begun with Denning in 1939. ABC 
reporters moved on rounds or beats with their newspaper counterparts. 
The Act of 1946., making the ABC responsible for gathering all its 
Australian news was interpreted to mean that all beats had to be 
covered in this way. So the ABC had its parliamentary, industrial, 
police, law court and general roundsmen, exactly as the newspapers did. 
ABC reporters waited for press releases at the same outlets, and 
attended all news conferences. Speed, accuracy and greater 'objectivity' 
were the weapons to demonstrate the strengths of the ABC news. 
Competition meant covering all the news in the newspapers. Missing any 
news story would be a reflection on the service and would undercut its 
role of being in James 1 s words "a kind of policeman" which would keep 
the newspapers on the right path by providing a check on whatever they 
reported. The necessity of beating the newspapers in getting the news 
to air meant a heavy concentration on immediate or 'spot' news which 
could demonstrate radio's advantages. Because everything was covered 
o;o as not to give the press any opportunity to score points, the volume 
of news was considerable. This accentuated the trend towards brevity, 
in order that as many items as possible could be squeezed into a 
bulletin. What went into those brief, heavily edited items was limited 
to simple factual information, because, as we have seen, Boyer believed 
anything which went beyond this, was comment, which was inappropriate 
for the ABC. Because ABC ne1's had long believed that press news 
was frequently inaccurate, because of 'errors' which had been repeated 
in the days of reliance on newspapers for news, the ABC would by contrast 
check and verify every fact of every story. Nothing "'auld be taken 
for granted. So the ABC News DirecM".ve sternly warned that newspaper 
and ABC standards were different. 
Do not be influenced by newspaper treatment of a story. It 
is not permitted to take any story, any fact, from a 
newspaper. We may follow up newspaper stories but a 
reporter must get all his Oh~ facts and statements from the 
correct source. The taking of facts •Jnchecked from a 
newspaper will be regarded most. seriously. No excuse will 
be accepted. 14 7 
So dubiously were newspaper sources and facts regarded that the 
News Service would not permit newspaper clippings to be kept in 
reference files. In this way, the possibility of any ne\;spaper 
inflwmce was supposedly removed. This ban was lifted as recently 
148 
as July 1976. 
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Because the newspaper method of gathering news was duplicated 
in order to compete, the possibility of the ABC introducing 
overseas techniques in radio news reporting receded. Ex-newspapermen 
were recruited to do the job they had always done - to write copy. 
The style, subject matter and motivation were frequently different 
but the product was in the same category. The newspaper methodology 
and the newspaper format made any consideration of alternative news 
presentation unlikely. The contrast with overseas methods of news 
presentation grew more extreme. 
147. 1'1.5. Hamiltor,, News Directive, p.l2. Emphasis in original. 
148. In memo from Handley to Chief of Staff, 5 July 1976. The 
reasoning was that they would "give a broader base to a 
story, or provide useful background reading". 
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The BBC Experience149 
The war had enhanced the reputation of the BBC news. Its 
impartiality had won world-wide praise. The news-gathering side of 
its operations had expanded with its observers covering events abroad 
and in Britain. As Kenneth Adam, then BBC Director of Publicity 
wrote in 1947: 
The BBC's corps of war correspondents took its place 
alongside that of the Press on every fighting front, and 
it is being succeeded, at the present time, by a select 
company of reporters in the main news-gathering centres of 
the world, specialist correspondents and home reporters. 
The newcomer now has the key to the door.l50 
Clearly the Briti~h p;.·ess was not happy about the full-scale 
entry onto the news scene by the BBC, or by the continued demonstration 
of radio's advantages in getting news to air before newspapers appeared 
on the streets. As Ivor Brown of the BBC Put it in 1946, "The entire 
Press has to submit to being 'scooped' nightly on the nine o'clock 
news and this may be called a lingering pain in the Fleet Street neck" .151 
Adam believed that: 
Radio has lowered the value of news as news. Every time 
Frank Phillips opens his mouth, he reduces the possibility 
of a 'scoop' on which modern newspaper fortunes were founded. 
And just as the 'scoop' is becoming a thing of the ~ast, so the 
'stunt' and the 'sensation' are beginning to pall.l 2 
149. Much of this section relies on two important sources: 
(1) Interview with Ivan Chapman, 9 October 1976; and 
(2) A report compiled by former AllC journalist Margaret MacCallum, 
who joined the BBC in 1947. At Moses's request she wrote an 
excellent survey of BBC aews reporting called "The Topical 
Broadcast: Some Ohservations on the BBC's Policy and Practice". 
It is 19 pages long with appendices, in SP286, Bundle 6. It will 
hc:1ceforth be referred to as MacCallum Report. No date, but 
rec e i 'Jed in Sydney in December 1948. 
150. Kenne-ch Adam, "The Press, the BBC and the Public", BBC Quarterly, 
Vol.2, No.2 (July 1947), p.72. 
151. Ivor Broi'.'Il, "In Search of the Critic", BBC Quarterly, Vol.l, No.2, 
(July 1946), p.43. · 
152. Adam, "The Pr<>ss", p. 73. Emphasis is Adam's. 
nw p:ress gave evidence of their uneasiness about the BBC 's 
expanding im;asion of the news field in 1949. In that year the 
Newspaper Society told the Beveridge Committee: 
that it would view with very great concern any further 
extension of news broadcasting,· especially in the form of 
extended broadcasts of regional news, and asks that the 
Committee will ~ay full weight to its representations in 
this respect.l5 
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Margaret MacCallum had reported in the previous year that the BBC's 
regional news bulletins were limited by a gentleman's agreement with 
the Newspaper Society to five minutes a day. 
The BBC consistently sought to mollify the press, denying that it 
had any intention to compete. A.P. Ryan, Editor of BBC News told an 
audience of newspaper journalists in 1946 that he did not believe that 
the BBC was a serious competitor with the press, and that BBC news would 
mecrely whet the public appetite for what was in the newspapers. He 
:.;.surec\ them that "The function of the BBC correspondent ... is not to 
cover spot news. The idea is to get one man in each country who can 
explain the news". 154 As far as home news l<as concerned they were going 
to have three or four domestic reporters who would cover stories which 
could be better done in voice. There was no suggestion of collecting 
all their own news. The same year Ryan briefed Bearup in London on the 
expansion of the BBC operation. After telling him that the BBC intended 
to appoint correspondents to all the important world centres, Ryan 
emphasised that their role was not competitive with world agencies. 
Their instructions specifically are not to cover the ordinary 
'agency' matter - they realise that in nine cases out of ten, the 
agency report liould be first in anyhow ... Their job is to amplify 
or supplement the agency despatches and to keep the BBC informed a)ld 
advised as to the relative importance of the events so reported_15:, 
153. The Newspaper Society, Memorandum of Evidence, Paper 113, Appendix H 
;,1c"w.,.-ar,.la SL.'J:nittc.d to the Broadcasting Committee (The Beveridge 
c:(),J;;t:c•t"cf-cnd.El17 cm1so, 1949),-i>~sss. 
154. The c·le;vsp&pcr ~Jr2i (London), l4 December 1946. 
155. Bearup to ~loses, 11 July 1946, Sl'724, Box 38,15/1/2. 
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MacCallum believed that by 1948, much of the press resentment 
was beginning to die down. The Press, she said, "is prepared 
to consider the BBC as a kindred craft and the BBC newsmen ..• as fellow 
j ournal1 sts". 156 In 1962, Donald Edwards, Editor of News and Current 
Aifai~s r~v~alcd that one or two British newspapers with interests in 
commercial television had endeavoured to handicap BBC news-gathering 
two years previously. But he dismissed this as a minor and relatively 
unimportant problem which had been solved. He praised the press for 
their ideas and repeated the adage that television coverage increases 
the appetite for newspapers. 
Newspapers render many services and have many advantages 
which broadcasting cannot rival. We have no wish or need to 
rival. The press and broadcasting are partners, allies, 
helping and supplementing each other, in the public service 
of interesting the public.l57 
Ivan ChapJ:Jan remembers that within BBC news there was no feeling of 
competition with the newspapers at all. If they were unsure of 
something they would wait for an hour or so befo-re putting it on air, 
to ensure authenticity. With an event like the death of King George VI, 
they HETEo beaten e<csily by the press because they sent a taxi to the 
home of the chief news reader to enable him to read the item, as 
. f. d . d. d. . t . 158 spec1 1e 1n stan 1ng stu 10 1ns ruct1ons. BBC correspondents "were 
specifically told •.. that their function in life was not to break 
. b 1 . . " 159 stories, ut to exp a1n stor1es . 
156. MacCallum Report, p.7. 
157. Donald Edwards, "BBC News and Current Affairs", BBC Lunchtime 
Lecture, No.2, 12 December 1962, BBC London, 1962, p.lS. 
158. This story was widely told in BBC neVJs, when Chapman joined in 
1949. Personal communication from Ivan Chapman, 9 October 1976. 
159. Interview with Ivan Chapman, 9 October 1976. 
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Given this leisurely approach to news gathering, and the lack of 
any competitive relationship with the press, the BBC might have been 
expected to concentrate on the development of more extended use of the 
voice report and actuality recording which they had pioneered during 
the war in Radio Newsreel. However this v:as not immediately the case. 
As Jonathon Dimbleby puts it: "For the first time in twenty years, it 
had the te•:hni.qUI"S, tile equipment, the talent and the reputation to 
exploit radio in peace as in war. Instead the Corporation squandered 
the lot". 160 The BBC decided to rely heavily on the press agencies 
for domestic news, although expanding the number of correspondents 
abroad, and appointed Tahu Hole as News Editor. 161 It was he who 
forbade 1 scoops' . Instead of using the war correspondents to widen 
the horizons of peacetime coverage, the War Reporting Unit was broken 
up. There emerged a "doctrine of broadcasting which was to terrorise 
a young, enthusiastic and energetic News Room into petrified 
immobility". 162 It was based on strict observance of 'objectivity' 
and adherence to what Has in the "sober public interest". 
Although the techniques of Radio Newsreel did not irr~ediately 
spill over into the normal ne1vs bulletins, the programme itself 
was in<:roduced for the first time to domestic audiences in November 
1947. I·c had an immediate impact. After its first six weeks on the 
Light Programme, it had an audience of six million. By 1948, it had 
risen to nine million. The programme contained a succession of voice 
reports from BBC correspondents: 
on the lines of cinema presentation with stories inadequately 
covered by the news. It ~Vas to avoid news highlights in favour 
of background stories wl1ich could always be pegged to the news 
of the day. Although dr1~~tic in form, the content was to be 
objective and unbiassed. · 
160. Dimblcby, Dimbl.ebv, p.270. 
161. See Chapter 4, p.421. 
162. Dimb1eby, Dimblcby, p.204. 
163. McCallum Report, p.l4. 
t 
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Its duration on the overseas service had been fifteen minutes, but 
for domestic listeners it was lengthened to thirty minutes. Nine or 
ten items averaging two and a half to three and a half minutes in 
length were included. 
The running order of items and the linking commentary of the 
narrator give a pattern of sound by contrasting voices -
the narration, the straight talk, the interview and actuality 
which give considerable movement and flexibility to the 
pattem.l64 
BBC news bulletins were compiled from material from the news 
agencies, from BBC correspondents and its monitoring service of 
,;hortwava broadcasts from overseas. The policy was not to use an 
item from an agency, unless it had been corroborated by another agency 
or by a BBC correspondent. Preference was given to despatches from 
BBC correspondents. These were cabled despatches or transcripts of 
voice reports for Radio Newsreel. Voices were rarely heard in the 
news bulletins. It was the failure to thus expand on the Radio 
Newsreel style of presentation which was so galling to the former war 
correspondents such as Dimbleby. 
Unlike the ABC however, the BBC had the latent talent and 
expertise on hand which could revamp news bulletins at any time. The 
Radio Newsreel style was copied in a number of other programmes such 
as "The Eye Witness" and "In Britain Now", which were prepared by the 
News Division's News Talks and Outside Broadcasts Departments. Although 
they functioned separ~.tely, their material was used in bulletins. Their 
staff VIen' made up of the voice reporters who recorded interviews with 
people in the news, and who described outside events. The BBC news 
staff was therefore made up of specialised voice reporting staff and 
sub-editors who became adept at handling material from recordings. Only 
major events in Britain were covered by its own reporting staff, who 
were still few in number. 
164. Ibid., p.lS. 
' 
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Although the Corporation and Tahu Hole ~Vere determined that 
news should continue to be presented in brief factual form read by 
an announcer,
165 Radio Newsreel's example began to cause many people 
to rethink the role of the radio news bulletin. The distinguished 
journalist and broadcaster, Donald McLachlan, strongly criticised its 
approach to news in an article in the BBC Quarterly in 1948. Claiming 
its content was unvaried and that it was limited in content, style, 
sources a~d delivery, he went on to criticise its simple, stereotyped 
recording of details, facts, official instructions which had only a 
very limited relevance to the listener. The major nine o'clock 
bulletin he said, "is too much about the things that a politician or a 
government official would want to hear. It seems completely appropriate 
in a London dub's smoking room; completely inappropriate in a London 
pub". 166 McLachlan objected to the taking of snippets from BBC 
correspondent's voice reports and putting them into the bulletins. 
BBC correspondents "must shudder to hear how fragments of their 
carefully written pieces are lifted out of their contexts and inserted 
into new contexts of which the style and purpose are quite different".167 
McLachlan pleaded for introduction into the news bulletins of the 
explanatory comment and the colourful picture from the man on the spot, 
as in Radio Newsreel. He suggested that a full half hour be devoted to 
news at nine o'clock. What listeners are getting in Radio Newsreel he 
said, 
165. 
166. 
167. 
168. 
is the news approach, the newspaper technique of comment and 
entertainment adapted to broadcasting - a technique still in 
its infancy in British studios. And with this technique it is 
possible to bring again and again to the casual listener ... the 
clear and simple picture of the world he lives in, ... By this 
n•etho•1 an immense amount of effective education can be 
unobtrusively achieved.l68 
For a view critical of the voice report, and defending the old 
announcer-read system, see Alvar Liddell, "Here is the News", The 
Listener, 2 November 1972. Liddell was one of Britain 1 s most -
famous-news readers. 
Donald ~1cLachlan, "The Nine 0' Cl~k News: Some Suggestions, BBC 
QuarterlJ:_, Vol.3, No.:> (October 1948), p.l56. 
Ibid., p.l57. 
Ilnd. , p. 159. 
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Despite eloquent pleas such as this, the expansion of news 
bulletins to include voice did not occur for another seven or eight 
years. Chapman recalls only two instances in the period 1948-54 - the 
first being a tube train crash in Lo11don and the second the arrival of 
British prisoners-of-war released from North Korea. Finally, it was 
television news which was responsible for the change in radio news 
bulletin style. 169 When well-known reporters from Radio Newsreel began 
to appear in front of television cameras in the mid nineteen-fifties, 
radio news decided that it could hold back no longer. From that time, 
voice reports became an integral part of longer bulletins. 
The co1rcrast with the ABC news service will be immediately 
appa:.-e;-.t. There was no break-neck competition with the press to get 
news first. There was a different type of reporter, a specialist 
trained in broadcasting skills. His role was different, being that 
of backgrounding news events. Although the traditional bulletins did 
not make full use of BBC correspondents for many years, much of their 
information was incorporated into bulletins, allowing the BBC to 
treat items at greater length. Chapman confirms that ABC bulletins were 
much more tightly edited than BBC bulletins. Referring to the ABC he 
says: 
I think we didn't tend to background stories. I think everyone 
thought it was a bit heavy going and I think we were wrong 
there. I think everyone tended to assume that the listeners 
were very, very intelligent and kne"' all this anyway, the back- 170 ground, and I don't think this was quite valid in assuming that. v 
By building up p:rofc~~ional skill in the presentation of explanatory 
voice r""ports, the BBC '"'~ ~ aying the foundations of the technique later 
used in TV bulletins. The reporter trained in voice reports was the 
man logically called upon to do work in front of camera. The ABC had 
169. See Chapter 4, pp.421-22. 
170. Interview with Ivan Chapman, 9 October 1976. 
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no such foundation to build upon. Voice reporting was entirely the 
province of other departments, notably the Talks Department. There 
was no training ground, no ABC version of Radio Newsreel within the 
News Department. TI1e Talks Department produced its News Review 
nightly but it was more of a magazine programme than one related to 
the major events of the day. The News Department however was not 
ignorant of the expanding role of radio news reporters overseas and 
from time to time there emerged within it a questioning of the rigid 
formula to which it still subscribed. The next section will deal with 
these occasional gestures of frustration and the reasons for their 
discontinuance. 
Effo~•-s _by ~.'.'_WS_!() Expand its Role 
The McCall-Deamer report of 1942 had recommen red that the ABC 
should take a service of news from the press, abandon the directly 
competitive news-gathering field, and concentrate instead on a new 
type of news presentation using voice reports from 'observers 1 , 
recorded descriptions of events, and actualities. 171 The proposed 
news agreement of 1943 included provision for these ideas. Because, 
however, the agreement was couched in such a way that made it appear 
that the newspapers had forced the ABC to abandon news-gathering, and 
the arguments in favour of 'observers' were less than convincing to 
ABC news staff, the observer concept was abandoned at the same time 
172 
as the Government and the PSCB prevented the passage of the agreement. 
171. See Chapter 2, pp.lll-117. 
172. See Chapter 2, pp.l37-139. 
, 
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The older news staff could see themselves and their techniques being 
overwhelmed by the influx of news/talks observers and proJucers. Any 
spark of U'1d2<St~>!ding or: er.thusiasm for the new ideas propounded by 
Deamer and McCall ~las d.)ur.l1,,d by the anger and resentment felt by news 
staff at the supposed Commission 'sell out' to the press. The observer 
principle was too high a price to pay for reliance on the press 
monopolies as a major supplier of news. The observer idea seemed 
almost to be an idea proposed by the press as a smokescreen to prevent 
the ABC gathering its own news. When the PSCB itself criticised the 
idea, it was laid to rest for some four years. 
It was unfortunate that antipathy to the press and the breakdown 
in communication between the Commission and its Ne\ls Department cut 
short what could well have been a logical extension of the news role 
in wartime. Dixon was not a broadcasting man, but BBC overseas 
broadcasts had alerted him to the contribution of 'broadcasters' to war 
news. In March 1941, for example, he complained to Bearup about the 
pcm~ handling hy the Talks Department of the departure of the American 
flef,t £rom Sydr.cy harbour. He felt it was a great opportunity lost by 
lack of 'news sense' within Talks, who had failed to describe the 
event direct or include any actuality. He appealed for News to be 
given direct control of the coverage of all news events. 
We are inadequately staffed and we have no men capable of 
going on the air and giving an eye-witness description of 173 big events, but these difficulties could easily be overcome. · 
In addition, Dixon wanted News Commentaries to be restored to Ne1<s. 
Bearup expressed sympathy with all these viewpoints but nothing 
173. Dixon to Bearup, 24 March 1941, SP286, Box 1, 52. 
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eventuated. Again on 15 August 1942, Dixon urged that all the 
material gathered by ABC war correspondents be placed under the 
control and at the disposal of the News Department. There were two 
types of correspondents covering the war for the ABC. There were 
'obscrV·3rs' - the broadcasters - sending back recorded material for 
broadcast by the Talks Department and there were war correspondents 
sending back cabled despatches for news. Dixon felt that news 
sessions would be made more dynamic and interesting if short excerpts 
of the 'observer' recordings were made available to news for inclusion 
in bulletins. Pointing cut that News Talks in the BBC was controlled 
by the News Department, and not Talks, Dixon said, "1 should like to 
see the question of an Australian Radio Newsreel revived". 174 
Dixon was also aware of the fact that the BBC ran longer items 
than the ABC and hence gave more information. He stressed this point 
in a letter to Moses in June 1939 l<hen he agreed with the BBC 
principle that: 
the first consideration in news presentation must be to see 
that each item contains sufficient information to satisfy 
listenel's who have r.o immediate access to a daily 
newsp&pel' to read the additional facts.l75 
Nevertheless he felt there was not much the ABC could do about it at 
that stage because bulletin periods were shorter than on the l3BC. By 
1943, however, when the number and duration of bulletins were greater, 
Dixon acknowledged that ABC news items were still on average half the 
length of BBC items. The BBC therefore obtained "a rounded rhythmic 
style". 176 He did not explain why the ABC news editors persisted in 
174. Dixon to Bearup, 19 August 1942, SP286, Box 1, S2. 
175. Dixon to Moses, 8 June 1939, SP286, Box 1, S2. 
176. Dixon to Deamer, 16 July 1943, SP286, l3ox 1, SS, "Radio News Style". 
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writing items of two and three sentences in length although he 
admitted "such brief items tend to be staccato and colourless". 177 
One clue however is contained in the same memorandum when, in 
replying to criticism from a member of the Talks Department that 
there were too many ite~s containing 1officialese 1 which was meaning-
less to the general public, Dixon revealed that the news staff 
itself had difficulty in understanding the vague and indefinite 
language of many official handouts. They had difficulty also in 
finding people who could help them clarify the facts. It seems there-
fore that: many items were kept as brief as possible to avoid errors 
of interpret:ation. 
In 1943, bulletins were reduced from t:wenty minutes to fifteen, 
largely at the expense of the State news segment which was reduced 
t th 0 178 o ree m1nutes. This was a major blow to Dixon and a decision 
he fought strenuously over the next six years. It resulted directly 
from his grm<ing isolation and that of his News Department within the 
ABC. 179 This had accelerated from 1943 onwards with the obvious 
campaign by the news staff to win Government and union support for 
stand against the newspaper agreements. But it had its origins earlier 
in long and sometimes bitter disputes Dixon had had with senior 
programme executives, particularly the Controller of Programmes, Keith 
Barry and the manager for N.S.W., Basil Kirke. In the nineteen-thirties 
Barry an:! Dixon frequently clashed over two issues - the ; pessimistic 1 
:reports from overseas about events in, and the attitudes of, Hitler 1 s 
Germany, and crime and accident reports in the news. Barry believed 
177. Ibid. 
178. This apparent] y occurred after Curtin's approval had been 
obtained in May J 943 to give the main i tcms of news first, 
irrespective of origin, instead of reading CanberrH nel<JS first. 
See Chapter 2, p.ll8. 
179. See Chapter 2, w. 140 and 181. -
~ 
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that Hitler was maligned by the international press and that ABC news 
180 
should adopt a more 'balanced' approach. He also felt the news 
was no place for crimes and accidents. Kirke, who was directly in 
control of announcers, frequently complained about late copy being 
thrust into news readers' hands just before, or actually during, 
bulletin time. Dixon and his staff insisted that they had to include 
any major story that came in before the bulletin ended. 181 In June 1943, 
there was a serious dispute between the two men when Dixon resisted 
efforts by Kirke to get him to cover a news conference to explain the 
gane of American gridiron, in which American servicemen were to take 
part. In the same month, Dixon was given a final warning to co-operate 
with other members of the staff by the Commission. By this time his 
Department had few friends but many enemies. 
In November 1944 Dixon attempted to persuade the Commission to 
extend bulletin times by five minures but was unsuccessful. The 
Commission determined that: 
the attention of listeners lags after fifteen minutes - in many 
cases, no doubt, before this period - first, because of the 
strain of concentrating, and secondly because the news is 
becoming progressively thinner during the period.l82 
In rare circumstances, however, the Commission was prepared to allow 
an extension - that is, when several major news events coincided. In 
the same month, Dixon was reprimanded by Moses for failing to carry nut 
an instruction that announcers were to be given news bulletins fifteen 
min'ltes before they weEt on air. 
180. 
181 
The :correspcndent:e on this subject, over four years, is contained 
in SP286, Box 3, S2. 
Correspondence on this dispute is also in SP286, Box 3, S2. Kirke 
had also antagonised Dixon by backing Deamer in urging a reduction 
in news staff. 
182.Commission minute of meeting of 28-30 November 1944. 
' 
! 
t 
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In May 1945, ;1e clashed 1iith HcCall when thz latter refused to 
r~fer the question of extension of bulletin times to the Commission 
once agaln. Dixon's reasons for lvanting the extra time ~<ere not 
related to the need for providing more information and background on 
specific stories. He wanted more time for more stories. The 
difficulty as he explained it was that he ~<as obliged to run so many 
stories based on Government statements that he had little time for 
anything else. 
If there is any justification for the complaint sometimes 
made that our 7 p.m. session carries more than a fair 
proportion of news relating to government activities, the 
blame rests not ~<i th the news staff, but with the inflexible 
period which prevents us from giving other items of general 
interest Ig~t might make the bulletin sound more varied and 
balanced. 
Dixon complained that too often his requests for extensions on 
special occasions had been refused by McCall, Barry and Bearup. The 
following month Dixon protested that since News became part of the 
Public Relations Division under first Deamer, and then McCall, his 
authority had dwindled. He was no longer consulted about the choice 
of announcers to read the news, and he asked that the principle be 
adopted of nmvs bulletins in future being read by members of the ne~<s 
staff. The suggestion was not adopted. 
With Cotton's appointment in 1946, Dixon found to his dismay, 
that instead of having an ally on the question of extending bulletin 
times, he had someone with a very open mind. Cotton believed that 
bulletin durations should be flexible. If there ~<as not much news, 
they should end early, or be extended on heavy news day, as in the BBC. 
Cotton influenced the Commission 1<hich adopted his point of view in 
June 1946. There is no evidence hm;ever of bulletins ending before 
time, and only rarely ~<as permission given for extensions. The fifteen 
~ninutes for nnjor bulletins 1vas firntly adhereJ to. In August 1946, 
183. Dixon to McCall, 1'/ May 1945, SP286, llundle 6. 
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Cotton warned against running bulletins up to time by including 
insignificant mate6~.1. He implied that this concept of news 
presentaticn, which differed from that of the BBC, resulted from ABC 
efforts to compete with the press. In the BBC, he said, 
there is no attempt to dress up stale news to fill a bulletin. 
In fact, a frequc11t lead begins: 'There is little fresh news 
since our last bulletin ... ' The BBC knows it has no need 
to compete with the newspapers and it is felt that frankness 
and honesty in the long run is the best policy.l84 
Despite his BBC background, Cotton brought with him no great 
desire to include voice reports or have the News Department move into 
the area of voice reports. He did however favour the inclusion of 
brief actualities in the bulletins, such as part of the swearing- in 
ceremony for the State Governor. But these he said should be used 
sparingly, be as brief as possible and should not normally affect 
the length of the bulletin. He saw them as a way of brightening the 
bulletin, rather than a way of shedding additional light on the issues 
c3vered. His major contribution in the field of new methods of 
presentation was the introduction of a 'tabloid bulletin'. This was 
made up of lighter items, not demanding great listener concentration, 
using material normally left out of main bulletins. It depended on 
terseness of writing and liveliness of reading. It began at 9 p.m. 
each day from the start of the independent service but was abandoned 
in February 1948 after Cotton became despondent at the insistence of 
Moses that it should conform to traditional bulletin patterns and allow 
each State to present its own segment of a few minutes at the end. 
Cotton felt this destroyed the national character of the material and 
disrupted the style and flow. While it was obviously a bulletin of 
a different character, and broadened the scope of the service, it did 
nothing to aid the understanding of the day's news. The emphasis was 
still on brevity and presentation of only 'essential facts'. 
184. Cotton to Dixon, i' August 1946, SP286, Bundle 6. 
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This trend towards cutting material heavily in order to cover as 
many stories as possible was formally made Department policy in the 
first news editors' conference of December 1946. It resolved: 
That all news editors make a special point of trying to 
attain the greatest possible economy in the wordage of 
each news item, with a view to securing the widest possible 
coverage in the time available.l 85 
This was the news staff's own interpretation of the Broadcasting Act 
of 1S46, which did not attempt to define news-gathering in this way. 
N:>r did Boyer'~ news directives suggest the ABC should attempt to 
t . "bl 186 cover as many s or1es as poss1 e. The 'alternative newspaper' 
principle, so strongly believed in by ABC journalists resulted in a 
facsimile approach to news-gathering. Wider coverage and briefer 
stories considerably weakened any chances of introducing news 'in depth'. 
It followed that with the appointment of additional staff for 
the independent service, the number of news stories increased and so 
did the demand for extra space in the programme schedules. News 
received several additional bulletin spots in 1946, the main one 
being the morning bulletin at 6.45 a.m. The most important bulletin 
of the day however continued to be that at 7 p.m. which attracted the 
largest number of listeners. The Department regarded it as their most 
prestigious spot, and continued to urge that it be given more time. 
The News Editors' Conference of August 1947 resolved "That in the 
opinion of this conference the outlet for State ne~<s at 7 p.m. at 
185. Hinute of Interstate News Conference, 9-11 December 1946, SP724, 
Box 39, 15/1/17. 
186. Hoses however, recorded his agreement with the resolution, without 
feeling it significant enough to be referred to the Commission. 
Some of the other resolutions of the News Editors' Conferences were 
sent to the Commission for approval. See Hoses to Dixon, 14 March 
1947, SP34l, Box 37, 11.1. Appendix X contains an outline of 
the mechanisms of communicatior: between the Ne~;s Department and 
other areas of the ABC. 
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present completely fails to do justice to the money spent on the 
independent service, having in mind the large amount of news available".187 
Cotton dissented from this motion, still feeling that much news that 
was trivial was still being used to pad bulletins unnecessarily. 
The demand for peak listening time once again saw Dixon and Barry 
at loggerheads. Dixon claimed, in support of his argument, that much 
of the news now collected by his staff, went into the waste-paper 
basket, because of in~ufficient time. His main premise is interesting 
because it reveals a continuing uneasiness about the type of news in 
ABC bulletins and uncertainty about its function. Obviously Dixon felt, 
as he had in 1939, that there was a wider role for news if only a 
formula could be found. He told Finlay: "Very little Australian news 
on the intellectual, spiritual or socially significant level is appearing 
in our bulletins, simply because the hard news, which demands priority, 
is taking up practically all the available time" . 188 There are many 
other examples in the document, prepared by Dixon, but representing 
the views of all his Editors, of the realisation that ABC was failing 
to communicate much of substance because of the brevity of treatment. 
It went on: 
if the effect of existing limitations is to cut stories 
below the point where a clear and adequate outline of their 
purport is possible, distortion and misrepresentation 
inevitably follow. Similarly, selection of news items 
becoi:Ies dangerous when space is so limited that a choice has 
to be made arbitrarily ... The present bulletins prevent the 
e;(pr e,,sion of viewpoints: yet the expression of viewpoints is 
the most important day-to-day method of educating the adult 
mind.l89 
187. Minute of Interstate Conference, 4-6 August 1947, SP724, 
Box 39, 15/1/17. 
188. Quoted by Finlay in Finlay to Barry, 27 August 1947, SP341, 
Box 37, 11.1. 
189. Ibid. 
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111e Dep2rtm.ent ob·deusly felt that it should be giving more time to 
the larger issues and yet was prevented from doing so by the 
compulsion it felt to provide all the news. To abandon any one story, 
would be to leave itself open to crit.icism that it had failed to 
match the press. More time was seen to be the answer, not a 
reduction in the number of stories covered in the time available. 
Barry countered by detailing the demands made for extra 
progr~•e time by many other departments. He charged the news 
service with overstating its case, giving as evidence figures showing 
how frequently item~ were repeated in the news. Two out of three 
were broadcast more than once. Hence an impasse was reached. No more 
time was available yet the Department was not prepared to limit its 
scope. Brevity continued to be the order of the day. 
At thi.~ time, the Ne~1s Department became even more conscious 
that it was nuc really part of 1:he ABC 'family'. Its incessant demand 
for more time, its escalating expenditure which threatened the budgets 
of other departments, its different union affiliations, and its 
history of conflict with the Commission all served to create a climate 
of alienation. Fraser remembers: 
a certain amount of resentment towards this johnny-come-lately 
that had achieved a pretty spectacular success ... a certain 
resentment towards our professionalism in an organisation that 
didn't have a marked professional ism. 190 
Oakley felt that a great deal of the hostility came from the Talks 
Department 
where, at the time, there were fe~< officers who had joined the 
Conmli.ssion to continue their profession, none who had assisted 
in the intrigue that had prefaced the rise of News. Some of 
the Talks attitude arose from the fact that AJA salaries were 
then better than for Talks men generally .191 
190. lntervie~·.' w~ th Keith Fraser, 25 September 1975. 
191. Letter· to the ~·:r:~ter from Oakley, 20 July 1976. 
Tl112 Department became inward-looking and sought to develop self-
sufficiency. It soon worked in an environment that was all its 
own - its own little world, described by Fraser. 
In radio we were a pretty self-contained group. We could 
go and get our news, sub it, and if necessary we could throw 
a switch and read it ... the only people we saw really, 
outside of the news staff ... would be the news reader ... 
and the technician.l92 
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It was this divorcement from the broadcasting skills being developed 
in other departments, its failure to use microphones in the field, 
or make use of studio production facilities, which heightened its 
isolation. Moses confirms that News began to develop a complex that 
it was threatened by other departments. 
You see Dixon was never a broadcaster and I think he felt 
at odds with the other heads of broadcasting departments and 
I think he was uneasy with them because I don't think he 
understood them ... so I think they might have felt isolated 
and that_was becaase they never attempted to be part of the 
g:roup. 19.:• 
Later Fraser came to believe that this was in part responsible for 
the failure to introduce new techniques. 
I think our very isolation, our very self-containment, worked 
against us ... in the area of broadcasting, that is the 
use of the microphone . . . I think we could have learned a 
lot from our colleagues. I think they could have learned a 
trick or two from us too.l94 
There was a period of three years however, 1947-49, when it might 
have been possible for news to have engaged itself in broadcasting 
work, and thus brought new influences to bear on its bulletins. With 
the expenditure of the news service under close parliamentary and press 
scrutiny, Moses was concerned about the wastage of news copy as 
192. Interview with Keith Fraser, 25 September 1975. 
193. lnterview with Sir Charles Moses, 8 February 1976. 
l94. Interview with Keith Fraser, 25 September 1975. 
536 
revealed by Dixon. The bulletins did not reflect the amount of work 
or the number of staff that had gone into their preparation. Desirous 
of providing more visible evidence of the value of the journalists, 
Moses and the Commission decided to explore the possibilities of their 
being used as broadcasters in News Review and News Commentary. The 
Department had for some years felt that some of its journalists possessed 
untapped potential as broadcasters, and there was concern during the 
wa::- that the news correspondents did not have more opportunity to do 
d . 195 recu>' 1ngs. Moses's suggestion was therefore welcomed by some in the 
News Department, particularly by Denning. As Acting Director, Denning 
made out a strong case for News Review and News Commentaries coming under 
the News Department. He suggested that when Talks got around to putting 
items in Ne1<s Review the news value had gone stale. Professional 
journalists with the resources of the Department at their disposal 
would be able "to take immediate advantage of every opportunity to build 
each night an up-to-the-minute, dynamic News Review". 196 It would be 
"a logical extension" of the news bulletins. 
Denning's enthusiasm was less than convincing however to the 
Commission because he did not see the provision of material for these 
programmes being a normal part of the journalists' activities. In his 
opinion, journalists could not do their 'hard news' work and broadcast 
as well. If they did broadcast items, they would probably have to be 
prepared outside of normal working hours, and therefore should qualify 
for special payments. If this was not possible, extra staff would have 
to be employed. For Denning it was impossible to envisage the two roles 
of the journalist as complementary. BBC correspondents, as has been 
195. See S.E. Pratt, Evidence, PSCB, 5 November 1943, p.28. 
account of an ABC Talks correspondent's work in wartime 
Legg, "W~r Correspondent" (Rigby, Ade1a1de, 1964). 
196. Denning to Moses, 28 October 1~47, SP28(>, Bundle 6. 
For an 
see Frank 
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mentior.ed, had their broadcast despatches for Radio Newsreel transcribed 
for inclusion in bulletins. The voice material was the basic contribu-
tion. Denning ancj. other members of the news staff did not equate 
broadcasting with bulletin work. 'Hard news' could only be provided in 
copy form. 
Denning had jumped the gun somewhat in his reply. Moses denied 
that any takeover of the two programmes by News was every contemplated. 
And meanwhile Molesworth, the Director of Talks, was doing his best to 
point out the unworkability of the proposal. Most journalists in the 
ABC, he claimed, lacked the authority or background to be news 
conunentators. News Review required special broadcasting techniques, a 
flair and capacity for outside broadcast work. 
After many years of experience, I can say without hesitation 
that as a general rule men trained in talks work give a very 
much better result in talks sessions on the air than do men 
trained only as a journalist ... there are two different 
spheres requiring two different types of technique, different 
qualifications and different training.l97 
Molesworth's suggestion that broadcasters needed additional skills to 
those possessed by journalists did not go down well in the News 
Department. The effective end to proposals that News men should do 
work for Talks Department programmes came when Molesworth dismissed 
peremptorily Denning's suggestion that he provide pieces for News 
Review on the High Court's hearing of the banking legislation case, 
which he was covering for News. Molesworth preferred to have an 
outside legal expert. 
197. Molesworth to Moses, 29 October 1947, SP286, Bundle 6. 
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Dixon now continued from where Denning had left off. He wanted 
control of News Review to provide an additional outlet for his staff 
and to end what he called "the monotony" of ABC bulletins. He wanted 
a half hour from 7 p.m. which would i_nclude a bulletin follm<ed by 
News Review or a programme similar to Radio Newsreel. "We could then 
make use of our news staff throughout Australia to collect and prepare 
material that would entertain as well as inform listeners. "198 He 
felt there should not be the competition in the newsfield that came from 
other departments. Again he drew an analogy with the press. "Much 
duplication of effort and additional expense are involved, and the 
service to listeners is poorer than if all topical features covered by 
a daily newspaper came under the control of the news department."199 
It was Moses who, for all practical purposes, closed off the debate 
over the control cf News Review and News Commentary. In putting 
Dixon's submission to the Commission, he recommended against it in these 
terms: 
If it were known that the Commission's journalists were 
handling sessions dealing with comment, it would be 
difficult to maintain in the public mind the view that our 
bulletins are objective and impartial. 200 
The Commission deferred the matter until after the receipt of the 
Harris Report, but it was never again the subject of resolution. As 
we have pointed out previously, Boyer 1 s vie1;point on this question was 
identical to that of Moses. 201 In their minds, anything which went 
beyond the recital of essential 'facts', was opinion, and this could 
198. Dixon to Finlay, 1 December 1948, SP286, Box 3, 52. 
199. Ibid. 
200. Minute of Commission meeting of 19-20 January 1949. 
201. Se8 Chapter 4, pp.398-400. 
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not be countenanced in news bulletins because it would undermine the 
'objectivity' and 'credibility' of the service. Thus the Commission 
turned its back on the principle of introduction of additional 
material which would have enabled news items to be seen in some 
perspective. Its own rigid views on preserving 'impartiality', 
combined with the strong resistance of other departments such as 
Progr~nuroes and "t'aJ.ks to the expansion of bulletins or the entry of 
j ournali~ts into other :;pecialised areas, meant that from this point 
News was to remain confined to its fifteen minute timeslot, unable to 
shed its fixation about matching the newspapers in all areas, and thus 
unable to expand its coverage of particular events because of its 
. 1' . . 202 t1me 1m1tat1ons. 
In fact, there is evidence that the News Department itself was 
split on the issues. Oakley for example believes to, this day that 
moves by the Ne1vs Department to take over News Review were not 
genuine, but were made to counter moves by the Talks Department 
to take over News. He, for one, and Cotton, for another, were not 
keen to expand the role of News in this way. Some idea of the 
conflicting attitudes can be obtained from comparing two quite disparate 
resolutions at the News Editors' conferences of 1948 and 1949. In the 
former conference Cotton moved and Oakley seconded a motion which read: 
That to preserve the objective atmosphere of news, readers 
regularly employed on national bulletins should not be used 
for talks, News Review, or any ~rogramme material ~;hich 
expresses a partisan viewpoint. 03 
202. In March 1947 and in .January 1948, the Commission had reaffirmed 
its dedsion not to extend the 7 p.m. bulletin except in unusual 
circumstances. See Moses to Dixon 14 March 1947, Moses to Dixon, 
4 February 1948. Both in SP286, Bundle 6. 
203. Minute of Interstate News Conference, 31 May-2 ,June 1948, SP724, 
Box 39, 15/1/17. 
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Clearly some of the news staff did not think that the standards of 
'objectivity' which they pursued so diligently, were held to apply 
in Talks. That department of course, denied this. The following year 
the news editors considered that News.Review was a "good session", but 
one which could be handled more competently by News. 204 Boyer, on 
the other hand felt the Department should confine itself to "factual 
news", and not enter "the magazine field". 
Although News had been frustrated by Programmes, it did have 
one significant victory in this period, in an area which once again 
allows us to contrast the differing methods and motivation of ABC 
and BBC news services. We have earlier noted the Commission decision 
that bulletins should be handed to announcers fifteen minutes before 
air time, and that no new material should be accepted by the subs 
less than thirty minutes before broadcast. It was introduced at 
Cotton's suggestion in April 1948 after late copy on the clash between 
miners and police in Brisbane had led to allegations of bias by the 
ABC against the police. The move met with the strong approval of 
Programmes, who as we have seen, had for many years been trying to get 
a firm decision on a deadline for the handing of bulletins to announcers. 
Cotton had come back to Australia convinced of the rightness of the 
BBC approach in which accuracy and considered news judgment took 
precedence over the impulse to get last minute news to air. As Chapman 
says, there are occasions "where they' 11 wait an hour and even miss two 
bulletins to make certain some fact is checked". 205 The BBC also had 
a rule that no fresh copy was to be handed to an announcer if it carne 
204. See minutes of Interstate News Conference, 19-20 October 1949, 
SP724, Box 38, 15/l/6, "News' Editors Conferences". 
205. Interview with Ivan Chapman, 9 October 1976. 
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in after thirty minutes before air time. Although Chapman says the 
r~le is frequently broken the case of big stories, efforts are 
nevertheless made to keep to it in normal circumstances. The 
instruction "was put in writing, it w.as on notice boards, and it was 
drummed into a new sub the very day he joined the service that we're 
not going to be panicked, we're not going to be pushed around. We're 
the BBC". 206 The idea was quite contrary however to every instinct in 
the ABC news service, where the emphasis was on 'spot' news and speed 
in order to demonstrate a degree of superiority over the press and the 
competing commercial stations. Thus the Conunission decision met with 
strong resistance. 
There was one practical reason for dissent which Dixon and some 
of the State news editors immediately raised. The States sent their 
most important stories to Sydney for possible inclusion in the national 
bulletin. Frequently they had to wait until the last minute before 
being infonmd by Syd:vcy whether their copy was being used or not. If 
it was not, or only used briefly, they had to make immediate arrange-
ments to include it in their own State bulletin. This could not be done 
if the thirty minute deadline was made to apply to them. But the 
general reaction in newsrooms throughout Australia was best summed up 
by South Australia. "In effect, we promised the public that our service 
would be up-to-the-minute, and to impose a deadline on copy means a 
departure from that promise and the exclusion of much valuable and 
. . h d ,.207 1mportant news 1n an . 
206. Ibid. 
207. Wicks to Dixon, 21 May 1948, SP286, Box 3, 52. 
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At its July 1948 meeting the Con~ission agreed that the deadline 
need not apply to the States but ruled that it was still to stand as 
far as the national bulletins from Sydney were concerned. It thus 
rejected a motion passed at the News .Editors' conference the previous 
month which urged that the decision about inclusion of late copy be 
left to the judgment of each news editor. By March 1949, the Federal 
Studio Superintendent, F .. '>ordon Scott, reported that the scheme seemed 
' to have failed completely as the News Department did not seem to be 
able to prepare bulletins earlier than ten to fifteen minutes before 
air time. At the News Editors' conference of October 1949, faced with 
a unanimous demand for the abolition of the deadline, Boyer began to 
waver. Cotton, its supporter, was no longer with the ABC. The news 
service had at last begun to win public and political support for its 
'objectivity'. Hamilton, the new Editor-in-Chief put forward the 
antithetical view to that of the BBC. The minutes record that: 
He contended that more errors are made when there is plenty 
of time to write a story as the brain is more alert when 
the pressure is on and there is a rush of copy to go into 
the bulletin.208 
Oakley supported him claiming that a journalist 1 s training enabled 
him to make decisions in one tenth of the time taken by "an ordinary 
p.nson". Boyer defended the original decision saying that it was 
td:en to "protect" the news staff, but he did not want to continue a 
restriction which was considered irksome. At the Commission meeting of 
October 1949, the original resolution was rescinded, but the News 
Department was reminded that "in no way should this action be taken 
as indicating any relaxation of the Commission's primary concern for 
accuracy, good taste and dignity in news bulletins". 209 
208. Minute of Interstate Ne1;s Conference 1949, SP724, Box 38, 15/1/6. 
209. Minute of Commission meeting of 27-28 October 1949. 
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Despite the degree of awareness by some senior news personnel, 
such as Dixon and Denning, that there was some degree of shallowness 
in ABC news items, because of their brevity, the disquietude was never 
sufficient to question the overriding principle of wide newspaper-type 
coverage which was pursued with such zeal. As the prospect of 
supplementation and change in bulletin format receded, a mantle of 
def~nsi.ver.ess began to be drawn around the news service. The difference 
in approach to that of the BBC was recognised and attempts were made 
to justify it. In August 1948, Dixon for example compared the number 
of bulletins produced by ABC journalists to the number produced by the 
BBC. 80 journalists on the BBC were said to put out eight and a half 
hours of news a day. Dixon calculated that 88 ABC journalists 
produced ten and a quarter hours. He concluded, "It is obvious 
that the ABC staff covers a much wider field and turns out a much 
greater quantity of work than the BBC staff". 210 
The most revealing correspondence however was elicited by 
Margaret MacCallum's report, which was sent by Moses to Dixon for 
comments. Dixon in turn sent it to all States. It immediately provoked 
a prolonged argument between Dixon and Cotton about the relevance of 
BBC practice. Unfortunately, however, the comments are not as wide-
ranging as they should have been, because Dixon distributed only part 
of the report, that dealing with the presentation of bulletins. Two 
important sections, one dealing with Radio Newsreel and the other with 
News Talks and Outside Broadcasts, which were vital to understanding 
the broadcasting component of BBC news were deliberately omitted. Thus 
remarks were restricted to the duration of bulletins and to the areas 
covered. There 1;as no invitation to discuss the inclusion and value 
of voice material within the nc~Vs area. From this, one must question 
210. Dixon to Hoses, 2 August 1948, SP286, Bundle 6. 
i 
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whether Dixon was ever conscious of the full value of the voice report 
in bringing greater authenticity and understanding to important news 
events. He and Denning seemed more concerned with taking over News Review 
in order to justify the employment of a large journalistic staff and to 
provide a way for them to earn extra income. 
It was immediately clear from the ~lacCallum report that the BBC 
restricted its coverage to what it considered to be the major stories 
of the day. There was no thought to embracing the range of stories 
covered by the daily press. As Dixon said: 
Clearly the BBC does not attempt to provide a 
service in competition with the daily papers; 
does. 2ll 
complete news 
the ABC 
The B!lC 13 coverage cf 'home' news was comparatively poor, Dixon thought, 
whereas the ABC sought t0 give "a fairly complete picture" of happenings. 
Denning made much the same point. 
There appears to be no effort [in the BBC] to compete story 
for story with the papers, but rather to highlight the big 
or colorful items. When a high selectivity is practised, it 
is comparatively easy to compress the day's news ... into a 
brief span; this is not true where a wholly independent 
service is striving to compete with the newspapers by givin~ 
its listeners the fullest possible cover of the day's news. 12 
Combined with this recognition were arguments presented for the first 
time to vindicate the ABC's approach. The importance of the service 
for country listeners was advanced as the most relevant reason for an 
all-embracing coverage. Denning felt that it was for listeners in 
in remote country areas particularly, who lacked other means of 
speedy communication. He argued, "British listeners ... almost 
invariably have quick access to a wide variety of newspapers, most of 
~;!1iclt are of far better standard than the Austral ian press". 213 These 
211. Dixon to News Editors, All States, 5 January 1949, SP286, Bundle 6. 
212. Denning to Sholl, 7 January 1949, SP286, Bundle 6. 
213. Ibid. 
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were decidely rationalisations made only after the difficulties and 
drawbacks in matching press coverage were recognised. The news service 
could not convey more than a tiny percentage of the information 
carried by the press, yet it kept on ~rying, because it was swept 
along on the compelling tide of anti-newspaper feeling, and the 
obligations it felt to provide an alternative newspaper-type service 
for the Australian public. 
The arrival of Hamilton had several important consequences for 
the debate over flexible bulletin times and efforts by Programmes 
to counter the encroachment of the News Department on progra~e 
schedules. Backed by Commission belief that News in its new 'objective' 
form had become a strong asset, he was able to resist any challenges to 
his domain so successfully that by the end of 1950, Programmes had 
giver, up the struggle. At the Commission meeting of 16 February 1950, 
for example, there was a very strong reaction against attempts to end 
the practice of broadcasting the 7 p.m. news from both metropolitan 
transmitters. This had been urged by Managers and Federal Officers 
at their last two annual conferences. The Commission rebuffed them 
by ruling that not only would the system remain, but the 7.45 a.m. 
bulletin would also be broadcast by two stations simultaneously. The 
Programme Managers and Federal Officers' conferences had also been 
critical of the 'triviality' of many news items and had wanted 
bulletins shorten ai, rather than run the full fifteen minutes. But 
when, at the Commission meeting of 2-3 August 1950, Nette recorrnnended 
cancelling some bulletins to save money, Barry backed Moses and 
Hamilton in their successful efforts to oppose this. 
In f~(;':, a r:cr::oc; ef stasis began under Hamilton, in which for 
a considerabl <' time, all c!ebatc about the content and style of bulletins 
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ended. 214 At both the 1951 and 1952 Ne~<s Editors' Conferences, 
Hamilton expressed himself satisfied with present bulletin lengths. 
There was no discussion about altering the type of coverage or 
inl:-roduci:J.g ne~> methods of presentati<:on. At the 1954 Conference 
however, there was a recommendation for five more minutes of bulletin 
time at 9 p.m. This was not for a more reflective, backgrounded 
approach, but to once again attempt to beat the newspapers by 
introducing more items into the bulletin from interstate. Thus, 
according to the minutes, Boyer "agreed there was an urgent need for 
a better coverage of interstate news, particularly in vie1< of the 
completely parochial outlook of metropolitan papers generally". 215 
It was an attempt to find space for a great deal of the interstate 
material sent to Sydney, as part of the wide national coverage being 
attempted. This problem of the pressure on time due to the flow of 
copy, grew as the service tried to expand into an ever increasing 
number of news areas. At the next News Editors' Conference, four 
years later, Hamilton candidly admitted that far too many stories 
were being discarded because of lack of time. In one week, 260 stories 
regarded as bei:1g v.-o:rth using, were omitted. In the same l<eek 674 items 
were used, which means that slightly more than 38 per cent of material 
was not included. This very heavy wastage rate emphasised still 
further the need to squeeze as many stories into bulletins as possible. 
Hamil ton had by no,., come round to the same point of view as Dixon. 
More frequent or longer bulletins were needed to cope with the volume 
214. ~loses says of Hamil ton, "It's possible ... that he may not have 
developed with the times ... he remained very much the news man he 
was when he joined us. That 1 s why I felt over recent years it was 
a pity that the ABC's ne>!S service had remained completely static". 
Interview with Sir Charles ~loses, 8 February 1976. 
215. Minute of Interstate News Conference, 3-4 August 1954, SP724, Box 
38, 15/l/6. 
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of copy. There was still no call for ·extended, more explanatory 
coverage for this would mean the exclusion of items and a limitation 
in range. 
This was still the position in 1961. Brevity, speed and 
accuracy had become the ingredients of· a formula for presenting news. 
In the Commission's eyes, and in those of Hamilton and his news staff, 
they had been succ!'ls~ful in promoting the image of 'objectivity' and 
therefore public credibility. 
It is not my intention to review events after 1961 in any detail. 
It is ho1~ever worth noting that the News Division's first regular 
essay into voice reporting, the 1~eekly programme, "This Week in Asia" 
was begun in 1963 because the all-encompassing format of news 
bulletins could not cope with the steady stream of very specialised, 
and in some cases authoritative, material which began to flow from 
South-east Asia. The ABC had opened an office in Singapore in 1956, 
largely due to the reasons advanced by Hamil ton after a visit to the 
area in 1955. He believed that "we ... should show a sympathetic 
interest in the progress of these countries and an understanding of 
h • b. • II 216 t e1r o J ect1ves . The agencies 1~ere failing in this respect. 
"Most ne'kspapers want news that is startling, that will excite ... a 
riot will excite people; the opening of a new irrigation project will 
not excite people. The agencies will certainly report the riot 
they will report the irrigation project onl)' if they have nothing else 
more exciting ... I do object ... to the failure of the agencies 
216. Hamilton to Finlay, 27 July 1955. ABC File, 'South-East Asian 
Establishment', SEAl. Another important objective in setting 
up the office was the obtaining of programme material for Radio 
Australia, and the assessment on the spot of the impact of Radio 
Australia 1 s programmes. It can rightly be inferred from this 
quotation that Hamilton was favourable disposed, to say the least, 
to the Governments of the countries he visited - Singapore, 
Thailand, South Vietnam and Indonesia. His report rings with 
phrases. "We can help the cause of the free democracies we are 
associated with." In the 'sixties he became strongly anti-communist 
in outlook in terms of foreign~ffairs, and incluenced news c9vcrage 
within the Department in this respect. Oakley, and Chapman g1vc 
examnles of this. Both closes •mel Lowndes deny the Commission was 
awarC of, or condoned, this poljcy. 
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properly to background and explain the causes of riots, demonstrations 
etc. Perhaps they give up because there is no market for this type 
of reporting. But we need it and must have it if we are to fulfil 
217 
our charter." 
By 1961 the ABC had opened an office in Djakarta, and its 
Singapore establishment included two journalists, a News appointee as 
Representative, and a Talks appointee as Assistant Representative. 
In keeping with Hamilton's concepts of its operation, the office 
backgrounded important events within the area. It regularly had a man 
in Vietnam for example, from 1961 onwards. These posts were unique 
at this time. Tn London. journalistic staff still basically edited 
a gene;' mate1·ial for rerouting to Sydney. In New York, the Talks 
Department had had an officer since 1958, supposedly to feed both 
departments. In practice, however, News received little suitable 
specialist copy from him. In Southeast Asia, News for the first time 
had journalists whose brief was a supplementary one. But being asked 
to background events was one thing. Inclusion of material of any 
depth in the already overcrowded bulletins was another. 
As the Asian operation was comparatjvely expensive, Hamilton 
realised that to do justice to these journalists, and prevent 
their usefulness being questioned, it was necessary to provide a 
special outlet for them. "This Week in Asia" began as an uneasy 
amalgam between the copy style of presentation and the voice report 
d d . . 218 or recor e 1nterv1ew. Reports were brief and by present day 
217. Ibid. Hamil ton's emphasis. 
---· ~BC newsmen sti 11 occasional! y refer to their 'charter'. 
·i'h"' word seems not to he used to refer to the Broadcasting Act, 
194•), bet'. rather to the Commission's news policy of 1946, as 
expanded upon by Boyer and Hamil ton. 
218. It was first broadcast on Saturday evenings from 3 August 1963. 
From 17 April 1966, it was repeated on Sundays in the early 
afternoon. From 4 March 1973, it is now broadcast on Sundays 
only. 
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standards very prosaic. But it was a beginning. Immediately the 
Talks r''"partment reacted. Alan Carmichael, then Director of Talks 
believed "that N·~ws Department should deal with factual bulletins, 
while it is Talks 1 responsibility to !)andle comment and opinion" 219 
The intervention by Talks was unsuccessful and "This Week in Asia", 
although restricted to the handful of journalists working in Asia, 
began t:O provide experience for journalists for the first time in 
broadcasting techniques and in the use of tape recorders. Occasionally, 
for example, when Singapore withdrew from Malaysia, these voices would 
be heard in news bulletins. But this was a rare occurrence. 
The difficulty in introducing voice into bulletins stenuned from 
two factors which have already been outlined. Boyer and Hamil ton 
believed in retaining the narrow definition of 'fact' and 'opinion'. 
'Facts' alone should be the News Division's responsibility. The public 
should make up its m..-n mind on this basis. Any attempt to provide more 
1;;1an this would be to trespass into the terri tory of 'opinion 1 • Such 
injection of the reporter's own views could undermine the 'objectivity' 
which nor protected the news service, and the Commission from undesirable 
critic ism. Hamil ton began to blur these definitions as soon as he sent 
the ABC's first reporters abroad to provide the background missing from 
press reports. But the 'factual' role of the domestic ABC reporters 
remained in uneasy contrast. These men, moving in the more contentious 
and politically dangerous areas of domestic politics were, and still 
are, far more restricted in the degree to which they can interpret 
stories. The BBC were in much the same situation immediately after 
the War. Voice reports came overwhelmingly from their overseas 
correspondents. Tahu Hole for years restricted the use of this technique 
in the domestic arena. Also, of course, voice reports took much longer 
---------------·-------
219. Qaoted by Hut:chisor •. COJ~trolleJ of Programmes, in Hutchison to 
lluckmanton, 17 t·:arc.h 1966, ll/1/1. 
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than copy stories because of their interpretative nature. To use 
them, as we have demonstrated, would be to reduce the coverage given 
other material. 
The Ptnnber of ABC offices abroad quickly increased during the 
nineteen-sixties. Represe11tation was established in Kuala Lwnpur 
in 1963, Tokyo and New Delhi in 1966, and Washington in 1967. In 
London, the news operation was radically changed from 1 January 1963 
with the decision to buy the full MP-Reuter service for delivery in 
Australia, end the agency editing work of the journalists in that 
office, and instead begin a full-scale reporting of British and European 
affairs. By 1970, voice reports on major news developments overseas 
were more frequently used, but there were many in the Division who 
viewed the technique with some misgiving. Oakley, then Controller, 
220 Th d '1 f . d. . h . was one. e 1 emma ·ac1ng ra 10 news was apparent 1n t e m1nutes 
of the News Editors' Conference of 1968. It was recorded that: 
Conference considered that continued use should be made of 
voic·e reports but there should be some restraint in the 
selectioP of voice .·eports for radio. It \Vas felt that, if 
this technique were misused, a voice report could be a 
distracticn rather than an added element to the story. 221 
The use of voice was seen to clash discordantly with the heavily edited 
factual style of the rest of the bulletin. There was uneasiness about 
the degree to which one should allow reporters to put an item in broader 
context. There was uncertainty about the definition of comment and 
background. 
220. Oakley says: "I must confess that ~Vhen voicecasts became the 
vogue I was at first no champion of them. I could not see that 
a straight report of an earthquake by cable had less impact, for 
instance, than the same IVOrds in voicecast form ... As time 
~Vent on, I got used to it". Letter to the writer, 20 July 1976. 
221. Minute of Interstate News Conference, 30 September-2 October 1968. 
ABC File 15/1/6, "News Editors Conferences". 
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By 1972, Bangkok and Hong Kong had been added to the list of 
overseas offices. The pressure for more voice outlets g:retv. Reporters 
who had developed skills and confidence overseas returned to find that 
the domestic role of the news broadcaster was extremely limited. The 
broad 'newspaper-type' canvass and the unchanged bulletin format and 
duration meant voice reports were still something of a novelty. There 
was still a distinct fear of allowing the average ABC reporter to give 
his intc,rpretat ion of contEntious stories. By this time however, 
televisio" news was beginning to embrace the voice report to camera 
as a highly desirable technique. Filmed repons from overseas offices 
were seen with more frequency in the late 'sixties. At the beginning 
of the present decade the use of reporters' voices, frequently with 
f . d d d . 1 . . 222 agency 1lrn, was stan ar proce ure 1n te ev1 s1on. Special filmed 
reports were arriving at more frequent intervals as the overseas reporter 
began to see television as his most important outlet, given the 
restrictions. of radio news. The News Editors 1 Conference of 1972 
recognised that· pending dramatic changes in attitude in radio news, the 
trend was inevitable. It recorded 
that it was not possible to offer any more outlets for voice 
work in the News Division than is the case at present. Most 
reporting in the home radio service is very limited. The 
Conference kept in mind however, the necessity for News to 223 
continually seek and train people with broadcasting potential. 
222. This m~!·ked the ABC's late arrival into the era of technological 
and professional revolution in th~ TV news field. The development 
of new portable equipment and demands by broadcasters overseas 
to use it, meant that "by 1968 every major international· news 
event was swarr.1ing with small television news teams, their 
equipment swinging round their necks on straps, their microphones 
connected by invisible radio Jinks to their cameras; they 
covered riots, demonstrations and invasions". Smith, Shadow, p.80. 
223. Minute of Interstate News Conference, 19-21 September 1972, 
15/1/6. 
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This pessimistic view of the future of voice in radio news 
programmes has however not proved to be correct. The situation 
since 1972 has changed markedly. A ne1~ outlet for the voices and 
interviews of domestic reporters was established from 5 May 1975, in 
an afternoon prograrmne called "Newsvo~ce". 224 ABC journalists have 
been encouraged to provide recordings for other radio outlets. A 
major reorganisation of the role of overseas offices, which began in 
1971, saw the staff integrated so that each correspondent would 
provide material not only for news but also for the Public Affairs 
programmes 'AM' and 'PM'. The result has been to involve the latter 
two programmes much more in the nei<S of the day. Their constant demand 
for voice mato-ria l £ron the overseas staff, had the immediate result 
of forcing Ne>•S to incluc'c much more voice material from the same mer! 
in bulletins. In 1977, it is now common to hear the voices of three 
or four overseas reporters in any one bulletin. The effect of this 
has been to give special emphasis to overseas events. Domestically, 
voices of senior Canberra reporters are now heard frequently but the 
aversion to voices in bulletins persists in other reporting areas. 
Instead short segments of 'actuality' recordings with figures in the 
news have now become a regular device for updating news presentation. 
It is dubious whether this technique - allowing a prominent politic ian, 
or trade union official the use of a microphone for twenty or thirty 
224. "Newsvoice" was largely the response to the challenge being 
mounted by the Public Affairs Department in the field of hard 
news reporting. The programmes "AM" and "PI!'', which 1vere the 
succes,ors of News Review, became in the late 'sixties and 
early 'seventies, aggressive proponents of the voice report ancl 
intenicw, often in competition with the 'copy' reporters of 
News. The contrast resulted in demands by news reporters for 
an outlet of their own. The Public Affairs Department (formerly 
Current Affairs) is one of three radio departments ~;hich 
resulted from the breaking up of tho old Talks Department in 
1969. The others are the Science Unit and the Radio Special 
Projects Department. 
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seconds - is a valid substitute for the voice report. The 
role of the voice reporter is to put such statements in context to 
provide more intelligent evaluation. He would perhaps use such a 
reco1dlng himself, but in the body of his report. 'Actuality' 
re<:ordings would appear to be a method of improving news presentation, 
without any commensurate improvement in the flow of information. 
Intellectual stimulation, the opening of the mind to new ideas - the 
ideal envisaged by Nordenstren g- would seem to be still a long way 
from being realised in the field of domestic news on ABC radio 
bulletins. 
It will be interesting to see whether the newspaper style of 
news-gathering in ABC radio news, and its extreme sensitivity to the 
dangers it feels are inherent in moving beyond the confines of 'fact' 
can survive the pressures building up within the Division for more 
interpretative reporting. "Newsvoice", the voice out let, already 
provides a stark contrast to the older style bulletins, much as Radio 
Newsreel did in the BBC news output thirty years ago. Newsvoice is 
extl"ell'.ely selective about the stories it covers, taking eight or nine 
of the n.ajor stories of the day. In television, a greater selectivity 
can also be seen to be operating. 225 There is a demand for more, in 
225. The same domestic reporters of radio who are denied the 
opportunities to present their own reports in radio bulletins, 
frequently appear in vision presenting their mm television 
reports. This anomaly seems to stem from the feeling that radio 
ne~;s is still the 'official' AllC statement on the day's events, 
representing considered news priori tics. TV news is allowed 
greater latitude because of its special demands in 
presentation and visual terms. But as we have noted these 
concessions have been made with misgivings and uneasiness about 
TV by news executives.See for example, Fraser's statement: 
"In ne~;s, it is not a crystallized medium. It is a mongrel 
medium and the result is you've got a peculiar hybrid, a 
mixture of different technjques ... and the result is that 
it doesn't crystallize as a medium and the stories don't 
have the same impact as radio 1'. Fraser, interview, 25 September 
1975. 
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particular a chafing at the obligation to include the 7 p.m. headline 
stories from radio ne1~s. Many of the younger generation of ABC 
journalists to Nhom the writer has spoken, feel no urge and feel no 
need to compete with the press. There. is, however, a great desire 
to present news more analytically and to use the special techniques 
of radio and television to achieve this. It is worth noting that the 
wide-ranging approach to news gathering has inhibited the development 
of specialist reporters, a]Jr.rt from those overseas and in Canberra. 
There has been teo litt.le scope for them. A move to greater 
specialisation would presumably make it worth while engaging or 
developing more specialist staff which would, it seems, in turn, give 
Radio News a greater confidence in its reporters. 
Summary 
In this chapter, an attempt has been made to trace the origins 
of the traditional hostility between ABC news and the press, and the 
consequences that flowed from it. Up to 1939, ABC news was intent on 
winning access to press news. From then to 1942, it was engaged in 
attempting to >~in the right to supplement. From 1942, when restrictions 
on ABC reporting were removed at Government intervention, ABC 
news staff saN their opportunity to set up an alternative service, 
wi.L1 Go·~crlll'er•t backing. TI1e ABC's reporting of Government activities 
led to derision and then anger ruTJong the newspa]Jers because of the 
different set of 'news values' involved. This disparity led to 
increasing antipathy to the press among ABC news staff, and an 
increased and obvious leaning to the side of the Government, when it 
and the press clashed on the issue of 'press freedom' in 1943-44. From 
this point, influential Labor members and senlor ABC news staff worked 
towards the goal of setting up an al ternativc service, which would 
'balance • the anti-Government press monopolies. 
l 
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ABC news staff interpreted their role, after the passage of the 
1946 legislation, as one which would cover the same areas as the press, 
in the same way, but which would broadcast the news faster and more 
accurately than the papers could publish it. The Commission, on the 
other hand, aware of the pro-Government and anti-ne11spaper bias of 
the pre-1947 service, sought greater 'impartiality' and 
'objectivity', in order to protect the organisation 
from political and public censure. The quest for greater 'objectivity' 
was assiduously followed by the news staff, which recognised that the 
Dep&rtme.nt's survival was dependent on creating such an image, and 
also saw that this was an excellent method of contrasting the output 
of press and ABC. The ABC would be 'non-policy' in contrast to the 
editorial colouring of the nev1spaper columns. The Department was not 
so certain of the need to selectively cull the news. It wanted to 
throw its net as far as possible, in order to catch the newspapers in 
every way possible. When the Press kept up their criticism and the 
Commission and the newspaper proprietors angrily confronted each 
other, this approach seemed to be accepted at Commission level and 
win general approval. Twin forces were at work to reinforce the 
appearance of strict 'objectivity'. The brevity of items, due to the 
wide field covered, meant only simple fact could be included. Also, 
soyer's insistence on fact alone, without explanation, and adherence 
to a 'neutral' prose style was accepted as having won over a doubtful 
Govermn"nt at a time of continuing industrial and political crisis in 
Aust-ralia. This apparently successful formula for ensuring political 
survival and at the same time sufficiently contrasting output with 
the press, was adhered to faithfully by Hamilton. 
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Within the News Department, the occasional questioning of the 
worth of news reporting in this fashion, was outweighed by the 
considerations mentioned above. Moves to experiment with voice 
reporting and involve reporters in a more interpretative capacity 
were also thwarted by antagonism from other departments and by the 
increasing sense of isolationism affecting the Department. The 
Department gradually evolved a reasoning which saw a 'rightness' in 
its approach and a waywardness in the approach of other departments 
and other ne~<s organisations. Thus organisational factors reinforced 
the trends already apparent. 
Aft0r 1947, a developing professionalism and 'news sense' 
alio•ed ABS n,'C<Smen to point to their product as 'objective'. A 
strategy or ritual was evolved which demonstrated impartiality. The 
verifying of facts and the presenting of the arguments of both sides 
so that the listeners could judge were the procedures adopted. 
H01vever, as we have seen, 1 facts' selected for broadcast were in 
accordance with the Commission's vi eN of the role it should play in 
Australian society, and with the ne1;smen' s view of the role they 
should play in relation to the newspapers. It is, as Tuchman points out, 
a highly dubious proposition therefore that such 'facts' can speak for 
themselves, when they are so dependent on other processes. The ABC 
news service seems to exemplify the discrepancy betNeen ends and means 
described by Tuchman. The need for protection and to justify the 
establishment of the service as an alternative competitor with the press, 
drove ~.he Nc~<s D0partmcnt tc; extreme lengths in its demands for 
blameles>:· 'objectivity'. Keith Fraser sums up in this way: 
It was almost a fetish, the objectivity, the factual content 
Nhat happzned, in striving for these qualities we limited 
ourscl ves . . . and one of the big casual i ties, or one of the big 
limitations ... was that we didn't get into interpretive 
r•)porting to the same degree we should have ... Another 
limitation that did effect 1:he quahty of our bulletins, we didn't 
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background sufficiently ... There 1qas such an obsession, 
or suc.h a discipline that required us to source for material, 
that we limited the ability of the journalist to form his 
own assessment.226 
226. Interview with Keith Fraser, 25 September. 1975. 
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CONCLUSIOi~ 
Summary 
The Period 1932-42 
From its inception in 1932, the ABC resented having to take its 
nc11s fror.. a press monopoly which imposed restrictions on news broad-
casts, in terms of durations and schedules, in order that they did not 
interfere with newspaper sales. The ABC felt it was not supplying a 
news service to the public which accorded with audience needs or 
expectations, or with its status as a national broadcasting instrumental-
ity. 
As there was no other news service available - there being no 
internal news agency of a suitable kind- the ABC might have been 
prepared to go along with the restrictions in the short term, had it not 
been for the fact that commercial stations, who were not suppo~ed to get 
news from the press on more advantageous conditions than the ABC, began 
broadcasting news outside the agreed hours. Many of these stations were 
controlled by newspapers. The Commission's status ~Vas therefore at 
stake, and also its chances of survival. The provision of an inferior 
service to that o:f the col111'1ercial stations would have invited questions 
about the ·value for money the Australian community was getting from the 
ABC. 
The two news agreements with the press - one for overseas news 
and the other for Australian news - had been unsigned. The circumstances 
of the agreement for Australian news were particularly vague and the 
Conunission therefore had no compunction in altering broadcast times 
unilaterally to gain parity .vith the commercials, and subsequently 
denying the agreement had ever been firm. 
i 
l. 
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In late 1935, the ABC was emboldened to seek major changes in the 
agreement because of widespread feelings within the political arena 
against the growing influence of the newspapers, particularly in the 
radio field. The ABC was also angered at the use by the press of its 
columns to mount a campaign against the ABC while negotiations were in 
progress. In this climate of confrontation, crucial talks between 
press and ABC broke down, apparently because of the last minute 
intervention of Sir Keith Murdoch, who took a particularly hard line 
against radio ne1;s broadcasts. 
Allegations of 'bad faith' followed which had repercussions 
ex~:onding ov"lr many years, and which help explain the bitterness which 
clnud,Jd oth<Or discussions, such as those in 1939. 
ABC Chairman Cleary broke off talks with the press, and declared 
at the end of 1935 that ABC would gather news independently. At the 
same time he approached Prime Minister Lyons and others in the 
Government for support. This, in retrospect, seem to have been aimed 
at gaining public and political support against the newspapers, in order 
to win concessions. The ABC had no •expert' knowledge of press 
operations and no infrastructure to enable it to set up a news 
service without press assistance. 
The ABC failed to get substantial support but did succeed in 
persuading Lyons to put pressure on Murdoch to give the ABC better 
bulletin times. However, legalistic and procedural delays and arguments 
still prevented the signing of any formal agreements. 
A-c the enc! of 19:'.6, two important developments occurred which 
helped mo·;c the ABC into a competitive relationship with the press. 
It appointed a Federal News Editor, M. F. Dixon, who 1vas strongly opposed 
to the press monopolies, and who understood the mechanics of news-
gathering. lle was instructed to make preparations for news-gathering, 
in case ABC and the pr8ss broke off relations completely. 
""~"........,.'-'-
561 
At this time the news service had no coverage on Sunday evenings, 
or overnight between newspaper edition times. News could only be taken 
from newspapers after publication. The agreement for overseas news 
with AAP did not hOI<ever preclude the ABC collecting its own news 
overseas. Through 1936 to 1938 at times of major international 
cTises, special. weekend cable services were arranged. In 1937 Dixon 
organised local news collection for Sundays in Sydney and Melbourne 
although there were rumblings of protest from the newspapers. 
These were the beginnings of independent news collection by the 
ABC. They engendered a feeling of increasing self-confidence and a 
taste for more. 
As Europe headed towards World War II the delay in getting over-
seas news to air was particularly obvious and listeners complained. 
Resentment at restrictions when demand for news was increasing led 
Dixon to take more words from the newspapers than the 200 he w&s allowed 
daily, under the agreement with MP. This caused more press resentment. 
But in 1938, ABC and MP at last thrashed out the essenti.als of an 
agreement for overseas news which allowed ABC more words, but which 
also for the first time placed restrictions on the time and duration of 
broadcas::. Pr,Nlous~y restrictions of this kind applied only to 
Australian news. 
As war approached in 1939, two further problems arose between MP 
and ABC which heightened the feeling of impatience within the ABC at 
being denied its right to news and therefore failing in its duty to 
the community. First was the realisation that ABC could not rebroadcast 
shortwave BBC news, because MP claimed rights to the Reuters' material 
contained in those bulletins. The second was the new practice adopted 
by the newspapers of using AAP eabling faeili ties for "special 
correspondent" reports from overseas, l<hich had the effect of reducing 
the total amount of AAP copy available. 
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The ABC at this time ~;as under attack by the press for its 
'extravagance' and 'incompetence'. The press urged major changes in 
the ABC. The ABC felt, for its part, that its access to news was bound 
up with its public image and ultimatel"y with its survival. 
In mid-1939, the Lyons Government did act to help the ABC in an 
unexpected way by insisting on the ABC having its own correspondent 
in Canberra, to faithfully report Government actions. Lyons had had 
a dispute with the press ever coverage. This arrangement caused strong 
press :resentmcP.t and the newspapers subsequently sought to prevent the 
ABC from •supplementing' newspaper coverage beyond this. The success 
of the first ABC correspondent, Warren Denning, in feeding back •straight' 
'factual' reports pleased the politicians and brought with it the desire 
for further supplementation by the ABC. Both Dixon and Denning saw the 
correspondent's role as one in which Government statements would be fed 
back quickly - thus competing >~ith the press at the same outlets and 
aiming to illustrate radio's special advantage of •speed'. 
The outbreak of war in September 1939 saw the ABC again attempt to 
sidestep press restrictions while hoping to gain Government protection 
in doing so. When Army authorities sought a nationally relayed news 
service from the ABC at more convenient news times for listeners, the 
ABC hurriedly agreed without seeking press permission. After ne1~spaper 
;>:rotests, the Minister of Information himself presided over a conference 
tG seek a rm.:t•ially satisfactory arrangement. In doing so, he·apologised 
to the press for their exclusion from previous decisions, thereby admitting 
and acquiescing in continued press control over news broadcast times. 
Nevertheless, Government influence brought ABC better news times at this 
conference, but the ABC was forced to agree not to supplement news outside 
Canberra. AAP agreed to allow BBC news re!Jroadcasts within a set 
schedule. 
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Hm:cver, confusion arose over the BBC section of the agreement. 
First, the commercial stations and then the ABC began broadcasting BBC 
bulletins in full, although the schedules agreed did not allow this. 
After Press protests the ABC agreed to.return to truncated broadcasts, 
Cleary apparently believing that by so doing, he would arouse public 
and Governmental resentment against the press and thus force it to be 
more generous in allowing access to news. Cleary's plan was to resume 
BBC broadcasts in full after a period of public outcry, in order to 
defy AAP and test its rights to BBC material which the ABC disputed. 
The Government would not permit this to be done, however, and took 
the matter out of ABC hands, to Cleary's disgust. AAP rights were 
eventually proven and the ABC was forced to conclude an agreement with 
AAP for BBC news in April 1940, allowing their rebroadcast in full, 
but with e. ,;ubstantial pa;mcnt to AAP. 
Th~ ABC had by this time realised that its own flow of news from 
other overseas sources was full enough to allow it to do away with the 
AAP cable service. When it did so, restrictions on overseas 11ews 
broadcasts were finally ended. ABC took its overseas news from its 
own full-time London correspondent, appointed in 1939, British Official 
Wireless News and the BBC. 
In 1940-41, the ABC became increasingly belligerent over rights to 
•supplement' Australian news and warned the press that it reserved the 
right to do so. As a firm written agreement seemed as far away as ever, 
the Government stepped in and set up an enquiry - the Gibson Committee -
\~hich was empowered to investigate the broadcasting of news. 
The ABC at this time was in a delicate situation. It wanted 
to press ahead with its challenge to the press but felt itself weakened 
by tho Government's delays in confirming Commissioner appointments, by 
a reducticr, in revenue, and by forthcoming broadcasU ng legislation. 
Cleary Has becoming increasingly \>Jor'Tied about the editOrial 
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coloration of ne!Vspaper material and the fact that the ABC could not 
vouch for the accuracy or impartiality of much of the ne\Vs it broadcast -
that is, that taken from the papers. It had a salutary reminder of the 
dangers to its existence ~Vhen Murc\och, appointed Head of the Department 
of Information, took over the compilation of its major evening bulletin 
for several months. 
The ABC ~Vas also becoming concerned at increasing pressure to 
include statements from Canberra, with Ministers' names attached. 
Politicians had begun to see the value of the ABC as a reliable outlet 
for reaching the public. When the Fadden Government fell and Labor came 
to power in September -1941, Labor Ministers who had long-standing 
grievances against the major newspapers looked to the ABC for redress. 
They also felt the urgent need to reach the public direct in order to 
more effectively warn Australians about the danger from Japan. In 
December 1941, when the Government intervened directly in news broad-
casting by altering broadcast times and ordering the introduction of 
bulletins compiled in Canuerra, the ABC felt alarmed. In January and 
February 1942 this interference increased and sometimes took the form 
of personal abuse of ABC executives who ~Vere thought to be obstructive. 
In January the Commission was instructed to ensure the news emphasised 
Curtin's new 'Australia first' foreign policy. BBC broadcasts were 
ordered to be reduced. Faced with the possibility of the Department 
of Information ~aking over ABC ne\Vs Cleary took the initiative of 
prop'JSing that commercial stations take major ABC bulletins, thus allowing 
the Government to reach the public through a hlanket coverage. This 
was accepted by the commercial stations. Simultaneously the Canberra 
news was given priority over that from overseas and broadcast first. 
This caused the ABC great difficulty with its listening public which 
decried attempts to foist a number of 'minor', 'dull', official 
stories on them when they were waiting for important war news. Many 
resented also the cut in BllC broadcasts. 
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In February, the ABC was attacked by the entire press and a 
great number of listeners for its obviously supine approach to the 
broadcasting of political statements during a bitter controversy 
between Spender and Ward. To many peqple the service was now being 
run on distinctly propaganda lines. 
The c;;_ bson Commit tee reported in March and only served to increase 
H.e Cotmnission's concern. It failed to come out in support of an 
independent service, and instead urged an agreement between the press 
and the ABC. It thought the ABC should refrain from attempts to 
gather news itself. 
Faced with this situation, and no indication from Prime Minister 
Curtin that he intended to help establish an independent service, the 
Commission began to look for alternatives which would still give ABC 
news credibility and a degree of independence. Sid Deamer, an ABC 
executive had, in January 1942, proposed a service on BBC lines in 
which broadcasters supplied 'observer' reports to supplement a basic 
'hard' news service from the press. 'Observers' would provide back-
ground and explanation. 
The BBC and other overseas organisations had by this time 
resolved their early differences with the press by engaging in this 
type of 5uppler.tentary role, which was not compctitiv"'. 
From the I>!unich crisis of 1938 onwards American and British broadcasters 
began to usc the microphone and recording machine to describe and add to 
news stories. The ABC, with no access to agencies, and only anxious 
to obtain basic news on a more continuous basis outside of newspaper 
edition times, had never developed this 'news observer' capacity. The 
obligations inherent in the appointment of its Canberra roundsman to 
provide simple coverage of Government statements on a competitive 
'roundsman' basis similarly worked against the evolvement of techniques 
which used the special facilities of M'oadcasting. 
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Denning's operation and the resultant ABC demands to 'supplement• 
press news further increased the fear of the newspapers that the ABC 
was determined to set up an alternative news service with Government 
backing. Newspapers still felt they s·hould be first with the news 
and reseated th·3 speed of radio reports, which exemplified the element 
of competition. Responding to the challenge, the press began to put 
obstacles in the way of ABC reporting from Canberra. Some Ministers 
were urged not to give statements to the ABC for broadcast prior to 
press publication, or newspapers would not use them. Rivalry and 
bitterness thus developed at the news gathering level which was to grow 
in momentum as different approaches to reporting and 'objectivity' 
developed between press and ABC, 
In 1940, Dixon had a clandestine meeting with Curtin to seek 
his backing for an independent service. \'/hen Labor came to power, 
the Government's directions to increase the ne1~s coverage from Canberra, 
were seen by Dixon as providing an excellent opportunity of gaining 
funds for expansion. If the Government were pleased 1vith the ABC news 
coverage it was likely to assist. He accepted that the ABC would 
mostly serve those in power. On the other hand, Cleary and the 
Commission could only see the situation as being fraught with danger 
for Commission 'autonomy'. They shuddered at the finar.cial prospect 
of ABC news expansion when funds had been reduced. Because the ABC's 
only 'independent' news coverage, that from Canberra, had been 
increasingly the subject of Government interference, and newsmen seemed 
powerless to prevent it, the Commission began to think it was best to 
withdraw from this competitive news area. Instead it thought it best 
to concentrate on a different type of news which described, explained, 
and added new perspectives. 
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The subsequent close ties of the radio news staff with the Govern-
ment was the key to the dispute \vhich caused considerable bitterness and 
suspicion to develop between them and the Commission. 
The Period 1942-46 
Government legislation on broadcasting in 1942 gave effect to the 
Gibson Committee's recommendations. The ABC was given certain 
'safeguards' against Government interference. Instructions had to be in 
writing and recorded in ABC Reports. But overuse of Ministers' names 
in ABC ne1vs continued to cause criticism and Commission misgivings. 
News staff defended the practice, though they were forced to try to tone 
it down. Even some Labor politicians, including Curtin himself, thougnt 
it was oYerdor~e. 
Deamer and Robert McCall, another AilC executive, were instructed 
by the Commission to report on the ABC's news service towards 1:he end of 
1942, with a view to changing its emphasis and lessening the influence 
of politicians. The Report criticised the strong Canberra emphasis 
o:" the news and urged agreements with the press which would give the 
ABC complete freedom on times of broadcast, in return for leaving the 
hard news area exclusively to the newspapers. The ABC would instead 
concentrate on broadcast •observer' reports. From the sensitive news 
centre, Canberra, news could be supplied direct to the ABC by newspaper 
correspondents, thus ensuring there was no editorial manipulation. The 
cost of news collection could be reduced by taking AAP's overseas 
service instead of using the ABC's own sources. They foresaw that 
'observer' reporting would ensure ne1vspaper compliance in the agreement 
by removing di:rect competition in news dissemination. 
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Subsequeat negotiations, with the McCall-Deamer report as tile 
basi~, sa~; the ABC and the press reach agreement on all major points. 
But by this time Dixon and his news staff had become a~;are of the nature 
of the proposed changes and began secret talks with Labor politicians 
and with their union, the AJA, to frustrate Commission plans. When 
the ABC approached the Government for its approval for the agreements 
it was rebuffed. 
A compromise solution put up by the ABC and the press suggesting 
that the ABC take an agency service to be established by AAP in Canberra, 
was eventually also rejected. The newspapers exacerbated the situation 
by threatening that there would be no agreement for the supply of news 
from elsewhere in Australia, if the proposal for Canberra was rejected. 
At this stage, the ABC felt major questions of principle were 
involved and chose to refer the matter to the Parliamentary Standing 
Commit1:ee on Broadcasting (PSCB), which had been set up by the 1942 
legislation, as a result of the Gibson Con®ittee's recommendations. The 
Committee aimed at providing a method of parliamentary supervision of 
broadcasting matters. 
The ABC felt the Government had no right to intervene. Although 
approval for contracts over "£5",000 had to be obtained from the 
Government as required by the Broadcasting Act, the Commission claimed 
this was a financial provision intended only to supervise expenditure, 
and should not be used to veto a policy decision of the Co®nission, 
~;hich it was entitlec.l to make under the section of the same Act which 
gave it the right to obtain ne~;s in ~;hatever manner it saw fit. 
Labor, on the other hand, was alarmed at the possibility that its 
key avenue of conununication with the public would decline in effective-
ness, and worse. perhaps fall under the influence of the anti-Labor 
rress monopolies. 
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The evidence before the PSC!l rC>vealed to the Commission the extent 
to \'hich its news staff had collaborated 1'ith the AJA in the preparation 
of the case against the agreements. For its part the ABC had trouble 
in explaining adequately its 'obsen'ei·' concept which was unknown in 
Australia. It appeared as if the ABC was e.bandoning the news field 
entirely. Deamer antagonised Labor members of the Committee by 
criticising Government interference in news and descrihing personal 
attacks on himself made by Ward. Through the AJA, ABC journalists 
represented themselves as men following a different puth in journalism 
to those employed on newspapers. They were more 'objective•, 'straight' 
and 'impartial'. AIJC news mC'n had devised an argument which validated 
their news selection criteria. ABC newsmen adopted the 'neutral', 'good 
citizen' role. Newspapers stuck to their 'adversary' relationship v1i th 
Governments. Newspaper and ABC standards began to drift further apart. 
The PSCB in its report came down strongly in favour of the existing 
•straight' ABC reporting methods, in which speed and •accuracy' were 
thought more important than in-depth examination of issues. It thought 
the •observer' concept, at least as far as Canberra was concerned, was 
dangerous and could possible be misused. It urged the ABC to work 
towards an independent service. The ABC it said, should get its 
own news in Canberra, but could take press r.ews from elsewhere. The 
report effectively ended for the time being ideas of ABC newsmen 
backgrounding news in voice and committed the organisation to the 
same type of •competitive', 'straight' neVIs-gathering with which it had 
begun in the nineteen-thirties. 
Dixon had by this time fallen foul of the Commission and management 
on -two counts. He and his men had been, in Commission eyes, 'disloyal'. 
Dixon had himself given evidence against the proposed agreements. And 
he was blamed for the continuation of the practice of overuse of Ministers' 
names. Before the i'SCB, Cle<>ry had given him an assurance that he would 
t.. 
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not be victimised for his views. As he gradually fell from grace, Dixon 
believed that Cleary had broken his promise, and he used this as one of 
his strongest arguments in asking for help from Labor politicians. 
The Commission began to look for ways of reducing Dixon's 
influence from 1943 onwards. By mid-1944, a scheme had been devised 
for replacing him as head of the Department with a Federal News Editor. 
Dixon would be given only executive duties. Getting wind of this, 
Dixon sought union and political support. The Con~ission was faced with 
constant interference, from a group of politicia>tS close to Dixon and 
his staff, led by Senator Amour, Chairman of the PSCB and including 
Cal well, llaylen,Allan Fraser and others. The Commission began to find 
it increasingly difficult to maintain any kind of control over its news. 
In early 1945, the Government appointed Labor stalwart and 
journalist J.S. Hanlon to the Commission, obviously to protect Dixon, 
to prevent any closer links with the press and to ensure the Commission 
made moves towards independence in news collection. Hanlon established 
strong contacts among the news staff, and throughout his term conveyed 
the substance of supposedly confidential Commission decisions on news 
to them. Hanlon's influence immediately made itself felt and moves to 
weaken Dixon were abandoned. An attempt to give McCall power to supervise 
political content ~1as quickly dropped. Dixon was soon promoted. 
In March 1945, Cleary resigned, apparently fatigued by his battles 
with the politicians and also convinced some members of his staff had been 
disloyal. His successor, R.J.F. Boyer, was convinced of the urgency of 
reasserting Commission control of its news service. There had been 
regular listener complaints about the politi::al nature or direction of 
the service from 1942 onwards. Further, the press were becoming 
bitterly ar.tagonisti(.: because in several major disputes they had had 
with the Government, particularly with Information Minister Calwell, 
over the issue of press 1 frc;cdom 1 , ABC news had lacked 'objectivity'. 
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Instead it had appeared to side with the Government. The Opposition 
were also becoming restless at. the extent of the coverage given them. 
Evide1:ce of Government interference abounded. Cabinet itself in 
mid-1944 declared that it was unhappy with ABC news, apparently 
because some Ministers still wanted their names used more frequently. 
Also it put pressure on the ABC to terminate a short-term agreement 
with Australian United Press for an out-of-hours backup service in 
Canberra, although the agreement was not technically subject to 
Government approval. The Government did not officially record this 
'instruction' nor did the Commission have the fortitude to insist on 
this being done, so that the public could become aware of the 
Government's moves. The 'safeguards' in the 1942 Act were thus neatly 
sidestepped. 
Boyer believed that if the Commission were able to negotiate a 
satisfactory agreement with the press, it would be seen to be deciding 
for itself its news sources, instead of being seen to be under 
Government direction. Government manipulation he thought to be a greater 
danger than the possibility of using 'coloured' press news. The 
Agreements he proposed would adequately cover the areas in which the 
PSCB disagreed with the 1943 agreements. The Government would have no 
cause for complaint. Also he had Curtin's assurance that agreements 
along these lines would be approved. 
The major disagreement with the press was over prjce. They agreed 
to the Con:mission' s right to collect its own news and to access to news 
within newspaper offices before publication. The news, it was felt, 
would therefore not be subject to editorial change or emphasis, and 
this would put an end to any disquiet about the use of newspaper 
sources. The Canberra news would be collected by the ABC's o•m 
staff. 
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The price question being resolved after an independent enquiry, 
the ABC went to Postmaster-General Cameron with every confidence he 
would approve the arrangements. When he procrastinated, and sought more 
details, it became clear that more trouble lay ahead. The ABC could 
not grasp the realities of the source of power in broadcasting matters. 
It was not successive Postmaster-Generals who made major decisions but 
the group centering around Amour and Cah1ell. Approaches to Curtin, 
Ashley or Cameron could not bri:lg results unless the group mentioned 
were in agreemm~t. Also the death of Curtin in mid-1945 immediately 
dissipated the value of the assurances he had given Boyer. 
Dixon had been excluded entirely from negotiations over the 1943 
agreements, foolishly as it turned out, in view of the effectiveness of 
the resources he could bring to bear to stop them going through. ln 
1945-46 he was involved, but at a late stage when it was thought it 
would do little damage. In fact he made things difficult by insisting 
on almost impossible conditions from the press and by calculating that 
the additional staff needed to man the newspaper offices would cancel 
out any savings. He urged that instead, an independent service be 
immediately created for the same outlay. By this time the ABC was 
collecting a considerable quantity of its own news. The necessity for 
adequate Federal coverage to meet Government demands had meant 
considerable expansion, not only of the ne~;s staff in Canberra, but also 
the staff in other States, who were also expected to cover national 
stories. Dixon claimed he now had the basic infrastructure to begin 
independent news collection. 
Meanwhile Hanlon and Dixon wore doing ~<i,at they coul.d behind 
the scenes to forestall and prevent, if possible, the passage of the 
agreements. At some time during this period, Dixon had secret talks at 
his home with both Calwell and Amour over the future of the news 
service. 
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Boyer approached Prime Ministe'~ Chifley early in 1946 to try to 
get early Government approval. Although Chifley could see no major 
problem, the matter was eventually referred to the PSCB. Dixon was 
persuaded by Amour to give evidence in public, so that convincing 
reasons could be given for Government intervention once more. Dixon's 
estimate of the cost of the independent service was crucial as it 
turned out. It l<as so low that he won the support of Moses who urged 
the Commission to reconsider. Boyer however was determined to press 
ahead mainly on the question of the principle of the Commission being 
given the right to determine its own news sources. But by this time, 
Boyer too was beginning to realise the extent of Labor's fear of the 
major newspapers, and the fact that ABC news and such sources were 
incompatible. ABC news had to be removed entirely from the suspicion 
of press irrfluence. It had to have a service which reflected its 
own sense of community values. 
Dixon successfully pointed out the unworkable nature of the 
proposed arrar1gements for getting neHs from newspaper offices and 
strongly argued that such methods would interfere with one of the 
strengths of his service - the speed with which news could be got to 
air. 
Dixon's figures proved persuasive. They were accepted by the 
PSCB as authoritative and more worthy of consideration than the 
estimates for an inclependent service quoted by Boyer and the press, 
which were considerable higher. 
The PSCB found against the agreements and said the ABC should 
have its own independent news service in order to win public confidence. 
Within a few weeks the Broadcasting Act was amended to make it compulsory 
for the i\BC to set up its mm completely self-sufficient news service 
\~ithin Australia. It allowed the collEction of overseas ne\\'S from 
agencies. The Opposition believ~d th:!t this was a tactic to give the 
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Government continued contl'C) of AS·: r:ews. Government speakers 
emphasised the unacceptability of any proposal under which the ABC 
took its news from the press .. news which could be, and most 
certainly would be, 'coloured' so as to give it an anti-Labor tinge. 
The Act severely restricted the Commission's right to determine 
its o~~ news sources, but it did make the organisation entirely 
responsible for its own news output. Up to this time, it had 
succeeded in surviving criticism because it could point to other 
influences at work over which it had no control. Frcm this point, the 
onus was on the Commission to win back control and provide evidence of 
the validity of its own news priorities. If it could not, then its 
independence could come under threat once again. 
This brought the Commission into further conflict with Dixon and 
his political supporters over the nature of the new service - whether it 
would continue to apply the old principles or adopt new ones of strict 
'impartiality'. It. was a question of whether Dixon's new:; philosophy 
of 'news not views' could still be held to apply. Up to this point it 
had been interpreted as meaning Governments received vastly 
preponderant coverage because they 'acted'. Oppositions did not •act' 
but merely offered 'opinions' and therefore were not frequently 
categorised as 'news'. 
The Period 1946-49 
Boyer believed that a new set of principles had to be laid down 
internally for the news service if it was to regain community confidence. 
The news policy of 1946, still the core of ABC news thinking, embodies 
his beliefs about the necessity for gaining Opposition, as well as 
Government, support, by embracing strict 'objectivity'. The need to 
demonst:l'atc 'objectivity' was urgent, not only in terms of giving tho 
575 
Opp(lsi t ion parties better coveragE', but also because 'impartiality' had 
been singularly lacking in the ABC's reporting of the disputes between 
the press and the Government in 1944-46. All sides had to be presented 
to obtain the look of 1 objectivity' . 
Boyer originally wan ted immediate mathematical balance between 
Government and Opposition but was forced to compromise. H01vever, he 
did succeed in enforcing stricter adherence to the principle of obtaining 
the Opposition viewpoint. It was also laid down that Government 
statements were only to be used if newsworthy. 
In terms of broad brow.lcas ting philos;:-phy, Boyer was committed to 
maintaining 'national unity' in the face or' divisive issues, within the 
framework of the parliamentary democratic system. He wanted the ABC to 
be used as a 'national forum' in which all viewpoints could be expressed 
to assist in public judgment of issues. He supported the consensual 
principles on which Australian society was based. News policy was 
therefore to work within this fTamework. 
Within the news policy of Boyer was enshrined the anti-newspaper 
ethic which ABC newsmen had long accepted - the opposition to 
'sensationalism' and 'circulation building for its own sake'. Also 
1 community service' was to be the new cri tcrion. 'Facts 1 only would be 
presented leaving the conclusions to be drawn by listeners. Anything 
beyond 'fact' was 'opinion' and this was outside the ABC's area. News 
was wanted ~Vhich was 'fast', 'accurate' and 'factual'. Beyond the 
directive, the ABC news editors themselves decided that they should also 
c. over as many stories as possible. Hence news i terns ~ad also to be 
brief. This decision was directly related to the 'competition' with the 
press which the news staff still believed was one of their major 
responsibilities. 
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Together, these news principles amount to ~;hat is now known as 
'mirror image' reporting in which little explanation of the news is 
given and in which the decisions of those in authority are simply 
relayed. The quest for extreme 'object;_vity' was pursued relentlessly 
from this time on, in the belief that ABC news had to demonstrate its 
superiority over the press as an alternative source of news. 
Boyer was faced with the distinct possibility of the nationalisation 
of broadcasting by Labor. He was therefore also anxious that the 
Commission demonstrate a distinctiveness in output, so as to underline 
its special value to the Australian public, and thus help its chances of 
survival. A news service which competed and yet contrasted with the 
press was one way of achieving this. 
Although Boyer had won a notable success in obtaining broad 
acceptance of his news •fairness' docr:ri.l'e internally, particularly at 
a time when the News Department retained such strong ties with Labor 
politicians, he and the Conunission realised they would eventually have 
to remove Dixon from a position of editorial responsibility in order that 
the policy should become fully operative. This realisation became 
starkly obvious after the appointment of Leicester Cotton as National 
News Editor. Cotton was given responsibility for National ne~<s content 
and the Commission relied on him to ensure that the code of 
1 impartiality' was followed. 
Dixon, Hanlon ancl their Labor associates however immediately 
attacked the appointment of Cottar,, thus alerting the Commission to the 
fact that there were still strong forces working to maintain a degree of 
political control over ABC news. Cotton was alleged to be 'a stooge' of 
the press, whose job was to destroy the news service as part of some 
Commission/newspaper plot. Staff loyal to Dixon, whose Departmental 
reputRtior. ~<as enhanced by his successful opposition to the Commission, 
leaked material which was dilmaging to Cotton to the press. 
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Dixon began to urge a quick beginning to the ne1~ independent 
service. He advocated large scale staff increases, the money to be 
provided by the Government. This approach alarmed the Commission, as 
it had in 1942. It also angered Moszs·, because it was now apparent 
that Dixon's estimate of the cost of the news service, which had been 
so influential with the PSCB, was extremely inaccurate. 
The Labor Government had consistently refused to regularise the 
method of financing of the ABC sinc.:o 1942. The rising costs of broadcast-
ing had been met by annual grants above the Commission's share of the 
licence fee. The Comr.1issj on believed this short-ter!l' method amounted to 
a constant threat to the organisation's independence. In fact, the 
1944-45 grant had been specifically tied by Cabinet to securing 
'an improvement' it desired in ABC news. 
Debate in the PSCB in 1946 on Commission finances had raised the 
possibility of a complete change in the method of financing, involving 
either a permanent system of annual grants, or some system of sponsored 
programmes. Anxious to retain the licence fee system, which it felt 
guaranteed some measure of independence, the ABC was in no mood for 
extravagant expenditure on news, which might trigger further Government 
interference. The Commission played for time to make its own assessment 
of the needs for news. 
Dixon meanwhile became convinced that Cotton was leftist-inclined 
because of his insistence that both side of the political spectrum be 
balanced. Dixon ~;as strongly anti-Communist as were his Labor friends 
Hanlon and Amour. Cotton became aware of anti-Communist leanings in 
news bulletins, and when he endeavoured to correct this, he ran foul of 
Dixon, Hanlon and Amour. Dixon began to bombard Cotton ~<ith complaints 
about his handling of nmos, so that Cotton's 1wrk was affected. Despite 
attempts by Moses and Boye;· tc get the Commission to lay down more firmly 
r 
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the principle of Cotton's sole responsibility for the National Bulletins, 
they were only moderately successful. Dixon was only reprimanded. He 
kept up the flow of critidsm. The overall responsibilities vested in 
him as Director of News gave him some excuse and he benefited from 
Hanlon's protection. Cotton's own position was further weakened by 
the fact that there were a considerable number of 'factual errors' made 
at this time for which he had to take responsibility. 
Dixon's po~<er was, ho~<ever, failing. The Commission avoided giving 
him any responsibility for ne~< staff appointments. Against his advice, 
the Commission decided to sever all contacts ~<ith country ne~<spapers and 
to obtain its ne~<s from 'stringers' in rural areas. Dixon complained 
this upset his estimates because he had al~<ays intended to obtain ne~<s 
from the country press. Boyer, on the other hand, wanted all press 
influence removed so as to remove any chance of criticism on that score. 
Boyer and Moses also sa~< that a regular and independent coverage of 
country ne~<s could establish closer contact ~<ith country listeners and 
give the Commission a strong boost in terms of listener appeal, thus 
further enhancing its distinctive image. 
At the PSCB hearing in 1947 into the Commission's finances, Dixon 
came in for criticism because of inaccurate figures given the previous 
year. His image and that of Amour suffered as a result. It ~<as 
realised that the full costs of the ne~<s service would be nearly twice 
Dixon's estimate. But it ~<as not conceded that the Commission ~<as 
blameless in terms of excessive expenditure. It ~<as decided that 
a Select Conmli ttee be set up to investigate CorrL1lission finances, 
largely because of the spending on news. 
The PSCB, and the subsequently appointed Fitzgerald Committee 
called upon the ABC to explain its cxpct1diture on regional news. Boyer 
1;arncd his staff that the ABC now had to justify its existence. The 
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independent service which began on l June 1947 could do this by 
demonstrating its individuality in news values, and by adhering to 
standards superior to those of the press. External criticism must 
be avoided. 
The influence of Dixon and the group of Labor politicians who 
supported him was further undermined when the Commission successfully 
challenged them over the dismissal of a pro-Dixon journalist. On this 
issue, the Commission received unprecedented support from the Postmaster-
General, Cameron, thus illustrating the strengthening of the Commission's 
position and the placing of greater trust in it by the Government. Its 
new 'impartial' news service was undoubtedly responsible for this. The 
Commission was proving that the distrust of the Amour group was ill-
founded. The Labor Party was not championinr Dixon with the same 
certitude. Amour's own power base was crumbling at this time. The PSCB 
was under intense criticism and about to become redundant at the end of 
1948. 
During the Fitzgerald Committee enquiry, the Commission made great 
efforts to 'improve' its news service, reduce costs and justify 
expenditure. Senior newsmen made long trips to instruct staff. Ex-
newspapermen were told to reduce the amount of copy. A large amount of 
'evidence' was obtained to indicate the impact the news had made in rural 
areas. Nevertheless, the Fitzgerald Committee found regional costs high 
and said there was insufficient evidence to justify proposed staff 
increases. It did endorse the overall value of the news service but 
recommended that another expert enquiry be held in order to increase 
efficiency. It criticised the fact that control of the news operation 
was not centred in one man, and made adverse comments about the 
disputes between Dixon and Cotton. 
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No other aspect of the ABC's operation came ir, for criticism and 
Boyer felt that the organisation had come out of it verv well. But 
the Government were apparently bent on using the criticism c.f the news 
service as justification for introducing far-reaching changes in 
broadcasting which would mean closer supervision of the Commission. The 
Broadcasting Act of 1948 appointed two public servants to the Commission, 
abolished licence-fee financing and introduced permanent annual 
Parliamentary grants. All the Commission seemed to gain were statutory 
safeguards in respect of its 'independence' in handling political and 
controversial broadcasts. When Boyer complained, Chifley told him 
frankly that the Commission could never be given a degree of 
1 independence' which would allow it to completely evade Government 
influence. 
Thus the costs of independent ne·.vs had allowed - in the sense of 
furnishing the occasion for making it easier - the Government to intervene 
once more into the ABC. Boyer thereafter knew that to gain full 
Government support, which '"auld be necessary to end Dixon's influence, 
there would have to be even mor8 stri>1g<cmt safeguards against 
controversy developing over news. 
Another step towards evolving a completely non-objectionable style 
was taken during the serious industrial disputes involving Communist-led 
unions in 1948-49. During the Queensland rail strike of 1948, the 
Commission fouvd its coverage coming under fire from Labor and 
conservative quarters because of reporting which was alleged to be too 
colourful and emotional. Boyer instructed the Department to keep to a 
colourless, bland style whic;h was •neutral'. At this time too he felt 
obliged to refuse to allo~< union leaders involved to !;lake broadcasts 
in reply to those of the Queensland Government. The reasons relate to 
his attachment to the principles of parliamentary democracy and his 
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aversion to 'direct action'. The union leaders and their party were 
not represented in Parliament and the Commission did not feel therefore 
that they had the right of reply. By this reasoning radical minorities 
could be excluded from ABC microphones. 
The Queensland incident was also noteworthy for the emergence of 
ne1~ ideas within the News Department about basic freedoms of 
reporting. A number of senior journalists supported Cotton when he 
protested at the decision by Boyer to suspend mention of the strike for 
several days, for fear of legal action. A ne1< independent point of 
view was evident in which deliberate subservience to authority was 
no longer paramount. 
Boyer struggled with conflicting principles over the issue of 
Communism. He resisted attempts by News Editors to ban all references 
to the Party, but at the same time, political pressures from both sides 
of Parliament combined with his own leanings to conservatism were such 
that allowing the Communist Party any time on air ~Vas unthinkable. 
News became seen as the safe outlet for these minority views. The 
Commission could claim that it had kept its pledge to allow all 
viewpoints to be expressed, by allo~Ving brief occasional references to 
them in bulletins. But the Communists were not alloiVed longer exposure 
on air to explain their viewpoint more fully. Thus Boyer was using the 
ABC to maintain 'national unity' in the face of the threat being 
mounted against the established system. 
The 'rights' wen under the 1948 Act proved rather illusory IVhen 
the Commission \Vas forced by Government pressure to put a Coal Board 
spokesman on air. No official instruction was given, and the incident 
~Vas not recorded, as it should have been, in the Commission's Annual 
Report. The Commission dodged responsibility for allo~Ving the minors to 
:::-eply, by saying that it had no control over the content of the 
original broadcast. 
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When Boyer refused to allow the Queensland Premier Hanlon to 
broadcast an appeal to the miners in his State to return to work, it 
was because he realised that the Commission's position would become 
untenable if it was at the beck and call of State as well as Federal 
Governments. If it put Hanlon on air, it could, in conscience, hardly 
refuse to allow the miners to reply once again. Yet if it did, it would 
run the risk of extreme public and political reaction. 
By this time Boyer had succeeded in convincing the Government that 
the ABC's intentions were proper and its attachment to the institutions 
of society secure. There was thus no intervention by the Federal 
Government on behalf of Hanlon. Yet Boyer felt that the Commission, 
because of its action, had still left itself open to censure and possible 
damage. Alarmed by the public and press criticism he took the unusual 
step of publicly proclaiming the Commis~ion's attachment to the idea of 
containing Communist influence. 
The idea that news could serve as a 'safety-valve' to allow brief 
expression of opinion in controversy, while allm,ing the Commission to 
avoid any longer discussion of industrial issues, put additional pressure 
on news to restrict its reporting to the most essential 'facts'. 
Safety and prudence in the interests of the Commission's survival were 
seen by both journalists and Commission to be essential. It was mutually 
acknowled~,;ed that this wa3 the path to self-·preservation. 
Other facuws were impelling news in this same direction. The 
Press had reacted to the founding of the lndependcnt news service in 
a hostile manner. Stung by the emergence of a service which was anti-
press and devoted to an •official' reporting style which they despised, 
the press attempted to interfere Hith ABC news-gathering, particularly 
at State Government level. The press ~>as on constant look-out for 
breachc':S of journalists 'rtorms' unJ at,.t<:~cked tho ABC in 1948 over the 
breaking of an official British en:bar-go. Charges and counter-charges 
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of embargo breaking followed. Evidence began mounting of pressure and 
influence being exerted to deny the ABC news at the State political 
level. Press attacks were mounted on the ABC, particularly over the 
Fitzgerald Committee report. The Commission was stung into taking a 
position of hostility towards the press, which matched that of its 
news staff. This had the effect of endorsing the highly competitive 
position adopted by the news service towards the newspapers and the 
copying of news-gathering and editorial methods which were felt 
necessary to match ne1;spaper coverage. An obligation was felt to 
cover all the areas the press reported or suffer from the comparison. 
In addition, faced with the fact that news broadcasting staff 
overseas were involving themselves more and more in descriptive and 
analytical voice reports, there was support by some of the news staff 
for entry into this area, by taking over the Talks Department's 
nightly News Review programme. They were however compelled to abandon 
this idea by opposition from both Talks Department and management who 
felt it would amount to dangerous incursions into the field of comment. 
There was therefore an inexorable thrust at several levels towards 
making the news service unobj ectionably 'straight 1 • Safety lay in the 
direction of absolute avoidance of 'background'. Putting the news in 
some sort of understandable context was, in Boyer's terms, putting the 
ABC at risk. It was 'objective' in appearance but lacked meaningful 
content. 
The independent expert selected by the Commission to review the 
news service was the former member of the Fitzgerald Committee, W.T. 
Harris. His report unclerlinecl the necessity for one man control of news. 
At the Commission's urging, he came down heavily on the side of Cotton 
and urged that he be put in charge. But before the Report was 
completed, Cotton hac\ gone on sick le<>ve to the U.K. Moses and the 
Commission wcrked hard to clemonstrat"c the lack of discipline and errors 
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of judgment that resulted from his absence. Their aim was to ensure 
that Cotton was installed as Head of News. 
The Conunission, in ar:cepting Harris's recommendations·, downgraded 
Dixon to a purely executive position,·an aim that it had tried to 
realise from 1944 onwards. However it found it wise to reinstate him 
in terms of status, but not duties, after strong criticism politically 
and from the AJA. 
The Conunission's plans for Cotton were wrecked by a last ditch 
effort from Dixon and his Labor supporters. They mounted a campaign 
against him in Parliament which did not receive Cameron's support but 
which nevertheless succeeded in vilifying Cotton to a point where the 
Conunission felt it prudent to d:::-op him. Amour attacked him as pro-
Conununist, at the height of the anti-Communist clamour during the miners 
strike. He was sacrificed so that the Commission could attain its 
higher goal -.that of ensuring one- man control of news and removing 
Dixon. This in turn would guarante<: full implementation of Conunission 
policy, which had been impeded up to now by the dispute between Cotton 
and Dixon. Thus would the Commission finally gain control of its news 
service. 
Cotton's influence extended in several important directions. He 
was instrumental in gaining Departmental acceptance of Boyer's policy 
of strict 'iT.lpartiality'. In particular, he began moving the Department 
av:ay from its dependenc8 on Government handouts, after first convincing 
the Cormoission that he and not Dixon should have control of the Canberra 
newsroom. By applying the policy of 'impartiality' to conflicts 
involving the 'left wing' and the 'right \•ling' he helped swing the 
Department away from its predominantly 'right-wing' stance. The 
Conmlission backed him against the politicians. 
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Cotton also made attempts to include more background in stories, 
against the oppo5ition of some of the older reporting staff. However, 
his success in this field was limited because of the tightening up 
of reporting style which followed 1948"-49 strikes. Also he was some-
what inconsistent in applying this policy. 
Cotton also helped give news an international flavour because of 
the importance be attached to overseas news. This preference too had 
to be modified when, afterwards, it incurred the displeasure of Labor 
politicians on nationalistic grounds. 
Dixon could not survive his last call for political help over the 
Cotton affair. The Labor Party was slipping in popularity, Amour's 
position had declined, and Hanlon died. Within the Labor Government, 
the Commission had gained a reput:ction for cv.on-handedness and 
responsibility in its coverage of contentious issues. The threat from 
the press was now overshadowed by the threat to Labor from Communism. 
Thus there was no Labor outcry at the appointment of W.S. Hamilton as 
Edi tor-in·-Chief, even though he was a :1ewspaperman. finally, the defeat 
of the Chifley Government in December 1949 removed Dixon's last line 
of protection. In 1950 his position was declared redundant. He 
fought for a while over the question of superannuation but finally left 
the Commission in May of that year. 
By tlHo end of 1949, the Commission and its news service had 
survived a torrid testing time. Listener complaints had declined and 
there was recognition of the Commission's efforts in establishing ><hat 
appeared to be a genuinely 'objective' news service, which gave firm 
indication of the Commission's attachment to and support of democratic 
consensual values. Labor was satisfied that it had evaded press 
influence ond had adopted a reassuring stance when the democratic 
system seemed threatened by the act. ion of Commtn~i:::;t led unions. 
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The Period 1949-61 
In 1949 and 1950 there was a challenge to news from another 
quarter. P. W. Nette of the Trea!mry, one of the two new public 
servant members of the Commission questioned expenditure on the news 
service, following the Fitzgerald Committee report. One of Hamil ton's 
first jobs was to find evidence to justify independent news collection. 
He had to produce facts to support the Conunission contention that the 
service was winning support, particularly in the country. 
The pressure from Nette was so intense that at one point the 
Commission was forced to confirm that it was once again prepared to 
secure some of its news from press sources, if the Government raised 
the issue. But Government support for this move, which Nette 
apparently expected, did not f,ventuate. Also the Commission fought s 
rearguard action to convince the Postmaster-General that its present 
service should not be interfered with. 
By the end of 1950, initial doubts about the attitude of the 
Liberal-Country Party Government over the news service, had been shown 
to be groundless. Boyer was justified in believing that the efforts 
made by the ABC to secure backing from both Government and Opposition 
since 1946 had been successful. As the year drew to a close, the 
Government ended the debate over regional news by giving the go-ahead for 
its expansion. Nette's influence declined. 
Hamilton in th0 interim had found his prestige on the ascendant. 
His reports had proved very effective in answering criticism. He had 
been most positive in concluding that it would be most inadvisable to 
rct'"rn to the press for news. He l>elicved that public acceptance of the 
news service continued to depend on its rerr~oval from the prospect of 
being influenced by the press. Boyer backed Hamil ton's arguments in 
telling the Government t!wt the 'objectivity' of the nm .. ~s service was of 
greater value than T•Jinor savings if news came irom the press. 
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Two years later, in 1952, the question of the cost of news 
collection was again raised by the Government but the Commission's 
reaction on this occasion was notic~ably firm and unequivoca.l. 
Confidence was obviously growing in the non-contentious nature of the 
service. ABC news could now speak for itself. The formula devised for 
news had progressively disarmed political criticism and enabled it to 
be removed from the political arena. Commission and News Department 
at last were in agreement about the policy needed to survive and prosper. 
There was now a growing audience for ABC news - which had become one of 
the Commission's most popular programmes. 
Hamil ton's degree of success in maintaining and strengthening 
ABC news policy was recognised in 1953 when he was put on the permanent 
staff. From 1951-56, news almost dropped completely from Commission 
agendas. It was the first time this had happened since the Commission 
was set up in 1932, and it was an indication of the trust now put in 
Hamilton. News was evincing no public or political criticism. 
The news directives which were issued by Hamilton were lengthy 
and detailed, in accordance with the belief that meticulous guidance 
was required to avoid trouble. He emphasised even more strongly than 
Cotton the need for full and adequate reporting of the Opposition, and 
opposing viewpoints generally in any controversy. He also reinforced 
the trend away from dependence on handouts. 
Hamilton defined more closely than before some of the Commission's 
news policy aims. Those details which 'a right thinking person' might 
object to, were to be omitted. Crime reports were reduced to a minimum, 
reinforcing Boyer's belief in serving the forces of 'law and order'. 
Hamilton viewed the audience as one which was sensitive, easily 
shocked and needed protection. 
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This dovetailed with Boyer's ideas on emphasising the positive 
aspects of society and playing down the bad. The two men also saw eye 
to eye on other aspects of news policy. Both were convinced the press 
was becoming degraded and was debasing public taste. The ABC had to 
redress the balance. 
There were flirtations with colourful 'human interest' material 
under Hamilton until the Commission expressed disapproval. From this 
point on, there was even less emphasis on language which was likely to 
awaken the senses. However, sensing the frustrations of ABC reporters, 
he did try to bui)d up their role as much as he could within the 
narrow framework allowed. Reporters tvere allowed slightly more 
flexibility in injecting simple interpretive phrases and there was an 
easing of the ban on non .. governmental unattributable statements. 
The Commission was again markedly self-confident in handling a 
series of complaints in the nineteen-fifties by Opposition Leader Evatt. 
He felt that uP.less he remonstrated about the cuttin~ or dropping of 
his statements, the Opposition would be ignored. This belief stemmed 
from the activities of the News Department prior to 1946, when the 
Opposition received very limited coverage. The staff resented his 
direct intervention and his implied threats to individual journalists. 
The Commission, for its part, had faith in the judgment of its 
journalists and recognised that Evatt was trying to influence news 
selection, r&ther th:m expressing any basic party dissatisfaction. 
Boyer believed television had enormous potential for good or evil. 
It would influence community behaviour. On a trip overseas in 1950, in 
which he examin<?c! devclop1nents in television, Boyer was appalled by 
the American approach to presenting news. Attempts to explain and 
illustrate with visuals in hi.s view distorted news values. He much 
preferred the BBC app:coac:h in which the rad_ic., news \Vas simply repeated 
on TV over a s Uclc. 
While successfully arguing before the Royal Commission on TV 
that the ABC should be given control over the national TV service 
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under the same conditions as applied to radio, Boyer outlined the dangers, 
as he saw them, of news selec1:ion falling into the hands of technical 
and other non-journalistic staff, who had no appreciation of the 
delicate ne11s mix required if the Commission was to continue to win 
acclaim for news 'objectivity'. lf illustrative values were to replace 
the proven formula for news judgment followed by radio news, the 
Commission could once again have the critical spotlight thrown on to 
its news service. 
Once the Commission's new TV responsibilities became reality, Boyer 
increasingly felt the heavy moral responsibility entailed. TV news could 
not be allm;ed, for sensationalist reasons, to concentrate on the 
unpleasant or the divisive. It must help the positive social and 
democratic values. 
In Britain the BBC had reluctantly begun TV ne-.:s when confronted 
with the creation of a competitive Independent Television News Ltd (ITN). 
Early restrictions on illustrations were removed following unrest among 
news staff and press criticism. The BBC by 1955-56 was beginning to use 
plenty of film, and reporters in vision to interpret and explain the 
news. Boyer was dismayed at this 'surrender 1 • 
In 1956, the year of the advent of Australian television, 
l!amilton reported enthusiastically on these developments overseas, 
including the advantages of making best use of technical expertise. 
Alarmed, Boyer insisted that the old standards of 'balance' and 
'objectivity' must take first place above illustration. After 
assurances from Hamilton, some visual illustration was permitted in 
news under strict guidelines. 
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When TV news began, ABC reporters did not appear in front of 
camera. It was locked to the radio news format. nut film did go to 
air - too much for the Commission's liking. Commission disapproval 
followed and early in 1957 it was ruled that the order, and wordage of 
items in radio and TV had to be substantially the same, fewer 'still' 
pictures were allowed, and film story length was not to exceed radio 
story length. 
The TV news staff decided to undermine these rulings by gradually 
increasing film usage. The head of TV news, Keith Fraser directed this 
campaign. For its part, the Commission felt that minor items were 
finding their way into bulletins simply because film of them was avail-
able. 
Following continuing expressions of concern by the Commission, 
Hamil ton attempted to explain that film stories invariably take more 
time than the brief coverage on riidio news. Hamilton and Fraser were 
increasingly of the opinion that the Commission was concerning itself 
with technical matters which it did not fully comprehend. 
The dispute over illustration co·,ltinued through 1958-59. The 
Commission because of its sensitivity on the issue of TV news, began to 
intervene in other ways. Music was banned in both News and more timeless 
Newsreel, because of its 'emotional' effect. To challenge the ruling, 
Fraser decided to leave both music and effects out of Newsreel, knowing 
that the effect would be considered flat and full. He then restored 
them several nights later. Nothing more was said by the Conunission. 
Soon afterwards the Commission reacted to the gradual build-up of 
film by ruling that a 15 minute bulletin could have no more than 2 minutes 
of film. Hamilton protestt'd forcibly. Fraser hm;ever saw the loophole 
that new sound cameras provided. He did not count filmed interviews 
within total filmed content, claiming that they were not really film at 
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all. After further argument, this interpretation was allowed. From 
this time on, more and more film began to find its way into bulletins. 
With the death of Boyer in 1961, the Commission lost some of .its 
hypersensitivity about TV news and turned more to the new and potentially 
contentious area of TV current affairs. 
In Britain, the BBC's Lord Reith had been devoted to the moral 
uplifting of the community. His influence declined during the years of 
television, as did that of Boyer. Television brought with it a new kind 
of professionalism which had a different concept of audience. These 
professionals did not take so kindly to traditions of audience protection, 
or to rigid viewpoints about the exclusion of all else but the skeletal 
outline of news events. But the questioning of Boyer's values did not go 
far in the ABC. The battle over illustra'!:ion 1cas of aiJ eler,J<•ntary kind 
which did not at this period, escalate into a full-scale questioning of 
tbe rigid approach which excluded all interpretation in the interests of 
safety. In 1961, in both radio and television ABC reporters were still 
excluded in the main from presenting information which could aid 
understanding. Brevity and extreme factuality \Vere still the rule. TV 
did bring with it a populist view of audience which was ultimately to 
have its effect on news presentation, and which, even at this early 
stage, led to so~e division of opinion between radio and television 
which was essentially based on the lack of understanding that each had 
its own •·ay of achieving 'objectivity'. Radio values at this stage, 
determined news output, as they still do to a large extent today. In 
Commission eyes radio news values,and the rfldio news output, remain the 
officially authorised product of th0 Commission. Its priori ties and its 
style mirror the Commission's Olvn sense of community values, which are 
in turn related to survival, and to the Commission's own desperate 
search for a product h'hich wou] d help it :l.n its quest: for 'autonomy' 
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instead of one which woulc. invit.e -political inteiference. From 1949 
onwards, the Commission felt it had found a news style with which the 
community as a whole was satisfied. The 'suc.cess' of ABC ne.ws was 
therefore held to be responsible for the period of 'autonomy' and 
political quiescence which followed. 
* * * * * * * 
News and the ABC' s Autonomy 
The experiences of the ABC with its news programmes bear out with 
singular clarity some of the key observations of Anthony Smith about 
broadcasting. Because of the power that broadcasting wields, 
Governments maintain controls over wavelengths, and in the case of 
Government-established instrumentalities to some degree over finan.cing. 
To survive broadcasters must adhere to a doctrine of 'impartiality' and 
'objectivity'. 
The broadcaster has to obtain and retain official approval 
and protection if he wishes to carry on the business of 
broadcasting. The central dialogue in the life of broadcasting 
is a dialogue with the state.l 
The key to this relationship, is the political coverage of the 
broadcasting institution. A bargain of style and content is necessary 
in those areas which deal with political subjects. In the period dealt 
with in this thesis, that Ocpartment was essentially the one which 
presented the news bulletins. News is therefore the most carefully 
scrutinised Department, the one which rr.akes the selection and judgments 
on 1·1hich the broadcasting institution relics if it is to retain 
'autonomy'. Clearly, in the ABC's case, for a considerable period it 
found it diffi.cult to evolve a policy embracing style and content, 
1. S!llith, Shadm .. ·, p.l40. 
1 
' r ( ' 
• II{ I ( 
I J' ll l 
f 
' I 
' l 1' 
594 
currently. Ensuing legislation to specifically direct the method of 
news collection in 1946, led to further external examinations on 
the implementation and cost cf independent news collection,eventually 
leadjng to closer Government supervision over Commission expenditure 
as a whole. A further internal ABC enquiry into ABC news had to be 
negotiated before ultimate Government approval of the service was 
forthcoming. After playing a significant consensual role in the 
attempts to thwart the 'violent' tactics of the conununist-led 
wlionists, and having cloaked itself with a new 'impartiality' 
towards all contending elements within the State democratic framework, 
the ABC was left more to its own devices in news. This in turn at 
last gave the ABC some respite from incessant political interference. 
Throughout the period of almost constant enquiry into ABC news, 
1941 to 1949, the Corrunission believed that news placed at risk its 
survival in the form in which it was constituted. The weapons used to 
threaten it were suggestions of possible widespread changes in 
broadcasting legislation, such as those which would involve nationalisa-
tion or commercial sponsorship of the same type as on commercial 
stations, and the provision of finance, which was linked implicitly 
and at times, quite specifically, with changes and 1 improvements' in 
news. The Commission resist.od strongly the changes that were forced 
upon it or threatened in news policy, believing that its 'autonomy' 
was being weakened. Yet the ajm of the 1946 Amendments was ostensibly 
to give the ABC greater 'independence' in its news collection, by 
removing it from the influences inhere!lt iTt any dependence on press 
sources. The Commission came in turn, to see the independent service 
as a guarantee of 'autonomy' by removing it from the ttvin areas of 
contention - the p:ress and the Government. Further, Boyer came to 
see the ne~<s service> as one of th<O m:>st impDrtant arms of ABC: policy, 
\'Jhich, by presenting the 'f&(.:t:-;' of controve1~sial ~-:-~sues could -:1ssi::.1t in 
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the building of an informed and critical democracy. By 1949, Boyer 
believed: 
the news service ... is gaining in popular regard ... ·The 
Commission feels that a continued and strict devotion to the 
continued objective of the news ·service, factual in content 
and sober in presentation, is further assisting the formation 
of independent individual. judgement. 2 
By 1952, news had become in the Commission's eyes, not an embarrassment 
and a cause for concern, but a distinct asset. By 1953, the Commission 
had gained "public recognition" for the way it had maintained "balance" 
in "the manner and presentation of news". News was providing a "vital 
service to a heal thy democracy". 3 By gaining the goodwill of both those 
in authority and the public, the Commission came to feel that its 
independent news service had helped immeasurably in strengthening its 
position in society and enabling it to survive. From being greatly 
concerned about the changes that were forced upon it in news policy, 
the Commission came to believe that it had, in fact, gained a greater 
degree of •autonomy' from the Government with regard to news 
collection and general programming. But to gain this 'autonomy', was the 
ABC obliged to become unduly supportive of wider social and com:nunity 
values in the news? Were the Ne1;s policy conflicts with the Government 
up to 19-~6 on purely illusory grounds or w&s the Connnission anxious to 
preserve a corporation character, based on freedom to gather and 
present news on an informational basis? 
2. ABC, 17th Annual Report, p.6. 
3. ABC, 21st Annual Report, p.6. 
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Recent writing in the field of orga:1isation theary has 
suggested new methods of examining degreGs of autonomy :in statutory 
organisations. In this analysis extensive use will be made ·of recent 
work by Leon Peres in which he suggests that instead of being a 
variable, 'autonomy' is constant. 4 What changes in corporations, 
he argues, is the degree of control they exercise over stocks of 
'incentives', which indue" contributions in line with the corporation's 
character. These incentives have been categorised as (a) purposive -
which result in contributo1·s being attracted by the organisation 
policy itself, or by the prospect of achieving organisational objective, 
(b) material being the attraction of physical or material 
advantages, and (c) solidary - which is the inducement of simply 
associating with the organisation or the people in it. If one type of 
incentive is replaced by another because of competitive outside claims, 
it can result in a change of corporation character of a fundamental 
kind. The real test is whether such a change is desirable; whether a 
trade-off in incentives has been made which has resulted in the loss 
of a corporation character which was ~<orth preserving. In this 
appraisal he combines two previous theories about 'autonomy' - that 
1·1hich sees it as control over the organisation's character and that 
which sees it in terms of capacity to attract contributions. 
Applying methods devised by Peres to ascertain the probable extent 
of policy control possessed by a corporation, one can immediately discern 
that the likelihood of controversy in the ABC, and a consequent loss of 
•autonomy' was high. The general dcfiilition of its news function in 
the 1932 legislation meant there was 11idc scope for competing policy 
concept ions. \\'hen ge.neral definition is combined \Vi th competing 
-------·------------------- -· ---.----·----· 
4. Leon Pcre::;, qThe ResurrectiCil cf .'\utonomy: Organisation Theory 
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--f~ii5"j-~-I~l:-~-~-~; ~' ~-10-7--:··-,------------- --------- ----- ---- ----------
I 
597 
conceptions outside the organi.sation, the chances of controversy are 
markedly increased, The ABC was faced with competing policy 
conceptions from the press from its inception and from the Government 
from 1941 onwards. Th0y did not end until 1949. 
Using Peres's terminology, the ABC competed strongly first 
with the press and then with the Government for control of its news 
policy, in order to set organisation goals and to define organisation 
character. It wanted news contributions in accordance with its policy 
and control over the incentives necessary to obtain them. Up to 1939, 
its policy was simply to secure more independence in news selection 
and presentation. It competed o·trongly but without complete success 
because aspects of control were still vested in the press. Nevertheless 
it developed incentives sufficient to attract a small news staff who 
were dedicated to the ultimate goal of greater independence from the 
press. These were incentives of a purposive kind - that is, they 
attracted people who valued highly the goals of the organisation and who 
looked forward to the prospect of achieving them. No doubt solidary 
incentives were also a factor ·· being incentives deriving from benefits 
that flow from an association with an organisation of a particular 
character. Prestige and novelty would have formed part of the 
attraction of the ABC. 
With the appointment of Denning to Canberra in 1939, and the 
g1·owing public and Government demand for news of the war, the Commission's 
stock of purposi. vc incentives IVOuld have increased, as independent 
collection of new~ became an established part cf thG ABC service, even 
if limited to Canberra aLe\ overseas. By the end of 1941, with the 
enlargement of the Canbe;·:·a bureau and its increasing importance to the 
Government, ABC news would have been seen as an important adjunct to 
Gavcrnment ain~s. The jouT!.1alists and faciljt:i2s at its disposal took on 
a nat]OJ"')<_~l importance. .:>x:~mission policy 'Vas h<Yh'evcr still circumscribed 
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by press agreements. The Commission competed with the press to gi\•e 
it the capacity to engage contributors in accordance l<ith its aims. 
Lack of pol icy control meant lack of capadty. 
Labor saw the ABC news servic0 as essentially an arm of 
Government. It did not want to take over the Commission but did want 
de facto control of its news output. It was a matter of overruling 
the press- agreements and winning some support from ABC newsmen 
themselves. The Commission was faced with competitive claims on its 
resources in news. The ABC's incentives had to compete with those of 
the Government for control over the ABC's own newsmen. Labor's 
incentives were also purposive and solidary. The purposive category 
centred around the attraction of assisting the Government in its aim 
of successfully mobilising Australians in wartime. As well, with greater 
financial resources at its disposal, it offered the opportw1i ty to 
provide an essential alternative 'factual' source of Government news for 
the Australian people, which was not 'coloured'. This incentive would 
have had great pull for ABC news staff who had always desired greater 
inde-pendence from the press. The ABC had failed, through lack of 
policy control to fully achieve this. The Government could. The 
Government also ha_d its solidary incentives - namely the personal links 
and a2scciations with Australian political leaders which were cultivated 
by ABC newsmen. 
In Peres's words, in this situation "the stability of the 
organisation will depend on the executive's capacity to 1·esist 
t; 
competitive claims on the resources it utilises".- The 1\llC had to 
.5. Peres, "!~esurrection", in Spann and Curnow (cds.), Public 
Policy, p.l03. 
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establish monopoly control of incentives. In order to do this, it 
changed thci r nature. A change of news policy had also been forced 
upon it - it had to suspend its quest for greater news independence 
from the press as a result of the Gibson Committee report and the 
Government's endorsement of it. Wanting a less competitive and more 
informational and 'broadcasting' style of news it produced alternative 
incentives of a purposive kind, centering a:::ound the greater 
professionalism and scope offered by the 'observer' concept. They 
were intended to produce contributors of a different kind, more 
attuned to broadcasting work, and at the same time maintain support of 
present contributors. However the end which this seemed to imply to 
independent news-gathering, in the sense that most ABC newsmen 
understood it, and the apparent assurances to the press on this question 
made the new incentives useless in continuing to attract the support of 
ABC newsmen. For the first time, internal co1npeting policy concepts 
arose, which became external when the newsmen sought and received 
Government backing. The chance to recruit new professional news broad-
casters never arose as strong policy competition resulted in Government 
veto of the ABC policy. The Commissior. was faced with the task of 
trying to maintain control of its existing contributors. But from this 
point to 1946, the purposive incentives offered by the Government were 
extremely effective in retaining the support of ABC newsmen. The new 
associations forged between them and Labor politicians meant that the 
possibility of an 'independent' service became more real. 
The 1944 PSCB Rep:>rt rejected interpretive reporting and the 
usB by the ABC of press sources from Canberra. Feeling that it was 
losing public and some political support from non-Labor, because of 
the degree of Labor control over news, Commission policy became one 
~)f endeavouring to demonstrate that it c:.on t i nucd to have 1 freedom' to 
obtain news fror.t press sources, anct-~11so or pcrsua.dirrg its newsmen to 
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accept a new code of impnrtiality. lly 1946 the incentives it offered 
to its newsmen were freedom to supplement that is, to collect news -
without restriction and also to join l<ith their employer to help 
re-establish credibility by taking a basic news service from the press, 
as a question of 'principle' . These incentives were not sufficient to 
win support from ABC journalists, who were still largely motivated 
by the goal of independent news which now seemed very close due to 
wartime expansion of the service. Internal/ external policy competition 
at this point, brought with it the 1946 legislation. 
Peres points out that legislative change, such as that of 1946, 
which forced the ABC to be self-reliant in Australia for news, might 
in reality not deplete •autonomy' as much as is assumed. The changes 
might 'protect' the corporation from competition or bargaining 1vith 
groups which might affect its autonomy, :reducing conipeting conceptions. 
Tht:y might also improve the corporation's capacity to attract 
cor.:tributors. 
The l 946 Act WJS aimed at protecting the ABC news from press 
'influence'. It is doubtful however whether the press had been 
greatly influential on Al3C news after 1942. The self-reliance the 
ABC developed from 19-12 Ci'lvards in the more controversial areas, such 
as political reporting, r;cduced any chances of this. By 1946, the 
year 'protection' began, ABC news gathered almost all its own news, 
getting from the press only minor State items. After 1944, and the 
PSCB rejection of the press agreements, the newspapers did not argue 
for any restrictions on ABC reporting. The increasing cynicism of 
ABC newsmen towards the press and lts news, and their differing 
concepts of 'objectivity' were other factors which diminished the 
chances of 'inf lueonce' . The 1\ct 11o1<cvcr did reduce the degree of 
~cnP.rality ln news purposes and alms, thus reducing the level of 
t'.mrcrovcr~-:-}". The press co-~tld )l_o 1·-~n~~J· iJe <--1 serious rival of the 
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Government in competing conceptions about the role of ABC news, but it 
did, for at least another three or four years, continue to create 
controversy - for as long, in fact, as the issue of ABC news 
remained controversial in Canberra. 
By eliminating the press from any position to 'influence', the 
Government's mm competitive stance in relation to ABC news became 
less aggressive, because its initial bid for control was made largely 
as a result of what it saw were press efforts to control ABC resources. 
Tho r,ct therefore reduced tension and enabled the ABC to set about 
creating a new set of incentives designed to attract and secure 
control of existing and newly recruited newsmen. The 1946 policy 
designed when the imposition of an 'independent' news service was 
about to become a reality, retained 'impartiality' as its core, ,but 
linked it with a strong anti-press ethic. By now World War II was over. 
The Government had lost two key elements in its competition for ABC news 
resources - 'independence' was no longer an is~ue, anJ the pull of 
'authority' was not as strong. The Commission now shared the 
enthusiasm to compete with the press. Its purposive incentives were 
thus much stronger, the more particularly because being 'independent' 
the ABC was now able to offer individual newsmen a greater chance of 
achieving organisational goals, as distinct from Governmental ones. 
But there were still competing role conceptions from inside and 
outside - from Dixon and his friends Hanlon and Amour, and also from 
the Government which competed for a degree of policy control by 
disagreeing as to the sums of money necessary for independent news 
and ahont some of its purposes. These resulted in a great dea 1 of 
what can be called 'bargainj_ng' over incentives. The caution, the 
extreme factuality, the rejection of interpretation and of voice 
reporting, the cnj cinders to be .sc.~bcr &nd unemotional , the rigid 
sourcing) and finally the coJr(m-1.. tmcnt to 'con sensus' during the 
industrial crises, all refined, codified, and stressed aspects of 
Boyer's policy. A subtle but distinct change in substantive 
incentives took place. In Peres's phrase the "capacity to offer 
individual freedom in programme determination"6 to attract high 
quality contributors declined. Some of the early recruits to the 
'independent' news service no doubt genuinely believed that 
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they would have a high degree of 'independence' in news judgments. 
Remaining, and now more important, was the 'alternative newspaper' 
concept with its dedication to matching the press output but in more 
1 objective' fashion. As the 'straight' , 'unobjectionable' nature of 
ABC news became more apparent, competiitg role conceptions from inside 
and outside dropped away. Competition for resources ended, and the' 
Commission at last had monopoly control over them. It had evolved a. 
stock of purposive incentives which matched Commission news policy and 
which was sufficient to attract contributors of the type needed for its 
extremely 'factual' , 'objective! sel"Vice. These Nere essentially 
newspapermen, using newspaper methods to turn out an alternative 
newspaper. They were deeply committed to the belief that such a 
'straight' service was needed in Australia to 1 b:1lancc' the 'biased• 
press. 
A considerable part of this bargaining process concerned the 
winning of Government support away from the Amour-Dixon axis to the 
Commission itself. Amour and Dixon insisted that press monopolies 
and attitudes to communism remained basic. This internal/external 
policy competition remained, trying to persuade the Government to 
continue its pre 1946 policy of competing for staff incentives and 
loyalties. It complicated the bargaining process the Commission was 
6. Perr·cS} 11 Rcsurrection11 , in Spann and Curnow (cds.), put_-:lic 
Policy, p.l06. 
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engaged in with the Government and it made more difficult the task of 
winning all ABC newsmen to the new incentive of 'ir.Jpartiality'. Dixon 
and his sr.1all group of older journalists were still motivated by the 
old incentives of 'authority'. It is worth noting that the 
Commission's o>m efforts at internal policy implementation were 
instrumental in ending the influence of the Dixon group. We have 
already noted in Chapters 2 and 3 that the Commission, in attempting to 
implement its programmes relating to nel<S policy, had found difficulty 
in appreciating that certain action must be taken towards achie\•ing 
policy goals once they have been set and that, instead of being 
followed by an apparently simple sequence of events, a policy decision 
results in a complex series of actions involving differently motivated 
people, with the ultimate chances of success being small. In 1943 and 
in 1946, it had failed to keep policy differences an i.ntemal matter 
because of lack of appreciation of the complexity of joint action 
required for succ.essful implementation. Between 1946 and 1949 it 
was successful in implementing its programme, though >lith difficulty 
and over a considerable period of time, because it appreciated far more 
than previously the need to reach acconur.odation at various decision 
points, and methods of reaching that accommodation. Using this 
criterion, and judging by the ABC's experience, knowledge of the steps 
needed for successful internal policy implementation reduces the 
possibility of competing conceptions about the role of Government 
instrumental i.ties arising externally and thus lowers their 
controversy <piOtient. 
The 1946 legislation did not in itself guarantee •autonomy' 
but it provided the condi\:.jons on \•lhich the Conunissi_on could devise 
and build a stock of inceontives l>hich would ultimately secure for it 
control over its own nc\~S poJ.icy. Thus, instead of losing 'autonomy' in 
' 
the 1946 l\.ct, by being strjpped ,Jf its pm•:crs to gathc-.c nC\iS as it saw 
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fit, it seemed by 1949 to have secured monopolistic control over a 
set of incentives which secured for it contributions in line with 
its news policy. 
The substitution of incentives had changed Commission character. 
It is necessary now to compare the character of the Commission as it 
emerged after 1949 with its character prior to 1946. Did its final 
substitution of incentives 1946--49, bring with it an abandonment of 
incentives which were worth l!laintaining? In the Colllll!ission's case 
there were two elements in its news policy between 1932 and 1946, which 
may be directly related to its character. The first was freedom to 
obtain news from any source without restrictions, which remained 
consistent except between 1942 and 1944 when it 1~as forced to suspend 
it. 7 The second, was the desire to be something more than a replica 
of radio to broadcast and describe and analyse as the BBC were doi.ng so 
effectively during the war. Although forced to abandon this proposal 
after t1~o years, it remains a logical evolutionary progression based 
on increasing knowledge of the special techniques of radio, and of 
radio's capacity to i'"part information of an immediate and authentic 
kind. The quite specific evidence given by Boyer, Moses, Deamer and 
McCall before the PSCB in 1943-44 enables the dra1dng of two conclusions 
about the nature of the news service which would have resulted j_f the 
Commission had managed to wrest control of policy and incentives away 
7. The Dixon vie11, maintained in Inside the ABC, is that the 
Commission's policy 1936-42 was to 1wrk for a complete break 
with all press sources. "!'hus, he argues, it was he who maintained 
continuity of puTpose, by doggedly pursuing this policy through to 
its successful implcment?.tion in 1946, while the Commission 
abandoned it. TheTe is, however, no e·.'idence that the Commission 
was ever seriously bent on a completely independent service, and no 
evidence that Dixon himself seriously contemplated such a step until 
Labor Party friendships rai.sed it as a serious possibility. In late 
1944, he ~as still advocating a full AUP service from Canberra, and, 
as h'C: have noted, still wanted country news from press sources after 
1946. 
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from the Government. The first is that it would have moved the ABC 
news into the area of •voice reports' which would have in turn 
imparted more perspectives of the news,, in simple terms, more 
information, and would have reduced its capacit.y to serve the 
interests of 1 authority' by providing a re:0 l8ct i ve 'mirror-image' for 
the actions and words of the institutions of the State, It would 
also have helped shift newsmen away from their obsession with press 
competition, l·dth its consequent work patterns based on wide coverage 
and brevity. Instead ne~Vsmen, of a different type IVith different 
mo~ivations, ~<ould have been more interested in more distinctive 
aspects of news work. 
The advantages that would have flowed from the retention of its 
right to decide its news sources are less obvious but nonetheless real. 
They relate also to the relationship with the press. We have noted 
that in the nineteen-thirties the Commission came gradually to 
realise that widely held beliefs about the nature of the Australian 
press made it a far from satisfactory source of news, unless it 
could be 'checked' and 'supplemented'. Despite the period of friendly 
negcrtiation with the press to secure Agreements, between 1942-46, there 
is every indication that the Commission graduaJ.ly became even more 
convinced of the dangers inherent in dealing with newspaper 
proprietors. The proposed 1946 agreement was so hedged around IVith 
special arrangements to avoid 'editorial manipulati_on' that it is 
unlikely that it would ever have worked as a basic supply of news. The 
much heavier emphasi5 was on the unrestricted 1 supplementation' - \'i'h:i.ch 
had come to mean simple news-gathering - so that the strong implication 
is that the ABC would have come to rely far more on its own reporters 
than on those of the press. It may, in fact, have simply used the 
press offices fer upcto--thc-minute information as to news happenings 
~·,rhich it i\'nuJ d lw.vc .follov.;ed ur itself. Thr. Af:JCCJ;1.E'llt \>Ja~; an inte·ri:n 
"...._\~t.·l\J.c•-'•..," 
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one for one year only and there is every indication that the Commission 
had come down firmly on the side of avoidance of the press by 1946, but 
pushed ahead IVith its agreement proposals in order to demonstrate its 
1 independence' from the Government. The iroescapable conclusion, 
particularly when linked with the opposition to press 'standards' in the 
news policy of June 1946 and Boyer's own critic ism of the press before 
the PSCB in 1946, is that the Commission I'JOuld itself have eventually 
ended Rny contractual arrangement with the Australian press. Had it 
been allowed to reach this ultimate conclusion and act accordingly, the 
rivalry towards the press in ABC news might not have been as great. 
The PSCB reports of 1944 and 1946, and the evidence which preceded them, 
aroused bitter press feeling, because of th<? imputation that it was 
'suspect' and 'biased'. The public ventilation of these views and 
Government endorsement of them created a bitter antagonism towards the 
news service, \":hich was immediately reciprocated by ABC journalists . 
. Had the newspaper agreements eventually been allowed to lapse - and 
there is evidence from the interim one year nature of the 1946 agreement 
that they would have done - ABC newsmen might not have been as determinedly 
anxious to match the press in every direction. As with 'observer' 
reporting, this might have helped produce a more selective approach and 
one which ~<as less geared to 'spot' or 'immediate' news. 
An analysis of ABC Annual Reports from 1947 to 1962 shows that 
the qualities most ascribed to the news service by the Commission ~<ere 
'object1vity' and 'impartiality'. In this thesis attention has already 
been drawn to the observations of Gaye Tuchman on the subject cf 
'objectivity'. She argues that in order to claim 'objectivity' and 
thns avoid danc'.crs to themselves and their organisation newsmen 
follow a ritualised procedure. Facts are verified, conflicting 
possibilities presented, cverns structutrcd in appropriate sequence 
' 
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and they use their 'news judgment' to decide what is true and can be 
taken for granted. But, as she points out, these procedures are merely 
attempts to obtain 'objectivity' and do not guarantee success. Facts 
are held 'to speak fc.r themselves' when they cannot an<i facts 
are presented in such a way as to invite selective perception. 
Significant problems arise because some of these crucial procedures are 
ultimately dependent on claims of •news judgment' or 'common sense' but 
as Tuchman points out, these are frequently dependent on editorial 
policy and on individual views of social and political reality. 
It would be remarkable if the ABC newsman's search for 'objectivity' 
was not routinised in this way as it was,and is, in the media everywhere 
because of the way newsmen work. As Tuchman says: 
[the newsman] must make immediate decisions concerning 
validity, reliability, and 'truth' in order to meet a 
problems imposed by the nature of his task - processing 
information called news, a depletable consumer product 
made every day. Processing news leave~ no time for 
reflexive epistemological examination. 0 
At this point we should look at the consequences of the type of <Vork 
pattern evolved by ABC news in its attempts to compete with the press, 
namely the speed with which news was broadcast and also brevity, which 
resulted from the wide news field which was covered and the pressures 
~<hich have been enumerated to reduce news items to only essential 
factual material. Tuchman notes that "Newsmen ... stand out as workers 
called upon to give accounts ... of a wide variety of disasters -
unexpected events- on a routine basis". 9 News organisations have to 
find ways of coping with the unexpected or of reducing tho varjability 
of raw news. She found that "news organizations routinize the processing 
8. Tuchman, ''Objectivity'', p.662. 
9. Gaye Tuchman, "MakiPg Ne 1.\~s by Doing Work: Routinizing the 
Unexpected", Ameyic:m .Jourrul of Sociology, Vol. 79, No.1 (July 
197 ~)) , p. 1. 11. ~chJ~·:tn' s cmpha~~ is. 
of seemingly unexpected events by typifying them along dimensions 
that reflect practical tasks associated with their work". 10 
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The ABC newsroom had to cope with a very large number of stories. 
A eonsi.derable numher were not used but nevertheless involved time in 
assessing. As many as possible were included, being heavily edited in 
order that the cover was seen to be 'comprehensive 1 • These had to go 
to air as fast as possible to demonstrate the superiority of ABC News. 
There was an incessant insistence on preparations to cover 'immediate 1 ·' 
spot' news because it was in this area that ABC had its best chance of 
'beating' the press. Because the ABC had bulletins throughout the day, 
its need for speed was much more essential than the newspapers. The ABC 
had far more deadlines than those of the press. Tuchman notes "the need 
for speed is so overarching that it influences characteristics of news 
. ll 
storl.es". So it was with ABC news. A system had to be devised to 
provide a quick coverage and turnover of a large number of stories. As 
far as national bulJ etins were concerned_. mnny of these \'JOllld come from 
interstate; for state bulletins, many ca.r..1e f1·nm country areas. The 
unexpected nature of mueh of this material, coming from so many remote 
sources, will be apparent. If we use Tuchman's typifications it will be 
seen that AllC news ~<as heavily related to pre-scheduled and un-scheduled 
events, rather than those which are non-scheduled. There was no room or 
i.ncl ination t.o usc the latter category, ,;hich relates to investigative 
reporting of a less urgent kind. Speed of handling and brevity in this 
situation would undoubtedly have meant even greater necessity than the 
press to control \vork activities and a r.lUch greater need to process all 
10. Ibi_~. p.ll7. 
ll. }bid.' p.ll8. 
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stories routinely. This, as Tuchman points out, amounts to perceiving 
and defining events in such a context that social reality is 
reconstructed. 
Elsewhere, in discussing TV news;Tuchman explores the possibility 
of newsmen masking the extent to which a story has been manipulated by 
showing events and interviews in a 1wy that "draws upon taken-for-granted 
cultural definitions of visual perception and patterned role expectcttions 
concerning the use of space". 12 Tld s gi·Jes the visual impression of 
'objectivity'. It seems obvious that: much the same thing can be said of 
radio news that is so heavily and routinely processed as that in the ABC. 
Such processing was undoubtedly a considerable aid to the 'objective' 
nature of ABC news i terns. The standard presentation form of copy 
demanded on the reporters in order to make quick subbing possible 1·1ould 
have been subjected to heavy editing which would enhance the 'objective', 
'impartial', 'neutral' nature of the coverage. But proc'"ssing news 
in routine fashion to cr0ate 'obj ccti-.,· i ty' can, as we have said, 
transform the nature of the news to fit a particular pattern. Speed and 
brevity themselves mean less time and less space can be devoted to even 
the ritual procedures necessary for •objectivity'. The ABC work routine 
would have meant extreme edherence to the principle that "newsmen, in 
practice, mean by objectivity that one must interview an opponent and a 
f . l ' 13 proponent o. any controvers1a measure'. As Tuchman suggests, the work 
process means that the interact.ion obtained is itself 'routine' because 
the opponents and proponents are well-known and quickly accessible. 
This would have been particularly so ir, the ABC's case. This i.s one real 
way in which this kind of cursory attempt at •objectivity' aids the 
12. G&ye Tuchman, "TechnoJo 1;y of Objccti.vity", p.24. 
13. G:;yc 'f 1_.;ch~J;.an, Introduc..:Li_on to Tu:.:hman (ed.), The TV Establishment: 
Pn.)·~r<.ar:r.-~\_n!~ fur Poh'~r ;:.m_d P1·0fiL (Prentice lia.lT~-[nglei•/Ood CliffS: 
~-r--·--- .. i.<· ~.7 ~-J ---.. -;::;-;---~--------
: •'-'. ~ ~-'1'-t , p . .:J.:... 
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dissemination of the viewpoint of officialdom while giving those that 
challenge authority fewer opportunities to do so. Thus work patterns 
themselves aid the promulgation of accepted values. 
It is possible to argue therefore that the approach to news 
gathering and presentation of ABC news made genul.ne 'objectivity' very 
difficult to attain, probably far more so than newspapers found, 
because of the greater space and time at their command. A work 
pattern base,! on compression and speed is bound to mean fewer sources 
can be located, fewer points of view put, less time to check and include 
'facts. An excessively heavy emphasis on routinised 'objectivity' can 
in fact mean standardisation or tailoring of material to meet editorial 
policy requirements. 
'Impartiality' is, of course, Of\.e of the components of objectivity, 
being the attempt to 'balance' viewpoints of oc-th sides in a controversy. 
Tuchman observes that: 
the insistence on balance ... maintains the organizational 
structure and minimizes the importance of those who challenge 
government authority ... Supposedly illegitimate challengers 
are never offered the opportunity to criticize governmental 
statements with the same frequency .14 
Hall takes this argument further by arguing that 'impartiality' 
gives the appearance c·f autonomy to bro2.dcasting iu.stitutions, while 
actually ensuring the conformity of broadcasting to the political 
system as a v1holc and the structure of the State. In his view the 
'impartiality 1 concept has been taken too much at face value. Agreeing 
v:ith Sinith that broadcasters cannot 'originate•, Hall points out that 
'impartiality' in Current Affairs programmes is played to certain rules, 
but the mediating 'neutral' broadcaster is d2pendcnt fClr his sources 
and his authority on the same political world from which his contending 
--·-------------- ·------· 
14. Tuchman, [J1~_:cuducticn, in Tuchman (cd.)) I~~._Est~_I-~~hmc~~~ p.33. 
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politicians come. "Within the rules of impartiality, politics, which 
grants independence, is the originating moment, and exerts the 
determining force over the whole circuit. In terms of the broad-
casting function, politics is the dc,t<irmining instance. ,,lS The 
politician while appearing to submit hill'self to questioning within 
the framework of 'impartiality' is able to project himself to the 
audience with a considerable degree of transparency because the 
broadcaster must remain as 'invisible' as possible, merely couching 
his questions in a form ~<hich represents the 'other side' or 'public 
opinion'. Because broadcasting institutions share the basic beliefs 
of those politicians they question, on 'rule of law' and 'de1nocracy•, 
he views the struggle between broadcaster and politician within the 
rules of 'impartiaU ty' as something of a sham which conceals a basic 
sharing of common beliefs. In this view the 'impartiality' of 
'autonomous' broadcasting organisations is a struetured deviee to give 
the State an avenue for ideologica.l reproduction. 
We have noted in Ch"pter 3 the twin pulls of Boyer's broadcasting 
philosophy. He wanted to defend and preserve 'national unity' against 
divisive elements, he was opposed to violent 'undem()Cre~tic• rneens 0f 
r·esolving disputes, and yet in social and political issues, believed that 
the ABC should present as many viewpoints as possible to enable and 
facilitate the formation of individual judgment, thus aiding 'citizenship'. 
An informed 'citizen' was the backbone of democratic society. In 1948, 
however, he was faced simultaneously with the problems of burgeoning 
radical unionism .vith attendant close scrutiny of ABC news coverage and 
an enqui·cy into ABC expenditure, both of which placed the ABC at risk. 
In the circumstances, he felt obliged to compromise to protect the ABC, 
by llmhing the radical minority to occasional brief references in the 
15. Stua-rt !Iall, 11 Bro:1Jcasting") 
Conference, p.l8. 
:-,lass COT1ll1lunication Research 
:,, 
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ne"s bulletins. The application of 'impartiality' was limited to those 
parties functioning within the framework of parliamentary democracy. 
Yet despite the strong institutional pressures to conform and 
give themselves over entirely to the strong public and political mood 
of anti-communism, Boyer and his Commission still felt that their 
obligations to the cmrJnunity demandeJ some action which demonstrated 
ABC 'independence'. Hence the refusal to ban references to the Communist 
Party in news and the unprecedented refusal to allow the Queensland 
Premier to broadcast. Gestures they might have been, but they indicate 
that broadcasting organisations do not always passively reproduce all 
the viewpoints of the political 'consensus' . 
However, it is equally clear that the tr8un.atic industrial events 
of 1948 and 1949 proved oven1helming influential. They and the 
continuing controversy over news caused the Commission to concede that 
the most vita 1 issue for survival \<las not 'citizenship' or 'minority 
rights' but the winning of Government and Opposition confidence by 
obvious support for and a.ttachment to consensual viewpoints - in 
particular the view that 'disruptive' minorities could not be given 
equality of treatment. Only in this way could true 'autonomy' in news 
and therefore insti. tutional' autonomy' be finally achieved. In fact 
not only was wider consensual support needed by the Commission but the 
Commission itself had to assume an active consensual role through its 
broadcasting of these events. The 'legitimacy' of the institutions of 
State being threatened by the 'illegitimate' communist tactics was 
undoubtedly the thrust of ABC news bulletins largely given over to 
statements from the 'official' and 'parliamentary' viewpoint. 
From ];ere on there was 'ideological reproduction 1 • Boyer and 
his staff ilurl "~e"~el.y adjusted the balance between forces which shared 
power in C9.n(J<;;-'I'l'<:l, ~;nd between o'ther conflicting viewpoints within the 
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parliamentary democratic framework. They realised that the ABC 
could not survive a transition of power unless this was done. ABC 
'impartiality' represented a recognition of the requirements· for survival. 
Thus "broadcasting maintains the ideals of society as a whole". 16 And 
while 
the contribution of radio and television to social and 
political opposition is among its most valuable gifts to 
society ... licensing anxiety impels the broadcasting 
institution as a whole in the opposite directions, tm;ards 
stasis.l7 
H. would have been remarkable :lf the ABC, given the political 
problems that had confronted it with its news, had developed any 
different concept of 'impartiality'. But, as ~<ith 'objectivity', what 
must be considered is the degree of 'i1.1partiall ty' achieved within the 
limitations imposed by its commitment to the State. Here it is worth 
analysing some of Hall's comments in greater detail. Although 
maintaining in general te1·ms that "the media can only function, a]l(J 
fulfil the requirements of the conditions of impartiality, by as faith-
ful and transparent a reproduction of the political Sj)here as it is 
possible to accomplish" 18 he goes on to concede that the treatment of 
raw materials by broadcasters transforms them to some degree through 
technical and labour processes. They amount in fact t:J a refraction, 
rather than a simple reflection. Further: 
This transparency is not as easy to accomplish in practice 
as it is to state in principle. For the broadcasters also 
~<ork under the constraining imperative to 'inform and educate'. 
And this may operate against the grain of the stric<: and 19 perfect 'reproduction of the political sphere through the media'. 
16. Smith, Shadow, p. 55. 
J. 7. Strti th, Shc:.Jow, p. 66. 
18. Hall, 11 13l'Oadcas ting11 , Mass z:.ommu?ica t i~.E.~_J:.e sc:a rch Con ferenco, p. l9. 
19. Hall, 11 Broadcast.ing", ~~;:?_s::_::.~nic..:~.::lo_n._~~~carch Confcre_nc~, 1?.21. 
··"'-··~-'...::.'1.:.::':. 
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lie therefore have a situation in which broadcasters, although sharing 
institutional rapport with the State, can affect the degree of 
transparency 1•i th which the views of politicians and others ·reach the 
audience, because of professional beliefs they hold about their role. 
This comes very close to echoing Smith's viewpoint that there are 
struggles within broadcasting organisations about concepts of audience, 
the broadcaster's point of view sometimes being at variance with that 
of the institution which is geared to survival. 
These observations have a direct bearing on a central theme of 
this thesis. It has been held that the news 'voicecast' , the form of 
news broadcasting in which the reporter presents his story assessment 
himself, frequently using actuality inserts to stress certain important 
points, is an inherently superior form of news presentation than the 
routinised heavily-edited announcer-read form that has traditionally 
prevailed in the ABC. It is not only the question of length which 
determines this superiority - the 'voicecast; invariably being longer 
than the standard form and therefore presenting more information. l t 
is also necessary to consid<>T the f,xtent to which the reporter intercedes 
between •raw news', frequently 't<'cements, speeches and other political 
matter, and the audience. He structures, emphasises, and explains. 
While it is inarguable that he must still work within the confines 
of the beliefs of the organisation that employs him, it is equally clear 
that he does prevent to some extent the sinvle 'reflection' of view-
points. ABC news bulletins of the time with their rigidly 'factual 1 
reporting style and the brevity of individual items were, in the main, 
devoted to simple exposition of viewpoints, without intermediary. The 
decision to reject the •voicecast' therefore meant that ABC 'impartiality' 
WBS related to an ext.rcmc degree to the needs and purposes of the elitist 
gr(jups whose activi~·-].es ',vcre being reported, because of the direct, 
unimpeded, ':-eflcctivc-' manner in which ne·\\'S bulletins treated them. 
6'15 
In 1949, the Commission stated that: "it has a peculiar 
responsibility to employ the National Service ... as a positive 
contribution . , . to the building of an informed and critical democracy" ?0 
In the same report it averred that the news service was providing 
information in a form which would assist in the formation of independent 
judgment. It is extremely open to question whether the Commission 
achieved its purpose in this respect either. Nordenstreng, as one of the 
leading advocates of informational criteria for news, contradicts one of 
the tenets on which Boyer based his confidence. in the extent to which 
the community benefited from the information contained in news bulletins. 
As we have noted, Boyer believed that the Commission should simply 
present the 'facts' and allow the audience to make up its o>m mind. 
Nordenstreng believes this limited kind of information is not enough. 
Only with 'many-sided information' can people be intellectually act:ivated 
so that the alienation and pDI':erlessness they feel at being unable to 
understand or control the events in the world around them, can be 
overcome. 
21 He points out that researchers have found that news 
bulletins too frequently provide a diet of familiar comforting material 
which provides a feeling of security, reinforces the already existir.g 
world view and provides temporary relief from anxieties. 'Many- sided' 
information would aim at conquering the state of alienation and enable 
people to awake to their state and begin to participate in the world 
around them. This in turn would aid the development of a healthy 
democracy. This information may at times have to be disturbing, causing 
in the short term additional insecurity, but in the long term this would 
-- _, ______ _ 
20. AllC, 17th Anm'a l RenoTt, p. 5. 
~-~--·---'--~ 
21. See Kaa.r1c Nor.doas~T-l::lb, !!The Mass ~·teciia and Freedom of Speech", 
"Extension of the Senses: An Audience Point of View", and 
"Who Determine:: Publl:: Opinion?", all in Nordenstreng (ed.), 
Inrcrnational Mass Communicnt.t'on (T;m'1li, Helsinki, 2nd ed., 1974). 
-----------
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be the key to understanding \vorld events, putting an end to all 
anxieties. Nordenstreng's definition of •many-sided' information is 
that in which the 'invisible' development surrounding events has been 
given - news in which analysis has beej1 provided, beyond what is merely 
'official' and 'visible'. He also is critical of the thinking which 
advocates that a news service must satisfy the public. This kind of 
satisfaction means merely that the public is being fed information 
which is supportive of their existing ideas and keeps their minds 
closed to new ones. 
It will be clear that, judged on this basis, ABC news did very 
little to im:ellectually stimulate and encourage democratic participation. 
Its news was certainly not 'many-sided'. Nor were the news staff 
encouraged to include very many disturbing ncv1s items as this did 
not accord with the Boyer/Hamilton ideas of uplifting society by 
ignoring the unsavoury and concentrating on 'positive' aspects of 
society. Also ABC news was heavily geared to gaining public support to 
justify itself, as the frequent references to this subject in Annual 
Reports indicate. The transmisslon of news experience did not find a 
place in this scheme of thi,lgs. The 'factual' brief nature of ABC news 
items seem to have beer, as far removed from 'many-sided' information as 
it is possible to be. 
Up to 1961, ABC ne,~s had projected institutional beliefs that 
buttressed the legitimacy of existing institutions, and so encouraged 
what Tuchman has described as national 'hegemony' - the domination of a 
certain way of life and thought and one concept of reality. Her 
conclusion regaJ:ding American television could equally apply to the ABC 
in this period in that "it adumbrates political and intellectual 
d~scourse. It not only buries di»sent; it buries the possibility that 
77 
new ideas may emel~gP. 11 • -~- NarJcnstreng is equaJJy relevant, as far _as 
22. Tuchm:1n, "Introduction11 _, in Tuehman (eeL), !V ~_:;ta~~ishment, p.39. 
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the ABC is concerned, when he says: "The message of the :nas;; media 
is largely biased in fa~our of prevaillng ways of thinking, on the 
side of previously assimilated opinions and attitudes against new 
information and open-mindedness". 23 However, more wealthy and 
illustrious broadcasting institutions overseas had also, in this 
period, perpetuated hegemony, and it is therefore not surprising that 
the ABC found itself in a similar situation, particularly in vie~< of the 
extreme difficulties it had had in satisfying the politicians. 
What is remarkable however is its extreme and unchanging 
supportive attachment to accE:pted institutions and values over such a 
long period. This is obvbus from the three perceptives just examines. 
A news style and consequent work patterns ~;hich flowed from the conception 
of the ABC as be1ng an al ternati vc and competing vehicle for news 
dissemination ~Yith the press, and also from the rejection of 'interpretive 
reporting, meant that even the ritualised procedures for establishing 
'objectivity' had to be reduced to a miP. imum. For the samG reasons, 
'impartiality' \Yent no further than the presentation in raw form of 
opposing statements. Instead of being the material for democratic opinion 
forming, ABC ne~Ys ~Yas more likely to have confirmed existing prejudices. 
The cumulative effect of its failure by 1961 to reach even existing media 
norms of •objectivity', 'impartiality' and i.nformation content, \YOuld 
have accentuated its considerable lean towards hegemony. It will have 
been noted that the practices and procedures outlined continued without 
basic ch:mgc throughout the nineteen-forties and nineteen-fifties, and 
well into the r.inetcen-oixties. Other broadcasting organisations had hy 
this time long launched themselves into the task of providing more 
expl~nation of the ne1;s, even though some, like the BBC had found it 
initially difficd t to do so. 
--------------------------
23. NordNtstrcng, "Puhlic Opinion", In Nordenstreng (cd.), Mass 
Co~!!!_un:i_~-~-~-~C11~, pp.l02-03. 
618 
It is doubtful therefore whether it can be said that the Commission's 
character as i.t emerged by 1949, and continued through 1961, was a worthy 
replacement for the character of the Commission up to 1946. The 
essential trade-off in incentives had been those of an anti-newspaper, 
heavily pro-censensual kind in place of an informational, broadcasting 
kind, which also offered greater individual 'freedom' in d<:termining 
output. The character of the Commission was indissolubly bound up with 
a policy which it ;ms never able to introduce because it failed to 
marshal the incentives needed when the Government corr.peted for resources. 
The Commission Vigorously resisted attempts to interfere with its news 
policy, because it wanted to preserve the character which was bound ·UP 
with it - freedom to collect news as it wanted, and its corollary, 
freedom to prese!lt the news as it wished. The too-easy assumption in 
judging the ABC's independent news service, is that because the product 
v;as more 'objective' and 'impartial' than it was before 1946, its 
•superior.i"cy' is self-evident, and therefore so is its justification. 
This ignores the fact that the Commission's news pre-1946 did not 
largely represent its views at all. Control over incentives lay with 
the Government. 
It can be seen that the 'autonomy 1 gained with the 'success' of 
independent news was at the cost of a substitution of incentives ,;hich 
brought a basic change in Commission character. 'Autonomy' was acquired 
at the price of zealous mirror-image reporting of the people and 
institutions whose support it needed for survival. Peres says: "Survival 
should mean more than sheer organisation survival; it should mean 
. . . f . 1 1 24 surv1va1 as an organ-, sat1on o a part1cu ar c 1aracter". The Commission 
survived and ultimately produced a respected, 'objective', 'believable', 
news service. But the new cha1·acter which it took on in doing so could 
24. Peres, "Rcsorrcction11 , in Spa"P\n and Curnow (eds.) '---~ub)_j_.c Po}icy~ 
p.) 06. 
. ~~ " 
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be said to suffer when compared to several important facets of the 
particular c.haracter it formerly possessed and which it was forced to 
change. 
In the Commission's case, the history of its news service 
involves several important factors which were unique to the organisation 
itself or to the Australian environment. Thus it is difficult to draw 
broad conclusions which relate to the media elsewhere. The press 
itself took upon itself a strong adversary role in relationship to 
Government and to Government instrumentalities. Its opposition to the ABC 
also stemmed from its ccntrolling interests in commercial radio. The 
monopolistic nature of the Australian press made it the only supplier 
of news, which produced the quixotic situation of the ABC being 
dependent for its supply on a grovr-ing which ran ,.,ost of its competitors. 
The •confrontationist' nature of Clc<irf himself might have been 
counter-productive in the long term. His largely unsuccessful appeals 
for Government assistance in his battle with the press, and his 
strongly critical attitudes to the press generally, could have confirmed 
traditional Labor attitudes to the 1 biased 1 newspaper proprietors, and 
the correctness of its intervention into ABC news. Reith has been 
criticised for his easy acquiescence in press restrictions on the 
broadcasting of BBC news up to 1938, but this policy avoided head-on 
collission w:i th the ne"spapers and large-scale intervention by the 
Government. The BBC eventually secured a ne~<s service which 1;as 
noticeably less restrained than that of the ABC. Boyer's character 
too was an important consideration bringing with it strong moral 
convictions on the need for protection of Australian family life and 
the need for issues to be ventilated and talked out \\1ithout recourse 
to violence. This attitude of mind made easier the transition of 
ABC neh·s to a role which was J!Ot only supportive of hegemony, but also 
pl<•yed Em active role in prc.scrv.:ing consen~:u~~l values and \<Jinning support 
for them from the public. 
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Nevertheless, the1·e seems to be two linked characteristics. A 
period of extreme and constant Government i:~terference in, and pressure 
on, ABC news resulted in a ne1~s policy which, in order to escape this, 
developed extreme attachment to hegemony and consensualism. It is 
possible therefore to theorise that broadcasting organisations 
which to an unusual extent are faced with Government manipulation and 
threats to reduce their 'autonomy' feel that their only salvation is to 
go to excessive lengths to win support from, and take a place within, the 
wider membership of the establishment. A demonstrated commitment to the 
unity of the State as a whole and its political :ideologies and forces, 
is the alternative to commitment to one single element in that 
combination. Over-attachment to Governments can destroy the broadcasting 
institution's credibility and its capacity to survive. The ABC was 
reasserting the principle governing all broadcasting institutions in 
which as Smith says: 
There seemed to be no intelligent alternative to making 
broadcasting draw its fundamental title from the state; 
the question was how to find a point of editorial control 
over the ~<hole content which would satisfy the ~<hole political 
spectrum of the nation.25 
Further: 
the broadcaster cannot place himself in permanent political 
jeopardy - but the terms in ~<hich he can rescue himself 
from this are profoundly related to the totality of the 
dominant beliefs of the society he is serving. 26 
25. Smith, Shadow, p.43. 
26. Smi.th, Shadow, p.l26. 
,c:;·~. 
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~~ulative Comment 
It can, of course, be argued that the ABC's independent news 
servi.ce brought with it many 'benefits'., despite its consensualism. It 
provided an alternative source of news for the Australian public to 
that of the press and commercial stations and thus enabled listeners 
to make some kind of comparison between sets of 'facts'. Some would 
say the more varied the sources of neo;s available, the better a 
community is served. It gave country listeners a service of news, 
particularly of local events, which \Jas superior to anything they had 
had before. It gave the public some news items which the press had 
either missed or ignored. It provided a sm:isfactory form of employment 
for many ex-nevJspaper journalists h'ho, for various reasons, were 
dissatisfied with the way the major newspaper~ operated. It enabled 
the ABC to survive and prosper so that it could, in many divers<J ways, 
help answer "the need to create a literate, socially consci.)US, 
adaptable and active socicty". 27 In other words, it enabled the ABC to 
fulfil its wider 'role' in society. 
The latter point raises broad<Jr issues about the purpose of the 
ABC and its role in the community whi;::h i~ is not the intentjon of 
this thesis to explore. There is some validity in the rest, but they 
do not affect the wider conclusions reached which relate to the reasons 
why the ABC adopted such a conservative news style, and the effect of 
such an approach. 
When one talks aboat the possibility of change or reform in 1\BC 
news, it is cOITlli!On to hc«r the view expressed that no change is possible 
because all that has happened to mould the service stems from the nature 
of the 1916 lcgislaticm itself. Hm>svcr, it cannot be claimed 
2·/. Sir Kc,bert Madg~;ick (ABC Cha.in1an, 1967-73]. Q'wtcd in Frank 
t.Joo1'house 1 "The ABC 1 s Search foi"" Idcntity11 , Current Affairs 
!l_L[l_~(>~i~, Vol.4b, No.lO (5 Octoloor 1970}, p.l5S. -----
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that the Act of 1946 was so definitive and restrictive that no other 
type of news service could have eventuated, and that therefore changes 
are difficult or impossible. the Commission policy of 1946.has been 
far more influential in shaping news C'Ontent than the legislation. 
The one restrictive effect of the Act has been the ban on other 
internal sources of news 1~ithin Australia. This has meant a drain on 
and a dispersal of resources so that the Commission is in a position 
to cover and be kept aware of news happenings. 1 t has had the result 
of prohibiting Commission use of the one agency service in Australia -
that of AAP from Canberra. There is still no Australia···Wide agency 
cover. Certainly the lack of an agency service, such as utilised by 
overseas broadcasting organisations has forced the Commission to engage 
more staff and spread them more l'lidely than other broadcasters have had 
to do. It means the Comnission has no immediate agency alert to 'spot' 
news of the unexpected kind, which the BBC, for example, has. 28 But 
the ABC , like the BBC, now is an established part of the ;r,cdia netHol·k 
in Australia. It is advised by all groups and organisations within the 
community of events in which they are concerned. It is on every press 
release list. It has 'roundsmen' who keep abreast of upcoming events 
in their specialist areas. This means that not only does it not have 
such a need for press or agency sources that it once had, but the lack 
of an agency service is no lon~r an excuse for its failure to be 
selective in the items it chooses to cover. lf it were more selective, 
items could be covered at greater length and in a more informational 
fashion. It could also lead to a reassessment of the thirty-three year 
old conception that only fifteen minute segments or less are suitable 
for news. The widespread coverage that the ABC embarked upon in 1946 
28. As a safeguard against missing unscheduled 'spot' news, ABC 
news staff anxiously scai~ eJclt edition of the J1ewspaper~,monitor 
comraercial l'adio bulletins c-:_nd -iisten tc the police waveband. 
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was not essentially related to the 1946 Act, as we have seen, but more 
to the role conceptions of ABC journalists. !here tvould, in the 
writer's view, be nothing to prevent paying more attention t:> the 
pre-scheduled and non-scheduled type of ne1vs items, thus causing 
beneficial changes in work patterns which are now geared heavily to 
the un-scheduled variety, with resultant shallowness and superficiality. 
Newspaper competition is no longer a real factor within the newsroom. 
This thesis has argued at two levels. On one hand, it has 
drawn attention to the reasons for, and the degree of, commitment to 
consensual values and hegemony. On the other, it has maintained that 
greater emphasis on 'professionalism' in the presentation of news, 
using the techniques of voice report particularly, would have lessened 
this attachment. It has been noted that in the BBC, for example, the 
collapse of Reithian values was brought about by the need the new breed 
of reporters felt for the exploration of new and previously unreported 
issues. Similarly Boyerism was undermined lJy the demand of the TV 
professionals to make more use of the filming fadlit:ies at their 
disposal. 
Yet it must be conceded that professionalism of the kind the ABC 
refused to countenance in the period to 1961 - the introduction of a 
more interpretive style of reporting, based on fewer items, greater 
selectivity, a less rigid interpretation of 'colllf.lent' and 'colour' -
could not in itself have brought any marked change in ABC support for 
hegemony. ABC journalists would still have been b:1sically wedded to 
their own establishment-oriented version of reality, in much the same 
way as the other media. The possibility of 'disturbing' the world 
view of the audience, by putting forward alternative versions of reality, 
thus offering opportunlties for opinion changing, would still, in the 
Australi::nl environment of the 1 fo;ties and 1 fifties~ have been slim. 
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What \-JC have tried to show is th~1t professionals, can, even 
though they are part of the consensual apparatus of the State, still 
stand bet~le2n the simple 'reflective' method of reporting, and the 
public, can interfere with simple consensual reproduction, and 
instead introduce differences in emphasis and can question central 
social concepts to varying degrees. As far as the ABC is concerned, 
it is simply argued that the professional news broadcaster and the more 
interpretive report could have simply lessened the undue attachment of 
the ABC to central consensualist ideas, by providing addi tiona! 'depth' 
to the simple statements emanating from approved institutional sources. 
Professionalism therefore is not 1:he sole answer to the problem 
of consensual attachment as it affects the AHC. The BBC is still 
accused of favouring the establishment to the d.3triment of minorities, 
despite its professionalism. Professionalism can at times insist that 
the broadcasting institution widen its perception of audience and 
insist on acting to meet audience needs, as did the ABC TV ne~1s staff 
in the early years of TV news. BEt on the other hand, as Burns points 
out, professionalism can also be inward looking and lead to a lack of 
appreciation of audience requirements, It can become a close.d artistic 
world. 
A new professionalism in both ABC radio ancl TV news is trying to 
bring changes to the pattern of consensual attachment. Radio newsmen 
are increasingly unhappy about t.he fact that radio news has changed 
so little in its approach to Australian coverage, 29 and in TV news 
there is unrest at th0 degree of control still exercised by radio nevrs 
vohich is heavily centered on 'traditional' ne~<s policy, 
29. OaKley says: "I suggest thaT even tod3y the radio news set up has 
not changed grcJtly (voice pieces excepted) from what Hamilton 
found on his arriv;od". Letter from C:tklcy, 20 July 1976, 
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Sigclman points out that commitment to an organisation's goals 
or to policy norms can be disrupted by emerging professionalism. This 
phenomenon calls for greater looseness in organisational structure. 
The professional holds dual cidzenship. He is to a 
greater or lesser extent cC>mmitted to the methods and 
goals of both his organisation and his profession. This 
dual:i ty presents a potent:ial for conflict which will be 
actualized when there is tension between organizational 
and professional standards.30 
Sigelman claims that professionals require greater autonomy of action, 
leaving organisation leaders in a quandary. 
But even if, for this reason, ABC policy control based on hegemony 
was weakened, and an 'in depth' approach to reporting in news became the 
norm, ABC might shake off some of its inherent and unique conservative 
tendencies, but would still be in th;; position faced by the BBC and 
other broadcasting organisations overseas - that of being accused of 
legitimising the system and of being elitist. In other words the major 
issues which have elicit·od calls for media reform because of declining 
credibility would still remain. 
The dangers of professionalism becoming inward-looking in the ABC 
would seem to be real. We have noted that the early impetus to the 
independent news service was the Commission's belief in the value it 
representee! to country people. The response showed this was a valid 
assumption. Later, however, under Hamilton, elitist reaction became 
predominantly important, and remains so to many executives to this day, 
despite the vague adherence of some news staff to populist ideas of 
audience. Feedback from the public is limited. 
Mayer has recently analysed the necessity and prospects for media 
reform in Australia, pointing out the important role of media controllers 
"ho: 
---------
30. Sigclman, "Keportj_ng the Ncc:s"r p.l4L 
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actively shape our image of wha·c we arc, what we might be 
and what the cost of achieving change might be. They shape 
our self-image, our relations with the mighty, and to the 
deprived, and increasingly our perception of what we need and 
what, in consumer terms, we just 'must' have.31 
He draws attention to "the citizens' or public right to information 
and to its effective transmission", 32 in similar terms to Nordenstreng. 
The path to reform be helievcs, is a two way process. It 
depends first on an increasingly obvious demand from the public for 
more information about how the media operates, not only asking why 
only one particular version of reality is made available, but asking 
who was responsible for the decision. He suggests that the public 
have a right to diverse and antagonistic in format ion. Secondly, he 
argues for the encouragement by the media of institutional feedback, 
with newsmen explaining more about themselves and their work, tl:us 
obtaining more consumer support. An allied development might be one 
in which journalists' attitude to their work and their image could 
alter and cause changes \vithin the media. Thus, a inor.:: i.nvostigati·/e 
approach could help win back support. These ideas are particularly 
relevant to the ABC ~<hich, Mayer believes, must have organised support 
if it is to become bolder. Professionals therefore must see the need 
for audience support and be aware of the reasons for public concern. 
There must be a joint professional/concerned audience approach to 
the preb !ems such as consensualism which is one of the main reasons for 
the declining credibility. 
Amonp, the higher cducat.cd at least. there has been a rapid 
decline in belief in both the possibility and desirability of 
'objectivity' and of 'getting the facts' and an increasing know-
ledge on the part of even those who \'Jish to sho:re up authorities 
that the-se lie and lie a lot. 33 
31. llenry Hayer, "What Should (and Could) \"/e Do about: the l•ledia", in 
G. ~Jajor (ecl..l, 1•\:lss Media .in i\ustralla (Hodder and Stoughton, 
Sydr.cy, 1976), p.l70. 
32. Mayer, nr,,tedia!'' ill Major (<,.i.), Mas_s_}~£~-~~' p. 183. Mayer's er:1phasi.s 
33. Mayer, "M<:"di a 11 , ln Major (<'d.). t.las s~c:_clia, p. 195. 
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Smith is also relevant here. He argues that the consensual 
values on •t~hich broadcasting institutions were based are now being 
increasingly questioned by their aud1ences. In the ABC's case, it is 
likely that some of these beliefs around which news policy centered in the 
'forties and 'fifties are no longer held by many politicians. Organised 
audience feedback and a growing institutional and professional 
recognition of the need to encourage this could have the twin virtues of 
causing the Commission to reappraise the survivalist guidelines for the 
news service and enable it to reach a new understanding with its 
journalists because of this. 
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APPENDIX A 
Occupants and official designations of heads 
of the ABC NeHs Service 
M.F. Dixon Federal Ne~<s Editor August 1936-Harch 1943 
~1. F. Dixon Chief Ne~<s Editor March 1943-November 1945 
*M.F. Dixon Federal. Director of News November 1945-1.1ay 1949 
* *L. C. Cotton National Ne~;s Editor April 1946-April 1949 
W. S. Hamil ton Editor-in-Chief August 1949-August 1959 
***W .s. Hamilton Controller, Ne~;s Services August 1959-July 1965 
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J.G.J. Oakley Controller, News Services October 1965-February 1968 
K. Fraser Controller, Ne~;s Services February 1968-January 1977 
R.G. Handley Controller, News Services February 1977-
*From Hay 1949, Dixon was given the post of Federal News Executive, 
a position ~;hich carried no editorial responsibility. He remained 
in this position until his retirement in May 1950. 
**From the date of Cotton's appointment as National Nc>~<S Editor, he 
and Dixon effectively shared control of the News Department:. 
Cotton took extended sick leave from January 1949 and did not 
return to the ABC. 
** In August 1959, the Ne~;s Department ~;as el.evated to Division status. 
Heads of Divisions are designated Controllers. 
639 
APPENDIX B 
Stunmary of Agrcc:nents for Supply of Australian News 
-------
Agreements and Disputes 
Agreement of 1.10.32 
l::!et\</een ti1e J:W: and ti1e ABC 
for 3 years. Rcsul ting from 
conference held 30.9.32. It 
applied to Sydney, ~lclboun1e and 
Brisbane only. Tne other States 
·to continue "as before". No one 
was clear \\'hat the arrangements 
\-iere "before". Apparently il' .A. 
could take anything from mon1ing 
press but could not broadcast it 
before midday. :~otidng from 
evening papers permitted 
before 1945. ~...,.Uccnsland fiad 
four sessions of 7 mins. each per 
day. S.A. had 5 mins in 
rorning, 10 mins. at midday, and 
5 mins. at night. Tasmania had 
three sessions of 10 mins each. 
T11is was the original "gentle-
man's agreement". It is unlike-
lv that some of the scheduled 
times were ever adhered to. 
1~'1!' years 1932-38 
The agreement was progressively 
and Wlilatcrally ..:l1anged by the 
J\BC in response to what it 
considered to be brcaci1es of the 
'agreement in respect of news 
supplied to the co11nnercial 
stations. No special step-by-
step record of these changes 
exist, but by 11.4.35 it is 
knovm the Schedule::> had been 
altered as in next col~~. 
On 1.10. 35 ABC began neh' national 
evening bulletin, in contra-
vention of tile agreement. A'JC 
opposed this strenuously. 
Following the breakdmm of talks 
with ti1e A\JC in Melbourne on 
3.10.35 the ,\BC continued its 
bulletins as at that time, 
excepting the early evening 
bulletin Hhich reverted to tne 
originally agreed time. ABC 
argued tb.at 1932 agreement had 
never been precise and tenms 
never fully agreed upon. 
ABC also argued: (i) Parlt. has 
recognised ABC's right to broad-
cast an adequate ncHs service; 
(ii) Newspaper service has not 
been satisfactory, particularly 
for country areas. 
(iii) Tnere are continuing 
breaches by commercial stations. 
The talks of 23,24 Jan.l936 
broke dmm over the question 
of the time of the early evC"n-"'" 
ing broadcast, tiu)Ugh tentative 
agreement was reached about 
other Sd1edule alterations. 
Schedule 
l. Not before 0750, S min.s. only 
f1·om morning papers. 
2. BctHeen 1000 and 1100. Repeat 
of previous bulletin. 5 mins. 
only (l3otil transmitters)-
3. Between 1300 and 1400. 5 mins. 
only, being additional news 
from morning papers 
4. Between 1950 and 2000. 5 m.i.ns. 
only from evening papers 
S. Bet\\.'een 2200 and 2230. Repeat 
of previous bulletin, 5 mins. 
only. 
Conditions 
:~o supplementai)' serv-
ices beyond "rcu!ine 
and sporting neh's'' 
Su1)rcme natural events 
can be broadcast 20 
Paym~ 
f.20Q p.a. 
times p. a. , not to include 
descript-ive events. 
.'Ia news to be supplied to 
commercial stations at 
hours or in qwmti tics 
\\.':ilici1 would gi vc them an 
advantage 
ABC Alterations to Sci1edule by 11.4.35 
!.Til-Sydney :--1Stl)"Unet~J1 bcgtns-r-
0709 (not 0750). 6 mins duration 
(not 5). 
2. In Sydney, 2nd bulletin begins 
0855 (not 1000). 
3. In ~telboume, 2nd bulletin 
begins 0901 (not 1000). 
4. First midday news in Helbourne 
begins 12!0 (not 1300) 
5. Second midday ne1.;s in Sydney 
at 1400 (instead of before 1400) 
6. Last nctvs begins in Sydney at 
2232 (instead of before 2230). 
7. First midday bulletin at 1300 in 
Sydney included neHs from even-
ing papers (not IHOrning papefS 
only as stipulated) .. 
Further 1\BC Alterations to Schedule 
as at 1.10.35 
1. First evening ne1;JS at 1930 approx. 
at end of o'seas bulletin begin-
ning 1915 (instead of 1950). 
1i1is news put back to 1953 from 
26.10.35. 
2. 2nd morning bulletin at 0755 
(cl1anged from 0~55). 
·<)I 
-Jl 
,-i 
I 
!,1 
:I 
:1 ~ 
The AgreC'J!K)nt_pf 1 Ju1v 1938 
Negotiations on hasis of Jan 
1936 talks continued sporadic-
ally until 1938. Then a new 
agreement was final.ly arrived 
at verbally but ncvt~r signed, 
The major points in it became 
effective from 1 July 1938. 
Agreement \'Y3S to be effective 
for 2 years. 
The Years 1938·39 
There was disagreement over 
ARC's right to collect its own 
nev.·s on Stmday evenings wh.en 
there were no papers. ABC 
continued to press for amend-
' mcnts allowing this. At this 
time ABC was broadcasting local 
news collected by itself on 
Sundays at 1850 and 2045 (to· 
gether with o' seas news from its 
own cable sources). 
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Sd!edu.1e V.'l'ckd:ws from Ju1v 1938 
-·--·----- --·---··-----· ---
Conditior.s 
-----
P2ymcnt 
l. Not bP.lorc 0CJ45. S mins. only, 
from moming papers 
H.cgionals to bro:1dcast f-200 p.a. 
1oca 1 Ill'hS not more 
2 At bo t 08, 0 5 · 1 than th·icc a day, tiYO . or a u · ·J • r.nns. on r, . . . 
t f . 1 ~ . b 11 t · r.unutcs manmlOll per Item. repea o ear .. cl u .. e 111. Exemptions are 
~- BctHeen 1030 and 1130. out not \Ycathcr, stock markets, 
before 1100 if possible. S mins. sporting events and events 
only. Repeat of earlier bull. Oi.- national in!portancc and 
4. Not before 1255, except /\delaidc ~ls~stc~~' _up to a 1~ximtun 
where not: before 1230 local time. ~Jf ·-5 . tlJ:lC:::> a ye:r' a.'1d 
Not more th.1n S mins. In :\S\\' descr~ptlvc ~ven ... s such as 
only. 2 mins. from ct.:rrent even- cl~~~:01~ 5 • /lr-r~ces' 
ing papers. balance from mornin~ we· 1 ' 1g~' tmcra 5 ' d 
. · proccs~~ wns, congresses an 
papers. other broadcJsts direct from 
S. Not before 1930. except Adelaide the 5pot. ABC to brcJdcast 
where not before 1900 locJl time. abo\·c as and when it sees fit. 
5 mins. only,from evening papers.Comncrcials stations subject 
6. Late evening bulletin at tjme 
deternined by ABC. 5 mins. only, 
repeatjng 1930 ne,.;s. Tr.smania 
·to tttk'3 ne,;s from ;.Jelbourne 
Scl1eJule Sundays 
l. Not before 0700 relayed all 
States, except those able 
to prepare neh'S from own 
local papc:rs. 
2. Not before 0900. Relayed all 
States. Repeat of earlier news. 
to n0 more advantageous 
conditions 
In Jan 1939 A'JC appeared to agree with 
tre contention that ABC should 
collect own news on Sundays, had 
the right to check newspaper 
items occasionally and to update 
items. 10e appointment of 
DeMing to Cailberra in May 1939 
upset the apparent agreement and 
caused newspapers to demand that 
ABC agree not to supplement the 
news. .<\BC became adamant that 
it needed this right. 
Agreement of 4.9.39 Changes to Schedule 7.9.39 
3.9.39 Agreement between ABC, 
Federation of Commercial Broad-
casting Stations, P~~·s Dept. and 
Army Headquarters. Commercials 
to relay two of the ABC's m£l.in 
bulletins. ABC acted in accord-
ance with Government's request. 
Newspapers protested at lack of 
consultation, particularly at 
ABC moving evening nc•.;s for.Nard 
thus breaching 'agreement'. 
Asrecment of 18.9.39 
Between ABC and ~\'C, Federation 
of Commercial Broadcasting 
Stations, P~·IG' s Dept. and Anny 
Headquarters. 
First evening news 1910,following 
BBC news (formerly 1930). 
From 14.9. 39, this session reverted 
to 1930. 
'Ibe sessions of ne\V"S at 0645, 1250, 
1900 and 2350 to be relayed to 
commercial stations on request. 
Changes to Schedule 25.9.39 
a. Additional mid-morning bulletin 
not before 1000 (repeat of 
earlier news) 5 mins. only. 
b. Additional midday bulletjn 1330. 
5 mins. only (same conditions as 
for 1230). 
c. ~Jain evening bulletin 1910. 
From evening papers and ABC 
Canberra office. 5 mins only. 
d, Additior.al late 'evening bulletin 
Fj rst not bcforc> 2200, repeating 
1910 11CI-.'S plus late C:inbcrra 
matedai. Second ::tfter 2300, 
same as above. Both 5 rnin:;,only. 
Conditions 
Goverrunent acting in 
accordance ,.,.ith National 
Security Regulations. 
Payment 
A.'lC agrees not to £200 p.a. 
press objection to ABC's 
Canberra rotmdsman. ABC 
agrees not to extend 
ne\\'S-gathcring activities 
by appointmcllt of addi t.ional 
news staff as •rounJsmen'. 
No more COliU1lCrcial relays. 
,, 
~ 
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The Years 1939-42 
ABC gave A""1C notice of termina-
tion of agreement on 12.4.40 but 
it \oJas exiendcd by mutual agree-
ment, month by month. Commission 
insisted that it should be free 
to supplement present services. 
ABC cited Ulls\,·ater Committee 
Report of 1936 (UK ) which said 
BBC should have freedom of 
choice in nevJs sources. 
On 17.12.4l.Govt. instructed 
ABC to alter midday bulletin 
tii"'"Cs. ANC was not consul ted, 
and prates ted. 
On 8.1.42 Govt. instructed ABC 
to select its ncw·s so as to 
eJmJhasise Australian national 
poiicy - that of attad1ing prime 
importance to the Pacific War. 
Criticism of domestic policies 
on national security to be 
restrained. Ministerial state-
ments to be given prominence. 
In line with thispolicy uvo BBC 
commentaries (following 1715 and 
2000 BBC bulletins) were ami ttcd 
because of their emphasis on 
European theatre and British 
national point of view. 
Boyer tells Govt. it will be 
necessary to supplement Canberra 
cover of Federal matters, by 
having additional rotmdsmen 
cover Federal stories in Sydney 
and Mclbcurne. l11ereafter ABC 
began to "supplement" its 
Canberra cover, in trans-
gression of 1939 agreement. 
Agreement of 11.2.42 Bet~~en 
AilC andl'eil0rat10n of Coffilrerc-
Ial Broadcast~ng Stahons. 
Conmercials to take 0745, 1230, 
and 1900 Australian news 
bulletins. Could take o'seas 
news as well if they desired. 
Operated from 16.2.42. 
Changes in Schedule 18.12.41 
a. First midday bulletin to total 
20 mins made up of: 
(i) 1230 o'seas nell's 
(ii) 1240 Canberra Statement 
(iii) 1245 Local news. 
b. Second middle bulletin to 
comprise: 
(i) 1330 o'5eas news 
(ii) 1340 Canberra Statement 
(iii) 1345 Local news. 
Botit o'seas and Canberra segments 
to be relayed. 
c. 1'-tajor evening bulletin to 
comprise: 
(i) 1900 o'seas news 
(ii) 1910 Canberra Statement 
(iii) 1915 Local news. 
Changes in Schedule as at 16.1.42 
Additional Canberra statements to 
be included in news at 0745 and 
2200. 
Canberra Statement at 1910 to be 
8 mins. in duration. 
Chanoes in Schedule 16.2.42 
Australian news to precede o 1 sea.s 
news services at 0745, 1230 and 190Q 
Full Schedule of Canberra bulletins 
from 16.2.42 (relayed and 
unrelaved) as follows: 
0745-0750 
1230-1235 
1330-1335 
1900-1908 
2215-2225 
Smdays 
OIOU-0708 
2215-2225 
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Commercials to get relayed 
ABC bulletins free of charge. 
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APPENDIX C 
Summary of Agreer:lents for Supply of Overseas News 
Agreem~nt of 1 July 1932 
Between the ABC and the Austral-
ian Press Association (APA) and 
the Sun-l!erald News Service for 
3 years. 
ANC was not a corporate body 
and this led to delays in 
signing the agreemen~. 
ABC at this time also took 
British Official Wireless 
(BOI~) news service, and the 
German Transocean ~ews. Both 
were free, but Amalgamated 
Wireless Limited (AI~A) was 
paid £470, as pickup costs 
for BO\\'. 
The Years 1932-38 
On 24 May 1935 ABC was advised 
that Australian Associated Press 
(MP) had noN been registered 
and would take over from Sun-
Herald and APA, their 
contractual obligations. This 
was done from 18 Sep~ember 1935. 
Original agreement continued in 
force after 30 June 1935, but 
still W1Signed. 
,from 1935 onwards ABC wanted 
more cable news. At some time 
late in that year (date unknown) 
the Government had denied it 
permission to use Transocean. 
In 1937 ABC began its own weekend 
cable service from London. 
By February 1938, AAP claimed 
ABC was using in each State 
approx. 700 "''Ords daily of AAP 
matter. 
AAP claimed that agreement was 
quite specific and meant o'seas 
news as printed. ABC was using 
15 ti mcs more than permitted. 
ABC claimed agreement referred 
to cabled words only which had 
to be "padded". 
Discussion in 1938 over new 
agreement mainly centred on 
question of price for more AAP 
wordage, and disagreement over 
length of certain bulletins. 
ABC now wanted access to proofs 
of AAP material as received, 
rather than take material from 
press, claiming some could be 
"suppressed" by newspapers . 
Schedule 
200 words daily in each State, 
being brief su:nmarie.s of most 
important cable news. 
There was no arrangement about 
umes of bulletins. 
Cable news was read at the same 
time as local news (See Appendix B) 
Broadcast Times by 1935 
From 1 October 1935 m~jor evening 
o'seas bulletin began at 1915, 
consisting of BOW and Transocean 
news only. 
As at October 1935, the following 
separa~e o'seas bulletins were 
programmed in Sydney. 
1. 0805-0810 BOW news 
2. 1000-1010 Transocean news 
3. 1305-1308 0 1 seas news ,all sources 
4. 1405-1408 O'seas news,a11 sources 
5. 1915-1925 O'seas ne,~·s,all sources 
(from 20 November 1935 
extended to 1930) 
6. 2237-2240 O'seas news,all sources 
In Melbourne, the schedule was as 
follows: 
1. 1005-1010 BOW news 
Conditions 
Not to be U5Cd until 
one hour a~ter public-
ation in the press.· 
There was no 
restriction on use of 
other overseas sources 
of news by ABC. 
2. 1915-1925 O'seas news, all sources 
3. 2220-2225 BON news 
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Payment 
£1,25! p.a 
Agreement of 7 September 1938 
Bet~<.•een ABC and AAP for 2 years 
as from 1 September 1938. This 
became effective but was never 
signed and there was some 
dispute as to the wording of 
this agreement. ABC insisted 
on including its o~n cable news 
and BOW news in Sunday evening 
broadcasts 
The Years 1938-39 
During the 1938 Munich crisis 
AAP allowed ABC to use 1200 words' 
of cable ne1-1s daily. 
ABC became concerned at the more 
frequent use of "special corres-
pondent" reports in press from 
o'seas, which were squeezing out 
some cable news. 
In August 1939 AAP advised that 
its agreement and that with ~~C 
could not be signed separately. 
They had to be signed together. 
AAP had claimed rights of pro~ 
hibiting BBC news rebroadcasts 
in Australia, because it held 
Australian rights to Reuters 
material they contained~ This 
became a big issue after outbreak' 
of war on 3 September 1939. AAP 
was notified that U.K. Govt. 
";anted it to permit BBC rebroad-
casts. AAP agreed to do so free 
of charge, for one week only. 
However it was extended for 
several weeks. 
Agreement of 4 September 1939 
At the conference between ABC, 
conunercial stations, PMG's Dept. 
and Army Headq~arters, a new 
schedule was drawn up for o' seas 
news broadcasts. AAP was not 
AgTeed Schedule - Weekdavs 
1. Not before 0645, 5 mins. only. 
2. Not before 0800, 10 mins. only; 
no additional AAP matter. 
3. Not before 1250. In Sydney only, 
not more than 3 mins. of new 
AAP matter. ~lay. be repeated 
between 1330 and 1400. 
4. Not before 1915, 5 mins. only. 
May be repeated twice, the 
first not before 2055. 
Schedule - Sundays 
5. Not before 0800, 5 mins. only. 
6. NOt before 1000, repeat of 
early session. 
7, Not before 1845. 5 mins only, 
repeat of early session. May 
be repeated not before 2030, 
and again not before 2200. 
Schedule of BBC rebroadcasts 
from 7 September 1939 
0645 BBC news, 15 mins. 
1615 sse news, undefined duration 
1900 BBC news, 10 mins. 
represented (see also Appendix B). 2130 BBC 10 · It was changed slightly after two news, mws. 
days due to protest~ by Hurdoch. BBC news could be included in other 
o'seas bulletins. 
The schedule was constantly being 
revised for several week. 
The sessions of news at 0645 and 
Conditions 
When there are happen-
ings of great import-
ance ABC can broadcast 
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Payment 
£2500 p.a. 
for average 
use of 600 
a brief statement, \\·ords daily 
sucn occasion's to be no of !\AP 
more than 24 times matter. The 
annually. AA.P news not words will 
to be given to any be the no. 
other station. of words 
. . broadcast AP not to g1ve 1ts . ? 
. 1n conveyu~g 
news to other stat1ons the intclli-
on more favourable terms f 
+ gcnce o an 
than those ~or A~C. . AAP mcssa e 
No more than 5 m1ns. 1n ~<.·hether 0; 
each session to be 
devoted to AAP matter. not the same 
words are 
used. Repeats 
not counted. 
AAP copy 
to be deliv-
ered by mes-
senger. AAP 
matter not 
,] 
to be used 
before 
publication. 
AAP resen•ed 
right to 
offer sen-ice 
to conunercial . 
stations. 
-. 1900 to be re 1 ayed on i-equest to 
commercial stations (see Appendix B) 
.. 
Agreement of 18 September 1~39 
Between ABC, commercial stations, 
~~C. AAP, Consolidated Press, 
PMG 1 s Dept and Army Headquarters, 
to reglllari.se arrangements of 
4 September 1939 with newspaper 
approval. AAP wanted to with-
draw its service from the ABC. 
ABC rejected this but \.\as forced tD 
accept fewer words for higher 
payment, in order to continue 
BBC rebroadcasts. 
The Years 1939-42 
Disputes began almost irr.mediate-
ly about the broadcasting of BBC 
bulletins in full. The schedule 
limited most BBC rebroadcasts to 
10 mins, thus cutting off the 
'last 5-15 mins. Comme:rcial 
stations began broadc~sting some 
in full and ABC fa 1101-I"Cd suit. 
ABC discontinued this following 
AAP protest, and assurance 
commercial stations would be 
brought into line. 
AAP intimated BBC bulletins 
could be broadcase in full if 
there was increased payment. 
AAP and ABC argued as to who was 
responsible fo~ truncated BBC 
broadcasts. ABC claimed BBC had 
right to permit Australian 
broadcasts, not AAP 
On 14 December 1939, Govt. took 
issue out of hands of ABC, in 
order to decide legality of 
situation. 
ABC wanted to end AAP agreement 
at this point, but Govt. would 
not permit this until situation 
clarified. ABC claimed it no 
longer r.eeded AAP. It wanted no 
further hampering restrictions, 
and wanted to broadcast news 
while it \';as fresh. In March 
1940, ABC v.:as .advised that the 
Govt. considered AAP had 
Australian rights to BBC 
bulletins . 
Rcvi.sed Schedule of !8 September 
1939 
Conditions 
No restriction on use 
1. Not before OMS. 10 mins. only. by ABC of own o•seas 
Rebroadcast of BBC,or items material. 
fron1 A.-'\P, Consolidated Press(CP) .,8C 200 HOW and ABC. , to use up to 
2. not before Oi45, 10 mins. 
Rebroadcast of first bulletin. 
3. Not before 1255, 5 mins. only. 
Repeat of AAP or CP material, 
plus additional BOW, BBC, ABC 
matter. 
4. Not before 1330, 5 mins. cnly. 
Same as for 1255. 
S. About 1615. about 10 mins. 
Rebroadcast of BBC news. Timing 
flexible. 
cables ;.;ords per day 
from AAP and CP. AAP 
cable flimsies to be 
made available at half 
hourly intervals, but 
cannot be broadcast 
until after publication. 
ABC can broadcast up to 
16 news flashes weekly, 
not more than 3 in ·one 
day. Can be used 
immediately or in first 
news session before 
6. Not before 1900, 10 mins only. publication. Commercial 
Rebroadcast of BBC news, or news station permitted to 
from AAP, BON, BBC and ABC. rebroadcast BBC in 
. accordance with ABC 
7. Not before ~200, 5 m~ns only.. schedules. AAP and CP 
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Payment 
£3000 p.a. 
Any news 
flashes to 
be paid 
for at 
same rate 
as for 
200 words. 
Source AAP tbut not new mater1al)t . f ABC' 
ABC BBC and BON. o get cop1e: o s own 
• cabled mater~al. 
8. After 2300, 5 mins. only. 
Same as for 2200. 
Alterations by ABC to Schedule 
26 September 1939 
9. BBC 1·ebroadcast in full at 
2130 (instead of 2200 for 5 mins.) 
10. BBC rebroadcast in full at 0745 
(instead of 10 mins.) 
At or abour 13 October, these sessions 
were reduced to the previously 
scheduled durations. 
Sche(luled BBC BulletliiS at 28 March 1940 
~ 
1. 0650 
2. 1615 
3. 2130 
The 0650 and 2130 bulletins ran to 
about 30 mins. on BBC Empire Service. 
ABC was limited to first '10 mins. 
1615 bulletin was always broadcast 
in full. 
. , 
Agreement of 15 March 1940 
BetWeen ABC and AAP, for right 
to rebroadcast BBC bulletins 
in full 
On 17 December 1941 Govt. 
instructed ABC to alter midday 
bulletin times (see Appendix B) 
Weckd3Y Schc.1ule nf !H.lC Dulletlns 
[!_om.l6~ril 19-0_I:i"1T in -fuTf) 
1. 0650 
2. 1615 
3. 2130 
4. 2315 
Sunday Schedule 
As for weekdays. 
From 5 May 1940, ABC also broadcast 
1800 BBC bulletin, ia line with 
conunercials. 
Change in Schedule 14 May 1940_ 
From 14 May 1940, ABC broadcast 
an additional o'seas news su~nary 
at lOSS for S mins. to also bring 
ABC into line ~·ith commercial 
stations. 
Co!'lditi_ons 
BBC bulletins to be 
broadcast in full. 
ABC free to supple-
ment BBC news with o~n 
cable service. AAP 
agreement of 1 July 
1938 terminated. 
AAP to provide ne~·s 
flashes of events of 
outstanding importance. 
Changes in Schedule 18 December 1941 
1. First midday bulletin to total 
20 mins made up of: 
(i) 1230 o'seas news 
(ii) 1240 Canberra statement 
(iii) 1245 local news 
2. Second midday bulletin to comprise: 
(i) 1330 o'seas news 
(ii) 1340 Canberra statement 
(iii) 1345 local news . 
645 
Payme•~ 
£3000 p.a. 
tOI•;ards 
cost of 
news in 
Bt!C bulle-
tins, half 
of which 
to be paid 
by 
commercial 
stations 
taking BBC 
broadcasts. 
:]111 
[ 
I 
l 
I 
~ 
APPENDiX D 
MULTIPLE I!>O:ERESTS I~ COMYEI\ClAL B!WA!>CASTING STATIONS.-!"' NOVEMBER, 
1935. 
Name. 
Amalgsma.W.d 
Wi.relcf'ls 
(A/aeia.) 
L>d. 
Melbourne 
Herald and 
asaociaWd 
publications 
St.aUoc. 
2.\Y Albury 
3BO BeoJ.igo 
•PM Port Morfleby 
"-TO Townsville 
4CA Cairns 
i 2GF GraCt.on 
1.2GN Goulbu.rn 
I 
2SM Sydney 
3HA liam.il'Loon 
1LA Launceston .. 
6PR Perth 
(;WK Wa-rwick 
3DB Melbourne 
4DK Brisbane 
'AK O•key 
(QY Gympie 
6AD Adelaido 
5Mt1 J\iurroy BIIidge 
5PI Port Pirie 
6ML Perth 
6KA Ka.ta.nning 
6MD MerrOOin 
01X Perth 
L~..... I Interet~. 
I 
Amalgamated Wire- 1' 
le~~:J (A/asir...) Ltd. 
AO\alga.IMted Wi..e-·
1 
1661:1 (A/a.eil}.), Lt.d. 
Holda licen~ 
HoiW liccn«~ 
Amalgamawd Wire-
less {Ajn.Bi9..) Ltd. 
Amn.lgamated \Vire· 
le99 {A/asia.) LW.. 
Amalga.ma.tf'd \\'ire-
lees (A/a.sia.) Ltd. 
Gr3.fton Broadcast-
ing Co. LU1. 
Goulburn llro~;~.dca.at­
ing Co. Ltd. 
C&.tholic Bros.deut .. 
ing Co. Ltd. 
W ~tern Province 
Radio Pty. Ltd. 
Findll'.y and Wills 
Pt~v. Ltd. 
Nichobon'e Ltd. 
W a.rwick. Broadca.st. 
ing Co. Pty. Ltd. 
3DB Broadco.sting 
Station l't.y. Ltd. 
Brisbane Broadcast--
ing Pty. Ltd. 
Brisbane Broa.dC'ast-
ing Pty. Ltd. 
Brisbane Broa.dca.at-
ing Pty. Ltd. 
Adt:erli&er News-
paper& Ltd. 
Murroy Bridge 
Broo.de.aoting Co. 
Ltd. 
M.idlu.n& Eroe.d-
ca.&ting Co. Ltd. 
West Aust~alian 
Broadco.stors Ltd. 
West AustrJ.linn 
Broa.dcMWre Ltd. 
West Australian 
Eroa.dcustcrs Ltd. 
W'E'At Au.~t.rl\li~>n 
Kcwspapcrs Ltd. 
H~lda licerr.c-: 
HoldB lk-ence 
LicenM approved, but not yet ilsaaed 
Holda ahares in liceoaNl company 
Nominal capit&l-£4,000 (£1 8ha.ros}-
l,O'JIJ sh11.rea Wued, of which A:naJga.-
mal•·•l Wireleda (A./&Aia..) Ltd., or nomi-
nees hotJ J{to. l!(·g-i.,t.:rt·J ot!icP- i"' in 
Ama.l~amat.ed WireleBS (Ajo.aia..) Ltd. 
s~~~daey odice 
Nominal c&pita.l £15,000 (£1 ahruu}-
1..,812 ah~:es issued of which Arn.aiga-
mr..tu\ Wirel!lSS (A/asia..) Lt.d. bo!ds 300, 
and con.:iucta technical Berticea 
Nomina.! capital £10,000 (£1 aharos)-
4,9;)2 sha.res issued of which Am&l.ga. 
mawd Wift'lMII (A/a.t'lia..) Ltd., hold tOO. 
E. 'f. Fin ia one of four diroot.on 
Not,ninal ":llPital £6,000 {£1 shan.'S)-1.000 
&nares wlWd. Amalgamated Wirel61Js 
{A/a.ais..) Ltd. hold 50() of tLeso &.c.d a !so 
ha. ve nominal holding of Z .~0 of 
remaining 5,000. Amalgamated Wire. 
le83 (A/asia.) Ltd. opera.tos station for 
£800 per annum. E. T. :Fisk is one of 
four dircct.ora 
Amalgamated Wireless (A/asia.) Ud. 
oper .. te station at Perth Radio for £50 
per week, plllil 20 per cf'nt. '\'"a.lue of 
advertising secured by Arnalgam.awd 
Wireless (A/asia..) Ltd. agents 
Shn.reholding details not yet. availc.ble, but 
~lanat;er-Announcer is .o\rr4nli;a.mat-<.'d 
Wirele...'<& {A/asia.) Ltd. appointeo 
Xominal capital £20,000-Tho Herald or 
it.& nominoo holda all isliu~ i:iha.fba 
(£5,300) 
Nominal capital £5,000 (£1 sban.'6)-
Que-3nsla.Dd NewspaperB Ltd. (Coun:er-
Mail) or its nominees hold l,bO!! of 
2,103 it3ued &ha.ro3. Diran.ora :-N. 
'White, Managing Director, QuN•nsland 
Ne~·srapers Ltd., R. T. Fo~t'-'r, Llitor 
•nd E. H. Macartney, &,licitor. 
Actual Herold interest in Quc<'nsland 
~ewspa.pera Ltd. not known 
Sote.-Licence approved fur Gym pit', hut 
_ not grnnt.ed 
Herald b~ 113,200 preference &.nd 13(•.000 
ordinary shares in Ad~·ertiBer .Nt~wa. 
papers Ltd. L. Dumas is ::Uana.gmg 
Director 
Nominal capita.l-£5,000 (£1 shaml). All 
iasued shares ( 400) aro held by na!nimff 
of Adrer!iur Newspape1s Ltd. 
Nomi.~al capita.l-£~,000 (£1 share:<~). All 
issued sharea (820) held by Adt'er!~.t~ 
Xewspapers Ltd. or nomiot'(\8 
Capital £12,()(,0 in £I shares of whkh fl,!JW 
h10ld bY \Vest Australian l"ewapapN"I 
Ltd .. 
Capital £12,000 in £1 sha'!'f'5 ofwhkh ;.,m 
ht:ld by West Australian Nev;·!!.i-Japf'rt 
Ltd.-Lirencc not Yet i.;sued 
Capital £12,000 in £1 ~har.:s of which 5,ro9 
hdd by West Austral.ia.n ?\ew:lp'l.J'f"•'11 
Ltd.-Licence not yet isauetl . 
Altbou:!h licence is held by VteBt Au~trah.an 
;.;-ewspapei"J it is understood th~· ~t.-:~uun 
is oWned b~ W eat Aust.ralian .U!1)s...i· 
cut.crs Lt.d. 
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Name, 
4BC Briaba.ue-
4Bll BrUbn.Lul 
I 
I 
'GR Toownomba. .. 1 
Findlay• Pty. 
Ltd. 
4MB Ma.ryborough 
4RO Rockbampton 
7 DU Burnie 
7HC Hobart 
7LA La.unCMt.on 
Allan and Co. I 3AW Melbounte 
Pty. Ltd. 
3HA Ha.miltoo 
The .Agt 3liA Hamilton 
3A W Melbourne 
Ne•· Sunra.\·· \ 3l1A )[ildur& 
aia. Da.ily 
Pty. Ltd. 
3HS Roraha.m 
G. F. Palmer 
1
1 3AK Melbourne 
and W. 
Harrieon 1 
7UV l.l'lverat.one 
Saverya J 5DN Adelaide 
Piano!' Pty. 
Ltd. 
'WAtchtower 
Bible So-
ciety 
Thf>osophical 
Bron.dcast· 
!ng Station 
Ltd. 
Country 
Broadcast-
ing SerYices 
Ltd. 
Northern 
Broad-
casters Ltd. 
SRM Renmark 
2HD KewcAstle 
5KA Adelaide 
2GB Sydney 
~ 5DN Adelaide 
2GZ Orange 
2::\Z N:~.rra.bri 
2AD Armidale 
2LV In.,erell 
L1eenue. 
J. B. Chandler & Co. 
Bror>.dca.9tGr& (Auat.) 
Ltd. 
Gold Ra.dio s~rvice 
Pty. Ltd. 
Mo.ry'borougb Broad-
ca.stiog Co. Ltd. 
Rackha.mpton 
Bro&dcAAting 
Ltd. 
Co. 
Find!aye Pty. Ltd. 
Commf':rcial Broa.d-
castera Pty. Ltd. 
Findlay and Wills 
Broadcaetora Pty. 
Ltd. 
Tl:.e V cgue Broad-
eaaLing Co. Pty. 
Ltd. 
Wf".stem Frovince 
Radio Pty. Ltd. 
Western Province 
Radio Pty. Ltd. 
The Vogue Broad· 
casting Co. Pty. 
Ltd. 
Sunraysia. Broa.d-
caaten Pty. Ltd. 
Wimmora. Bron.d-
CMting Co. Pty. 
Ltd. 
Melbourne Broad-
ca.stera Pty. I.td. 
NorLhern Tasmanian 
Broa.dcaatf"rs Pty. 
I.td. 
Humo Broadca~tera 
Pty. Ltd. 
River Murrav Broad-
casters Ltd. 
Airsales Broadcast-
ing Co. 
Sport Radio Broad-
casting Co. 
Theosophical Broad· 
castil11; Station 
H ume Broadca.stf'n 
Ltd. 
Country Broadca.~~t· 
ing Scn·ices Ltd. 
Countr• Bro~dra~t­
ing s'erviCC!'I Ltd. 
Northern llroad-
castcril Ltd. 
Northern Broad-
casters Ltd. 
Source: CP~, 3 December 1935. 
Interest. 
Holilil licence 
Nomiu<l.i capit.a.l £!5,000 (£1 ah~~ol"'il! 
Chandler o.nd nom.inuca hold a!: ( l,O{•Ot 
ordinary shares. r.nd .'500 p:-"f"r··n~"~'~ 
shares. J. B. Chrmdkr i::J a d.Jre,tor 
::-;omina.l capital £!i,OVO (£1 ~!:.•ro-~.1 -­
. Chandler and nomin>::-<:S hold 73!; (>f I.!/1(\ 
shs.rea issued. ,J. B. Ch!i.ndl~r a • 
director 
Xomina.l capita.l £5,000 (£1 a:-,~~., .•. _ 
Chandler nnd norr.inees h.;J.l so:, of t,oon 
i£sued shares. J. _B. Cbandkr 111 • 
director 
Xomir.al enpit:l.-1 £10,000. Chs.nd\•·r and 
nominoos bold ali issufAl sb!U't>l1 (2,000) 
Licence held 
Nominll-1 capital £5,000 (£1 eha.rea). 
.Fin ilia. \'S bold 279 of 800 issued share& 
Nominal· ca.pit&l £6,000 (£1 eha.res). 
Fin.iia:n hold ~50 of 1,000 i83ued s!J.s.res, 
and 1.~50 nominA.ll.Y of rema.ining 5,000 
Kominal CAptt.."\1 £10,000 (£1 eharea). 
Alla.n and Co. hold 2.000 of 6,000 iMaued 
aha rea 
Nomin!il capttal £10,000 (!1 aha.ro~~). 
Alb.n's hold 400 of 4.952 sb'l.re& 
!';ominal ('zrita.l £10,000 (£i ai.&T'flll). .4gt 
group {~ymes) hold 1,750 of 4,95!! issued 
sba.res 
!'ominal Cl'\!lita.l £10,000 {£1 Rhnrea). .Age 
&roup (Symes) bold !?,000 of 6,000 issued 
ah~;.rea 
Xom;nal capital £9,1)4')0 (£1 shares). AU 
issued ehares (500 ordinary and .500 
preferentf') hdd by New Sunra.yaia. 
Daily 11 ~;>. Ltd. or nor.::tincca 
Nominal o;>it.al £.3,000 (£1 share-B). New 
Sunray~ia. Daily Pt.y. Ltd. holds 935 of 
1,248 ismed shares 
Nominal capital £2,000 (£1 shares). 
Palmer and Harrison ellch holds 1,000 
of 2,()(• t issued ahare3 
Nominal capital £2,000 (£1 abaf{l8), 
Palmer :md llarrison each holda 1,000 
of 2,000 ia.med ahares. 
Xominal capital £~0,000 (£1 sha.roo). 
Sanrv~ hold 5,405 of 12,405 issued 
shareS 
Norni.no.l cs.pital £10,000 (£1 shares). 
Sanns hold 500 of 4,7:::0 issued shares 
All issu~J sh3.rcs held by members of 
Societv 
All issueJ aha.rca held by members of 
Societ., 
Holds li~cn!'9 
Nominal capital £20,000 (£1 shares). 
Theosorhica.l Broadcasting Station Ltd. 
and A . .!:cnnett hold 7,000 of 12,405 
issued sl..arca 
Holds lict!nce 
Approval panted for issue of licence 
Appro..al ~nt.ed for issue of licence to 
Com pan~· to be formcd 
Appronl granted for issue of licence to 
Company to be formed 
D4 7 
,, 
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APPENDIX E 
Three Possible News-Obtaining Schemes Suggested by Dixon to ~loses 
18 February 1936 
In my opinion there are three courses open to the Commission in 
improving its news services. I will deal briefly with each one: 
(l) Depend on the daily newspapers as at present for the bulk of the 
local, interstate and cable news, and supplement the local service in 
each capital city, where it was deemed necessary, by appointing a News 
Editor who would organise the collection of news from recognised 
sources such as government departments, weather bureau, police, etc. 
There would be a limit to the amount of additional news that could be 
collected in this way, but a "live" man could effect an appreciable 
imp<rovement in the present volume of news available from the metropoli-
tan papers, and there would be no restriction on the time of broadcasting 
such news. The Commission has so many thousands of listeners behind it 
that there should be no difficulty in securing the co-operation of the 
departments mentioned, in making news available at least as soon as it is 
released to the daily newspapers. The cost of this scheme would be small, 
and the Commission might consider undertaking it, with a view to working 
up its own extended service a year or two hence. 
(2) Employ a News Editor and two or three experienced journalists in 
Sydney, Melbourne and any other capital city it was desired to cover, 
and collect the maximum amount of news possible, for broadcasting at 
specified times. The city and suburbs could be covered fairly well by 
telephone, but there would be no country coverage. To provide this it 
would be necessary to arrange for members of the staffs of newspapers 
in practically all country centres to telegraph direct to the News 
Editor any important items of news immediately they became available. 
This news would have to be paid for on a basis to be arranged, and there 
would also be the telegraphic charges to meet. I presume the Postmaster 
General would agree to transmit such messages at ordinary press rates. 
The cost of No.2 scheme would be considerably greater than No. 1. 
(3) Appoint a News Editor and arrange to buy a service of city, country 
and interstate news from a recognised news agency such as Austral ian 
United Press, assuming it is willing to sell such a service at a 
reasonable price and without restriction as to the time when the news 
could be broadcast. At least one other journalist would be required in 
addition to the News Editor, to ensure that the news, which is flowing in 
during the greater part of the day and night, is prepared for broadcasting 
without undue delay. I am of opinion that if No.3 scheme were undertaken 
it would give the maximum amount of satisfaction at a limited cost. I 
assume, of course, that the News Agency would be willing to sell its service 
at a reasonable price. In that event a greater coverage would be assured 
than the Commission could hope for unless it employed a large staff of 
reporters, and the cost should be a great deal less. As an example, the 
"Daily ~lercury" gets a very much better cover of news than it could hope 
for even if it maintained, say, three reporters in Sydney, but the cost is 
less than the cost of ONE reporter. It would be better for the Commission 
to pay £1000 per annum to a News Agenc:y than maintain three additional 
reporters, whereas it would cost that amount to employ two experienced 
news gatherers in Sydney. _, 
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The cable news is largely a matter of policy for the Commission. 
I am not in a position to say what services are available outside of 
Australian Associated Press, but I have no doubt that if the 
Co1nmission is prepared to pay the cost of an independent service, one 
could be arranged. It might be that if an arrangement :;ere made with 
Australian United Press for a service of Australian news, that 
organisation would be willing to co-operate in arranging an independent 
cable service. Confidentially, I can say that all our papers are 
dissatisfied with the existing service (A.A.P.) and A.U.P. is seriously 
considering arranging its o1m service. 
(Signed) M.F. Dixon 
Maitland Daily Mercury 
APPENDIX F 
First Release of News In ARC Broa<lcasts 
(20 August 1941) 
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The following list mentions some of th(O "first releases" of important 
Australian and OvPrseas news through the Commission's service, in 
1940-1941. It is contained in memo from Dixon to Bearup, 20 August 1941, 
SP286, Bundle 6, 
1940 
11 January 
31 " 
7 February 
23 " 
2 March 
3 " 
7 " 
8 " 
14 " 
20 " 
23 " 
26 April 
27 " 
28 " 
29 " 
2 May 
7 " 
8 " 
9 II 
20 II 
AUSTRALIAN NEWS 
Finding of Flying Doctor near Cloncurry. 
Announcement by Prime Hinistcr of proposed production of 
cars in Australia. 
Name of Rhodes Scholar for 1940 
Resignation of Minister for Customs (Mr La~;son). 
Corio by-election progress results. 
Death of Lieutenant-General Squires in Melbourne. 
Satisfactory basis for Coalition Ministry agreed upon. 
Death of Archbishop Kelly. 
Names of members of ne~; Common~;ealth Ministry. 
Statement re coal strike. 
Statement re coal strike. 
Statement re coal strike. 
Statement re coal strike. 
Statement re coal strike. 
Statement by Mr McE~;en re Nor~;ay campaign. 
Result of conference of mining unions. 
Result of miners' meeting. 
Result of miners' voting. 
Restrictions on gas and electricity. 
Restrictions on gas and electricity. 
31 " Passing of Motor Car Bill. 
7 August 
10 
13 
20 
29 
II 
II 
II 
II 
Details of ~;ater restrictions. 
Tamworth by-election progress results. 
Air disaster at Canberra, in which 10 people were killed, 
with statements by Prime Minister and Mr Curtin. 
Announcement of date of Federal Elections. 
Mr Justice Evatt's resignation from Bench to contest 
Parliamentary seat. 
7 September 
29 " 
14 " 
26 " 
29 " 
30 " 
7 October 
8 
" 
14 
" 
15 " 
21 " 
22 " 
23 " 
27 " 
28 " 
3 November 
9 " 
12 " 
16 " 
21 " 
21 " 
25 " 
27 " 
5 December 
14 " 
17 " 
18 " 
1941 
4 January 
4 " 
16 " 
28 
" 
29 " 
" 
Full 1 i£.t of nominations for Federal Elections. 
Croydon by-election progress results. 
Ryde by-election progress results. 
Arrival Australian air trainees in Canada. 
Crash of two R.A.A.F. planes near Albury. 
Full coverage of announcement by Prime Minister of 
conference between Party leaders. 
Statements following above conference. 
Names of delegates to represent Australia at Delhi 
Conference. 
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Messrs. Curtin and Forde re-elected Leader and Deputy 
Leader respective of Federal Labour Party, Canberra. 
Names of new Executive of Party. 
Important resolutions carried by Federal Labour Party. 
Progress of negotiations at Canberra for formation of 
National Government. 
Formation National War Council. Composition of same 
and brief statements. 
Appointment Major-General H.D. Wynter to Command of 
9th Division of A.I.F. 
Names of new Cabinet members. 
Personnel of new War Cabinet. 
Landing of British troops in Greece. 
Loss of American ship off Victorian coast. 
Import ban. 
Progress results Barwon and Kalgoorlie by-elections. 
Sinking of minesweeper off Victorian coast. 
Summary of Federal Budget. 
Prime Minister's denial Australian troops in Greece. 
Details of new Federal taxation plan. 
Sinking of two ships off Australian coast by enemy raider. 
Settlement of crisis re Federal Budget. 
Extension of term of ABC Commissioners to 30 June. 
Australian forces in action in Middle East. 
Settlement of coal strike. 
Entrance of Australians into Bardia. 
Air Force accident at Narrandera. 
Ban on Jehovah's Witnesses. 
Arrival of Australian air trainees in Canada. 
Appointment of Mr S. ~ McGibbon as Commonwealth Business and 
Financial representative abroad. 
3 February 
10 March 
31 " 
7 April 
14 " 
1 May 
2 " 
6 July 
15 
15 
1940 
" 
" 
6 January 
17 February 
13 March 
20 " 
9 April 
9 May 
10 " 
17 June 
19 " 
16 October 
16 " 
28 " 
3 November 
12 December 
Arriv:>l of Australian Prime Minister in Middle East. 
Resignation of Admiral Sir Ragnar Colvin from 
Australian Naval Board. 
Handing over of Dutch hospital ship to Australia. 
Gasworks stopwork meeting and subsequent strike. 
State elections to be held 10 May. 
Identity of Australian troops in Greece. 
Completion of withdrawal of troops from Greece. 
Appointment of Sir Frederic Eggleston as Australian 
Minister to China. 
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Name of new Chinese Minister, Dr Hsu-Mo, to Australia. 
Statement by Prime Minister regarding abolition of petrol 
cartel and taking control of petrol stocks and 
importation by Cormnonwealth Government. 
* * * * * 
OVERSEAS NEWS 
Resignation of Mr Hore-Belisha and Lord Macmillan from 
Cabinet 
"Al tmark" incident. 
Finland's agreement to Russia's peace terms. 
Resignation of Daladier Government in France. 
Germany's invasion of Denmark. 
Result of House of Commons voting in which Government 
won by 281 to 200. 
Germany's invasion of Holland (not broadcast until 
next BBC session) 
Resignation of French Government. 
Sinking of "Niagara". 
British ship "Ajax's" sinking of three Italian destroyers 
(not broadcast until next BBC session) 
Further details received and full story given in our 
7.45 a.m. session. 
Italy's ultimatum to Greece (not broadcast until next 
BBC session) 
Landing of Australian troops in Greece. 
Capture of "Side Barrani" (not broadcast until next BBC 
session). Dealt with at length in our 7.45 a.m. session. 
r 
ii!UJ'<IMQ-- --~- .. -·-· "---· •" 
1941 
22 January 
4 April 
6 " 
13 May 
25 " 
19 June 
22 " 
' 
Fall of Tubruk. 
Withdrawal of British forces from Benghazi. 
Outbreak of war between Germany and Yugoslavia. 
Hess's landing in Scotiand. 
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Sinking of H.M.A.S. "Hood" (not broadcast until next 
BBC session) . 
Pact between Germany and Turkey. 
War between Germany and Russia. 
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APPENDIX G 
OBJECTIVES OF T!IE ANC, 23 JANUARY 1936 
Quoted in McCay, Evidence, Gibson Committee, 20 October 1941, p.307 
1. Not denying nor opposing the Commission's right to broadcast a 
service of news. Affirming that such ·a denial or opposition has never 
been expressed or implied. 
2. Recognizing particularly the needs of listeners in remote or 
inaccessible regions. 
3. Prepared to restore the friendly relations and practical working 
arrangement with the Commission which existed for years up to 
October last. 
4. Not abating their astonishment and resentment caused by the 
unfounded statements in the Commission's ultimatum of 12th November, 
but prepared to sink that aspect in the public interest. 
5. Maintaining the right of the newspapers to control the 
dissemination of the news gathered by their m·m far-reaching and 
costly organizatjons. 
6. Determined the resist the broadcasting of their property - i.e., 
the newspapers' news - at times and in ways unfair and injurious to 
their legitimate rights. 
7. Remembering that even up to the conversation at the Commission's 
rooms in ~lelbourne on 3rd October, the Commission had expressed 
satisfaction with the news service except as to certain times for 
broadcasting. 
8. Re-affirming that no agreement was reached at that meeting nor 
during subsequent discussions by representatives of the respective 
organizations, and that no interstate newspaper delegates returned 
home.satisfied that agreement had been reached. 
9. Repudiating as baseless and unjustifiable any suggestions of 
monopolistic objectives. 
10. Ready to apply all possible checks and controls to B class 
broadcasting, but not to accept impossible responsibilities. 
11. Rejecting unworthy suggestions of bad faith in the newspapers' 
repeated offers to confer. 
12. Willingness to pass over many pin-points of controversy rather 
than provoke further acrimony by quashing them. 
13. Reserving absolutely the right of the press to comment on the 
conduct of all pub lie utili ties, and declining to allow resentments 
felt by members of the Commission against criticism to be factors in 
determining matters of broad national policy. 
14. Desiring without reserve, except as to vital principles, to discuss 
and adjust details in a spirit of honest friendship towards the great 
national implement of broadcasting_ 
., ... 
APPENDIX H 
WINKLER~ "STUNT" 
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Memo from Warren Denning (Federal Parliamentary Correspondent,of the ABC, 
Press Gallery, Parliament House, Canberra) 
to Mr Dixon. (dated 27 August 1941) - in SP286, BW1dle 6. 
Last night there 11as a considerable amount of manoeuvring inside the 
Government as a result of the political position that had developed 
during the past few days. 
The possibility seriously developed of Mr Menzies being asked to 
resign the Prime Ministership in favor of another UAP or a Country 
Party Prime Minister, in the cxp<?ctr.tion that another such Prime Minister 
would be acceptable to the Labor <'arty and a·;ert the threatening crisis. 
The pro-Menziesi tes were very busy trying to establish the fact that the 
Labor Party wanted the Government out of office and was not prepared to 
support any (non-Labor) Prime ~1inister. 
From the viewpoint of immediate politics within the Cabinet, the effect 
of establishing this viewpoint would have been to weaken any move to 
displace Mr Menzies. 
Shortly before 9.30 p.m. Mr J. Winkler, who was acting as the Prime 
Minister's publicity officer in the temporary absence of Mr Dawson, came 
to me and said he wanted me to work a "stunt"; that I should broadcast 
a story saying the Labor Party would not support any non-Labor Prime 
Minister; the idea being that Mr Menzies would contrive to have 
Ministers "innocently" gathered around the wireless in his room, and 
possibly be influenced by this public indication of the Labor Party's 
attitude. 
I told Mr Winkler that apart from any other consideration, we had just 
missed one news session, and there would not be another until 11.15. 
Then he suggested that 11e should put a special news session on the air 
at ten o'clock containing this story. 
I told him I did not think there was the slightest possibility of our 
being able to do this, for purely mech~~ical reasons apart altogether 
from other considerations. 
However, as the matter was potentially a difficult one, I thought I 
should telephone and consult you, which I did, and wherein you confirmed 
for me that we would not do such a thing. 
I consequently informed Mr Winkler that we could not arrange a special 
news session. 
However, in the course of these discussions, I could not overlook the 
fact that important ne1vs had been conveyed to me which, if properly 
confirmed and substantiated, was of a character that our listeners were 
entitled to know. 
I had been shown by Mr Winkler the notes of an interview which he had 
just had with Mr Curtin at Mr Menzies 1 behest, and in which Mr Curtin 
said categorically that the Labor Party Nould not support any other 
non-Labor Prime Minister. 
So that I might have entirely independent corroboration, I then 
interviewed the deputy leader of the L.abor Party, Mr Forde, ,;ho did 
in fact confirm the Labor Party 1 s refusal to make Mr Menzies the 
scapegoat. Mr Forde is the "Labor member" referred to in the i tern 
attached. 
I considered that the information which had come to me in the course 
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of these talks should be used, and for 11.15 I wrvte a r.ational item the 
text of which is attached. 
In fact the Cabinet meeting had adjourned for the night before this item 
was used, and it could have had no influence on the immediate Cabinet 
position. 
(Signed) Warren Denning 
Ps. It should be clear that Winkler was the intermediary throughout 
and that I had no direct contact with Mr Menzies on this 
particular matter. 
E~tract from 11.15 p.m. News - 26/8/41 
The Cor.Irnission' s Federal Roundsman reports from Canberra that the 
political position is still in a state of high tension fol101dng 
the Labor Party's rejection of the Prime Minister's proposal 
for an all-Party Government. 
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In rejecting the proposal and asking Mr Menzies to resign his Commission, 
the Labor Party has passed the responsibility back to Mr Menzies of 
deciding the next move. Cabinet sat again to-night, but there is no 
indication that a solution of the political problem has been found. It 
is generally assumed, however, that at least the Government will refuse 
the Labor request for the Government's resignation. 
Some efforts are being made to-night to induce Mr Menzies to resign 
from the Prime Ministership. These are based on the belief that the 
Labor Party would be prepared to see the present Government carry on if 
there were another Prime Minister. 
The Roundsman says, however, that Labor spokesmen indicated to-night 
that their objection is to the Government as a whole, and that they are 
no more prepared to support a Government lli,der another Prime Minister 
than the present Government under Mr Menzies. One Labor member said 
the Labor Party had no desire to make Mr Menzies the scapegoat in this 
difficult Parliamentary situation. 
There is no authoritative indication to-night of what course the Labor 
Party will take if the Government refuses to resign. Some Labor members 
think there should be an immediate move in the House, but the concensus(sic.) 
of opinion seems to be in the direction of withholding a serious 
challenge until the Budget is brought down. 
APPENDIX I 
THE SPENDER/WARD/FADDEN AFFAIR 
Memo From M.F. Dixon 
To: The Acting General Manager 
Dated 2nd February 1942. 
WEEK-END HAPPENINGS: 
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Here is a summary of what happened over the week-end concerning our 
broadcasting of statements issued by Messrs Ward, Cameron, Spender, 
Menzies, Fadden and Ashley. 
About 9. 45 on Saturday night Mr Hamil ton telephoned me from Canberra 
to say that he had received from Melbourne statements issued by Mr Ward, 
replying to Me Spender, and Senator Cameron, replying to Mr Menzies. 
(Mr Spender's statement had appeared in the press on Friday and Mr 
Menzies' statement had been made in a commercial broadcast on Friday 
night. We did not use either statement.) Mr Hamilton read both 
statements to me. Mr Ward's statement was very strong. Hamilton 
said that Denning had told him that the statements had been issued 
earlier in the day and that Dr Evatt was inclined to be annoyed when 
we did not use them in the 7.10 p.m. Canberra session. Evatt then 
insisted on them being used at 10.15. I told Hamilton that in the 
circumstances he had no option but to use them. I told him to use 
them unless he heard from me to the contrary before 10.15. I then 
telephoned the Chairman of the Commission (Mr Cleary) but \Vas told 
that he \Vas not available. I then telephoned Mr Holman and told him of 
the circumstances. He agreed IVi th me that 1ve had no option but to use 
the statements. Accordingly they were used at 10.15 p.m. Hamilton 
then telephoned Mr Spender and asked him if he wished to reply. Spender 
thanked Hamilton for his courtesy, said he had heard the broadcast and 
intended to reply to it immediately. Spender then sent the reply to 
our neiVs room at Market Street and a feiV lines were used in the State 
session at 11.20 p.m. 
Shortly after 6. 30 on Sunday morning, Mr McGill (who is doing our 
Australian news) telephoned me to ask ~Vhat he should do with Spender's 
statement. He said it was a very strong reply to Mr Ward. He said he 
had not up till then referred it to the Censor. I told him to refer it 
to the Censor at once and unless he heard from me to the contrary, to 
use it in the first session, provided the Censor agreed. I then 
telephoned Mr Holman and told him of ~Vhat had happened. I asked him to 
get Mr Boyer to listen to the first session and then make a decision as 
to IVhether the i tern should be rebroadcast at 9.10 a.m. A few minutes 
later Mr McGill telephoned me to say that the Censor (Mr White) had 
said that he wished to refer the i tern to the State Publicity Censor 
(Mr Rorke) and therefore asked if it could be held out of the first 
session. This was done. In the meantime Mr Holman took a copy of the 
item on the telephone and read it to Mr Boyer. Mr Boyer then telephoned 
me and said he thought the responsibility for the item should be placed 
on Canberra. He recommended, therefore, that I telephone Mr Denning in 
Melbourne and get a decision from him. I then asked Mr McGill to 
telephone Mr Denning and ask him IVhether or not the Government wished us 
to use Spender's statement. McGill told me at this time that the 
Censor had passed the statement. Shortly before 9 o'clock McGill 
telephoned to say that he had spoken to Denning and Denning urged that 
the statement should be used. He (Denning) had told Evatt the previous 
night that Ward's statement was bound to bring a reply. Evatt said 
he recognised this and did not mind the reply being used. Accordingly 
we broadcast Spender's reply to Ward, in full, at 9.10 a.m. 
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Shortly after lunch, Mr Denning telephoned me from Melbourne to discuss 
the whole position. He said he was very worried over the way things 
Kere shaping. I told him that as far as any future statements were 
concen1ed, we intended to put the responsibility on Dr Evatt and 
~fr Beasley. If they insisted on the statements being used, .we would use 
them. We did not, however, Hish to be placed in a position where they 
would not give a definite "yes" or "ncr" but leave the decision to us. 
Mr Denning said that he would take care that this did not happen. He 
said that Ward was preparing another strong statement in reply to 
Spender and that this would be broadcast from Canberra at 7.10 p.m. 
During the afternoon, Hamilton telephoned me to say that he had 
received Ward's statement. Ile said it was particularly strong and he 
was Korried over one portion of it which said that Spender had been 
instrumental, while Minister for the Army, in getting his (Spender's) 
brother-in-law - a man named "Hentze" - released from an internment 
camp. Hamilton said that he was under the impression that Spender had 
explained that this man was not his brother-in-law, and that he 
(Hamilton) was afraid that if we used it in the form in which it was 
issued, we might be sued by Spender. He said that the Chief Publicity 
Censor (Mr Bonney) was also doubtful about whether Hentze was Spender's 
brother-in-law, but was not prepared to take any responsibility in the 
matter. I advised Hamilton to telephone Denning and check upon that 
point. He said he would do this. 
Hamilton also told me that Mr Fadden l<as issuing a statement, and, 
amongst other things, intended to attack the ABC for broadcasting 
political propaganda. He said that Senator Ashley's Secretary had told 
him about this and had stated that Senator Ashley intended to issue a 
defence of the Commission in reply to Fadden's attack. He said he had 
telephoned Menzies during the day and invited him to reply to Senator 
Cameron's attack of the previous night. He said Menzies was not in a 
very amiable mood and remarked that "it was just like the ABC to broad-
cast long statements from the Government and only a few lines from the 
Opposition". Hamil ton said he told him that he was prepared to take a 
statement from him and use it. Menzies then gave him a brief statement 
in reply to Cameron. This was used at 7.10 p.m. 
Still later in the afternoon, I telephoned you (Mr Bearup) and outlined 
what had happened up till then. About 6.45 p.m. Mr Hamilton telephoned 
me again and read Fadden's statement, which he had just received. He 
said he wished direction as to whether he should use the portion 
attacking the ABC for broadcasting political propaganda. I told him 
that I would refer the matter to you (Mr Bearup) and that he should also 
seek Denning's advice about it. (You will recall that I telephoned you 
and that you spoke to Mr Boyer and subsequently telephoned Mr Hamilton, 
advising him to use the statement. Later, you advised me of what you 
had done. I agreed that it was good policy to use Fadden's attack on 
the Commission) . 
Our 7.10 p.m. broadcast lasted for about 15 minutes and contained a 
summary of Ward's and Spender's early statements and Ward's latest reply 
to Spender. I noted that Hamilton had omitted direct reference to 
Spender's brother-in-law and had merely said that Spender had been 
instrumental in getting a man released from internment. Fadden's 
statement attacking the Com:n.ission was 1nc::.uded iTl th<> broadcast. Later 
you telephoned me to say that Mr Boyer wa~ pleased that we had used 
Fadden's statement. 
At 10.45 p.m. Mr Hamilton telephoned me to ask if I had heard the 10.15 
p.m. broadcast - I said I had not; I was tired and had gone to bed. 
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He said the broadcast had lasted about 17 minutes and had included still 
another reply by Spender to Ward. He said he (Hamilton) had telephoned 
Spender after 7 o'clock and asked him if he wished to reply to Ward. 
Spender said he had not heard the 7.10 p.m. broadcast but thanked 
Hamilton for telling him about it. He asked Hamilt.on if we had broadcast 
a statement that he (Spender) had had ·his brother-in-law released from 
an internment camp. He said that if we had, he would issue a writ 
against the Commission. Hamilton told him we had not used this direct 
statement. Spender then dictated another reply to Ward, and, as already 
stated, this was broadcast in the 10.15 p.m. session. Hamilton said he 
had taken it upon himself, after consultation with Denning, to delete 
the allegation that the man released was Spender's brother-in-law. He 
said, however, that shortly after the 7. 10 p.m. broadcast, Dr Evatt and 
Mr Beasley had telephoned the Chief Publicity Censor (Mr Bonney) and 
complained about the deletion of the name of Spender's alleged relative and 
had also expressed dissatisfaction with the reading of that session - they 
said it was gabbled. Hamilton then asked me what he should do about all 
the controversial statements on Monday morning. I told him to scrap 
them all unless he received a specific direction to use them. I said 
it did not matter if the 8 a.m. Canberra session ran to only 2 minutes -
we would not rehash any of the Sunday night controversial matter unless 
directed to do so. I told him I would direct Mr McCa1·thy in Sydney 
that there was no reference to the controversy in the early morning 
Australian news from Sydney. This direction was carried out in both 
Sydney and Canberra. 
1 should explain here that Senator Ashley's defence of the Commission in 
reply to Mr Fadden's attack, was used in the 10.15 session on Sunday night. 
Although we had it in hand earlier we could not use it before then because 
it was a reply to Fadden's attack, which was not broadcast until the 
7.10 p.m. session. 
P.S. The question as to whether or not we would have been open to 
legal action had we said that Spender had used his influence 
to secure the release of his brother-in-law, is an open one. 
I attach copy of an extract from "Hansard", in which Spender 
explains that the man concerned is married to his wife's sister. 
Whether or not that makes him Spender's brother-in-law is a 
matter for argument. 
• 
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APPENDIX J 
Draft Agreements for Over~eas News and Australian News 
Appendices 1 and 2 of PSCB' s 4th Report: "The Broadcasting of News" 
13 April 1944. 
Draft ~greement for Overseas News 
(1) The Australian Broadcasting Commission agrees to pay Australian 
Associated Press the sum of £5,000 a year for the Australian broadcasting 
rights of its full overseas cable service, which shall include the right 
to rebroadcast any overseas transmissions which include Australian 
Associated Press matter. 
(2) The Australian Associated Press messages, if the Commission so 
desires, shall be conveyed from the Australian Associated Press office to 
the address or addresses supplied by the Commission in the same manner as 
to newspaper members, the Commission paying to Aust;,alian Associated 
Press the internal transmission charges of the Postmaster-General or beam 
service involved. The Commission shall have the right to teleprinter 
service when available, on the same terms and conditioas as newspaper 
members. 
(3) The Commission shall permit commercial stations to take relays 
of its overseas ne1>1S bulletins compiled in Australia from Australian 
Associated Press material, and the Commission shall be entitled to charge 
commercial stations a maximUln of 50 per cent of the total amount paid 
by the Commission to Australian Associated Press provided that -
(a) if the commercial stations desire to confine their use of 
the Australian Associated Press material to rebroadcasts of 
the British Broatcasting Corporation, the total charge shall 
be £1,500 a year; and 
(b) if commercial stations desire to take relays of Commission 
services based on Australian Associated Press messages in 
addition to rebroadcasting British Broadcasting Corporation 
transmissions, such stations shall pay the Commission through 
the Federation of Commercial Broadcasting Stations an 
increased amount to be agreed between the Commission and the 
Federation. 
(4) In any arrangement it may make with the commercial stations 
the Commission shall be entitled to impose such restrictions as it 
may deem necessary to ensure equality of treatment in broadcasting as 
between itself and the commercial stations. 
(5) The Australian Associated Press material may be broadcast by 
the Commission without restriction as to form, quantity, length or 
frequency of broadcasting periods. 
(6) Acknowledgment of Australian Associated Press as the source of 
overseas news in bulletins prepared in Australia shall be broadcast 
twice daily in the tr&,smissions carrying the news. 
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(7) The Commission shall be entitled to employ news observers 
whose news activities shall be confined to actual broadcasting or 
recording for broadcasting except that -
(a) they shall be entitled to submit to the local man~gers of 
the Australian Associated Press any i terns 1;hich they 
consider worth cabling or telegraphing, and if the local 
managers of Australian Associated Press reject the material, 
the Cormnission news observers shall be entitled to cable or 
telegraph such items at the Commission's expense, and the 
items shall be offered to the Australian Associated Press in 
Australia for distribution among members, and if published 
shall be acknm;ledged to the Connnission; and 
(b) when a broadcasting or telephone channel is not available, 
the Commission news observers shall be entitled to telegraph 
or cable scripts for recording and rebroadcasting in Australia. 
(8) Subject to the law permitting transcripts of all news broad-
<:asts in Australia by Connnission overseas news observers shall be made 
available to the Australian Associated Press when requested, and if 
published in full or in part shall be acknowledged to the Connnission. 
Publication shall be confined to newspapers. 
(9) 1bis agreement shall be terminable upon six months notice by 
either party, to be given only in the following circumstances:-
{a) immediately upon the expiration of two years from the 
commencement of the agreement; or 
(b) at any time after the expiration of four and a half years from 
the connnencement of the agreement. 
* * * * * 
Draft Agreement for Australian News 
(1) The Australian Broadcasting Commission agrees to pay the 
Australian Newspaper Proprietors Association the sum of £2,700 a year 
for the broadcasting rights of a service of Australian news comprising -
(a) a cover of federal political, departmental and parliamentary 
news from Canberra; 
(b) war communiqu6s and other news from general head-quarters; 
(c) drop copies of messages from war correspondents (selected by 
mutual arrangement) in operational areas, capital cities or 
elsewhere. 
(2) In addition to the services provided for in clause (1) the 
Commission shall have the right to select and broadcast Australian and 
New Zealand news published in all or any of the newspapers of members of 
the association and shall not be bound to broadcast the news contained 
in such i terns in the form in which it is published in the newspapers, 
provided there is no alteration in the substance of the news. 
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(3) The Commission shall make arrangements for the service referred 
to in (1) (c) through the Secretariat of the Australian Newspaper 
Proprietors Association. 
(4) In addition to the services provided for in (1) and (2), the 
Commission may request a cover of events of national importance by 
arrangement with a member or members of the Australian Ne~Vspaper 
Proprietors Association provided r8asonable notice is given, and the 
Commission meets the extra expense incurred. Such requests shall be 
made through the Secretariat of the Australian Newspaper Proprietors 
Association. 
(5) Costs of transmission in connexion with all the services 
aforementioned shall be borne by the Commission. 
(6) The neiVs material available from the services covered by this 
agreement may be broadcast by the Commission without restriction as 
to form, quantity, length or frequency by broadcasting periods. 
(7) The Commission shall be entitled to employ observers and 
commentators (as distinct from reporters or ne~Vs gatherers) whose 
activities shall be confined to actual broadcasting except that when 
a broadcasting or telephone channel is not available they shall be 
entitled to telegraph scripts for recording and rebroadcasting. 
(8) In addition to the special services provided for in clause (7) 
the Commission shall be entitled to collect and receive information 
for the broadcast of routine services such as weather, stock exchange and 
market reports, sporting events and elections. 
(9) Nothing in this agreement shall preclude the Commission from 
broadcasting statements or announcements supplied to the Commission by 
goven1ments and/or government departments and/or fighting services in 
Australia. 
(10) This agreement shall be terminable upon six months' notice 
by either party, to be given only in the following circumstances:-
(a) immediately upon the expiration of two years from the 
commencement of the agreement; or 
(b) at any time after the expiration of four and a half years 
from the commencement of the agreement. 
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APPENDIX K 
Memo to All Commissioners dated 9th April 1943 
PROPOSED NEWS AGREEMENT 
REPORT ON VISIT TO CANBERRA BY THE CHAIR~~. 
GENERAL MANAGER AND MR DEAMER (25 March 1943) 
The Chairman, the General Manager and Mr Deamer met the Postmaster-General 
in his office at Canberra at 10 a.m. on Thursday, 25th March, and discussed 
with him the proposed agreement with the newspapers. In spite of all 
arguments put forward in support of the agreement, Senator Ashley made it 
clear that he was opposed to the signing of any agreement which did not 
leave the Commission completely independent of newspapers insofar as 
Canberra is concerned. He stated that it was immaterial to him from what 
source the Commission got its news in any other part of Australia, but it 
must have its own news gathering staff in Canberra. 
At about 10.20 a.m. Mr Beasley came into his office and joined in the 
discussion and immediately adopted a somewhat aggressive attitude, his 
opening remark being "Well Mr Cleary this is a snide sort of thing you 
have tried to put over us." After some brief discussion he became very 
heated through a misunderstanding over a comment made by Mr Deamer. The 
discussion interrupted(sic) when Mr Beasley left to attend a meeting of the 
War Cabinet, and it was arranged that we should meet Messrs Chifley, Evatt, 
Beasley and Senator Ashley during the aften1oon. 
The second discussion took place at S p.m. in Mr Beasley's office, and 
again the strongest opposition came from Mr Beasley, supported by Dr Evatt, 
the former being especially unreasonable in his attitude. It soon became 
obvious that the Government would never agree to the Commission drawing 
its Canberra news from any other source than its own news gathering staff, 
no matter Hhat safeguards it might make to ensure the completeness and 
impartiality of its coverage. Realising the situation, the Chairman said 
that he would reopen the question of the agreement with the newspapers on 
a basis of the Commission retaining complete independence in Canberra. 
Mr Beasley kept stressing the importance of the Commission sending its 
sub-editorial staff back to Canberra and in this connection mentioned that 
he had had discussions with members of our News Staff on this subject. It 
was pointed out to him that to do this would necessitate the Commission 
having two sub-editorial staffs, one for overseas news and Australian 
interstate news, the other for Canberra news; also that this ·sub-division 
of the news staff would make it impossible for the Commission's News 
Editor to give the necessary personal supervision to news bulletins, or 
to make decisions as between the relative importance of various items of 
news coming from different sources. 
Mr Chifley made it clear that he was not interested in the question of 
the return of the sub-editorial staff to Canberra, and he would be 
satisfied as long as the Commission retained its independence with regard 
to Canberra news. Dr Evatt too, said that he was content to leave such 
matters of administration to the Commission. and eventually Mr Beasley 
ceased to press this point though he insisted that attention should be 
paid to the acknowledging of Canberra as the source of official Australian 
news. 
, 
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One i tern of interest ~<as that Dr Evatt stressed the importance of 
retaining "Advance Australia Fair" as the theme for the 7. 45 a.m. and 
7 p.m. bulletins, and suggested that other orchestral arrangements of 
this theme might be made. 
The General Manager stated that he ~<as· discussing with the Commission's 
Programme and Ne1·1s Staffs the possibility of preparing a "composite" 
15 minutes bulletin of Australian and overseas news in place of the 
present straggling 25-minute bulletin. Dr Evatt said that he would be 
glad to see the "State" news session eliminated as he thought this was 
usually of a ve1y poor standard. 
The meeting broke up amicably at 5.50 p.m. after the Chairman had 
indicated we t<ould confer with Mr Henderson of the A. N. P .A. to discuss 
a revision of the agreement. Senator Ashley stated that he would like 
to be present at this conference. 
Mr Henderson was contacted by telephone and arrangements were made for 
a meeting in the Postmaster-General's Sydney office at 3 p.m. on 
Monday, 29th March. 
APPENDIX L 
FORDE's CO~U'LAINT 
Extract from 7 p.m. News - 20 March 1944 
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"Men of the Australian Ninth Division will he given extra leave to 
place them on the same basis as other troops returned from the Middle 
East. Ninth Division men got practically no leave for a long time 
before they returned to Australia. Those men already on leave 1.-ill 
be given more days at home, and those returning to their units will 
get the extra leave cTedi ted tc them. The:; wi 11 be allowed to take it 
at the first oppoTtuni ty." 
ExtTact from 9 p.m. News - 20 MaTch 1944 
(after a complaint by FoTde) 
"The Minister foT the Army, Mr Forde, announced to-night that extra 
leave will be given to men of the Australian Ninth Division in ordeT 
to place them on the same basis as otheT troops who have Teturned from 
the Middle East. The Ninth Division men got practically no leave for 
a long time before they returned to Australia. The men already on leave 
will be given more days at home. Those now on the way back to their 
tmits will be credited with the extra leave they are entitled to and 
will be allowed to take it at the fi Tst opportunity. 
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DRAFT AGREE~IENT FOR OVERSEAS NEWS 
(Appendix A of PSCB' s 14th Report - "The Broadcasting of News", 14 July 1946) 
AGREEMENT dated this day of One Thousand Nine 
Hundred and Forty Six between AUSTRALIAN ASSOCIATED PRESS PTY. LTD. 
of the first part AND the AUSTRALIAN BROADCASTING COMMISSION, a body 
corporate tmder the Australian Broadcasting Act 1942 (hereinafter called 
THE BROADCASTER) of the second part, WI-TNESSETH the parties hereby mutually 
agree as follows: 
(1) A.A.P. hereby bargains and sells to the Broadcaster the full right 
and privilege of broadcasting in the National Broadcasting Service 
radiation from Australia A.A.P.'s full overseas cable service without 
restriction as to form, quantity, length or frequency of broadcasting 
periods, which right and privilege shall include the right to rebroadcast 
any overseas transmissions which include A.A.P. matter. 
(2) Full A.A.P. cable service shall be delivered to the Broadcaster in 
the same form as that in which it is delivered to member newspapers. It 
shall be conveyed from the A.A.P. office to the address or addresses 
supplied by the Commission 
(a) by teleprinter if and when the teleprinter is available 
at no extra cost to the Commission other than the rental 
of the teleprinter. 
(b) by drop copy at the Commission's expense until the 
teleprinter is available. 
(3) The full A.A.P. service shall consist of a complete cover of the 
factual news of the day. 
(4) The Broadcaster agrees to pay to the said A.A.P. in respect of the 
A.A.P. service the sum of Twelve Thousand Five Hundred Pounds {£12 ,500) 
for one year from payable quarterly on the days of the months of 
and PROVIDED THAT A.A.P. shall refund to the Broadcaster 
any portion of the above amount which exceeds 5/Sths of the highest 
amount paid by any member newspapers in ac~ordance with the Articles of 
Association of the A.A.P. and for this purpose the accounts of the A.A.P. 
shall be submitted at the end of the year covered by this agreement to a 
person mutually acceptable for a report thereon (to be added in the event 
of the agreement covering a year that does not coincide with the accounting 
period of the A.A.P.: "The amount of the charge for the overseas A.A.P. 
service for the purpose of the qualification of 5/Sths of the highest 
payment of any member of the A.A.P. shall be calculated by taking the 
proportion of each accounting period determined by the ratio of the 
currency of the agreement in each period to a year of time"), ALSO PROVIDED 
THAT if there is a departure by the Broadcaster from the existing practice 
of the Broadcaster by more than 10% of wordage used by the Broadcaster or 
frequency of broadcasts by the Broadcaster, either of the parties may apply 
to a mutually acceptable person sitting as a private arbitrator 
for a review of the rate for the news concerned, and the decision of such 
Arbitrator shall be adopted by the parties. Existing practice in 
connection 1vith overseas news shall be taken to be approximately 40,000 
words, including repeated news, per week, used by the Broadcaster in the 
Broadcaster's Overseas News Sessions emanating from the Broadcaster's 
Studios and excluding any B. B.C. rebroadcasts, but the Broadcaster shall have 
the right to give news flashes or to extend its wordage of broadcasts to 
cover some important world event, and snch last mentioned wordage and 
broadcasts shall not be included in calculation or wordage or number of 
broadcasts. 
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(5) The Broadcaster sha 11 have the unrestricted right to collect and 
use in such manner as it th1nks fit news and information relating to 
current events in any part of the world and to subscribe to News 
Agencies and News Services. 
(6) The Broadcaster shall supply A.A.P. at the office of the Broadcaster 
with a copy of each of the Broadcaster's overseas news broadcasts. 
(7) A.A.P. overseas cable service shall include news drawn from the 
following sources: 
Reuters 
Associated Press of America 
Exchange Telegraph 
Press Association of Great Britain 
"The Daily Mirror" 
"The Daily Telegraph" 
"The Times" 
"The Manchester Guardian" 
"The News Chronicle" 
etc. 
etc. 
If at any time during the currency of this contract A.A.P. ceases to 
enjoy the right to supply the Broadcaster with any of the following 
cable services -
Reuters 
Associated Press of America 
Exchange Telegraph 
and 
The Press Association of Great Britain 
the Broadcaster shall have the right to cancel this agreement on giving 
one month's notice in writing or to negotiate a variation in the terms 
thereof. 
DRAFT AGREEMENT FOR AUSTRALIAN NEWS 
(Appendix B of PSCB' s 14th Report - "The Broadcasting of News", 4 July 1946) 
AGREEMENT dated this day of One Thousand Nine 
Hundred and Forty Six between AUSTRALIAN NEWSPAPER PROPRIETORS ASSOCIATION 
of the first part AND THE AUSTRALIAN BROADCASTING COMMISSION, a body 
corporate under the Australian Broadcasting Act 1942, (hereinafter called 
THE BROADCASTER) of the second part, WITNESSETH the parties hereby mutually 
agree as follows: 
(1) A.N.P.A. hereby bargains and sells to the Broadcaster the full and 
unrestricted right and privilege of broadcasting in the National Broadcasting 
Services radiating from Australia, the local news services supplied by 
A.N.P.A., in such form as the Broadcaster deems fit, and shall make available 
to the Broadcaster or its representatives from time to time as required 
by the Broadcaster at the offices of member newspapers Australian news in 
copy or proof as requested by the Broadcaster or its representatives for 
which purpose the Broadcaster or its representatives will be provided with 
suitable accommodation, telephone and other facilities in the newspaper 
offices aforesaid and full access at all time to Australian news in copy or 
proof which Australian news may be used by the Broadcaster at any time 
without restriction as to amow1t or fre~uency of broadcast. 
., 
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(2) The Broadcaster agrees to pay to the said A.N. P .A. in respect of the 
A.N. P .A. service the sum of Seven Thousand Five Htmdred pow1ds (£7 ,500) 
for one year from payable quarterly on the days of 
the months of . . . . . . and . . PROVIDED THAT if there is a departure 
by the Broadcaster from the existing practice of the Broadcaster by more 
than 10% of wordage used by the Broadcaster or frequency of broadcasts by 
the Broadcaster, either of the parties may apply to a mutually acceptable 
person sitting as a private arbitrator for a review of the rate of payment, 
and the decision of such arbitrator as to rate of payment shall be adopted 
by the parties. Existing practice shall be taken to be approximately 
21,000 words, including repeated news, per week, of Australian news, and 
broadcast on National relay, and with respect to news restricted to State 
broadcasts, the following approximate wordages represent existing practice -
N.S.W. 17,000 words 
Victoria 21,000 " 
South Australia 16,000 " 
Western Australia 21,000 " 
Queensland 17,000 " 
Tasmania 17,000 " 
but the Broadcaster shall have the right to give news "flashes" or to 
extend its wordage of broadcasts to cover some important event, and such 
last mentioned wordage and broadcasts shall not be included in calculations 
or wordage or number of broadcasts. 
(3) The Broadcaster shall have the unrestricted right to collect and use in 
such manner as it thinks fit news and information relating to current events 
in any part of the world and to subscribe to News Agencies and News Services. 
(4) This agreement shall have no bearing whatsoever on the Broadcaster's 
sporting sessions. 
(5) The metropolitan newspapers from which the news may be taken include 
the following papers: 
SYDNEY: Morning: 
Evening: 
SWldays: 
MELBOURNE: Morning: 
Evening: 
BRISBANE: Morning: 
Evening: 
SWldays: 
ADELAIDE: Morning: 
Evening: 
Sundays: 
PERTH: Morning: 
Evening: 
HOBART: 
LAUNCESTON: 
NEWCASTLE: Morning: 
Evening: 
Sydney Morning Herald; Daily Telegraph 
The Sun 
Sunday Telegraph; SWlday SWl 
Argus; The Sun 
Melbourne Herald 
Courier Mail 
Telegraph 
The Mail 
Adelaide Advertiser 
News 
The Mail 
West Australian 
News 
The Mercury 
The Examiner 
Newcastle 
Ne11castle 
Morning Herald 
Sun 
If at any time any of these sources are no longer available to the Broadcaster, 
the Broadcaster shall have the right to ~ancel this Agreement on giving one 
month's previous notice in writing, or to open negotiations for a Variation 
hereof. 
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APPENDIX N 
169th Commission Meeting, 5, 6, 7 June 1946 
DIRECTIVES - NEWS AND SPOKEN TRANSHISSIONS: 5399 
SPOKEN TRANS~1ISS IONS: 
In general, the Commission regards its charter as a national broadcasting 
instrumentality as laying upon it the responsibility of aiding citizen-
ship, in addition to providing entertainment and information. By 
"aiding citizenship" is meant not the diffusion of any particular point 
of view, but the stimulating of independent judgments on the problems of 
life -- social, political, philosophic -- and of independent appreciation 
of cultural values. It is this purposeful educative f~qction, aimed at 
developing an informed and critical citizenry, which should basically 
distinguish National from Commercial broadcasting. 
For this reason, the canons of judgment as to both form and content of 
national talks and commentaries cannot be thought of as necessarily running 
parallel to those employed in proprietary netl<orks. 1'/hile broadcasting 
technique as an interest-arresting and interest-retaining weapon is as 
vital in our system as in others, this in itself must be brought within 
the framework of the general purpose of the national objectives. 
Popularity, entertainment value, personality-building, for example, the 
cardinal and often sole criteria of the advertising systems, cannot, 
therefore, be the only guides to programming, and indeed may not all be 
reconcilable with the principles of our charter. In other words, technique 
and presentation must follow the purpose which is our raison d' etre, and 
not vice versa. Commercial radio and journalistic practice are net 
necessarily valid for national radio. 
In particular, the above expression of principle involves the following 
considerations: 
(a) The Radio "Personality": The Commission is opposed to the practice 
of "personality building" in its spoken transmissions where matters of 
opinion are involved. This objection derives from the above-mentioned 
aim of presenting listeners with the material of thought rather than with 
a set of second-hand ideas. The continued programming at too frequent 
intervals of a single speaker or commentator, as the Commission's 
experience has shown, while it builds up audiences, also standarises 
public attitudes. Our aim is rather to present a variety of views, 
covering as far as possible all major angles so as to acquaint listeners 
with a broad picture of the issues. The Commission is well aware that 
in so doing it must perforce sacrifice a considerable amount of listener-
interest and devotion to our sessions. People, as a whole, prefer the 
predigested output of a favourite pundit with a good voice and pontifical 
infallibility on regular sequence, and they are well served in this 
respect by some networks. Ours is perforce the hard way. We must of 
necessity seek a variety of speakers not all of l<hom can be stars if we 
are to meet what is a grave responsibility in democratic nation-building. 
This does not mean that talks officers should strain the principle just 
enunciated to the point of programming speakers of indifferent calibre, 
but the Commission does stress the necessity of continually seeking to 
~<iden the range of acceptable and programme-worthy speakers. Nothing in 
this directive relieves talks officers of their responsibility to ensure, 
by their selection of speakers, that the script of a talk and its 
presentation reaches the standard r~uired for our programmes. 
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(b) The "Editing" of Scripts: Similar consider at ions have force in 
the difficult problem of script- "editing". Apart from the requirements 
of ~;a:rtime censorship, there obviously are certain broad fields within 
which some editing of scripts by executive officers is necessary. Libel, 
gross breaches of good taste, and obscenity cannot be justified by 
pinning the responsibility on the speaker. As broadcasters, ~<e share 
the liability common to publishers and other controllers of publicity 
media to answer for statements offending in these categories. Obviously, 
too, ~<e are responsible for the general broadcasting value of the matter 
transmitted, ~<hoever be the speaker (other than governmental statements). 
These responsibilities necessitate the reading of scripts and the elimina-
tion, in ~<hole or in part, of unsuitable matter. Nevertheless, the degree 
to which an executive officer should actually amend, alter or re-write 
scripts, and the principles covering these questions call for some 
definition having regard to the abovementioned general purposes of 
national radio. 
The over-riding consideration governing judgment on these points is the 
fact that, in the Commission's scale of values, a radio talk is not 
merely a feature to be judged solely by its interest plus technique 
value, but is the projection of an individual's O\Vll thought and 
personality and valuable as such. It may be erroneous in argument, 
distorted in opinion, inadequate in expression, but may be nevertheless of 
value as typical of some section of our people. The temptation to recase 
a script by an officer according to his own canons of literary t:aste, or 
fact or opinions, for the purposes of creating a better "broadcast" is 
obviously strong, but in the Commission's view is fraught with much 
danger. In the first place, it is undesirable that the Commission should 
assume responsibility for (a) style or (b) the opinions expressed (other 
than the indecent, libellous or blasphemous). For our .. fficers to alter 
scripts for these reasons, without the express or willing approval of the 
writer, is to assume such responsibility. It is necessary to stress 
"willing" approval of the writer. Approval may be obtained by indicating 
refusal to broadcast unless the change is approved, but a writer under 
such conditions would realistically and fairly apportion responsibility 
to the Commission for the matter and style of his talk. 
The Commission feels that excisions, alterations and re-writes for these 
reasons, while admittedly practised in current journalism and commercial 
broadcasting for technique purposes, is out of keeping with the nature of 
national broadcasting acting as a medium of popular expression. In 
general, it is preferable to refuse the script in toto than to undertake 
corrections and alterations except of a very minor character. Control 
over our spoken transmissions should be exercised rather through the 
choice of speakers than through the editing of scripts. It should be 
made clear to speakers that the responsibility for the content, the style 
and the opinions expressed, is theirs alone, but that the Commission 
reserves the right not of correction but of refusal to broadcast at its 
discretion. Assistance in presentation, intonation and choice of 
phrasing is another matter. We should offer such help, indicating 
suggestions for revision and rewording, and encourage acceptance of it. 
Departures from demonstrable fact should of course be drawn to the 
attention of the speaker and he should be urged to check his facts with 
a view to their correction. In the event of a speaker's refusal to alter 
his script the talks officer concerned should consider whether such 
refusal so seriously prejudices the value of the script as to make its 
rejection advisable. The final draft as broadcast, however, of any talk 
should be the speaker's own responsibility. 
• 
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(c) Contentious Subjects: The programming of talks dealing with subjects 
on which the community may have strong divisions of opinion calls for 
special attention. Clearly, if our charter as above considered is to be 
carried out, our responsibility to present significant angles upon 
matters of contention is probably more urgent than to deal with matters 
of agreement. The question at issue is not whether these issues should 
be touched, but the manner of presentation. Hitherto the Commission 
recognises that the sensitivity of groups in the community towards the 
broadcasting of views with which they disagree has pressed us either {a) to 
avoid certain topics altogether; or ra) to put both sides simultaneously 
in a discussion; or (c) to run a carefully balanced series with equal time 
to each view. This policy :1as become general for all really contentious 
matter, although less explosive views such as may be contained in current 
comlllentaries are still programmed without undue regard to balance. 
"~1ile it is true that as a Commission we have no partiality in matters of 
controversy, and aim to give to listeners a full presentation of all 
facets of current issues, the question still remains as to whether the 
present policy is not unduly restrictivoo. Many excellent talks of a 
highly inforJ~tive character cannot, under this system, be programmed 
wither for the lack of a suitable "counter" immediately at hand, or a 
balanced discussion group. The Commission now feels that this policy is 
too rigid. Wl1ile over the whole period of our programmes we must continue 
as far as possible to secure the most balanced presentation of contentious 
issues, it is hardly flattering to the tolerance and intelligence of our 
public to assume that it is unwilling to hear any views with which it 
disagrees unless the contrary opinion is immediately put as a counter. 
Unfavourable reactions from an intoleraut minority should not be allowed 
to stultify the search for significant and worth>lhile broadcas<:s by our 
officers. Indeed, the ability to listen to intelligent and earnest critic-
ism of our o;m views is a major element in citizenship which the Commission 
hopes to foster. It may, therefore, be accepted that the Commission is 
favourable to the programming of contentious talks without the immediate 
counter now thought essential, provided that over a reasonable period care 
is taken to present alternate views. 
(d) Political Talks: Political talks, in the sense of Party political, 
are a matter of particular concern to the Commission. In general the 
Commission's policy is that outside specified pre-election periods, talks 
of a Party political nature are not acceptable to the A.B.C. The sole 
exception to this policy is when such talks are made in the form of a 
simultaneous discussion such as the Forum of the Air. TI1is rule must not 
be contravened without special permission from the General Manager who 
shall refer proposals for inter-election political talks to the Commission. 
NEWS: 
General Approach: The Commission's responsibilities in respect to news are 
peculiar to the national broadcasting service, and it must be appreciated 
that the habits of news judgment and news expression which operate either 
in the proprietary press or in a government department do not necessarily 
apply in our case. This peculiarity arises from the fact that the 
Commission' 's charter requires it to select and present news with a degree 
of objectivity not called for in other organisations. Even the sense of 
news values should not necessarily follow that of current journalism in 
which the estimate of news value is often that of circulation-building for 
its own sake. 
" 
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The Commission 1 s news bulletins are designed to be in the fullest sense 
a service presenting the happenings of the day in ilhe order of their 
importance for a community ll'hich wishes to be well-informed. It is 
therefore an obligation upon the Commission 1 s ne1;s staff to approach the 
selection and presentation of news from this point of view ,;hich will 
necessitate the discarding of much journalistic habit of mind. In other 
1vords, the Commission 1 s news service should not merely be pre·ss news over 
the air. 
More particularly the Commission 1 s requirements are as follo~1s:-
(1) Selection of News: The terms "news interest" and "news value" are 
currently interpreted as meaning that q'Jali ty in news ~;hich will attract 
the greatest degree of interest. In some juurnelistic practice "news 
value" on this interpretation leads to giving a priority to items that 
are startling and sensational; for example, a criminal act by a person 
is regarded as having more news value than an act of positive beneficience .(sic. 
While it is impossible to draw any line between the value of a sensational 
as opposed to a non-sensational item, the objective of the Commission, 
as expressed above, would dictate that sensationalism for its own sake 
without other nell'S value in an item would not justify its inclusion 
in an A.B.C. bulletin. The first principle of selection for the 
Commission 1 s purt>oses would be the interest value of an i tern of news in 
terms of the question "Is it a service to inform the community of this 
event?" Then as to items involving opinion on current affairs, political 
or international, the greatest care must be exercised that the power of 
selection should not be employed to give greater prominence to one view 
or policy than to another. For this purpose the selective function 
should be exercised in the most strictly objective fashion in such 
manner that by presenting a wide range of views it would be impossible 
to determine by listening to the news what the attitude of the news 
selector to the issue would be. 
The Commission is conscious that the selection of news is possibly the 
most potent weapon in the Commission's hands for the forming of public 
judgments, and it is essential that as far as humanly possible it will 
be carried out in such a way as to leave the function of judgment entirely 
with the listener. This objectivity attaches not only to the selection 
of news but to the priority in which the news is offered in the bulletin 
and the amount of wordage devoted to any particular item over and above 
that which the intrinsic importance of the item would justify. Here 
again the principle must be adopted of giving, as far as possible, 
equivalent prominence and equivalent wordage to conflicting points of 
view. For example, the quoting of newspapers should be undertaken with 
a strict eye to ensuring that the net effect of the bulletin is to leave 
in the listener's mind a balanced appreciation of the issue referred to. 
Most particularly the selection of local or overseas press editorials 
from one paper alone whose policy is one of strong protagonism defeats 
the purpose of the Commission's news service. 
7 
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(2) Presentation of News: The manner in ~<hich a ne~<s item once selected 
is presented also requires attention in the light of the foregoing 
principles. In other "ords, the presentation of a person's opinion or 
an event should not be in such a form as to constitute a commentary except 
where such commentary is essential for the identification of a person or 
an event. For example, in the report of a statement by Professor Laski, 
the principle of legitimate identification would be served bi describing 
him as "Professor Laski, Chairman of the British Labour Party". 
Inadrnissib le comment, on the other hand, would be - "Professor Laski, 
the Left Wing Chairman of the British Labour Party". 111e content of 
news bulletins should preserve a dignity of expression consistent with 
a national service. Such dignity is not inconsistent with freshness and 
brightness of presentation. For example, it is not necessary to quote 
verbatim statements in Parliament or elsewhere which in themselves are 
in bad taste. A paraphrase in the third person can be equally effective. 
(3) Religious News: The principles enunciated above are of particular 
importance in the religious field where the extreme sensitivity of 
varying beliefs within the co~nunity and the responsibilities of a 
national service demand a degree of balance and objectivity greater 
than in most types of nm;s i terns. 
111at the following Addendum be added to the Directives on 
News and Spoken Transmissions. 
A difficulty has al~<ays arisen in regard to the varying claims of 
political persons making statements for transmission over the air as 
between !i1embers of the Government of the day and of the Opposition. It 
is quite obvious that Ministers actively carrying out the government of 
the country have more newsworthy statements to contribute than have 
members in opposition. The relative positions of these two classes of 
politicians creates a difficulty both for spoken transmissions and for 
inclusion in news bulletins. As to ho~< far this situation justifies 
discrimination, two major considerations have relevance in this matter: 
First, that the position of ~finisters undoubtedly gives them an opportunity 
to contribute much more valuable factual material both for a spoken 
statement for a ne~;s item than members of the Opposition, but secondly 
there is an equally important consideration in that members of the 
Government may utilise their positions as controllers of departments to 
secure unnecessary publicity through these means. 111is latter 
consideration has been brought to the attention of the Commission by all 
parties in opposition since the inception of the A.B.C. 111e Parliamentary 
Standing Committee on Broadcasting of September 1942 -- October 1943 dre~< 
attention to the fact that the mention of a politician's name had political 
value in itself irrespective of the question as to l<hether his statements 
were factual and non-controversial or not. This principle has been 
admitted by the Cumrnission as one of importance, and the question for 
direction remains as to ~<hat principles should be adopted by the 
Commission's officers in this matter. While obviously no rigid rule can 
be laid down, it may be stated as follows:-
(a) Statements by Ministers or Members of Parliament should be judged 
as Northy either for broadcasting as an individual statement or for 
inclusion in news bulletins only insofar as the matter contained in the 
statements themselves is of intrinsic importance and of public interest. 
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(b) Over-emphasis and too great repetition of a speaker's name are 
undesirable particularly when a statement is of a purely departmental 
character and not the individual opinion of the speaker. Experience 
has shown that journalistic practice in this regard is not suitable for 
broadcasing technique. Frequent repetition of names is more noticeable 
and irritating when spoken than when written. 
(c) Distinction should be made in respect of talks between the factual 
account of the carrying out of a settled policy of the Government by a 
Minister and the enunciation of nelV policy or a defence of Government 
policy. In the first case there w::mld appear to be no reason why any 
effort should be made to secure a balance by Opposition speakers lVhereas 
in the latter case a reply would be expected and a balance should be 
sought. 
APPENDIX 0 
(1) DRAFT DIRECTIVE ON THE ORGANISATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF 
THE Cm1MISSION' s INDEPLNDENT NEWS SERVICES 
(in SP724, Box 38, 15/1/2) 
Considering the means whereby the Commission's 
news gathcr:ing. ser:v:Lce within Australia can be organised, 
it is clear that the problems of origin of news and of 
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the engagement of permanent and part-time news-gatherers, will depend 
fundamentally upon the obligations imposed by the term "independent" as 
applied to the Commission's service and ti1e degree to which that 
principle is implemented by the Commission's staff. 
Basically the term "independent" means that each item of news broadcast 
by the Commission carries with it the Commission's o1m endorsement of 
accuracy, such endorsement being based upon the guarantees of our own 
staff. Sources of news admittedly are varied and are not necessarily at 
first hand; for example, government departn1ents and public institutions 
may be regarded as reliable sources of information requiring no personal 
check, the bona fides of such institutions being accepted in advance. 
News of a political and controversial nature will, of course, require 
first-hand independent coverage, as by its nature it is capable of a 
variety of interpretations and selections. The major problem before 
the Commission, however, will be the treatment of news which has neither 
been obtained at first hand by the Commission's staff nor sponsored by 
the reliable public organisations mentioned above, but which may first 
appear in published form in the daily or provincial press. News so 
published cannot, of course, be ignored, but does not become eligible for 
the Commission's bulletins until it has been checked either at first-hand 
or through the reliable media outlined above and thereby bears the 
Commission's guarantee of accuracy and objectivity. This latter point 
is of supreme importance both as to the quality and quantity of staff 
required and as to the duties of staff. It presupposes that an adequate 
staff will be available to make such checks in a proper and adequate 
fashion both in the metropolitan and country areas. It may mean, 
furthermore, that some items of news formerly included in an earlier 
bulletin when taken as at present from newspaper columns, will require 
to be held pending checking for a later broadcast. It points also to 
the consideration that the Commission's country correspondents should be 
men who are not simply relaying the contents of a local paper but are in 
a position themselves to check and verify news of whatever origin for 
the Commission's bulletins. 
It is quite clear that reference to the press office in which an item may 
appear or the the staff of that office could not be considered as in any 
way complying with the requirements of an independent service, and strict 
instructions as to the adequacy of checking methods 1vill require to be 
issued both to permanent and temporary staff in the news-gathering service. 
It would seem in implementing the above that country correspondents 
should not as a matter of principle be members of the staff of existing 
journals, but that they should be ind>cpendent persons as detached from the 
proprietary press as will be our own permanent staff in the metropolitan 
area. We must, in other words, so organise the service that we shall be 
able, if challenged, to show that each item broadcast h2s been guaranteed 
adequately by the news-gatherer conce.,ned on the above lines. 
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(2) MEMO ON DRAFT DIRECTIVE ON THE ORGANISATION AND DEVELOPMENT 
OF THE COMMISSION'S INDEPENDENT NEWS SERVICES - DATED 
14 October 1946. 
From: General Manager To The Chairman 
As I may not have an opportunity of discussing with you thoroughly your 
draft directive on the organisation and development of the independent 
news service I hope you will not mind one lettmg you have the following 
comments. 
The Directive covers two main questions -
1. The definition of the term "independent" 
2. Sources of news under an independent service. 
Definition of an independent service (paragraph 2) 
The Parliamentary Commi ttec' s majority report and the debates in Parliament 
on the amendment of the Act regarding the news service etc. suggest that 
the essential point that the Government had in mind in directing the 
Commission to establish an independent service was that items of 
Australian news should come direct from the news gatherer to the 
Commission without being coloured by the policies of other organisations. 
That is, the persons supplying news for A.B.C. bulletins should be 
directly engaged and paid by the Commission instead of the Conunission 
securing its news through an intermediate source, such as a newspaper. 
May I suggest therefore that the definition of the term "independent" 
in paragraph two of the draft directive should be amended to read -
'Basically the term "independent" means that each item of news broadcast 
by the Commission carries with it the Commission's own endorsement, such 
endorsement being based on the fact that the Commission has itself 
directly engaged the staff and correspondents supplying the material for 
its service. ' 
In order to provide the best possible service I feel it is clear that 
the Commission must seek to engage the most competent staff and 
correspondents available from among those who have had training and 
experience in the news field. 'Independence' relates to the method of 
securing material by direct engagement by the Commission of the persons 
concerned rather than, as suggested in the draft directive, to the fact 
that those persons are or are not already in the news field. The 
Commission could not contemplate engaging inexpert and untrained persons 
to provide material for other sections of its programmes - music, drama, 
etc. and it must look for trained people in the news field also. 
In the case of the metropolitan areas, our news will be supplied by 
trained journalists engaged by the Commission for that purpose. 
Paragraph 3 of the draft directive suggests, however, that country 
correspondents should be "independent persons as detached from the 
proprietary press as will be our permanent staff in the metropolitan areas. 
We must, in other words, so organise the service that we shall be able, 
if challenged, to show that each item broadcast has been guaranteed 
adequately by the news-gatherer concerned". I feel, however, that there 
are other considerations which should not be overlooked, especially as 
some of them might be used to suggest that the Conunission is reluctant 
to employ the normal and most effective methods of collecting its 
news:-
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1. That if a country journalist is engaged by the Commission on a 
part time basis to provide news items he would in fact be 
supplying a service direct to the Co1rumission. His engagement by 
the Commission would be an arrangement between himself and the 
A.B.C. and would not imply that the A.B.C. was securing a service 
from any country newspaper by which he might also be engaged. 
2. That is is a common practice in the news field for journalists 
who do not hold exclusive contracts with a single paper, to work 
for several organisations and this is not regarded as affecting 
the independence of their work for each of those organisations. 
e.g. Australian correspondents of overseas news agencies. 
3, That competent persons who have had training in news gathering 
will not be available in the country, apart from those who are 
already connected with country newspapers. 
4. That the standard of our service might suffer, both in speed and 
quality, if our correspondents were not trained in news gathering. 
Persons not already working in the news field may not be able to 
supply news as it breaks. 
5. That if our correspondents are not trained news men they may be 
lacking in news sense and may send stories that cannot be used, 
thus adding unnecessarily to costs. 
6. That as to the question of guaranteeing accuracy the fact that a 
correspondent is not engaged by a newspaper doe~ not necessarily 
imply that his material would be accurate. 
SOURCES OF NEWS (Second half of paragraph two) 
The directive states that there will be three main sources of news -
(a) Government departments and public institutions which "may be regarded 
as reliable sources of information requiring no personal check". 
(b) Political news which will require first-hand independent coverage. 
(c) Other news "which may first appear in published form in the daily 
or provincial press". 
As to (a) would it not be dangerous to state in any directive to the news 
staff that this does not require checking? Government departments may 
well issue handouts angled to their particular policies that may not 
include all the facts. 
As to (c) while our news staff will undoubtedly keep an eye on the papers 
for news items which may have escaped them I feel it would be a mistake 
to set down in any directive that material seen in newspapers would be 
a regular source of news. 
Perhaps the directive might list the three sources of news as --
(a) Government departments and pub li-e institutions. 
<' 
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(b) Political news. 
(c) Other news arising from a variety of sources 
... and then go on to say that all n0ws must be adequately checked 
and that if the first information ·about a particular item is obtained 
from press sources it must be checked ·at first hand before being used. 
As this directive is intended to apply only to Australian news it 
would be as well if the word "Australian" were added to the heading. 
I notice also that several reference are made to "permanent" and 
"temporary" news staff. I would suggest that in each case these words 
should be changed to "full time" and "part time" in view of the 
implication of the word "permanent" in our organisation. 
(Signed) CHARLES MOSES 
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145-149 
Elizabeth St. 
Sydney, 2000 
G.P.O. Box 487-2001 
Dear 
Rei. 
We are glad to kr1ow that you have accep~ed the position of our country 
correspondent for 
Your engagement will be for a. period of three months frvm 
and will continue thereafter r.mbject to one weei<'a 11oti::::a of termination by 
either party. During the continuance of trd.s ~:orra.ngtlment you will receive 
a fee for each news item used a.s follows1 
E.t@.QI 
T.ill.EVIS!ON: 
National ............... .., •••••••••• .,".•••••• $).30 
State (including Northern TerritorJ) •••• $1.65 
Radio Australia •••··~·•••••••••••••••••• $1,65 
Metropolitan Regional (i.e. the 6.30 a.m. 
News Session) •••••••••~••o•••••••••••••• $1.10 
Country Regional •••••••••••••••••••••••• $1.10 
State and Interstate Networks 
(including Northern 'I'.;rritor;:r) ........... 
* Country Television (whe~e it~m not used 
$1.65 
on Radio) ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• $1.10 
For Newsfilm tips which we accept we will p3¥ a fae of ••••••• $1.65 
* One fee only is payable in respect of each item ir~espective of the number 
of times it is used. The rate will be that of the bu.lletin of the highest 
· claGsirication in which the item is used. To this there ia one cxcepttolt-
a.n item used on State and Interstate TV a.nd on Radio will r"ceive the State 
and Interstate TV fee ..!!:!:!!! the appropriate Radio fee. 
Should a voice insert from a correspondent be used in a National i;,·.dio 
bulletin a fet' of $7 per item will be paioi or if used in a State or Regional 
bulletin a fee of $5 per item. In the main th~se would be voice 1•eports 
recorded through telephone. 
Should you incur any necessary out-of-pocket expenses 1 throe will be refur.ded 
n>onthly on subm1ssion of a detailed statement at the end of each month. 
Australian 
Broadcasting 
Corr1mission 
·----
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Elizabeth St. 
Sydney, 2000 
G.P.O. Box 487-2001 
Dear 
APPE:I/DIX P 
Ref. 
We a.re glad to kr1ow that you have aoce~~d the position of our country 
correspondent for 
Your cn~ag~mer1t t.:ill be for a period of three months !'r;J:r. 
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a.'ld w.ill continue th&re;a.fter mt't'ljed "to onf! weei.hJ nol;:.os of termination by 
aither p.:u-ty. During the continuance of tids t:.:ra:Lgt1ment you will receive 
a fee for each newe item us ed as follo-.,st 
~: National 
··········· ············ h···· ···· $3.30 
Sta~e (including Northern TerritorJ) •••• $1.65 
Radio Australia ••••••••••·•••••••••••••• $1.65 
Metropolitan Recional (i.e. the 6.30 a.m" 
News Session) •••c•••••e••••••••••••••••• $1.10 
Country Regional •••••••••••••••••••••••• $1.10 
T"ill.EVIS!ON: State and Interstate Net.uorkB 
(including Northern 'I't:rr1tor;:r ) •••••••••• $1.65 
* Country Television {whe~e item not uaed 
on Radio) ••••••·~··•••••••••••••••••• ••• $1.10 
For Newafilm tips which we accopt we will pay a foe of ••••••• $1.65 
* One fee only is payable in respect of oach item ir~espective of the number 
of time-3 it is used. 'l'he rate will be that of the bl'lletin of t\e hie,hcst 
ol&Goirication in which the 1tem is used. To this there ia one cxceptton-
an item used on State and Interotate TV and on Rad.io will r3ceive the Stato 
and Interstate TV feo ~ t he appropriate Radio fee. 
Should a voice insert from a correspondent be used in a Natio!:al 2 dio 
bullotin a fet' of $7 per item will be paid or if used in a State or Re.Jional 
bulle-tin a fee of $5 per item. In the main these would be voic~ reports 
r~corded through telephone. 
Shuuld you incur My necessary out-of-pocket expenses, throe \ii1l be ref'..U1~.ed 
nlont hly on sub:n1zsion of a detailed stat€JT\ent at the end of eo.c!~ month. 
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We uhould like your ":wurunce th·tt you will m.Lke yourself ver•Jonally 
rooponuiblo for the nccura.oy of evvP,V item you send us. As you arc aw;1re, 
the r.nc places the grentost import:cnce on the aocuf'noy of items, and we 
obvjouely can not contemplate any m•rn:1gement with you which doatl not 
ensure your reeponsibil ity for •Jhecking the accuracy of each it em you 
aend us. 
In lieu of a formal contract we should be glad if you would sign md 
return the orir,inal of this letter to this office 1 as soon a" possible. 
The other copy wl.ich we enclose is for your own records. 
Yours faithf:,lly, 
ENG~.GEl4!ill'r ACCEPTED ON ABOVE TERMS: ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
~: ••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
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APPENDIX Q 
18th May 1946 
GUIDANCE l 
It is obviously necessary that all sub-editors and news writers 
should work to a broad co1mnon policy, and that there should be 
cohesion between night and day bulletins. To this end it may at 
times be useful to call a conference, but because of ti1e different 
rosters on which we all work, it is impracticable to make this a 
daily event. 
Notes such as the following, which I hope to send round from time 
to time are admittedly inadequate as a substitute for a conference 
at which all points of view can be advanced, but they may help towards 
giving a coherent approach to the news. 
The last thing I want to bring about is a dull level standard of 
style. Each of us has his own mannerisms and idiosyncrasies, and often 
it is this individuality which gives a bulletin vitality. On the other 
hand, it is inevitable that with sub-editors working on different shifts 
and with little or no actual contact, there will be a tendency towards 
divergence in attitude to news and its presentation. 
These guidance notes are intended not as inquests, or criticisms 
of the past, but as a effort to steer the news in one direction. When 
particular stories are referred to critically I know only too well from 
experience that these may have been done in such circumstances that we 
\~ere probably lucky to have them in the bulletins at all. But the 
listening public doesn't know these things, and it's on the result 
that a bulletin must be judged. 
Every bulletin brings its own problems of precedence, order and 
length of story, and no hard and fast rules can be laid do~~ beforehand. 
But as there seems to be some confusion in certain cases on our ultimate 
objectives, it may be a good idea to remind ourselves from time to time 
of the aims demanded by our position as a responsible, unsensational 
and factual news medium. 
It may seem pointless, for instance to labour the value of 
material of urgent global interest (India, the Food Famine, UNO, etc.) 
but it is very human and understandable to be over-influenced by the 
more sensational and ephemeral. The newspapers can do as they like 
about these things: that's their job. It's not ours. We must try and 
rid our minds of the attitude: "The public would rather read the 
details of a good murder than all the UNO stuff ever published." That 
attitude reveals that we are unaware of, or have forgotten the functions 
of our news services. 
The very fact that we are constricted in our approach to news, in 
that we must discard the sensational and must not "play up" or "colour" 
material throws on us an onus that newspaper writers don't have. But 
it's at the same time an exciting challenge. We've got to make our 
bulletins at once authoritative and attractive sober yet interesting. 
It's a formidable job, but it can be done. If we can persuade our 
listeners that "if it's the A.B.C. then it's true," we'll have gone a 
long way towards fulfilling our ambition. 
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That's why we can afford to make mistakes less than other stations, 
or the newspapers, and why minor errors, such as in grammar, assume a 
seemingly disproportionate importance. 
My stress on international news must not be interpreted as meaning 
that we should always lead with it. There are times when little has 
developed overseas to justify such a lead; then is the opportunity to 
devote more space to domestic happenings. Big industrial stoppages, for 
instance, are in their way, of world significance, affecting as they do 
economy on an international scale, and justifiably take a high place. 
So does the infantile paralysis story, for another reason. By giving 
the facts (and taking care not to stampede our listeners) we are doing 
them a service which we would NOT be by presenting the details of a 
divorce case. 
T~lli WORLD FOOD SITUATION. We have been giving this a good run, and 
rightly so. With the great deal of space that has teen devoted to it in 
the past, and the fact that we in Australia are luckier than in most 
other countries, there may be a natural inclination to drop it at times 
or keep it down. The war could not be dropped in this way, and many 
millions more are affected by the food situation than were directly 
involved in the war. Therefore we have the grim duty of presenting the 
truth, but in such a way that we do not bore our audiences with statistics 
or platitudes. It is not length that is needed so much as the punching 
horne of the seriousness of the situation by a well-placed paragraph or 
so in an appropriate context. 
We don't want to enter into any acrimonious or spiteful questions 
on 1-1hich countries are doing their part and which are not. But of course, 
we must give such facts or opinions if they come from reputable 
authorities such as Herbert Morrison. We handled the question of Russia 
with absolute correctness by giving first the fact that Truman would 
not disclose Stalin's reply and then quoting Moscow on what Russia has 
done for Finland, France, etc. 
PRESS QUOTATIONS. In themselves quotations from the press (I'm thinking 
of the foreign papers) are NOT news, and should be used only to 
illuminate points that are not clear from the cables. They are certainly 
worth using as a follow to big announcements such as India, in order to 
indicate British reaction. But extreme care must be taken to obtain a 
balanced picture. For instance, it is wrong to say: "The British Press 
favours the new plan," and quote in support of this statement, say 
Ulli DAILY MAIL, THE SKETCH, THE TELEGRAPH, & EVENING NEWS, for it is 
10 to l that on all major issues these papers will think alike. If, 
however, the HERALD, TilE TIMES and THE NEWS-CHRONICLE also support 
whatever plan it may be, then you are justified. BUT you must quote the 
usually opposed camps equally to convince your listeners. Also be 
careful of "unanimous" in this connection, for if the entire British 
press except the DAILY WORKER speaks with one voice, then it is still 
not unanimous. 
In using a story such as "Scrutator's" opinion of the Big Four 
conference we are laying ourselves open to charges of partisanship. The 
observations of the SUNDAY THIES or THE OBSERVEB._rnay be the fairest 
summing-up, but those papers have a very definite political line, and 
after all, what they say is not news, and can quite justifiable be ignored. 
We must, a.s far as possible, draw a line between news and comment. 
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HEADINGS. In the past, I feel we have been apt to overdo our headlines 
both in length and number. These should be as simple as possible, so 
that the listene!' can understand their import without undue thought, and 
yet piquant enough to invite him to listen to the 'follow'. Only the 
main points of the news should be given, and these in as economical a 
way as possible. Keep out dependent clauses. 
ORDER. The sequence of stories should'be given as much thought as 
possible. Natural sequence according to content or an easy 'follow-
through' or geography will often keep an item higher than would 
ordinarily be the case. This helps to give a bulletin 'rhythm'; but 
don't let the comparatively frivolous come before a serious item, even 
if it is fresher news -- the latest snooker results or Mollison's 
arrival, for instance, before the Big Four. On the other hand if the 
Big Four or any other 'serious• story is stale, or in its essence, dull, 
there should be no hesitation in dropping it. 
"JOURNALESE" is raising i1:s ugly head here and there. I'm not so much 
concerned with purists' criticism as with the valuable time these 
phrases waste if they're allowed to multiply. Here are a fe1; I've 
noticed in the last few days: "Prior to" (before): "with a view to 
(to): "as from" (from): "1·1ith the object of ascertaining if (to find 
out if). Note: "Advise" and nwarn" take an object: "feature" is a 
very dubious verb. 
LEICESTER COTTON 
APPENDIX R 
4th June 1946 
GUIDANCE I I l: 
I must draw attention once more to the much vexed question of 
quotations from the press. My notes on this subject a fortnight ago 
do not appear to have made clear the extreme care which must be 
taken over such tendentious subjects, for instance, as the French 
elections. 
I can only repeat that quotations from the British press are not 
news and should be used sparingly, and then only to illuminatea 
point not made clear from the cables. It is not our job to 
comment on news; that's the prerogative of the Talks Department. 
The fact that the BBC Pacific Service used such a spate of comment 
today on the elections does not sanction our repeating m~terial so 
obviously ill-balanced. The BBC's Home Service seldom, if ever, uses 
press comment and as a National station we should also avo:Ld it. 
Let 1 s examine today' s l. 30 p.m. bulletin. Headlines -- "London 
newspapers describe the French election results as a vote for 
stability." To support this we have 15 lines from the "Daily Mail"; 
4~ from the "Sketch"; 4 from the Telegraph ; 6 from the ~. 
and 2 from the News Chronicle . Nm~ this is a completely lop-sided 
sampling of the London newspapers, as you will see by referring to 
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the chart which I laid out last week. It may be true that these 
comments were indicative of the general trend of press opinion, but 
our story does not bear it out. Our listeners, particularly if of 
'Leftist' tendencies, would be quite justified in dubbing us one-sided. 
We cannot afford giving hostages to either camp. 
It may be true that France will achieve stability as a result of the 
swing to the Right. On the other hand, it may reasonably be argued 
by the impartial observer that the mere fact that the HRP has 
achieved a majority, does not necessarily constitute a really working 
majority, for the Communists and the Socialists between them (if 
they like to work together) still have the whiphand. 
I would like to see our cable staff examine all such contentious 
material with an open and critical mind, rather than rely on ready-made 
opinion. 
In any case, please first apply the test of "is it news or is it 
comment?" and use your judgment accordingly. 
LEICESTER COTTON 
...,.... ___________________________ _ 
APPENDIX S 
MISTAKES IN BULLETINS - A SUBMISSION TO COMMISSION MEETING, 
16 October 1946. By J.S. HN~LON 
No.1. On July 19, the 7 o'clock a.m. news bulletin said that the 
Postmaster-General in the House of Representatives said that 80,000 
people were on the waiting list for telephones, etc. 
This was repeated in the 8 o'clock a.m. bulletin. 
Senator Cameron, the Ministerial head of the Broadcasting 
Commission, is not a member of the House of Representatives. 
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A paragraph in the Sydney Morning Herald of the same day stated 
that the Minister for Information, Mr Calwell, representing the 
Postmaster-General; gave this information to the House of Representatives. 
No.2. On the same day the bulletl.n stated that the Wheat Industry 
Stabilisation Bill "is still held up in the Canberra House of 
Representatives". 
It was not "held up" but was still under discussion when the 
House adjourned. 
The bulletin also stated that Opposition speakers, led by the 
Leader of the Country Party, attacked one clause after another, and 
mentioned that "other important points" called for by the Opposition, 
were not acceptable to the Government, or words to that effect. 
"Important points" obviously is comment which is against the 
directive given recently to the news staff. 
No.3. On July 20, the 7 o'clock p.m. bulletin said that the nominations 
for the Federal elections would close on September 3. This date was 
altered on the ll o'clock bulletin to September 23. 
The following morning the 7 o'clock and 8 o'clock bulletins 
repeated the information that nominations would close on September 23. 
This was a serious mistake, which calls for explanation, and, if 
I may say so, some disciplinary action. 
No.4. On Sunday, August 4, at 8.45 and on Sunday, August 11, in the 
8.45 bulletins, two items were repeated in almost identical forms; the 
one concerning the introduction of Frequency Modulation on the second 
occasion was read immediately after the first. 
This reveals a lack of supervision and apparently a complete 
absence of editorial or sub-editorial control. 
' 
687 
No.5. On Wednesday, August 14, the 7 o'clock p.m. bulletin announced 
that the Sydney Morning Herald had received a verdict of [3,000 odd 
damages against the Railway Commissioner for refusing to handle their 
composite paper during the 1944 newspaper strike. 
The same item was used in full in both the 7 and 8 o'clock State 
news sessions the following morning, making three broadcasts of the same 
item on three consecutive sessions without any additional facts. 
No.6. I understand that the Premiers' Conference in Canberra, which 
had considered and determined several matters of national importance, was 
completely ignored by the A.B.C. News Services, and some of the Premiers 
were very caustic because there was no mention of their meeting, but 
there 1~as quite a deal broadcast about an offer being made by .John Wren 
to Bill O'Reilly of £3,000 to enable him to play in the Test Matches, 
and that some tennis player had also received considerable publicity in 
regard to the Davis Cup. 
No.7. Our National News Bulletin also stated on the 7 o'clock bulletin 
on Saturday that "rationing was being continued next year, and new 
coupon books were being printed for distribution on expiry of the present 
books in December." 
The Prime Minister on Monday stated that no decision had been made, 
or could be made with respect to rationing until after the elections, 
Parliament having been dissolved, but as a matter of routine, ration 
books were being printed as a precautionary measure. 
It was apparent that the A.B.C. news service, presumably after a 
check-up, could inform listeners that Wren's offer to O'Reilly had not 
yet been received by him, etc., etc., but apparently those in control 
did not think it worth while contacting the Prime Minister or the 
Minister in Charge regarding the continuation of rationing before the 
misleading statement was broadcast. 
No.8. One of the news bulletins on Monday also stated that the Duke of 
Gloucester had left Canberra that morning for Central Australia. 
The Duke and Duchess had been in the Northern Territory for 
several days, and it was obvious that he had left Darwin and not Canberra, 
as stated in the bulletin. 
No.9. On August 5, the 7 o'clock news State session gave an account of 
the funeral of a gangster in Sydney who had been found dead some days 
previously on a vacant allotment, and that the funeral was attended only 
by his mother and a number of vigilant detectives. 
No reference of any kind, however, in this bulletin was made to 
the important story featured in the same afternoon's papers that a shipment 
of prize cattle worth over £20,000 from overseas had reached Sydney that 
afternoon. 
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,~,,.Ill. Another slip - in the middle of our driest spell and the worst 
,irc)ugnt in Australia since 1902, a news service recently said that 
"n account of heavy rain the River Murray was overflowing its banks. 
The phenomenon might have been due to the melting of the 
recent heavy snows on the Southern Alps rather than the non-existent 
r;lins . 
. ~ phone call to the Weather Bureau might have established the 
Tt~ct and provided a very interesting news item. 
No.I!. On August 28, in the morning bulletin it was stated that the 
~;,_.~;)nd ~ccur i ty Loan would open in three weeks' time, a week before 
'the eledions, but according to the daily press the date fixed is 
4ippr{)xi!lk~tety October 15. 
COTTON'S REPLY 
Attachment to resolution of Commission meeting of 16 October 1946 
J. n~hc:re was no mention of the subject in the morning bulletins of 
.July 19th. At ll.OO p.m. that night, however, one item said 
'that 77,000 people were on the waiting list for telephones. The 
.uc.t.ual phrase used was: "In answer to questions by ~1r Cameron 
(Liberal, South Australia), in the House of Representatives, the 
,J>.ostmaster General said that some time would elapse before the 
.J;n.g •was overtaken ... " The words "Mr Cal well for" were omitted 
~~.r reasons (mistaken) of brevity. 
2. :fltc term "still held up" was not used in the story of the Wheat 
lndustry Stabilisation Bill. The actual text was:-
"The Wheat Industry Stabilisation Bill is still making slow 
p.r.ogress through the House of Representatives. The House 
cSat yesterday for the longest session for many months -- from 
half past ten in the morning until after midnight. Despite 
ethics, the Wheat Bill is still in the Committee stages. 
~Opposition speakers yesterday, led by the Deputy Leader of 
'!;he Country Party (Mr McEwen) made repeated attempts to 
.amend one clause after another. Most of the amendments 
:followed the second reading speeches by the Opposition and aimed 
:at the exclusion of the 1945-46 wheat harvest from the 
s~abilisation scheme. Other important points asked for by the 
Opposition were that wheat should be paid for at country rail 
,s:idings, instead of at ports, and that changes of the 
guaranteed price should be permitted to correspond with changes 
)J1 production costs. 
9pposition speakers also strongly resisted any amendments put 
forward by the Government. 
At one stage, three hours were spent debating a single Government 
amendment for the insertion of a few words which would give the 
Minister final say in directing the Wheat Board in certain cases. 
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Finally, the Prime Minister (Hr Chlfley) applied the gag and 
the House divided t.vice in quick succession -- first on the 
closure motion and t~1en on th0 autendment. 
Both tvere carried by 37 votes to 16. 
When the debate was finally adjourned, the House had dealt 
with little more than half the Bill. 
The House rose after midnight. 
To-day's session will begin at half past ten this morning." 
This resunu:i I consider a fair one and the use of the word "import-
ant" in conjunction with the rest of the story admissable. 
3. This was a mistake. The proper date, September 3rd., was given 
in the 7.00 p.m. Bulletin and was incorrectly given (apparently 
owing to a typing error) at 11.00 p.m. on July 20th. The 
mistake was carried through on July 21st. 
4. There is no record of any duplication in these bulletins and 
the reader (Sanderson) has no recollection of them. If such 
were the case, the reason would be either that 
5. 
(a) the typist pinned two copies of the one story together. 
This is unlikely to remain unnoticed by the chief sub-
editor or the reader, unless the bulletin were so late as to 
preclude adequate checking. 
(b) The announcer became confused in turning over. 
It is a common practice to 
to the morning bulletins. 
its interest value. 
carry stories through from the night 
This was treated as any other -- on 
6. This bears no relation to fact. Over a week, more than two 
hundred lines were devoted to the matters discussed by the 
Premiers' Conference -- that is, a total of nearly half an hour. 
The one decision omitted was on immigration, but the proposals 
had been given a very full coverage earlier. 
7. The actual statement, which was an official "hand-out" and came 
from both Melbourne and Canberra, read: "On present indications, 
it is expected that rationing of meat, butter, sugar, cotton and 
other clothing materials will be continued next year. However, 
the final decision will be made by the Commonwealth Government"· 
8. This was a definite slip on our part. 
9. On August 6th, in the 7.45 a.m. bulletin, it was reported that a 
cargo of stud stock valued at .£20,000 had arrived in Sydney and 
also that a large cargo the day before had arrived in Melbourne. 
Naturally, this would not be carried nearly 32 hours later. On 
7th August, mention was made of the funeral of the gangster Flaherty. 
10. This was not "another slip". The facts were as stated -- the River 
Murray was flooded owing to rains, not melted snow. The Weather 
Bureau is telephoned both here and in Melbourne several times a day 
and it is, in fact, the source- of virtually all our 11eather stories. 
.•.4····-...~-........ ,, .. ,_, 
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The possibility that the cause of the floods might have been 
melting snow had, in fact, occurred to the news staff, who 
took particular care to check on this point. 
11. This was a mistake. 
f,PPENDIX T 
NEIVS ITEM DEALING WITH DEBATE ON COMMUNISM 
Wednesday, April 23, 1947 
1.30 p.m. bulletin: 
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Mr Abbott (Country Party, N.S.W.) secured an adjournment of the House 
of Representatives this morning to discuss, as his motion stated, "the 
danger of Communistic influence on the Corr@onwealth Public Service, 
including the staff of the C.S.I.R." 
After speaking for about a quarter of an hour he was refused an extension 
of time by 37 votes to 20. 
~lr Abbott was twice called to order by the Speaker, Mr Rosevear, who told 
him that he was "off the track" and that unless he kept to the subject of 
his motion he would be asked to resume his seat. 
Amidst heckling by Government members, Mr Abbott named 21 alleged 
Communists and said that the list was far from complete. He said that 
Communists were wielding such influence that the Government was afraid 
to act against them. 
Mr Abbott stated that in June 1940 Mr A. W. Rudkin, now of the C. S. I. R., 
had been sentenced to four months imprisonment in Western Australia for 
publishing information which might be of advantage to the enemy. 
The Minister in charge of the C.S.I.R. (Mr Dedman) said that when Mr 
Rudkin was convicted in 1940 there was a feeling of near hysteria abroad 
and many proceeded against should not have been convicted at all. 
After the debate had proceeded for an hour the Vice-president of the 
Executive Council (Mr Scully) moved the closure. This was agreed to 
by 36 votes to 20. 
APPENDIX U 
EXTRACTS FROM BULLETINS DEALING WlTH THE QUEENSLAND RAIL STRIKE 
12.30 Bulletin dated 17 March 1948 
There were sensational developments in the 7-week's old 
QUEENSLAND strike this morning whe>1 police took strcng action to 
enforce the HANLON Government's anti-picketing law. 
In a serious disturbance outside the BRISBANE Trades Hall, 
severe injuries were inflicted on MR FRED PATTERSON, Communist member 
for BOWEN in the QUEENSLAND Parliament. 
PATTERSON is in BRISBANE Hospital with a probable fracture 
of the skull and possible injury to the brain. A few minutes ago 
his condition ~1as reported to be satisfactory. 
Another man, ~ffi JACK GRAYSON, is being treated for concussion 
and a torn scalp. 
The disturbance began when police clashed with about 150 
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strikers who were carrying placards attacking the HANLON Labour Govern--
ment of QUEENSLAND. 
The strikers' procession which began at the BRISBN{E trades Hall, 
was led by two men carrying the AUSTRALIAN flag and the EUREKA flag, 
followed by a group with a coffin bearing the words "Trade Unionism" 
on its sides. 
At an overhead railway bridge, about 200 police advanced on the 
marchers in close formation. Police drew their batons and the 
strikers fought back with the staffs of their placards, but within 
about 10 minutes were driven back into the Trades Hall. 
Police then cordoned off the building while strikers shouted 
slogans from the balconies and windows. 
During the demonstration, five men were arrested, including 
the Secretary of the QUEENSLAI\ID Labour Council, Mr M. HEALY, and the 
barrister, l•ffi MAX JULIUS. 
Heated scenes followed in the BRISBAI\IE police Court when the 
five men were charged with obstructing traffic and taking part 
in an illegal procession. 
Counsel for the accused men - l,ffi MURPHY - said that police, 
including plainclothes men, had used their batons in a brutal manner. 
One detective had seriously injured Mr PATTERSON, M.L.A., and another 
man - ~ffi SYDNEY BOYD - had had his face mercilessly knocked about 
and his nose broken. Altogether, Mr i•lURPHY added, the scene had 
been a most disgusting display of police brutality. 
~ffi ~llJRPHY said that the accused men would not plead because 
they had committed no offence. However, the Magistrate replied that 
MR ~IURPHY must either plead for the men or be dealt with. 
':;;, 
The ~lagistratc said, however, that BOYD, who appeared in Court 
with his face covered with blood, should be given medical aid at once. 
MR JULIUS, the accused Barrister, attempted to lay a charge 
against detectives, but the Magistrate ordered his removal from COURT. 
Finally, all five accused men were remanded until tomorrow. 
7 p.m. dated 17 March 1948 
Police action during a charge against strikers in BRISBANE this 
morning has brought protests from labour organisations representing 
hundreds of thousands of Australian unionists. 
Late this evening in SYDNEY, a meeting of ten Federal Unions, 
representing ZOO-thousand workers in the metal, mining, rail 
waterfront and shipping industries, condemned what it termed "the 
savage treatment of peaceful demonstrators in BRISBANE." This meeting 
called for the resignation of PREMIER HANLON, and the dismissal of 
the QUEENSLAND Chief of Police, and members of his force who were 
responsible for today's incident. 
The meeting also called on its 200-thousand unioniscs to resist 
in every way the anti-strike legislation of the QUEENSLAND and VICTORI~~ 
GOVER~ffiNTS. It will ask the A.C.T.U. or organise a nation-wide 
campaign against the legislation. 
The meeting produced a Manifesto to be issued to all trade 
unions, declaring that unionists will use their industrial and financial 
strength to protect their traditional right to strike. This Manifesto 
goes on to say that the political beliefs of individual trade unionists 
are unassailable; and that any move to ban the COMMUNIST PARTY would 
be regarded as the first step towards suspension of political and 
religious liberty. 
Mass meetings in all States are being ~rganised to support the 
QUEENSLAND Strikers. 
In t·ffiLBOURNE today, Interstate Executive of the A.C.T.U. 
unanimously carried two resolutions on the QUEENSLAND trouble. The 
first described the H~~LON Government's anti-strike legislation as 
a direct attack on the Trade Union Movement and went on to demand the 
immediate withdrawal of the anti-strike laws. The second 
condemned today's police action, describing it as a "Savage attack on 
trade unionists." 
In NEW SOUTH WALES, the Western Miners Federation decided to 
protest by calling the first strike in another State in sympathy 
with the QUEENSLAND strikers. 
All. Western mines will be idle tomorrmv, and the Western Miners 
have called on their Federal Executive to organise general action through 
the A.C.T.U. and the NEW SOUTH WALES and Labour Council. The President 
of the Western Federation, MR MARA, ~id he did not know whether the 
protest would develop into a general strike. 
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The Seamen's Union Executive decided this afternoon to 
instruct ships crmvs in all Australian ports to telegraph immediate 
protests to the QUEENSLAND Government, ;md to include a threat that 
if brutal police methods continue the Seamen will continue their 
boycott of QUEENSLAND ports after the rail strike is settled. 
Earlier today, the A.c.·;.u. Interstate Executive decided to 
send a delegation to CANBERRA, and later to QUEENSLAND, to discuss 
the QUEENSLru~D situation with National ~nd state leaders. 
For those who missed earlier bulletins, here is a brief account 
of this morning 1 s incident in BRISBANE. 
About 150 strikers began a procession, carrying placards in 
Saint Patrick's Day Green, attacking the HANLON Government. They 
were led by two men carrying the AUSTRALIAN Flag and the EUREKA flag. 
As the procession reached a narrow railway bridge about 100 y-ards 
from their starting point at the Trades Hall, some 200 police moved 
in to break up the march. Scrimmages began immediately; many of 
the police drew batons, and some strikers used their placards as 
weapons. The out-numbered strikers were driven back into the Trades 
Hall, and the police cordoned off the building. 
The State COMMUNIST Member for BOWEN, MR FRED PATTERSON, was 
taken to BRISBANE hospital, suffering from probable fracture of 
the skull, and possible brain injuries. His condition was described 
this evening as "satisfactory." Other men were treated for head 
injuries. 
Five men were arrested, including the Secretary of the QUEENSLAND 
labour council, Mr M. HEALY, and a barrister, Mr MAX JULIUS. 
\'/hen the men appeared in BRISBANE Police Court, there were 
heated scenes their counsel first refused to plead and then said that 
the police had given "a disgusting display of brutality". 
Union protests against police action in B RISBANE this morning 
when strikers attempted to stage a St Patrick's Day march, reached a 
peak when an unofficial meeting of ten Federal unions in SYDNEY this 
evening condemned the HANLON Government's activities. 
The meeting represented 200-thousand workers in the metal, min1ng, 
rail waterfront and shipping industries. It called today's police 
action "savage treatment of peaceful demonstrators;" demanded the 
resignation of Premier HANLON and also the dismissal of QUEENSLAND's 
Chief of Police and any members of his force responsible for 
today's incident. 
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The meeting went on to c. all for united action throughout the 
country against the Anti-strike laws of QUEENSLAND and VICTORIA. It 
issued a manifesto declaring that unionists will use their full 
strength to protect the traditional right to strike; and that any 
move to ban the COMHJNIST PARTY will b e regarded as the first step 
towards suspension of political liberty. 
In MELBOURI'lE, interstate executives of the A. C. T.U. decided 
to send a delegation to Cfu~BERRA, and later to QUEENSLAND to discuss 
the situation. Later on, the A.C.T.U. executive carried resolutions 
condemning the HANLON Government's anti--strike laws and today' s 
action by BRISBANE police. 
The first sign of direct action outside QUEENSLAND in S)~pathy 
with the QUEENSLAND strikers appeared in NEIV SOUTH WALES when the 
Western Miners' Federation called a 24-hour strike as a protest against 
the BRISBANE incident. It's expected that a large number of northern 
and southern mines in NEW SOUTH WALES will also be idle in sympathy. 
Many telegrams of protest have been sent by unions ~nd union 
members to the HANLON Government; and a number of others, expressing 
solidarity and sympathy with Queensland workers, has been received 
at the BRISBANE Trades Hall. Most of the latter demand an open 
enquiry into today' s clash, which is described as a "Brutal attack" 
on QUEENSLAND workers. 
The incident which started the wave of protest began this morning 
when 150 workers started out from BRISBANE trades Hall, carrying placards 
in St Patrick's Day Green, with slogans attacking the Hfu~LON 
Government. At the narrow bridge about 100 yards from the Trades Hall, 
some 200 police closed in to break up the procession. Scuffles began 
immediately; many of the police drew batons and strikers used 
their placards as \veapons. After the strikers had been driven back 
to the Trades Hall, the State's Communist Member for BOWEN (MR FRED 
PATTERSON) was taken to BRISBANE Hospital, suffering from a probable 
fracture of the skull and possible brain injuries. Other men were 
treated for head injuries. Late this evening, ~ffi PATTERSON'S condition 
was said to be 'satisfactory." 
This morning's trouble - and particularly the injuries to MR 
PATTERSON - were mentioned several times in the QUEENSLAND Parliament 
today. The Premier, t.JR HANLON, said he would give Parliament full 
details as soon as he had the information. One Member (Mr AIKENS -
an Independent) repeatedly tried to speak on the disturbance, but 
was cut short. 
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APPENDIX V 
NEWS ITEM DEALING WITH DEBATE ON THE SOVlET UNION 
AUSTRALI~N NEWS 7.45 a.m. - 25/9/4i. 
During the debate on foreign affairs in the Australian Parliament 
last night, Mr ABBOTT -Country Party, NEW SOUTH WALES -accused RUSSIA 
of disregarding the ethics of diplomacy. He referred to the recent speech 
by the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister - Mr VISHINSKY - and said that the 
Soviet was threatening, brow-beating and bullying GREECE and TURKEY. 
The only way to stop RUSSIA, Mr ABBOTT went on, was for the 
democracies to present a solid front and tell her that if she did not end 
her policy of aggression they would make war. 
Mr FRASER (Labour, NEW SOUTH WALES) said that Mr ABBOT's speech 
and the one made earlier in the debate by Mr SPENDER (Liberal, NEW SOUTH 
WALES) were a disservice to world peace. 
The Opposition Leader (Mr MENZIES) backed Mr ABBOTT's statement 
saying the time had come when the democracies should say to RUSSIA: "Thus 
far and no further". He said RUSSIA had spread her domination by taking 
things first ar.d arguing later. 
Mr MENZIES forecast that some day AUSTRALIA would regret having 
sponsored intervention in the Indonesian dispute. The time might come 
when AUSTRALIA would have to ask BRITAIN to use her veto to prevent 
similar meddling in what AUSTRALIA regarded as her own affairs. 
During the debate, Mr SPENDER (Liberal, :-JEW SOUTH WALES) was 
suspended. While Mr DEDMAN was speaking, Mr SPENDER interjected, and the 
speaker threatened to name him if he interrupted again. Mr SPENDER did 
so, and was named. 
The House divided on the motion for Mr SPENDER's suspension, which 
was carried by thirty-six votes to twenty-four. 
The debate was adjourned at half-past-ten, and the House rose until 
this afternoon. 
Mr MENZIES also referred last night to the resignation from the 
External Affairs Department of Mr PAUL HASLUCK. He said that despite the 
claim by Dr EVATT that this >Jas for personal reasons, Mr HAS LUCK disclosed 
that he had resigned for reasons of high policy. Mr HASLUCK's resignation 
had confirmed that AUSTRALIA had a one-man Foreign Policy. 
The Minister for Defence, Mr DEDMAN, said it should be recorded 
that Mr HASLUCK had resigned five times for what he termed "personal 
reasons". Mr DEDMAI'l denied that AUSTRALIA's foreign policy was the policy 
of one man. 
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APPENDIX W 
Membership of the Commission 1932-61 
C.L. Jones (Chairman) 
H.R. Brooks (Vice-Chairman) 
R.B. Orchard 
R.S. Wallace 
Elizabeth Couchman 
W.J. Cleary (Chairman) 
J.W. Kitto 
E. C. Rigby (Vice-Chairman) 
Sir Richard Boyer (Chairman from 
1945) 
S .J. McGibbon 
P.G.J. Foley (Vice-Chairman) 
Ernestine Hill 
Sir John Medley 
E.R. Dawes (Vice-Chairman) 
Ivy M. Kent 
J.S. Hanlon 
P.W. Netto (Treasury) 
P.E.R. Vanthoff (PMG 1 s Dept.) 
C.W. Anderson 
Dame Enid Lyons 
M.W. O'Donnell (Treasury) 
J.C. Stewart 
Elsie F. Byth 
H.B. Halvorsen 
A.G. Lowndes 
Rhoda M. Felgate 
J.T. Reid 
1932-34 
1932-39 
1932-39 
1932-35 
1932-42 
1934-45 
1935-39 
1940-42 
1940-61 
1940-42 
1942-44 
1942-44 
1942-60 
1944-67 
1944-61 
1945-49 
1949-62 
1949-56 
1949-52 
1951-62 
1952-56 
1952-56 
1956-60 
1956-67 
1956-74 
1960-72 
1961-67 
Company director 
Manufacturer and pastoralist 
Jeweller 
Academic 
Women's Organisation 
Representative 
Businessman/Civil Servant 
Civil Servant 
Solicitor 
Pastoralist 
Chartered Accountant/Company 
Director 
Unionist 
Author/journalist 
School Teacher/Academic 
Unionist/Politician 
Women's Organisation 
Representative 
Journalist 
Civil Servant 
Civil Servant 
Unionist 
Politician 
Civil Servant 
Civil Servant 
Women's Organisation 
Representative 
Chartered Accountant 
Businessman 
Speech and Drama Teacher 
Company Director 
-===/ 
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APPENDIX X 
News - Mechanisms of Communication 
Up to 1943, there was a considerable degree of informality in 
the News Department's communications with management and with other 
departments. Dixon Nrote direct to the General ~!anager on many issues, 
such as the newspaper agreements. He also communicated directly with 
other departments, such as Programmes. Letters from listeners 
concerning news were answered either by Dixon or the General Manager. 
However, the general impression received from ABC files is that the 
flOI'I of information, and the level of consultation was not good. 
There were complaints about alterations to news broadcast times and 
durations without advice being r<:>ceived by the Department. 
With the decline of Commission confidence in Dixon and his staff, 
a new period of greater supervision was ushered in from 1943 l<hen Deamer 
was created Controller of Public Relations and Dixon's Department 
placed under him. Henceforth communications with other departments 
was not made direct but through Deamer, and his successor, McCall. 
Dixon did not however relinquish his right to conununicate directly with 
the General Manager and frequently did so on major policy issues, 
particularly those in which he was in dispute with management. Noticeable 
at this time, was Dixon's growing belief that he would get a fairer 
hearing from the Commission than from management, and he made many 
attempts to obtain permission to see the Commission. Such requests 
had to be approved by the General Manager and then by the Com.mission 
itself. Dixon did secure this on several occasions. On others, 
requests were turned down. The Commission became particularly anxious 
to keep him at aTms length from 1946 onwaTds. 
The period 1943-46 saw a decline in status of News because of the 
reorganisation, and a reduction in contacts Nith other departments, thus 
helping to isolate News from programme and technical developments taking 
place. Dixon was not anxious to have many dealings with either Deamer 
or McCall, whom he regarded as basically hostile to him and he kept 
correspondence with and through them to a minimum. There were however 
informal office gatherings, described by Dixon in Inside the ABC and 
at a formal level he attended the annual meetings of the Managers 
and Federal Officers. These meetings could and did discuss any programme 
or technical matter affecting any department. Many of their resolutions 
went to the Commission for discussion and/or approval. Dixon was 
frequently on the defensive at these meetings when news was on the 
agenda. Other departments resented the heavier demands on time made by the 
N\'ws· Department,· because of the Government's wartime insistence 
on more bulletins. 
From 1943, copies of all Dixon's correspondence ~·ent to the 
Controller of Public Relations. All inter-departmental correspondence 
was by memorandum. Dixon at all times seems to have been a very 
conscientious reader of all material received, and usually replied 
almost immediately. He read a number of overseas journals about 
broadcasting and distributed articles on radio news style and radio 
developments to his staff. He at times sought and received comments 
on the grarrunar and syntax of bulletins from 'authorities' outside the 
Commission. There is no suggestion -rhat he failed to pass on to his 
staff instructions recei.ved from Commission or manager.tent, but the 
~ 
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manner in which they were passed on sometimes made it clear that 
Dixon himself was not in agreement with the decision. ~Iemos from 
Dixon to his staff, containing these decisions, often contain the 
inference to his personal disagreement. This 'formal' issuing of 
instructions, as distinct from any 'practical' efforts to implement 
them, weakened Commission authority and preserved the solidarity of 
the news staff. 
The Chairmanship of Boyer and the increased responsibilities 
of the News Department as a result of the 1946 legislation brought 
about major changes in the News Department'~ relationships with 
others in the ABC. From his appointment in 1945, Boyer sought to 
involve the News Department more in major decisions concerning them. 
This was partly because he felt a new type of approach was necessary 
to sort out his major problem area, and also because of Hanlon's 
influence within the Commission. The debate by senior news and 
programme officers over the 1946 News Policy was quite unique for 
the ABC and was intended to usher a new era of cordial relationships. 
The institution of the annual News Editors' Conferences in 1946, 
provided the News Department with a means of influencing both 
management and the Commission. It also enabled the Chairman and 
the General Manager who invariably attended some of the conference 
sessions, with an opportunity of clarifying and explaining Commission 
policy. Other senior officers representing programmes or finance 
also appeared if issues concerning them were brought up. All 
resolutions from these conferences were submitted to the Controller 
of Programmes and the General Manager for comments. Some were 
approved at this level and others which were the subject of 
disagreement or which involved some major policy area were referred 
to the Commission for decision. It is noteworthy that the conferences 
rarely however involved themselves in major issues of style of content. 
They rather tended to be concerned with the practical problems of 
news-gathering and presentation. They were used to put pressure on 
programmes for extended or different bulletin times and became a 
useful counterpoise to the Managers and Senior Officers Conferences 
which frequently urged the Commission to cut back on news output. 
They continue to this day, but since 1950 have not been held 
annually, but usually at three or four year intervals. 
When, in 1946 news was placed under the control of the Assistant 
General Manager, it was directed that he and the General Manager 
sight all news correspondence, both internal and external. This a 
was assiduously done, particularly during the disputes between Dixon 
and Cotton. Both Moses and Finlay frequently commented to Dixon 
after perusing his correspondence files. Cotton's memoranda were 
also viewed in this way. This period of close supervision seems to 
have ended soon after Hami 1 ton's appointment. In ushering in a 
period when, to use Oakley's words, "news seemed to be a law unto 
itself", Hamilton, while continuing to work to the Assistant General 
Manager apparently managed to divest himself of much of the red tape 
that Dixon and Cotton had to contend with. The General. Manager 
and the Assistant General Manager took less and less interest in 
routine neiVS letters and memoranda and allo~Ved Hamilton much more 
of a free rein. This resulted from increasing confidence in News 
generally and the high standing of Hamil ton himself. He quickly 
established himself on an equal footing with the other heads of 
departments, and had a good reputation in the eyes of Boyer and 
Moses. 
His 'man of principle' image served him in good stead in his 
dispute with Boyer over the inclusion of film in TV News. Although 
feelings ran high, in the middle of this period, his Department 
"/QC) 
was elevated to Division status, and he became Controller. This put 
him on an equal footing for the first time with the Controller of 
Programmes and superior in status to such departments as Talks. 
This reinforced the independence of action of the news staff and 
accentuated its insularity. 
This seemed to confirm the 'rightness' of the approach taken 
to news since 1949 and made much less likely any marked changes. 
APPENDIX Y 
EXAMPLES OF ABC NEWS BULLETINS BEFORE AND AFTER 
THE START OF TilE 1NOEPENOE'lT NEWS SERVII.E, 
29 MARCH 1944 1\.\JD 7 NOVE~!o[R 1947 
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The people of V!CTO!UA l!lill .eo to the poll tol'!Orrow 
in one or the ~!Oat 1mporttmt eleetione in the St::~to over !'ilany 
years. 
The tate of the CAIN Labour Gov~rnment will ~e 
decided by the voting for a new Legislative Aasembly. 
The pollln~ h<)Ur5 will he ci,!,ht. o'clock in the 
•~ornlnt' to ei.;!&t in th3 evoninr:, and vot.in;; '.>"ill br~ C•)tl!;ul.sory. 
Rosult.L will be ;,roadca.Jt 1n VL ·r-.'::E t'u-ough J-l·R 
an;i reg1om>1 st.ai:.iona. :Jp.;;eL.l surnLl8rie;' of vrogresa rasul ts \dll 
be given ;,n thP no., lunt-1 network '"'t a-qu .. rte;:-t.o-nin~, ~:nd on t.~lu 
interstate notw•,)rk at a-quc.rt.<:r•yaat-nine, ten ~~:inutas to ten, 
balf-p5-llt ten, eeventeen-lllinutea paet eleven, alid t.en minut.e11 
t.o tweJ. ve. 
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NOTOr: C!if, ~·r~: Ii'-ii:Ofi.T[; • 
7/11/47. ll .a.. "! '" • '1 A'l · (~ /Cla ) j1 \.. -.-. l'~.h...,. . •. • ;;)purr y GJ 
Additional icport cutl' lii&Y be necessary in AUSTRALIA 
to cope with ·the dollar fE~mine and to relieve the strain on 
the Empire dollar pool. 
Our CA:H>i'JU(A round!rnan e&ya the position is still 
being exar••ined in the light of a further deterioration ill the 
past few weeks. 
It is expected that large numbers of' BliiTISH motor-
chas~;ia 1dll be urrivin~ in J,U[:T;;.J.:.IA in the cor..ing r.ontha. 
i·::Otor-body builC:et"t> in AUS'.i'J11.LIA t~bo huve been building bod iee 
for .;FERICitll chascio J:l&Y have to lltllitch over, ~<nQ build bodiee 
for BRITISH cheuil!l. There are elremiy l~o~rge nuinb10rs ot 
A.J.IERICM~ ,,nd Rl\ITI.S.H chuss!a in AU::TtiALIA. 
Our s·ot.ndeman sr;ya JJrospect.a of incr~acir•c }•etrol 
im:~Jorta !rom sterling areas, especially thn r; .t .I. 1 are being 
examined. 
-----------
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TIIOHN rON Tv Hhi ': • 
7/11/47. 7 i' .m. Atr!r"'l'~ _:. J.If.!!. (P.e••r1 te/Hughes/Clay) 
The alternutive AUS1~ALIAI delegate has been called to 
attend the meeting in Hfiif> of the Executive or the World 
Federation of Trade Unians. 
He is J.·:r. Bi:l'SE:::T Ti!OIWTON, National Secretary <Jf the 
Ironworkcre' Union, \'tho i8 flying to PARIS tonight. 
712 
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The Chief AU~··TRALIAN delegllt&, 1:r. ALBERT 1'0N.k 1 3ecret2ry 
' 
ot the 1 •• c.r.u.1 ~ill fly .rrou: riD\-: D.:.:Ul!, whers ho has been attending 
an I.L.o. Conference. 
The two AUSTfiALIAH delegates are attending the Executive 
' 
Meeting because it will diecuse matters affecting the F ;t~, EAST i~ii.lll 
and PACIFIC areas. 
-----
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7/3 
:~:TOIJ~:_N Di.:It;K c~di. 
7/ll/47. fi 4 P•"'• AU:~TR",UAN. (Litchfield/Clay) OJ 
A r.an clu.rced with stealing the BfU.CK [;Ei:>AN CA!;, 'l'/!11ch 
diaapr•eBred · fro!t! General !~torll Te~;tinE; Coo~rse at. .i-J,C:t;r:OOD • 
SYDNi:Y 1 some weeks ago, is b.oing broug<;t. baek :-.o Slmn:;y trom 
DAR'JIN. 
The man, J.SK CASDY, wae before the ilA' WIN t'oliee Court 
today 1 an<.! wa!' rcma.>1ded to ~YtNE;Y in ~he cc &t.Ody of Detec ti Te 
FRAS·C.:,. Ha i!l e';Cr>eetetl to lasve .D!ohWIN t1r :lunday'o J'l&ne. 
--
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1·2.. BVATT'~ Pi!:ACE PLEA. 
7/11/47. 11 p.m. STATE:. (BEAU110!tT /CLAY) GJ 
Attacks on RUSSIA were condemned tonight by the 
-· NEll' SOUTH WALES Minister for Housing, l!fr• ,CLIVE EVATT, speaking 
in SYDNEY. at a gathering ot the AUSTRALIA-RUSSIA SOCIETY held 
to n~rk RUSSIA'S National Day. 
~~. EVATT said Australians would refuse to be persuaded 
into a feeling of hatred for RUS::IA. Nor would they allow 
themselves to be drawn into hostilities against the SOVIET. 
-----
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:;,:J\H_l)t:·. SPLECH. 
7/11/47. 11 p,I;,, :~TATE. (Be:mrnont/Clay) GJ 
Twelve-hundred people packed !'ADDINGTON TCJ.;N HALL 
tonip;ht to hear the !Unister for ExternAl Territories, Mr. 
~:.J. ,;ARD, speak on the Federal Government's scheme to 
Nationalise the Trading Banks. 
Apart from occasional interjections, most or which 
were drowned by applause, r.~r. \<ARD '~as given a cood reception. 
-----
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LOC , L r1UV R"'"-N·' co-----, ·r'-[TIUN" 1'- ..1 ,~ J:t,.·~t. 1 .' ..... i~ . X ...... • 
7/11/47. 11 p.m. ;.;TJ;TE. (ROOl!EY (Kntoomba) CLAY) GJ 
Tile tir r, t day oi' tho c.nnual Local r::overnr:ent 
com;?cti t:l on~: war. hold at t,Jl'fOOMDA toC.ey. To1norrow, 
tennir; fi nf•llil anc:l tb' ;~olf cht'J!!pionf'hip l'fill bo decide~. 
1dnm,rs t>f the pe.i,rs comvetitior, in the .bOll1s 
tod"Y "I': ere: 
L. i,l.Ll:N and F. hiT.i,:U~, of l'er.r:tth •~nm:tcina1_ r.ounc11, 
who def"o;.lt.ed ii. G(;LJ)OI; &n<i i-:. LAr:;;:, cr the Illu;, .- C>unt;:l:!_n c~_t.y 
Council, ter. to five. 
' 
-----
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'7tq 
~i,L-; IKl·! 
' ,., , ·/" v;· ' ·j··' "' "'l~ v.~L ... .; vJ. .• .d.J. ~ . ~.l.~v . , J •• ; .J. 
.i!'lvu uw1d:::cd r.'~<,rua <wd e. uu.i.·1cnt hL-.Ka.:u in ::.;~·uHEY 
dooided at u rc:nas ll<•Cting ·~oduy •:,.t to :cot<J·ll to work until 
t:u;; wr.;ro ,:.;••::..nt<:O. u. \l<':okly ~~age inoreast~ of one round und bett~>l' 
v1o.r::Lne; oc::C.1 t: 1, nP o ':i'he men Oil·ected their union o1't1o1els to 
oonfor w 1 tl.t tho en1ployera on t118tl@ do;:u.no.s. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • 
' 
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3T ;\'!'3 7 p.m. 7/11/47 
72.o 
DI::oPiiTCH GU:itl<..S . 'l'H.IKE 
\'!HITE/FALCJN.!i:rt/CLAY/ F:\T 
The sit-doun s~rike by )5 despatch clerks emploJed 
at FARMEltJ Limited., camo before Ei~. JU:>TICE \.'EBB t.!1is afternoon. 
He asked the Union to recommend a return t.o work until t.ne n.en 1 s 
application came before the Court. At a later meeting the 
men decided they would go back in the morr,in& if they did not 
lose any pay and if the Company would not oppose their applic<>ti.) 
••••••••••••••• 
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( , ATH'::.H j 721 
7.00 p.m. 7/ll/47 ST.~TE B',A U:; :f"f FALC(;E . H G~AY J~-
The present spell or pleasant wm•t.her over the ::>tate 
promises to 1 ost until Sat,urday ri:i.ght. It • s expected that 
unsettl.:d ~rtmc: conditions with scattered thunderstorms 
will then deve~op in the West reaching coastal areas latoon 
Sunday. 
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rcu1~~-rr; .:_~ .. --c- ~::rY ( ; ~ ,, 
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( llO/Falconer/i#ley l Qol 
The la t.eat. country returne l;.1 the FDUETH .SI::Cl'?.fTY .O.U{ 
rev~a.l 'lol"e rat~•f.!r spoctecular r:'tmltl!. 
CAtb:~P. A, wit.! a quota of 70..thc·u:-;•,nd j:ouncla, alrto1ul.iy 
bee n~arly 'l9•thalll!!l~c1 in ;·,r,ru:'• COO;.:A. WI. th l\ 15-that;(l;,.nd v•unc11' 
quota, hn~ more th<·n trehled that arnotmt; 1\tnl at .I,H,•iL · ~-:~, tile 
ctuota or 40-th·mS ,nc!, pounda hus boen exceeded by nearly 18-tl •• ;u:~~ and .. 
• i e~ v • Y ''"1' ..... , .. ,. ... \'A'.,., .. ' .. . IV. I' .... ,, ··1 Aft t lQ ......... :·;r,.. Sr8Q 1 al~ 4~! 4.!.Li-~Pt . '---.n .. A.:- to. 1 ..... . i.Yi.·~-- t 
S'"I·A"'.'"l''L" 'I'· '•'·'T "'"~/··A'! GU''C····r-. ''"''"''····v d '''!""'1 .. '' ,, l 1 ~ ......... 11'\.to: ... J'r:·.i. aol!. 1\..,lju, '• ''"''".h;"'• ft,tl~r..J .. t)!'~.t. an I';}' ....... ; :A.' 
h11ve all oxeeefied their quotas. 
·. 
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;'OUT !I ~:iADLY t~!f~N~D. 
7/11/47. 11 p.ot. ~;T f·/1' t;. (BeaUlllont/Clayl OJ 
• 
An 1~-ytlar olri youth was criticnlly injured 
at :'fNL'l, SY! :!· .Y, tonl~:ht wht:n he r~ade cont1.1ct. with a 
wire carrying 2-th~usand volts or electt· iclty. 
723 
The boy, IJOHJI PATl'IillSON, l':ho lfas cle•.:rinz; scrub, 
became t.an~lCi!d in wipQ 1 w~ich somel\Ody had thrvwn across a 
hifh tension c at.le in the nearby street. He was found by 
neig:hbours bedly burned, and rushed to :·,i>.NLY Hli ; ITI.L in n 
serious condition. 
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